Not so long ago, Alexander Timokhin in his wonderful articles Sea warfare for beginners. Putting an aircraft carrier on strike and Naval Warfare for beginners. The problem of target designation examined in detail the problem of searching for aircraft carrier and naval strike groups (AUG and KUG), as well as pointing missile weapons at them.
If we talk about the times of the USSR and about the current reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Navy, then the situation is really quite sad, and the use of long-range missiles can be extremely difficult. However, this can be said not only about the Navy, but also about the intelligence capabilities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation as a whole. Lack of early warning aircraft (AWACS), radar, radio and optical-electronic reconnaissance aircraft (analogues of the American Boeing E-8 JSTARS), complete absence of heavy high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), insufficient number and quality of reconnaissance satellites and communication satellites, aggravated after the imposition of sanctions due to the lack of a domestic element base.
Nevertheless, intelligence and communications are the cornerstone of modern armed forces, and without them, there can be no talk of any confrontation with a modern high-tech adversary. Based on this thesis, we will consider what space systems can be effectively used to detect and track AUG and KUG.
Reconnaissance satellites
The Legend system of global satellite maritime space reconnaissance and target designation (MCRTs) created in the USSR included the US-P passive radio reconnaissance satellites and the US-A active radar reconnaissance satellites.
In his article, Alexander Timokhin speaks about the rather low efficiency of the Legend MCRC, and it is quite simple to explain this. According to data taken from the site navy-korabel.livejournal.com, in different time periods of operation of the Legend MCRC (from 1975 to 2008) there were from 0 (!) to 6 working satellites in orbit:
“The largest number of Legends spacecraft (six) could be observed in orbit only once during 20 days at the third stage (in the period 04.12.1990 - 24.12.1990), which is 0.2% of the total operating time of the ICRC system. A group of five spacecraft worked 5 "shifts" with a total duration of 175 days. (15%). Further (in the direction of decreasing the number of CAs) it goes on increasing: four CAs - 15 episodes, 1201 days. (ten%); three - 30 "shifts", 1447 days. (12%); two - 38 "shifts", 2485 days. (21%); one - 32 episodes, 4821 days (40%). Finally, none - 12 time intervals, 1858 days. (15% of the total and 24% of the second period).
In addition, the "Legend" never functioned in its standard configuration (four US-A and three US-P), and the number of US-A in orbit never exceeded two. Of course, three or more US-Ps were able to provide a daily unauthorized survey of the World Ocean, but without US-A, the data obtained from them lost in reliability”.
It is clear that in this form the ICRTs "Legend" system could not physically provide the USSR / RF Navy with reliable intelligence about the enemy's AUG and KUG. The main reason here is the extremely short lifespan of satellites in orbit - an average of 67 days for US-A and 418 days for US-P. Even Elon Musk will not be able to output via a satellite with a nuclear power plant every two months …
Instead of the ICRC "Legenda", the space reconnaissance system "Liana", which includes satellites of the "Lotos-S" (14F145) and "Pion-NKS" (14F139) type, is being commissioned. Satellites "Lotos-S" are intended for passive electronic reconnaissance, and "Pion-NKS" for active radar reconnaissance. The Pion-NKS resolution is about three meters, which makes it possible to detect ships made with the use of signature reduction technologies.
Taking into account the delays in the commissioning of satellites of the Liana system, as well as the continuing problems of the Russian satellites with the period of active existence, it can be assumed that the efficiency of the Liana system will be far from desired. In addition, the orbit of satellites of the "Liana" system is at an altitude of about 500-1000 km. Accordingly, they can be destroyed by SM-3 Block IIA missiles with an impact area of up to 1,500 km in height. There are significant numbers of SM-3 rockets and launch vehicles in the United States, and the cost of the SM-3 is likely lower than the Lotus-S or Pion-NKS satellites, combined with the cost of putting them into orbit.
Does it follow from this that satellite reconnaissance systems are ineffective for searching for AUG and IBM? In no case. It only follows from this that one of the most priority areas for the development of Russian industry should be the development of electronic components in general, and "space" electronics separately. Certain work in this direction is underway. In particular, the STC “Modul” company received 400 million rubles for the creation and launch of the production of chips intended for use in spacecraft of a new generation. Those interested in this topic can be advised to read the history of the development of space microprocessors in two parts: Part 1 and Part 2.
So which spacecraft (SC) can most effectively search for AUG and KUG? There are several possible options
Conservative solution
The most conservative way of development is the continuation of the improvement of reconnaissance satellites of the MKRTs "Legend" - "Liana" line. That is, the creation of fairly large satellites located in orbits of the order of 500-1000 km. Such a system will be effective if several conditions are met:
- creation of artificial earth satellites (AES) with an active life of at least 10-15 years;
- launching a sufficient number of them into the Earth's orbit (the required number depends on the characteristics of the reconnaissance equipment installed on the satellite);
- equipping reconnaissance satellites with active systems of protection against anti-satellite weapons, primarily of the "ground-space" class.
The first point implies the creation of a reliable element base capable of functioning in a vacuum (in leaky compartments). The implementation of the second point largely depends not only on the cost of the satellites themselves, but also on the reduction in the cost of putting them into orbit, which implies the need to develop reusable launch vehicles (LV).
The third point (equipping reconnaissance satellites with active protection systems against anti-satellite weapons) may include something like a tank complex of active protection (KAZ), which ensures the defeat of incoming anti-missile warheads with kinetic elements, blinding of optoelectronic homing heads (GOS) with laser radiation, emission of smoke and aerosol curtains, infrared and radar traps. It is possible to use inflatable decoys with the simplest unit for maintaining orientation and simulating performance.
If the kinetic defeat of anti-missile warheads is quite difficult to ensure (since appropriate guidance systems will be required), then the means of ejecting decoys and protective curtains may well be implemented.
Constellation satellites
An alternative option is to deploy in low reference orbit (LEO) a large number of small satellites with multispectral sensors on board, forming a distributed sensor network. It is unlikely that we will be the first here. Having gained experience in deploying huge clusters of SpaceX's Starlink communications satellites, the United States is likely to use the groundwork it has gained to create large networks of LEO reconnaissance satellites, "winning in numbers, not skills."
What will the huge number of LEO reconnaissance satellites give? Global overview of the planet's territory - the "classic" surface fleet and mobile ground missile systems (PGRK) of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF) will have virtually no chance of avoiding detection. In addition, such a reconnaissance satellite network is almost impossible to disable at once. Compact satellites are more difficult to destroy, and anti-missiles will be more expensive than the satellites they target.
In the event that some of the satellites fail, one carrier can put several dozen small satellites into orbit at once in order to make up for the losses. Moreover, if "large" launch vehicles can be launched only from cosmodromes (which are quite vulnerable targets in the event of war), then small satellites weighing 100-200 kilograms can be launched into orbit by ultralight launch vehicles. They can be placed on mobile launch platforms or on stationary ones, but without the need to deploy complex and cumbersome infrastructure - something like "jump spaceports". Such missiles can, if necessary, promptly withdraw a reconnaissance satellite as soon as possible after receiving a request.
Since the enemy does not have information about the launch time and the orbit into which the satellite will be launched, the "sudden" launch of the reconnaissance satellite into orbit will create an effect of uncertainty that makes it difficult to camouflage the AUG and KUG by evading a meeting with the field of view of the reconnaissance satellite.
By the way, the short service life of the ICRTs "Legend" satellites, which caused their insufficient number in orbit, led to a decision on the advance production of the US-A, US-P and "Cyclone-2" launch vehicles and their storage. In order to ensure the possibility of prompt launch into orbit within 24 hours from the moment of making a decision on their launch.
“The possibility of operational deployment of satellites of the ICRTs“Legend”system was confirmed during a pair launch on May 15 and 17, 1974 and was tested during the Falklands War, by the beginning of which (1982-02-04 - 1982-14-06) the satellites of the system were absent in orbit, but on 04/29. 1982 - 1982-01-06 two US-A and one US-P were launched."
Russia does not yet have the competence to create and launch satellites into orbit, the number of which is in the hundreds and thousands. And no one has them, except SpaceX. That is not a reason to rest on our laurels (given our general lag in the element base and the creation of reusable launch vehicles).
At the same time, America's plans to create a huge network of small satellites are already openly announced. In particular, the United States and Japan are planning to jointly create a constellation of low-orbit detection satellites for an anti-missile defense (ABM) system. As part of this program, the Americans plan to launch about a thousand satellites into an orbit with an altitude of 300 to 1000 kilometers. The first 30 experimental satellites are scheduled to enter service in 2022.
The DARPA Advanced Research Projects Department is working on the Blackjack project, which provides for the simultaneous launch of 20 small satellites operating as part of a single constellation. Each satellite will perform a specific function - from warning of a missile attack to providing communications. The satellites of the Blackjack project, weighing 1,500 kg, are planned to be launched in groups every six days using a launch vehicle with reversible stages.
The US Space Development Agency (SDA), also involved in the Blackjack project, is developing the New Space Architecture project. Within the framework of this, it is planned to launch a satellite constellation into orbit, which provides the solution of information tasks in the interests of anti-missile defense and includes serially produced satellites weighing from 50 to 500 kg.
Directly indicated programs do not relate to the means of detecting AUG and KUG, but can be used as a basis for creating such systems. Or even get such functionality in the process of development.
Maneuvering spacecraft
Another way to detect and track AUG and KUG can be maneuvering spacecraft. In turn, maneuvering spacecraft can be of two types:
- satellites equipped with engines for orbit correction, and
- reusable maneuvering spacecraft launched from the ground and periodically landing for servicing and refueling engines.
Russia has competencies both in terms of creating ion engines and in terms of creating maneuvering satellites, some of which (the so-called "inspector satellites") are assigned the functions of strike spacecraft capable of destroying enemy spacecraft by means of a controlled collision.
Theoretically, this makes it possible to equip satellites of the MKRTs "Liana" with propulsion systems. The possibility of promptly changing the orbit of the satellite will significantly complicate the AUG and KUG the task of avoiding the intersection with the field of view of passing satellites. The concept of "dead" zones will also become rather blurred. In addition, the ability to actively maneuver, coupled with the presence of active protection systems, will allow satellites to avoid being hit by anti-satellite weapons.
The disadvantage of maneuvering satellites is the limited supply of fuel on board. If we plan a satellite's life cycle of about 10-15 years, then it will be able to make adjustments extremely rarely. A way out of this situation can be the creation of specialized spacecraft-refueling vehicles. Taking into account the experience of the Russian Federation in the creation of maneuvering satellites and in the automatic docking of spacecraft, this task is quite solvable.
As for the second option (maneuvering reusable spacecraft), then, unfortunately, our competence in their creation may be largely lost. Too much time has passed since the automatic flight of "Buran", and all projects of reusable launch vehicles and spacecraft are at an early stage of development.
At the same time, the United States now has at least one spacecraft, on the basis of which an orbital reconnaissance vehicle can be created. This is an unmanned spacecraft Boeing X-37B, the concept of which is similar to the concept of space shuttles "Space Shuttle" and "Buran".
Boeing X-37B is capable of launching into orbit and gently lowering 900 kg of payload to Earth. The maximum period of its stay in orbit is 780 days. He also has the ability to intensively maneuver and change the orbit within the range from 200 to 750 kilometers. The possibility of launching the Boeing X-37B into orbit with the Falcon 9 launch vehicle with a reusable first stage allows, in the future, to significantly reduce the cost of its launch into orbit.
At the moment, the US states that the X-37B is only used for experimentation and research. However, Russia and China suspect that the X-37B could be used for military purposes (including as a space interceptor). If placed on the Boeing X-37B reconnaissance equipment, it can effectively conduct reconnaissance in the interests of all branches of the US armed forces. Supplementing existing reconnaissance satellites in threatened areas or replacing them in case of failure.
A division of the Sierra Nevada Corporation of the private company SpaceDev is creating the Dream Chaser reusable spacecraft, developed on the basis of the Soviet project of the BOR-4 experimental reusable spacecraft. The general concept of launching and landing the Dream Chaser spacecraft is comparable to that of the unmanned X-37B spaceplane. Both manned and cargo versions are planned.
The cargo version of the Dream Chaser Cargo System (DCCS) should be capable of launching 5 tons of payload into orbit and returning 1,750 kg to Earth. Thus, if we assume that the mass of reconnaissance equipment and additional fuel tanks will be 1, 7 tons, then another 4, 3 tons will fall on fuel, which will allow the reconnaissance version of the Dream Chaser Cargo System to carry out intensive maneuvering and orbit adjustments for a long time. The first launch of the Dream Chaser Cargo System is planned for 2021.
Both the Boeing X-37B and Dream Chaser have a soft return and landing profile. This will significantly reduce the amount of overload experienced by the cargo returned from the station (in comparison with a spacecraft with a vertical landing). Which is critical for sophisticated reconnaissance equipment. In particular, for the Dream Chaser spacecraft, the landing overload is not higher than 1.5G.
With the optional Shooting Star combustible module, the payload of the Dream Chaser Cargo System can be increased to 7 tons. It will be able to operate in orbits, up to and including highly elliptical or geosynchronous.
Considering the potential capabilities of the Dream Chaser Cargo System with the Shooting Star module, Sierra Nevada Corporation has proposed to the US Department of Defense that the Shooting Star modules be used as "orbital outposts" for reconnaissance, navigation, control and communications, as well as for experiments and other missions. It is not yet definitively clear whether the module is being considered separate from the reusable Dream Chaser Cargo System spacecraft or whether they will be used together.
What is the niche of reusable unmanned spacecraft in terms of conducting reconnaissance for AUG and KUG?
Reusable reconnaissance satellites will not replace reconnaissance satellites, but they can be supplemented in such a way that the task of concealing the movement of AUG and KUG will be much more complicated
conclusions
The question arises, how realistic and economically justified is the deployment of large satellite constellations for the detection of AUG and KUG, as well as the guidance of missile weapons at them? After all, it has been repeatedly said about the enormous cost of the ICRC "Legend" system, coupled with its rather low efficiency?
As for the ICRC "Legend", the issues of its high cost and low efficiency are inextricably linked with the short time of active existence of reconnaissance satellites from its composition (as mentioned above). And promising space systems should be free from this disadvantage.
If the Russian Federation does not solve the problems of creating reliable and modern spacecraft and satellites, promising reusable launch vehicles, manned and unmanned spacecraft, then neither tanks, nor aircraft carriers, nor fifth-generation fighters will save us. For military superiority in the foreseeable future will be based on the capabilities provided by space systems for various purposes
However, any military budget is not rubber, even the United States. And the best option may be the creation of a single reconnaissance space group, acting in the interests of all types of armed forces (AF).
Such a constellation can include both satellites and reusable orbital maneuvering spacecraft. In many ways, such an association will not have contradictions and competition for resources, since the "working zones" of various types of aircraft will hardly overlap. And if they do, it means that the Armed Forces will act within the framework of solving a single task. For example, in the framework of a joint attack on the enemy's AUG by the Air Force (Air Force) and the Navy.
The issue of interspecies interaction is one of the most important. In particular, the same USA is paying heightened attention to it. And it will definitely bring results. For example, the latest AGM-158C LRASM anti-ship missiles should also be used from B-1B bombers of the US Air Force, which implies the need for close cooperation between the Air Force and the US Navy.
Of course, the space reconnaissance group alone is not yet capable of providing a 100% probability of detecting AUG and KUG, as well as targeting anti-ship missiles at them. But this is the most important and critical element of the combat effectiveness of the armed forces in general, and the Navy in particular.
