The transition of the tsarist army to the side of the interim government was the reason for its end
On February 27, 1917, after the manifesto on the dissolution of the Duma, a part of the deputies of opposition views formed the Provisional Committee. He announced that he was taking control of the restoration of state and public order and expressed confidence that the army would help in the difficult task of creating a new government. The hope of the chairman of the Duma, MV Rodzianko, who signed this appeal, to help the military came true.
Some of the military leaders closest to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in their official position - the elite of the army, having violated the oath, supported the Provisional Committee. Perhaps they did not then imagine the scale of the catastrophe that would befall - primarily through their fault - the entire officer corps of the Russian Imperial Army.
Shoulder straps torn off
Even some members of the dynasty rushed to salute the Provisional Committee. On March 1, Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich with the Guards naval crew subordinate to him reports to Rodzianko about their readiness to be at his disposal. The chief of staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General MV Alekseev, also did not show loyalty to the sovereign (for more details - "Orange Technologies of the February Revolution").
The path chosen by the highest ranks to save the army - treason to the sovereign and the commander-in-chief, led to the end of this army. They began to bring him closer with the publication of Order No. 1 by the Petrosoviet, which undermined the fundamental principle of military discipline - one-man command. The order addressed to the troops of the capital garrison became the property of the entire army and caused an unprecedented disintegration of the troops.
Having lost the supreme leader, the army received from the Provisional Government a new, mockingly discrediting name - the Revolutionary Army of Free Russia, which quickly lost the meaning of continuing the war, and no rulers could save it from collapse. Most of all, this was reflected in the officers. Cleansing of personnel, detentions, arrests, lynching and executions of gold-hunters have become widespread. In the Baltic Fleet alone, more than 100 people were killed by mid-March 1917.
The officers tried to somehow save the army and themselves, creating public organizations as an alternative to the soldiers' committees, romantically supporting the political slogans of freedom, equality, brotherhood and at the same time expressing confidence in the Provisional Government, but it acted with an eye on the political predilections of the Soviets, and the soldiers did not show readiness to be with the former gentlemen. This showed the failure of the idea of creating an organization designed to restore the destroyed unity - the "General Military Union".
The democratization of the army, coupled with the lack of success at the front, led it to decay, and the officer corps to death. By order of the provisional military and naval minister AI Guchkov No. 150 dated April 21, 1917, naval officers were deprived of their shoulder straps. They were replaced with sleeve insignia.
From booters to Decembrists
Everything that happened testified to a deep spiritual and moral crisis among the officers. Since the time of Peter I, the Russian nobility has been under the ideological influence of the West. By the beginning of the 19th century, the average bar library held 70 percent of the literature of French authors. The nobles themselves not only spoke, but also thought in a foreign language. The Decembrists, for example, gave evidence in French during their trial. There was a growing misunderstanding between the upper stratum of society and the people who continued to preserve their traditions.
The moral principle of the military oath of loyalty was gradually lost, which became a formality that could not be respected for the sake of certain goals. One of the reasons for this is the abolition by Peter I of the ancient custom of transferring the royal throne to direct descendants in the male line, which caused constant revolutionary fermentation in the upper echelons of power and the army at the next change of the tsar. Coups of nobility entailed violation of the oath, weakened and undermined the foundations of the monarchy.
In 1725, with the accession to the Russian throne, with the help of the guard of the first foreigner, Catherine I, the Supreme Privy Council was formed, which limited the empress's power so that none of her decrees could be issued until they "took place" in this 18th century Politburo. The next action to weaken the monarchy was the "conditions" worked out by the Supreme Privy Council in 1730, which seriously limited the powers of the monarch, reducing them to representative functions. But this time the "constitutional monarchy" lasted only a few days. Most of the nobility and the guard were not ready to support such a reform.
If in the coups of 1725 and 1730 the officers involved in them had not yet broken the oath, then in the next two they were already deliberately committing perjury, overthrowing the infant emperor John VI in 1741 in favor of the daughter of Peter I Elizabeth and in 1762 - Peter III for the accession of his wife Catherine.
Over the many years of the rule of monarchs, enthroned by the top layer of the nobility, it was corrupted by its leading position in the coups. And she was convinced that the fate of the emperors was in his will, because the conspirators did not receive punishment for perjury, but regular liberties and tokens of gratitude, given with the expectation of the future loyalty of the gifted. The discipline of the officers of the guard fell, they turned into idle, spoiled by luxury, dandies who were only listed in the regiments, and instead of combat training and formation, they preferred revelry.
Participation in palace coups turned the sovereign's servants into a corrupted caste - tsars paid officers for loyalty.
Paul is not a decree
Paul I took an important step to end these iniquities by restoring the previous procedure for the transfer of royal power and taking measures to strengthen military discipline. In order to raise the value of the military oath to the proper moral height, he personally, in a solemn atmosphere, was encouraged by the conferment of military ranks up to major general inclusive and awarded the Anninskaya ribbon to the retired Prime Major Abramov, who refused to swear allegiance to Catherine II, remaining loyal to the former Tsar Peter III.
This moral lesson has long been the subject of discussion in society, and yet the highest dignitaries and the guards did not learn it. Having lost the opportunity to influence the choice of rulers and not having time to wean themselves from the old liberties, they once again changed, staining their uniforms with the villainous murder of the emperor.
For the military coup d'état on December 14, 1825, an interregnum was chosen to create at least the appearance of non-violation of the oath. However, it looked like this for the bulk of the conspiracy soldiers who did not know the true state of affairs. The organizers, who were members of secret societies, knew that their activities were anti-state in nature, but they took on other obligations that they placed above national ones.
In 1917, the generals did not take another oath, but at the decisive moment they did not firmly declare their support for the sovereign. And very soon, for their infidelity, they felt the "gratitude" of the temporary and long-term leaders, as well as the liberated people and the masses of soldiers who had gone out of obedience.
Calculated as a servant
The commander-in-chief of the armies of the Western Front, General A. E. Evert, who made his choice after hesitation, realized his guilt: "I, like the other commanders-in-chief, betrayed the king, and for this atrocity we all have to pay with our lives."
Four of the eight top army officials paid dearly. The first to fall was the commander of the imperial Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral A. I. Nepenin, who on his own initiative sent the tsar a telegram on March 1 asking him to support the State Duma's demand, and on the 4th - already arrested by revolutionary sailors for not wanting to hand over the cases to the new one they had chosen commander, and shot in the back.
Vice-Admiral A. V. Kolchak, who headed the Black Sea Fleet, did not leave written evidence indicating his infidelity to the oath, but having all the information about the opinions of the commanders-in-chief of the armies of the fronts, he remained silent, did not express his support for the sovereign. Arrested already as a former supreme ruler, giving testimony to the investigation, he said that he fully welcomed the fact of the transfer of power to the State Duma. So his silence can be considered solidarity with the opinion of the highest military leaders of the army and navy. On the night of February 7, 1920, Kolchak was shot.
The most tragic was the fate of the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Northern Front, General N. V. Ruzsky. Having made, during personal communication with the tsar in Pskov, an offer to surrender at the mercy of the winners (for more details - "Chronicle of treason"), the general lost the forgiveness of Nicholas II. In October 1918, among a group of hostages, he was hacked to death at the Pyatigorsk cemetery.
In August 1920, General V. V. Sakharov, a retired assistant to the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Romanian Front, who was removed from office in April 1917, was shot by the Greens in Crimea.
MV Alekseev was entrusted to lead the revolutionary army, who provided support to the Provisional Committee and immediately after the departure of the sovereign from Headquarters, who swore allegiance to the new government. Feeling illusions about saving the army, he tried to do this, but did not receive the understanding and support of amateurs from the Provisional Government. Soon after his appointment, realizing the futility of his efforts, the Commander-in-Chief spoke openly at the constituent assembly of the Union of Officers being created: “The military spirit of the Russian army has fallen. Yesterday, formidable and mighty, she now stands in some kind of fatal impotence before the enemy. A similar assessment was given by the next revolutionary commander-in-chief AA Brusilov. In his memoirs, he admitted that by May 1917 the troops of all fronts were completely out of control and it was impossible to take any measures of influence.
The words of two military leaders, who saw the salvation of the army and Russia in the abdication of the sovereign, but who were unable to do this without him, became their moral judgment for infidelity. The new government ceased to need their services, therefore, “they calculated it like a servant,” Alekseev bitterly said about his resignation. The temporary workers did not stand on ceremony with Brusilov either. The Commander-in-Chief was never able to show his military talent during the offensive in June 1917, which undermined his authority. Therefore, he remained in history only as a hero of the Brusilov breakthrough, awarded and marked by those who were denied loyalty in difficult times.
