A naval battle in northern waters in the fall of 2018 had disastrous results for both sides. In that "battle" a Norwegian missile frigate, a Russian floating dock and an aircraft carrier fell. All three were incapacitated indefinitely.
The Viking Code read …
The Drakkar, who did not know defeat, was not obliged to give way to the LR2 class supertankers.
According to another version, the descendants of Eric the Red neglected modern means of navigation. Like their ancestors, they led the "drakkar" after the bird released from the side, hoping that the bird would show where the shore was.
The fairway is not marked with anything, The sun does not go down here for a day, The stars are not visible, the wind is changing …
Only against the wind do the oars go.
O. Khutoryansky
According to the third version, the sinking of the Helge Ingstad was not a mere coincidence. An ominous shadow of sarin hovered over the ship - in 2013, the frigate participated in an operation to remove chemical weapons from Syrian Latakia.
The fourth and most plausible version is that an American officer was present on the Helge Instad bridge, sent by the NATO Personal Exchange Program. The American, who did not understand Norwegian, was entrusted with the authority to control the frigate, which was the reason for the navigational disaster.
But it doesn't matter now.
Frigate series "Fridtjof Nansen"
In fact, this is all that the Norwegian Navy can count on. There were five such frigates. Now there are only four left.
Due to negligence Norwegians in peacetime have lost a fifth of their Navy!
The news feeds relished the drowning of the Helge Ingstad, but it was nowhere indicated which ship it was.
The five "Nansens" were built in 2003-2011 (from the laying of the first to the commissioning of the last), so that the Norwegian nation had at least something on which to enter the World Ocean. Actually, this happened for the first time. Never in the past has Norway had such large and sophisticated warships.
At the time of the birth of the project, NATO was in a state of deep suspended animation.
If "Nansens" were built in the current conditions, their technical appearance and composition of weapons would have turned out different.
The combat capabilities of the frigates were deliberately limited. Of course, "limited" is a conditional concept. In terms of combat capabilities, the Nansen is comparable to the fleets of many developing countries. Indeed, at the heart of the overgrown frigate is a very remarkable ship - the American "Burke".
On average 3, 5 years from the moment of laying to the moment of commissioning. The pace of construction is not surprising: Norwegian frigates were built in Spain by the Navantia forces. It was based on the finished project "Alvaro de Bazan" - a small copy of the "Orly Burke" for the Spanish Navy, with a high degree of unification of systems and weapons between them. Another representative of this "subclass" is the Australian Hobart-class air defense destroyer.
Each of the listed countries "cut off" the original "Burke" to the extent of their ideas about the role and greatness of their own fleets.
The Norwegians got what they wanted: a long sea zone patrol ship with very reduced weapons and capabilities, even in comparison with the Alvaro de Bazan.
Of all the nations operating Aegis-powered ships, the Norwegians were the only ones to skimp on a full-fledged radar. For the Norwegian Navy, a smaller version of the SPY-1F was created with transverse antenna dimensions of 2.4 meters (instead of 3.7 m for the base SPY-1D).
The number of transmitting and receiving elements decreased from 4350 to 1856, and the instrumental detection range decreased by 54%. Of course, even with such restrictions, we are talking about 324 km in range and 61 km in height when a "typical target" is detected (as a rule, it means a large radio-contrast object the size of a B-52).
Smaller dimensions of the antennas made it possible to install them at a higher height, which became a comforting bonus for their weak energy capabilities.
"Nansen" is equipped with only one launcher for 8 cells - 12 times less than the progenitor of "Burke", with a twofold difference in displacement of these ships!
The vertical silos are occupied by ESSM short / medium-range anti-aircraft missiles, 32 in total. The range of destruction of the ESSM (50 km) can pose a threat even to carrier aircraft, however, the frigate's air defense capabilities look awkward compared to other Aegis ships.
Strike weapons - small-sized anti-ship missiles NSM (Naval Strike Missile), developed by the Norwegian company Kongsberg. A total of 8 units launched from the guides on the upper deck. 400-kilogram "products" with a flight range of 100 nautical miles, equipped with a relatively weak warhead (125 kg, half of which is the mass of the warhead shell).
The description of artillery weapons will take exactly one sentence. "Rattle" of 76 mm caliber, due to its insignificant power, is suitable only for salutes and warning shots.
"Nansen" is comparable to its progenitor "Burke" only in terms of anti-submarine defense capabilities. The explanation is elementary. Anti-aircraft weapons are much cheaper than anti-aircraft weapons.
Norwegian frigates turned out to be extremely weakly armed units, given their considerable size (length 135 m, displacement over 5000 tons) and access to the best world technologies. But the Norwegian Navy has its own priorities.
The frigate "Helge Ingstad" did not use either its defensive weapons or a retractable thruster for maneuvering in narrow fjords. The only thing that mattered in that situation was the 13 watertight compartments. But even they didn't help.
During the international naval exercise Trident Juncture 2018, NATO forces lost a frigate. However, by our actions (or inaction) we helped NATO members to “level the score”.
The fleet got hit by the dock
From the information provided, it is still not possible to understand what happened that night at Shipyard No. 82 in Roslyakovo.
According to one version, the Northern Fleet command decided to prepare the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier for a short-term exit to sea in order to respond to the naval provocation Trident Juncture - demonstratively and deliberately conducted maneuvers near the borders of Russia. The floating dock PD-50 was sunk, the aircraft-carrying cruiser was removed from the keelblocks and mooring lines and began to move out of the dock gate. At that moment everything happened. The dock continued to sink with heel and trim, the cranes collapsed, you can learn about the further development of events from the pages of the media.
According to another version, the abnormal submersion of the PD-50 took place without any interference from the workers of the plant. The only merit - they managed to give up the mooring lines in time and take the aircraft carrier out of the crumbling dock.
As part of the established practice of negative selection, I propose to invite the entire management of the USC to Roslyakovo to present awards and medals for "an outstanding contribution to the development of the ship repair industry."
The reason for the emergency is associated with the loss of power supply due to such a rare and unusual phenomenon for the Murmansk region as heavy snowfall and snow adhesion to wires.
The official explanation of the causes of the PD-50 accident is simply monstrous. For such a confession, you can go to the tribunal.
Do the responsible persons even understand what they confessed to the whole country?
The shipyard carries out docking and repairs of ships with nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons on board, without having backup energy sources.
There is no need to explain what is fraught with abnormal operation or suspension of equipment operation during repair work in the event of a sudden power outage of the dock.
Naval history remembers a case: there was also a violation of safety, and old infrastructure, and a crane in the lead role. An attempt was made to clean the Submarine's reactor cover O-ring. As a result, the floating crane that swayed on the wave tore out the cover together with the control rods. The reactor instantly went into launch mode and destroyed all those nearby (see "Radiation accident in the Chazhma Bay").
At that time, the reason was a boat passing nearby, which raised a wave. This time - snow adhering to the wires.
USC managers optimized the plant to the maximum, including funds for mandatory backup generators.
Do submarines of the Northern Fleet unload missiles before being put on dock repairs? Yes, this is Openel's secret!
In December 2011, there was a fire in the wooden scaffolding erected along the hull of the K-84 Yekaterinburg missile carrier while it was in the same PD-50 dock. Immediately after the emergency, the damaged boat was taken out of the dock and sent to Okolnaya Bay, and then to Yagelnaya Bay. Where are the submarine ballistic missile storage bases located? It was unlikely that the submarine was preparing to receive ammunition for going on combat patrols: after all, the K-84 had a long three-year repair.
In general, the neglect of unloading ammunition when docking is a well-known worldwide practice, periodically leading to dazzling and deafening consequences.
Well, back to the events of last fall.
I want to believe
“Loss of power supply” due to “sticking of wet snow” is the first and not the most successful excuse that came to the heads of those in charge. An attempt to shift the responsibility for the emergency onto a natural disaster.
The floating dock, due to its age (40 years old, half of which fell on not the best times), clearly had leaks in the underwater part of the hull. All funds allocated for repairs were used in a different way. It is not excluded that recently the PD-50 kept afloat only due to the pumps that continuously pumped out water. Finally, on October 30, the water inflow exceeded a critical value and the dock sank. This is how the idea of power loss was born. We are not to blame, but the weather.
However, such a description is also ill-suited to the place where nuclear-powered submarines and SSBNs with weapons on board were repaired.
Exactly six months have passed
Affected parties refrain from further comment. Although the consequences were clear from the first day.
The Norwegian frigate was raised in early March and still do not know what to do with the drowned man. Extensive destruction of the starboard side, touching the rocky bottom, half a year in salty sea water under the impact of waves. The repair will be comparable in cost to the construction of a new frigate. Most likely, they will restore, for reasons of prestige. In history, not so happened (the incredible resurrection of the "Cassin" and "Downs", the restoration of the burned out cruiser "Belknap").
With the loss of the frigate, the Norwegian navy significantly weakened, but this loss had little effect on the NATO naval forces - there are about 40 such ships in the fleets of European countries.
Domestic PD-50 is still at the bottom. It will certainly be raised (otherwise it threatens to slide to great depths and completely block the harbor of the 82nd Shipyard), the whole question is whether it can be used as intended. According to Interfax, divers who surveyed the dock found cracks in its hull. Someone has already rushed to declare that the dock has split into several parts. On the one hand, this does not mean anything - any dock is a complex of pontoons. Putting them together is a difficult but routine operation.
On the other hand, taking into account the obvious technical condition, age and damage received during submersion (to make it clearer - the fall of the 100 thousand-ton structure to the bottom), the timing of lifting and putting the PD-50 into operation will be comparable to the construction of a new dock.
PD-50 was built in Sweden, which will not build anything under the existing sanctions. Only China can help in the creation of a new PD.
For example, last summer a floating dock built by the Chinese company Beihai Shipbuilding within the interests of a consortium of Rosneftegaz, Rosneft and Gazprombank was delivered to the Far Eastern Shipyard Zvezda. The main purpose is servicing gas carriers, tankers and oil platforms. The Chinese dock is two times inferior in terms of the carrying capacity of the PD-50 (40 thousand tons instead of 80 thousand tons), but the very precedent with the purchase of the dock demonstrated the possibility of cooperation with the PRC on this issue.
Everything rests on the timing of the decision. Currently, there is no evidence of negotiations on the acquisition of a replacement for the PD-50. Probably, the USC management first wants to understand the sunken dock and assess the chances of its return to service.
And time goes by
The only dock capable of receiving the Admiral Kuznetsov TAVKR is located in the Far East. Dock PD-41 with a carrying capacity of 80,000 tons was built in Japan in 1978. The leadership of the Navy is unlikely to dare to transfer "Kuznetsov" in its existing state to the Pacific Ocean, where there is no infrastructure for basing the TAVKR and its air wing. It is also unknown whether the technical condition of the dock will allow the aircraft carrier to be docked.
Towing the PD-41 across the world to the Northern Fleet seems to be an even more extraordinary task.
Docking of "Kuznetsov" in the drained basin of "Sevmash" (like "Baku-Vikramaditya") can only be considered as a temporary, one-time solution. Constant and regular maintenance of TAVKR in such conditions is impossible.
If the issue of acquiring a new floating dock is not resolved within a few years, the Navy will probably have to say goodbye to the only aircraft carrier.
Here, in brief, are the consequences of the "sea battle" in which the naval forces of NATO and the Russian Navy inflicted serious losses on themselves.
