In the previous part, intelligence materials were considered (RM) about the German troops at the end of 1940. These RMs overestimated the total number of German troops, including those concentrated near our border. Based on the overestimated number of troops in the General Staff, they made the erroneous conclusion that Germany would allocate 173 divisions for an attack on the USSR.
The following abbreviations will be used in this article: AK - army corps, an - artillery regiment, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GU - Headquarters, cd (cbr, kp) - cavalry division (brigade, regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), RO - the intelligence department of the headquarters, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, td (tbr, TP, TB) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).
Intelligence information of the NKVD of the USSR in 1940
Reports began to appear that the intelligence of the border troops had the RM more accurate than the RM RU. In the materials of the series "Unexpected War …" it was shown that the intelligence services of the NKO, the NKVD and the NKGB (from March 1941) provided the RM in RU (until 7.40 - the 5th NCO Directorate) about the armed forces of foreign countries. RU summarized the provided RM, prepared reports, sent them to the leaders of the USSR, NKO, NKVD and VO (in the part concerning them). In addition to the specified circulation of the RM, there was an exchange of materials between the headquarters of the military and border districts, between the headquarters of the armies and border detachments, etc.
The intelligence of the border troops used the same basic methods of obtaining information as the RU: visual observation and collection of information during conversations. One of the sources of information for the intelligence of the border troops was the reconnaissance of the border violators.
At the end of 1939, information appeared that, under the guise of deserters from the German army, German agents could be sent to us (4.12.39):
According to our information, the Gestapo is preparing to transfer to the territory of the USSR a group of its agents who graduated from a special intelligence school in Linz … It is possible that the listed persons will be abandoned in the USSR under the guise of deserters from the German army who fled because of persecution for revolutionary activities.
Therefore, information from border trespassers should have been treated with suspicion. it could have been planted by the Germans.
Data on numbered formations or the number of divisions published by the RM of the NKVD for 1940 are rare. Let's check the reliability of the RM NKVD. 14.7.40 was prepared Memorandum of the NKVD:
Recently, newly arrived units of the German army have been noted:
in the city of Yaroslav (20 km north of Przemysl) - the 39th pp and 116th ap;
in the city of Rzeszow (60 km north-west of Przemysl) - the 129th pp …;
in Przeworsk (40 km north-west of Przemysl) - 192nd sub, 44th heavy ap …
Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General Maslennikov.
The 39th subdivision was part of the 26th subdivision, which from May 1940 to May 1941 was in France and Belgium.
The 116th ap was part of the 5th TD, which will arrive in Poland only in September 1940. Therefore, the 116th ap could not be near our border until 14.7.40. At this time, even in the General Staff of the ground forces could not know that after 6.9.40 a new group of divisions will be sent to the Soviet-German border.
The 129th PP did not exist and information about it can only be planted disinformation.
The 192nd subdivision (56th subdivision) has been located in Belgium since May 1940. After 6.9.40 he will arrive in the area of the city of Lodz.
The 44th heavy up in May 1940 was part of the 8th AK. Further, until the spring of 1941, there is no information about him. Suppose the 44th ap in July 1940 is in Poland. In this case, the information in the RM is confirmed by only 20%, and 80% of the data on numbered regiments is disinformation. The same amount of misinformation is contained about numbered units in the Republic of Moldova.
Help GUGB NKVD (6.11.40 g.):
During operations in France, the German command held up to 27 infantry divisions in East Prussia and former Poland … [in RM RU also 27 divisions. - Approx. auth.]
After the surrender of France, the German command began at the beginning of July 1940 a massive transfer of its troops from the west to the east and southeast, as a result of which the following were concentrated in East Prussia and the former Poland:
before July 16 - up to 40 pd and over 2 td [according to RM RU - 40 pd, up to 2 ppm, tbr, tp and 6 tb. - Approx. auth.];
on July 23 - up to 50 pd and over 4 td [according to RM RU - up to 50 pd, two tbr, two tp and 6 tb. - Approx. auth.];
on August 8 - up to 54 pd and up to 6 td.
According to RM RU - up to 52 PD, 2 MD, one TD, two TBR, 5 TP and 3 TB. In fact, there were no TD, 2 TBR and 5 TP. There is no information on TB. Most likely they did not exist either.
The Help contains information about the troops at the border, which is close to the data of the RU. Therefore, the RM NKVD in the second half of 1940 did not coincide with the information that was included in the reports of the RU.
RM on German troops at the beginning of 1941
In the previously considered RM RU and RO ZAPOVO in terms of numbered parts contained up to 80% misinformation … Maybe at the beginning of 1941 the volume of disinformation decreased? To answer this question, let us analyze the information from the first report of RU (for the West) in 1941.
Intelligence report No. 1 RU:
“… Changes in the grouping of German troops in East Prussia and on the territory of former Poland for the period from 15.11.40 to 1.2.41… In Velau the headquarters of 192 infantry division was marked; in Konigsberg - the headquarters of the 4th division; in Suwalki - headquarters of the 12th front line …"
There never was a 192nd pd. There is no postscript in the wording that the information needs to be clarified or verified. Therefore, this is verified information or in another language - competent disinformation of the German command.
From 15.8.40 the 4th front division is being reorganized into the 14th TD on the territory of Germany. The 14th TD will be in Germany until March 1941, and then it will be noted in Hungary. There could not be a 4th Infantry Division in Konigsberg - this is again the disinformation of the German command.
Further in the RM the wording “” will be repeatedly encountered. The reconnaissance unit has been tracking the military unit for a certain period of time, but at some point its presence is not confirmed - it has allegedly been redeployed.
The 12th front until 10.3.41 is located in France. It is clear that its headquarters cannot at this time be on the Soviet-German border away from its units.
"According to the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters, the 10th Infantry Division was redeployed to the Ostrow, Rozhan, Govorova areas …"
Once upon a time, there was a 10th PD in some area and suddenly moved to another area - a common thing … Only the 10th PD from 23.9.40 until April 1941 will be on the territory of Germany. In RM, the information about the presence of four divisions does not correspond to reality.
The 7th TP has been located since 10.40 in the city of Reims (France), and later in the city of Dijon (France). The 7th TP is part of the 10th TD, which is located in France until the end of 1940. From January 41st, she will be redeployed to Germany, from where she will arrive at the border in June 1941.
"According to the data of RO ZAPOVO, from the Ostrolenka area in December, departed in a southern direction … 662 pp, 110 ap, kp, 68 tp SS …"
The 662nd regiment was disbanded on 8.8.40 and therefore could not be in Poland. Only a group of military men with false insignia on their shoulder straps could go somewhere.
The 110th ap was part of the AK amplification, and it was not possible to find where it was in the specified period. Let's consider that RM on the regiment were confirmed.
In the Wehrmacht at this time there were only four cp, which were part of the 1st cd. They were in their places of deployment. The presence of a set of kn in the RM is a disinformation. We'll talk about cavalry in the part devoted to mobile troops.
The 68th SS did not exist. The 68th SS regiment did not exist either.
Of the four references to the shelves, only the data for the 110th ap.
“From the region of Warsaw, Rembertow in the southern and southeastern direction, the decrease: 48, 57, 67, 68, l 05, 135, 171, 178, 225, 529 and 600 pn, 1, 584 and 660 ap; from Pruszkow - 106 pp and from Rojan 458 pp …"
The 48th and 57th subdivisions were, respectively, part of the 12th and 9th subdivisions, which were in France until March 1941.
67th and 68th subdivisions from the 23rd subdivision, which is located in East Prussia. PM can be considered confirmed.
The 105th subdivision of the 72nd subdivision, which until 1.1.41 is located in France, and then will be redeployed to Romania. Accordingly, the 105th PP could not get into the territory of Poland.
135th subdivision from the 45th subdivision, which until 1.2.41 is located in Belgium. RM was not confirmed.
171st, 178th and 529th subdivisions from the 56th, 76th and 299th subdivisions, respectively, which were in Poland. RM were confirmed.
The 225th and 600th pp did not exist.
1st ap was part of the 1st pd, which is located in East Prussia.
584th ap not found. It is only known that in April 1944 there was a spare 584th ap. Let's consider that intelligence has correctly tracked this ap.
The 600th ap did not exist.
The 106th subdivision was part of the 15th subdivision, which from August 1940 to June 1941 was located in the city of Dijon (France).
The 458th subdivision was part of the 258th subdivision, which has been in Poland since July 1940. RM were confirmed.
Of the 16 references to numbered regiments, only eight can be reliable.
“At the end of December, 10 kp arrived in Demblin. In the Sokolów area, 208 infantry divisions were noted and in the Radzyń area, the headquarters was 40 divisions …"
The 10th CP did not exist.
The 208th Infantry Division is located in the city of Calais (France) from August 1940 to January 1942.
The 40th Infantry Division never existed, but our intelligence will also observe it in June 1941.
"62 and 552 subdivisions arrived in the Biala Podlaska region …"
62nd subdivision from the 7th subdivision, which until 14.4.41 will be deployed in Northern France.
The 552nd regiment together with the 279th regiment will be disbanded in July 1940. Only in December 1941 it will be formed again together with the 329th Infantry Division.
"According to the RO of the KOVO headquarters, from the Kielce, Krakow region, 3 and 12 TD left in an unknown direction, … 221 TD …"
The 3rd TD is located on the territory of Germany from 15.8.40 to 7.4.41, and its parts simply cannot disappear somewhere from the territory of Poland.
The 12th TD is being formed in the city of Stettin (distance to the border is 467 km), which has been the territory of Germany since October 1939. The minimum distance from the cities of Kielce - Krakow to Stettin is 501 km. Units of the 12th TD cannot be in the indicated area in any way. The 12th TD will be located in Stettin until 15.4.41.
The 221st Infantry Division is on vacation until January 1941. Then it is deployed again in Germany (8th Military District) until March 1941.
"From the area Yaroslav, Przemysl, Pshevorsk departed: headquarters 2 md, 8, 29 mn, … 112 kp, 9 np, subdivisions 50 and 146 np …"
The 2nd MD from 5.10.40 to 10.1.41 will be reorganized into the 12th TD and therefore could not go anywhere from Southern Poland.
The 8th and 29th MP were part of the 3rd MD, which from 23.9.40 to May 1941 was in Germany.
The 112th CP did not exist.
9th subdivision from the 23rd subdivision, which was located on the territory of East Prussia. The 9th PP could not be located on the territory of Southern Poland.
The 50th subdivision from November 1940 to April 1941, together with the 111th subdivision, will be located in the city of Fallingbostel (Germany).
The formation of the 146th pp will begin only on 11.7.42.
"From the area of Yaslo, Sanok, Krosno, 239 pd departed from 239, 237 and 372 pd …"
The personnel of the 239th Infantry Division has been on vacation since July 1940. The deployment of the division will begin in January 1941 in the 8th Military District (Germany), and on 4.4.41 it will appear in Romania. The division included the 327th, 372nd and 444th pp.
The 239th subdivision was part of the 106th subdivision, which at that time was located in the city of Wahn (Germany).
The 237th PP did not exist. It is possible that the servicemen from the 327th regiment depicted the 237th regiment, changing the places of the insignia on the shoulder straps. The information coincided only on the 372nd regiment.
"From the district of Grubieszow, Zamosc, 55 pp, 72 and 93 kp have left …"
The 55th subdivision was part of the 17th subdivision, which was in France until May 1941.
The 72nd and 93rd CP did not exist.
“The data on the presence of: 23 subdivisions in the Kholm area has not been confirmed; headquarters of the 11th Infantry Division in the Jaslo region; 39, 342 pp and 116 ap in Yaroslav; 102 pp and 48 ap in the Pshevorsk region”.
The 23rd Infantry Division has been in East Prussia since the summer of 1940.
The 11th Infantry Division will be in France until March 1941.
39th subdivision from the 26th subdivision, which will be in Belgium until May 1941.
342nd subdivision (231st subdivision) was disbanded on 31.7.40.
The 116th AP was part of the 5th TD, which was in Poland until January 1941. RM are confirmed.
The 102nd subdivision as part of the 24th subdivision will be located in the city of Elda (Germany) from August 1940 to 23.3.41.
The 48th ap from the 12th subdivision will be in France until 10.4.41.
“Not marked: in Lancut - 302 and 315 pp; in Krakow - headquarters of the 4th and 7th Guards; in Lublin - 132 and 353 pp …"
302nd subdivision from the 231st subdivision, which was disbanded on 31.7.40.
315th subdivision from the 167th subdivision, which is located in France from September 1940 to January 1941. Then she will be redeployed to Bavaria, where she will stay until May 1941.
The 4th State Rifle Division from October 1940 to February 1941 is located in Germany. Then she will be redeployed to Bulgaria, where she will meet the beginning of the war with Yugoslavia.
The 7th Guards Rifle Division will be formed only in December 1941.
132nd subdivision from the 44th subdivision. This division will remain in France until March 1941.
353rd subdivision of the 205th subdivision, which will be in France until January 1942.
“The arrival of 168 infantry divisions in the Kielce region was recorded, consisting of 571, 650 and 652 divisions and, presumably, 529 divisions. 175 pd, stationed in the Zamoć region, is motorized …"
The 168th subdivision included the 417th, 429th and 442nd subdivisions, as well as the 248th ap. The division has been in Poland since the summer of 1940. It did not include the 571st, 650th, 652nd pp and 529th ap.
The 571st subdivision was part of the 302nd subdivision, which will be formed in Germany (2nd VO) from 11/12/40, and then will go to France.
The 650th and 652nd Infantry Regulations from the 372nd Infantry Division, which was disbanded in July 1940. The 529th ap never existed.
Also, the 175th PD did not exist. Information about the motorization of a non-existent division can only be misinformation of the German command.
"567 and 590 points were marked in Tomaszow …"
The 567th Infantry Division was part of the 270th Infantry Division, which was disbanded in the summer of 1940. It will be re-formed on 21.4.42.
590th subdivision from the 321st subdivision, which was formed in December 1940 in the 9th VO (Germany). From January 1941, the division arrived in the city of Boulogne (France).
"Additional mobilization and the formation of new formations … As a result of this event, the number of divisions of the German army by the spring of 1941 can be increased to 250-260 pd, 20 td and 15 md …"
In total, the number of German divisions is 285-295.
In RM, there are 69 references to license plates and kp. RM can be considered confirmed only 14. Information about license plates is 80% German disinformation. We met the same ratio in RM for July, August and September 1940. When in four RM, spaced in time, there is a comparable amount of disinfection by license plate, it looks like a regularity …
Special message of the NKGB of the USSR (31.3.41 y.):
The 316th regiment arrived and quartered in Komarovo … In late December 1940, the 525th regiment moved from the side of Sandomierz through Ostrovets. 9.3.41 to the village of Koroshchin, Biala-Podlyassky district, arrived and billeted at pp # 584. In the same village, a horse-machine-gun team is located. On the shoulder straps of officers and soldiers of the team there is a number 17
The 316th subdivision is part of the 212nd subdivision, which will be located on the coast of the English Channel until June 1941. The 525th ap did not exist.
The 584th Infantry Regiment (the formation of the regiment began on 15.11.40) was part of the 319th Infantry Division, which in December 1940 completed its formation and went to Normandy. Where it was before the Allied landing operation in 1944.
The insignia on the shoulder straps of the machine-gun team may correspond to the 17th pp. The 17th subdivision was part of the 31st subdivision, which arrived in Poland in September 1940. If the scouts later concluded that there was a 17th PP, then the RM in part of the numbered regiments was confirmed by 25%. In this case, the volume of disinformation was 75%.
The figure shows a graph of the concentration of German divisions at the Soviet-German border. The decrease in the number of German troops in the figure is associated with the movement of divisions to the Balkans and to the territory of Romania.
The main mistake of the General Staff of the spacecraft?
Earlier it was shown that in RM the total number of divisions in the German armed forces was constantly overestimated. It was shown above that the information of the NKVD about the German troops coincided with the data of the RU.
Based on intelligence estimates of the presence 243 divisions, in the Note of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft (18.9.40) it was determined that "". In the variants of the beginning of the war with Germany considered by the General Staff, the number of German divisions is estimated at 160 … 180 … 188. At the same time, the presence of a German group on the territory of Romania, which did not exist at that time, was not taken into account. The note was presented by I. V. Stalin and 5.10.40 received instructions to clarify it. A revised Note was prepared in October 1940:
"I am submitting for your approval the main conclusions from your instructions given on October 5, 1940 when considering plans for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1941 …"
It is possible that on the basis of the revised Note of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, documents on the deployment of districts in case of war were being prepared at the headquarters of the military. For example, KOVO is preparing a 1940 Deployment Plan Note. The exact date of preparation of this document is unknown. Let's try to clarify the time of its compilation.
The Note of the Chief of Staff of KOVO states: “”.
The RM RU dated 30.10.40 says:
As of October 29 th, deployed: to Romania - except for the training division - 3 infantry divisions, td, md … The arrival of the troops continues …
The previously established army groups of Colonel General Blaskowitz … and Field Marshal Reichenau … are advancing in a southeast direction and, as can be judged, are concentrating: army group Blaskovits - in Romania … and army group Reichenau - on the Yugoslav border …
In the report of the RU (9.11.40), it is noted:
According to newly received information … the army of Colonel General Blaskowitz … finished my concentration in Romania … On the territory of the latter, at this time there is 15-17 divisions …"
It turns out that most of the group of General Blaskovitsa was transferred to Romania in early November 1940. Consequently, the Note was prepared at the same time. In the Note of General M. A. Purkaev, the total number of German troops is estimated by the number over 250 divisions, of which up to 166 can be fielded against the USSR. In the considered variants of the initial period of the war, the maximum number of German divisions fielded against the USSR (including the territory of Romania) may be 178 … 190.
The discrepancy between the maximum number of German divisions and divisions concentrated for the war with the USSR can be explained in the Notes of the General Staff and the KOVO headquarters:
- or clarification of the German grouping when discussing the document with Stalin;
- or the development of the Notes was carried out independently of each other (the most likely option).
From the documents presented, it can be seen that the leadership of the KA and the Military Council of KOVO are trying to estimate the number of German troops deployed against the USSR and KOVO, and are also trying to predict options for the start of hostilities. The number of German divisions deployed in the initial period of the war against the USSR is estimated at no less than 166 … 173.
At the end of December 1940, a meeting of the highest command personnel of the spacecraft was held in Moscow. There are many different reports that explain how the German generals fought. The speakers explain many points in sufficient detail. People who read these materials should have had a question: why did the senior command staff forget everything that was said at the meeting before 22.6.41? Or is it easier to use the version voiced by many high-ranking military personnel that Stalin alone is to blame for everything? How many German troops were there in the scenarios of the war games that took place in early January 1941 after the end of the meeting?
There were almost the same number as was considered in the Note dated 18.9.40. Up to 173 German divisions, and about 120 were concentrated at our border by 22 June. In a variant of one of the games, the number of 180 German divisions was also used:
In the documents of the first game, it was indicated that the North-Eastern and Eastern fronts of the "Western" (up to 60 pd), operating north from Deblin to the Baltic Sea, launched an offensive "in the interests of the main operation" carried out south of Brest, where the main forces of the "Western" - up to 120 infantry divisions, and together with their allies - up to 160 infantry divisions …
14.2.41 in the RM RU it is said about the increase in the number of German divisions: “[Po]
On 11.3.41, the number of divisions in the RM of RU increased again. According to intelligence, in comparison with September 1940, the number of the German army increased by 20 divisions.
In the Plan of the General Staff of the SC on the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and East (11.03.41), a similar number of divisions in Germany is called "". The Plan further states that "…"
Everything is logical: the Germans have increased the number of divisions and, therefore, Germany can send more divisions for a war with a strong spacecraft. The only embarrassing thing is that the plans of the General Staff are somewhat behind the given RU. In the latter, the RM is called "263 divisions", and in the General Staff they operate with older information about 260 divisions.
Don't you find that the number of 200 significantly differs from the number of 120 divisions concentrated at the border by 22.6.41? Do you think that by June 1941 the General Staff officers suddenly saw the light and realized that the Germans would attack, having only about 120 divisions?
In the fall of 1940, the General Staff officers estimate the number of German divisions for the war with the USSR as 173. In January 1941, games were held against the 173-180 spacecraft of German divisions. In the same period, intelligence reports on an increase in the size of the German army, and, therefore, the number of troops allocated for the war with the Soviet Union should increase. In the General Staff document dated 11.3.41, this number was increased to 200 divisions. The next step should be to take this mass of troops into account when developing the Covering Plans …
The Directive of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft to the commander of the Western Military District, Colonel-General D. G. Pavlov. There is no exact date for this Directive, but the approximate time of its preparation is indicated - April 1941. April is later than March 11th … What does the Directive say?
I order to proceed to plan development operational deployment of the armies of the Western Military District, guided by the following instructions … In the event of a war with us, Germany, of its 225 infantry, 20 tank and 15 motorized divisions, will be able to send up to 200 divisions against our borders …
Even a month later, the material set forth in the General Staff Plan of 11.3.41 is quoted verbatim. When developing the Plans, one should be guided by the direction against the USSR of up to 200 divisions! And why do writers tell us that all our military know that 120 German divisions are enough? Maybe later the General Staff will see the light and name the number of 120 German divisions cherished for a number of writers?
We are looking at a well-known document - the draft Note of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, which was drawn up after May 15.
And after 65 days, when developing a new document on the deployment of troops in the General Staff, the number of German divisions allocated for the attack on the USSR is used: significantly more than 120! The number of divisions was reduced to 180, but in the original version it was. And now question: What grouping of German troops in the initial period of the war were the troops of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO to resist? Of course, 180 German divisions, which are considered by the General Staff after May 15, 1941! And with regard to this number of German troops, plans should be developed to cover the indicated VOs!
Directives from the General Staff for the development of new "Covering Plans …" KOVO and ODVO were obliged to take into account this vision of the General Staff, since these Directives were prepared at the beginning of May. Both Directives have the same mark:. Most likely, both Directives left in the first decade of May.
A similar Directive went to ZAPOVO until May 15. This follows from the fact that an extract from the specified Directive of the General Staff to the commander of the 3rd Army was sent from the headquarters of the ZAPOVO on 14.5.41.
There are memories of war veterans that with them in the General Staff, before sending the Directives for the development of the Covering Plans, all issues were worked out for a long time. In other words, the representatives of the districts in the General Staff worked out the deployment of their troops and their actions in the initial period of the war, based on the number of German troops at the border of up to 180 divisions.
Information on the maximum number of German troops was included in the draft of the PribOVO Covering Plans:
The railway network … already on the 12th day of mobilization provides for the concentration of up to 40 reinforced infantry divisions, and the developed network of dirt roads and the presence of a motorway allow the transfer of motorized and mechanized troops, the number of which against the PribOVO can be determined up to 6 TD and 2-3 MD …
Thus, according to the headquarters of the PribOVO, it is possible to concentrate against the troops of the district up to 48-49 German divisions. By June 22, there will actually be 40 of them in the PribOVO reconnaissance area of responsibility. According to the intelligence data of the RU and RO of the district headquarters, there were only 24 of them near the border. A significant part of this number is dispersed quite far from the border. Up to the maximum number of troops, about 50% of the divisions are missing …
On the entire Soviet-German border 21.6.41 g. up to 180 German divisions another 31% of connections were missing … Therefore, the German generals should not have started the war on June 22. And the Soviet command did not assume that the German command needed a significantly smaller number of troops to defeat the frontier grouping of spacecraft …
Error overestimating the capabilities of the spacecraft and the required number of German divisions for an attack on the USSR was one of the two biggest mistakes that led to a surprise attack for the leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft.
Second a mistake, which led to the same consequences, were incorrect RM, which came from our intelligence services. We will continue to consider this issue further.
For many advanced members of the forum, "VO" could be puzzled by the pushing of Directive No. 3 by Stalin on June 22 by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, and the urgent departure of GK Zhukov to KOVO to organize an attack on Lublin. During this period, the Chief of the General Staff is fully confident in the Republic of Moldova, which was represented by the RC of the General Staff of the SC until June 22. According to RU, by 21.6.41, the number of German divisions in the Lublin-Krakow region was 35-36. True, in a day, RU will significantly overestimate this grouping, referring to some new RM. According to the author, they are fictional. The same fictional, as added to the summary information about the SS on the Suvalka ledge. Information obtained from rumors and not confirmed within a month. The same information taken from the air about the presence of up to 14 divisions on the border of Slovakia and Hungary …
So where did the Chief of the General Staff rush to on June 22? And the answer is in the well-known Note of General M. A. Purkaeva:
Timeline for deployment.
1. The Lublin group: a) in the border strip at a distance of up to 250 km are deployed - 10 pd, 2 td, 2 md …; b) the capacity of the railway leading to the Vistula River is 72 pairs, taking into account the optional 48-60 pairs, ie. delivery of one division is possible per day. It is necessary to give a lift to 15-18 divisions. Conclusion: the grouping in the Lublin region can be completed at 15-18 day from its beginning …
2. Krakow grouping: a) in the border zone at a distance of up to 250 km, the following is deployed: infantry and mountain divisions up to 20, tank 2, motorized 2; b) the capacity of the railway to the Vistula line is 126 pairs, taking into account the optional up to 100 pairs, i.e. makes it possible to bring up to 2 divisions daily. Tank and motorized divisions from the Katowice meridian can follow on the ground. You need a ride 10-15 pd … Conclusion: the concentration of the group requires 5-7 days.
The total number of German divisions in the Lublin-Krakow region, according to the Memorandum, before the start of concentration is up to 38 … And according to RU data as of 21.6.41, there were up to 36.
In one of the first parts, a map with a plotted situation on the eve of the war was examined. The map is posted on the Memory of the People website and has a note that the date of its creation is 23.6.41. The figures show fragments of the map that correspond to the German grouping concentrated in the Lublin-Krakow region. In the figures, you can see the areas of deployment up to 30 (one of the divisions was obtained by adding three tank regiments). Infantry divisions in the cities of Radom and Demblin were not counted because the indicated cities belong to the zone of responsibility of the ZAPOVO. The missing 5-6 divisions (up to the number of divisions indicated in the RM) are deployed in the depths outside the figures. The chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft was supposed to see a similar map with the deployment of German troops on June 21 and 22, 1941.
The numbers 38 and 36 are close to each other. And the German command had to give a lift even up to 33 divisions … The Chief of the General Staff had to decide for himself that the German group had not yet concentrated for a full-scale war, and the speed of the attack by mechanized corps would make it possible to break the German divisions on the march to the border one by one!
Did not know at that time GK Zhukov that the German army had already concentrated entirely on the border.
Did not know Chief of the General Staff that the German generals were going to beat the spacecraft units with smaller forces than the General Staff thought about it …
And the last thing. An echo of the expected number of German divisions at the beginning of the war, much more than 120, can be seen in the first intelligence report of RU, which began to be prepared after 20-00 on June 22:
It turns out that the German command concentrated significant forces to the border and only about 30% of them were thrown into battle on June 22. And the maximum number of divisions at the border can reach 173 (100% of 52 divisions). It is strange that the number of divisions 173 coincided with the number of divisions indicated in the Note dated 9/18/40.
The author will try to fantasize further, and fantasies do not require proof. How were 180 German divisions supposed to be distributed along our border?
Against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO, the enemy could concentrate up to 80 divisions (of which 48-49 are against the PribOVO).
The 100 remaining German divisions were concentrated against KOVO and ODVO. Of these, on the borders with Slovakia and Hungary - up to 10 divisions. In Romania, up to 20-25 divisions, of which 15-18 are on the southern flank of KOVO. Then in the Lublin-Krakow region there could be 65-70 remaining German divisions.
In addition, according to 1940 estimates, up to 20-25 non-German divisions (Italian and Hungarian) could be located on the territory of Romania. Plus Slovak, Hungarian and Romanian troops. That is why the main blow was expected against the KOVO troops. This has nothing to do with the version that the southern variant of the enemy's main attack was pushed through by immigrants from KOVO or Stalin …
