The massive saturation of units and formations of modern armies with tanks and other armored vehicles ultimately led to the fact that they became one of the most important on the battlefields. Therefore, the confrontation of anti-tank weapons (PTS) with them, as shown by a number of local wars of the twentieth century, is the main content of modern combined arms combat.
An extremely rich experience in fighting enemy tanks and overcoming its anti-tank defense was gained during the Great Patriotic War. Let us consider some directions of development of methods of fighting PTS while overcoming the anti-tank defense of German troops.
To combat tanks, the fascist command widely used field and anti-aircraft artillery, aviation, special anti-tank weapons and tanks. To increase the effectiveness of field artillery in the fight against well-armored Soviet tanks, the enemy began to include cumulative shells in the ammunition of systems of caliber up to 155 mm in 1943. They hit armored targets at ranges of up to 800 m. The aviation also received armor-piercing shells and anti-tank bombs. The special PTS of the German troops were also continuously improved. The effective fire range and armor penetration of German anti-tank artillery had tripled by the summer of 1943. Self-propelled anti-tank artillery and special melee PTSs (faust cartridges, anti-tank guns, grenades, etc.) were created.
Tanks, as a multipurpose combat weapon, were also the most effective anti-tank weapon, especially in offensive and mobile defense. Analysis of the combat losses of Soviet tanks shows that, on average, 75% of them were hit by artillery and tank fire at a distance of 500-1500 m. From other means, losses were: from melee vehicles - 12.6%, anti-tank mines - 9%, aviation - 3.4%.
For the defense of the main directions in 1944-1945. Hitlerites created high density PTS. Although the enemy echeloned the PTS, however, most of them were located in the main strip, with a depth of 6 to 8 kilometers. About 80% of the MTS within its limits were located in the first two positions. The enemy used aircraft and long-range artillery to defeat Soviet tanks on the march, in wait-and-see and departure areas. With the approach of our tanks to the front line of the German defense and with the breakthrough of its main zone, all the enemy's anti-tank weapons were successively connected to the fight against them.
As the experience of the most important offensive operations of the third period of World War II showed, the likelihood of a successful breakthrough of the German defense depended, first of all, on the degree of destruction of anti-tank weapons, the rate of attack, as well as on the effectiveness of fire support of the advancing tanks. Particularly important was the defeat of the enemy PTS by artillery fire and air strikes in preparation for the attack. The experience of the Lvov-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin and other operations shows that the high reliability of the fire destruction of the PTS was achieved in the course of a short but powerful artillery barrage. At the same time, fire raids at the beginning and end of the artillery barrage were especially important. The enemy's anti-tank defense was suppressed during the period of artillery preparation to the entire depth of the main defense zone. However, due to the fact that the caliber of almost 70% of the artillery was less than 100 mm, it was possible to reliably suppress the enemy's PTS only in the first and second positions, that is, to a depth of about 5 km.
To destroy the observed enemy PTSs during the artillery barrage period, direct fire guns were used very effectively. Their density was usually 20-30, and in a number of operations - up to 60 or more shafts per 1 km of breakthrough. Along with artillery, front-line aviation performed a large volume of tasks of fire destruction of the enemy's PTS, which during the war carried out 46.5% of all its sorties in order to support the combat operations of tanks and infantry.
Aviation suppressed the anti-tank defense, delivering massive strikes with the forces of assault and bomber air divisions and corps against anti-tank strongpoints, artillery positions, and anti-tank reserves of the enemy. Usually, these actions were linked in time and objects with artillery strikes, the actions of tanks and infantry.
The most characteristic was the following sequence in the delivery of air and artillery strikes (it can be traced on the example of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the East Prussian operation). Before the start of the artillery preparation, a massive strike followed with the involvement of most of the bomber and up to 20% of the attack aircraft against targets located in the main German defense zone. In the course of artillery barrage, aviation carried out strikes on PTS, tanks and other enemy fire weapons on the flanks of the breakthrough, in the depths of the first two lines of its defense. Aviation training was ending immediately before the start of the attack with a massive strike by large air forces on anti-tank targets in the breakthrough sector.
In cases where the enemy had a deep anti-tank defense system with a high density of PTS in the main defense zone (East Prussian operation, Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations), artillery support for the attack of Soviet tanks and infantry was carried out with one or two barrels of fire to a depth of 2-4 km or by means of a sequential concentration of fire. This made it possible to significantly reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's anti-tank fire when overcoming the first and second positions of the main line of his defense.
To maximize fire impact on PTS and other enemy fire weapons during an attack by tanks, it was important to achieve continuity of the transition from artillery preparation to artillery support for the attack. So, during the Vitebsk-Orsha operation, the fire of the last raid went on increasing, up to the maximum permissible mode. In terms of power and character, he practically corresponded to the barrage of fire, which achieved a surprise transition to the attack. 2-3 minutes before the end of the artillery barrage, a third of the artillery concentrated their fire on the first line of the artillery barrage (200 meters from the forward edge). At the end of the artillery barrage, the rest of the artillery also transferred the fire to the same line, but it was conducted in small jumps (the fire was "sliding") in accordance with the advance of the advancing tanks and infantry. This ensured a breakthrough of the first position with relatively small losses in tanks.
The defeat of the PTS and tanks by aviation, with the beginning of air support for the attackers, was usually carried out in echeloned strikes of 40-60 aircraft. The strike areas of each echelon of aircraft were successively shifted by 1-1.5 km into the depth of the fascist defense, providing continuous fire action on its PTS from the air. Artillery escort of the attacking forces to the depth of the tactical zone of the German defense was carried out both in pre-planned areas by sequential concentration of fire, and by fire at the call of the commanders of tank subunits and artillery spotters stationed in radium tanks.
In order to increase the effectiveness of fire damage to PTS and enemy tanks by artillery at this time, it was envisaged to re-subordinate it to rifle battalions, regiments and tank brigades. The fighting revealed the urgent need to directly escort the attacking tanks of the first battle line with self-propelled artillery installations (ACS), which with their fire destroyed the PTS and fought against the counterattacking enemy tanks. To solve these problems, an armored self-propelled artillery was created. Already in 1943, she was organizationally included in the tank formations and was the best fire means for escorting tanks in an attack. Thanks to the armor protection and high maneuverability, the self-propelled guns could operate directly in tank battle formations, and their more powerful weapons made it possible to destroy the enemy's PTS even before our armored vehicles entered the enemy's effective fire zone. In the most successful operations, the ratio of self-propelled guns and tanks when breaking through the German defense was 1: 2, i.e. every two tanks were supported by one self-propelled gun.
The experience of a number of operations in the third period of World War II showed that upon completion of artillery and aviation training, tanks supporting the infantry at a depth of two to five kilometers were subjected to fire from the remaining German PTS and tanks transferred to the breakthrough site. The density of the artillery fire after the completion of the artillery barrage decreased. In these cases, the effectiveness of the fight against PTS and enemy tanks depended on the formation of the battle formation of the tanks, the tactics of action and their close interaction with the self-propelled guns. Self-propelled artillery attacked, as a rule, in the battle formations of the attacking infantry and supported the tanks of the first battle line with fire. The second echelon of tanks (when building a tank brigade in two echelons) moved behind the infantrymen at a distance of up to 200 m.
When breaking through a strong anti-tank defense (the Berlin operation, in the 1st Belorussian Front and the East Prussian operation in the 2nd Belorussian Front), heavy tanks were used, accounting for 33% and 70% of NPP tanks, respectively, in these operations. Combat experience revealed that the combat properties of armored vehicles were of great importance for the successful fight against PTS and enemy tanks. Therefore, during the war years, all types of Soviet tanks were continuously improved. The caliber of medium tanks increased from 76 mm to 85 mm, and heavy - from 76 to 122 mm. As a result, the range of a direct shot increased by 30-50%, and the effectiveness of hitting targets increased. Armor protection was strengthened, by installing a commander's cupola on combat vehicles, the view improved, the accuracy of fire and the maneuverability of tanks increased.
During the entry into the breakthrough of the formations of mobile groups of armies and fronts, the defeat of the PTS and tanks in front of the breakthrough line and on its flanks was carried out by artillery and aviation during the period of support for the entry, by the fire of tanks, self-propelled guns, artillery of the forward detachments (brigades of the first echelon). For example, to provide artillery support for entering the battle of the 3rd Guards. tank army during the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, five artillery brigades and artillery of four rifle divisions were involved, and the introduction of the 2nd Guards. The tank army in the Berlin operation was supported by five artillery brigades, two regiments and artillery from five rifle divisions. This made it possible to engage from eight to twelve divisions of artillery and mortars in the entry zones of tank armies to defeat the enemy's PTS.
Artillery usually suppressed enemy anti-tank defenses in front of the front and on the flanks of mobile groups to a depth of four to five kilometers from the line of entry, but most reliably - to a depth of 2-2.5 km. The greatest efficiency in the defeat of the PTS was achieved when the fire was planned in advance, and artillery officers from the tanks marching in the battle formations of armored battalions carried out the call and correction by radio.
Aviation played an important role in the defeat of PTS and enemy tanks when the mobile groups were deployed. The suppression of anti-tank defense during this period was carried out, as a rule, in the course of an air offensive with the involvement of up to 70% of the front's aviation. The air offensive included: preliminary air training, when tank and anti-tank reserves were suppressed; direct aviation training (aircraft continued their attacks on German reserves, and also suppressed PTS, tanks, artillery); air support for forward detachments and the offensive of the main forces, during which, along with strikes on reserves, aviation suppressed PTS and enemy tanks in front of advancing tanks at the request of the commanders of armored formations. The most powerful air impact on enemy anti-tank defenses was in the first 2-3 hours after the introduction of mobile groups.
After reaching the operational depth and separating the mobile groups from the main forces, they lost the support of the artillery of the combined-arms formations. The suppression of the enemy's anti-tank defense on intermediate defensive lines at this time and the fight against his tanks were carried out by regular and supplied artillery, aviation, fire from tanks and motorized riflemen.
Success in the fight against PTS and enemy tanks in the operational depth strongly depended on the saturation of tank and mechanized corps (armies) with artillery and the number of supporting aviation. The saturation of tank armies with artillery averaged 18-20 guns with mortars for each battalion. The ratio of tanks and self-propelled guns was within the limits: one medium or heavy self-propelled guns for 3-4 tanks.
To accompany tank brigades in the 1st Tank Army in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, artillery support groups for tanks were created according to the number of brigades, the core of which was, as a rule, self-propelled artillery. Sometimes these groups included anti-tank and rocket artillery. The creation of highly mobile artillery support groups for tanks increased the independence of tank brigades in the fight against PTS and enemy tanks when they were conducting highly maneuverable combat operations.
According to the experience of the most important operations of the third period of the war, the actions of the tank army in the operational depth supported up to three air corps. The massive use of close combat PTSs in the German army sharply marked the problem of combating them and sharply limited the independence of tank combat operations. Additional measures were required to ensure the actions of armored vehicles. In particular, a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy's firing positions and places of concentration of PTS was carried out and their destruction by artillery and aviation. The compulsory accompaniment of each tank by machine gunners was introduced (Berlin operation). The security of tanks was strengthened when they were located in place. The most important condition for suppressing and destroying close combat PTS was the high-quality interaction of individual tanks with small units and infantry groups, both during the breakthrough of the German defense and during operations in the operational depth.
In the fight against PTS and enemy tanks, practically all the military means that the troops had at their disposal were involved. During the offensive, this task was solved in several directions at the same time. The main ones were: increasing the degree of fire destruction of the enemy's PTS by artillery fire and air strikes during the preparation of the attack; improving the formation of battle formations of tank formations in order to ensure the most effective interaction of all combat assets during an offensive; improving the combat properties of tanks and self-propelled guns; creation of the most acceptable organizational structure of tank units and formations; the achievement of continuous fire support of the attacking echelon of tanks throughout the entire course of hostilities.
