Since then, 67 years have passed, but the debate about whose tanks is better continues to this day. True, there is one gap in them: in almost all cases there is a comparison of the calibers of guns, millimeters of armor, armor penetration of shells, rate of fire, speed of movement, reliability, and similar quite "tangible" things. As for tank optics and instruments, then, as a rule, we see approximately the same phrases rewritten from each other: "high-quality German optics" is about German tanks or: "very poor visibility" - this, of course, is already about Soviet cars. These phrases, so "capaciously" characterizing a very important constituent element of the combat power of any tank, are found with enviable constancy in almost any books on this topic. But is it really so? Was the optics of German tanks so "high quality"? Were the instruments of domestic tanks so bad in reality? Or is it all a myth? And if a myth, where did it come from? We will consider all these questions in this article.
First, you need to understand why optical devices are needed in a tank in general and how they work in principle. At the same time, I will immediately make a reservation that the viewing slit in the armor of the tank will not be taken by me for an "optical device". Even if it is closed with a bulletproof triplex, it is just a viewing slit for a direct view - no more. So, in order to destroy a target, the tank must first of all detect and identify this target. Only after the target is detected and defined as an "enemy", the tank needs to accurately aim the weapon at it and fire. What will happen next is already beyond the scope of our research. That is, the process of preparing tank weapons for hitting a target is divided, in fact, into only two main components:
1. Target detection.
2. Targeting.
And the faster these two operations are performed, the more likely our tank is to defeat the enemy. Thus, the optical instruments of the tank are quite specifically divided into two main groups:
1. observational devices / complexes / panoramas, giving a wide field of view for viewing the terrain and target detection devices by the tank crew;
2. optical and infrared sights with high magnification, but a small angle of view for accurate targeting. Guidance drives and stabilizers can also be attributed to this group, since the speed and accuracy of aiming a tank gun at a detected target depends on them.
In accordance with this approach, the functional tasks of the tank crew members are formed. In some tanks, the task of detecting and targeting weapons was solved by one person - the tank commander. Accordingly, he alone served the devices of both functional groups. These include Soviet tanks: T-34 models of 1939, 1941 and 1943, and German Pz. Kpfw I and Pz. Kpfw II.
But still, most of the tank designers, rightly considering this scheme suboptimal, decided to functionally divide the responsibilities of the crew members. The task of the commander was now reduced only to detecting the target and giving target designation to the gunner, as a result of which he himself began to operate only with devices of the 2nd group. The task of hitting the target, that is, aiming the weapon at the target and firing the shot, now fell to the gunner-operator with the devices of the 1st group. At first, the task of communication and command control was solved by a separate person - a radio operator (as a rule, he combined the task with the function of a machine gunner).
This principle, later aptly named as "hunter-shooter", was implemented on Soviet KB series tanks of all brands, T-34-85 mod. 1944 and subsequent combat vehicles. For the Germans, this "innovation" (in quotation marks, because in the navy such a scheme, in its general essence, has operated, almost from time immemorial) was introduced on the light tank Pz. Kpfw II and subsequent models.
So what exactly were these devices on the Soviet and German cars of those times? I will cite just a few of them as examples. Of course, an attentive reader may find that other scopes were installed on the KV-1 or T-34. But the fact is that as the optics of Soviet tanks improved, more and more modern sights and devices were installed on machines of various years. There is no way to list them all and will only lead to confusion. Therefore, I only present some typical modifications.
So let's compare the order and the stages of the war.
1941 year
All tanks were produced with high quality even in peacetime, by highly qualified specialists and with all the resources necessary for this.
Heavy tank KV-1 (crew of 5 people)
The gunner had two sights for targeting:
- telescopic sight TMFD-7 (magnification 2.5x, field of view 15 °), - periscope sight PT4-7 (magnification 2.5x, field of view 26 °), - for firing from the course and stern 7, 62mm DT machine guns, PU optical sights were used, - to illuminate the target in the dark, a searchlight was installed on the gun mask.
The commander for target detection had:
- command panorama PT-K, - 4 periscopic observation devices along the perimeter of the tower.
In addition, there were two sighting slots in the sides of the tower.
The driver had at his disposal:
- 2 periscopic observation devices (one on some tanks) and a viewing slot located on the VLD of the hull in the center.
The drives for aiming the gun horizontally are electric, vertically mechanical. There is no stabilization. The number of daytime optical devices - 11. Nighttime optical devices - 1. The sighting slits - 3. The commander's cupola is absent. There was a side level for shooting from closed positions. The peculiarity of the tank is that domestic designers immediately took the path of creating a specialized observation complex for the commander, rightly deciding that a primitive commander's cupola with narrow sighting slots along its perimeter was already an anachronism, since there was poor visibility through these slots. A very small sector is visible through each specific slot, and when passing from one slot to another, the commander temporarily loses sight of the situation and its landmarks.
With regret, it is worth admitting that the command device PT-K of the KB-1 tank was also far from perfect in this regard, although it made it possible to continuously observe the entire sector at 360 degrees without taking your eyes off the situation. The principle of "hunter shooter" in the tank is implemented. Here is a general assessment of the KB-1 tank's instruments by the Americans: “The sights are excellent, and the viewing instruments are rough but comfortable. The field of view is very good …”[1]. In general, for 1941, the instrumentation of the KB 1 tank was very good, to say the least.
Medium tank T-34 (crew of 4 people)
The gunner (who is also the commander) had:
- telescopic sight TOD-6, - to illuminate the target in the dark, a searchlight was installed on the gun mask [2].
The radio operator-gunner for firing from the front 7, 62-mm machine gun DT used:
- optical sight PU (3x magnification).
The commander (aka the gunner) had:
- command panorama PT-K (on some tanks it was replaced by a rotary, periscopic sight PT4-7), - 2 periscopic devices on the sides of the tower.
The driver had at his disposal:
- 3 periscopic observation devices.
The drives for aiming the gun horizontally are electric, vertically mechanical. There is no stabilization. The number of daytime optical devices - 8. Nighttime optical devices - 1. There are no sighting slits. The commander's cupola is missing.
As you can see, in terms of the number of optical devices, the T-34 tank of the 1939-41 release was somewhat inferior to the KV-1 heavy tank. But its main drawback was that the principle of "hunter-shooter" was not implemented on this tank. On the T-34 of these releases, the commander combined the functions of the gunner. Naturally, in battle, he could get carried away with sighting the target through the TOD-6 telescopic sight (magnification 2.5x, field of view 26 °) and thus completely lose control of the environment. I think there is no need to explain what kind of risk the tank and its crew were exposed to at such moments. To some extent, the loader could help the commander in detecting the enemy. Therefore, in comparison with the heavy KV-1, the T-34 tank of the first releases is still much more "blind".
The opinion of American experts on the T-34 optics: “The sights are excellent, and the observation devices are not finished, but very satisfactory. The general visibility limits are good”[1]. In general, the instrumental equipment of the pre-war T-34 tank was quite at the level. Its main drawback is the lack of a gunner in the tank crew.
Light tank T-26 (crew of 3 people)
I chose this tank for consideration for two reasons. Firstly, the T-26 was the main tank of the Red Army in the pre-war period and was produced in an amount of more than 10,000 pieces. At the beginning of World War II, the share of these tanks in the Red Army units was still significant. Secondly, despite its rather unsightly appearance, the T-26 was the first Soviet tank whose fire control system allowed it to conduct effective aimed fire on the move.
The gunner had two sights for targeting:
- telescopic, vertical stabilized sight TOS-1 with a shot resolution unit, - periscopic sight PT-1, - to illuminate the target in the dark, 2 searchlights were installed on the gun mask, - for firing from the stern 7, 62-mm DT machine gun, there was a diopter sight.
The commander (who is also the loader) for target detection had only two sighting slots along the sides of the tower. To search for a target, he could also use the PT-1 panoramic sight. The driver had only the sighting slit at his disposal.
Thus, the light tank T-26, having rather weak means for detecting a target, at the same time had an excellent chance of hitting this target (if it was still possible to hit it).
The drives for aiming the gun horizontally and vertically are mechanical. The number of daytime optical devices - 2. The number of nighttime optical devices - 2. The number of sighting slits - 3. There is no commander's cupola. The very idea of stabilizing only the sight in the T-26 tank was undoubtedly more successful than the American approach to the problem of firing accuracy on the move - stabilizing the entire gun with dependent mechanical stabilization of the sight from it. The imperfect and low-power VN stabilizer of the American M4 "Sherman" tank did not allow accurately keeping the gun on target, especially when moving over very rough terrain. There was still a pullback during hull vibrations, since the sight had a mechanical connection with the gun - the gunner of this tank also lost its target. The TOS-1 sight of the T-26 tank confidently held the target in the most difficult conditions. When the gunner pressed the fire button, the shot occurred at the moment when the axis of the gun was aligned with the axis of the sight, and the target was hit. TOS-1 had a magnification of 2.5x, a field of view of 15 ° and was designed for aimed firing at a range of up to 6400 m. The PT-1 sight had the same magnification, a field of view of 26 ° and an aiming range of 3600 m. The principle of "hunter-shooter" as a whole was implemented rather doubtfully, since the tank commander had a very limited set of means for target detection and was also distracted to reload the gun.
It should be noted that due to low qualifications and danger in handling, the stabilizer on Lend-Lease M4 Sherman tanks was usually turned off by Soviet tankers. Also for the illiterate soldier crews of the Red Army there was a variant of the T-26 tank with a conventional TOP telescopic sight, similar in characteristics to the TOS-1 stabilized sight.
Light tank Pz. Kpfw III Ausf. G (crew of 5 people)
The gunner for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TZF. Sa (magnification 2, 4x).
The commander had 5 sighting slots in the commander's cupola for target detection. The loader could use 4 sighting slots along the sides of the tower.
The driver mechanic had:
- rotary periscope observation device KFF.1 and 2 sighting slits in the tank hull in front and on the left.
One sighting slot in the right side of the hull was also available for the gunner's radio operator. For firing from a course machine gun, the radio operator-gunner used the same sighting slit.
The horizontal and vertical guidance drives are mechanical. The number of daytime optical devices - 2. The number of nighttime optical devices - 0. The number of sighting slits - 12. There is a commander's cupola.
Surprisingly, this German tank is more than poorly equipped with any optics at all. A particularly striking dissonance is obtained when compared with Soviet tanks. For example, KB-1 had as many as 11 optical devices (!) Versus 2 for the "troika". At the same time, the latter simply catches the eye with a huge number of sighting slots - as many as 12! They, of course, improved the view from the tank, but weakened its protection and in themselves were a vulnerable spot in the tank, while posing a danger to the tankers using them. The commander of this tank was generally deprived of any optical observation devices, except, perhaps, his own binoculars. Plus, there was a commander's cupola, however, again, the commander's cupola did not have any instrumental equipment, and through five narrow slots it was very difficult to see.
Here I still consider it necessary to give a detailed explanation of why I do not consider the sighting slit to be a full-fledged optical observation device. In the case of a periscopic device, a person conducts observation indirectly, being protected by armor. The very same exit pupil of the device is located much higher - very often in the roof of the case or tower. This makes it possible to make the mirror area of the device large enough to provide the required field of view and viewing angles. In the worst case, hitting the device with a bullet or a fragment will only lead to the failure of this device. In the case of the sighting slit, the situation is much more sad. It is simply a narrow slit cut in the armor, through which the person is directly observing. It is clear that such a design is vulnerable and potentially dangerous. The consequences of a bullet or projectile hitting the slot can be different - from damage to the observer's organs of vision, then the failure of the tank. To minimize the likelihood of bullets or shrapnel hitting the viewing slit, its dimensions are minimized, which, in combination with thick armor, greatly narrows the field of view through this slit. In addition, to protect the observer's eyes from bullets or fragments accidentally hitting the gap, it is closed from the inside with thick armored glass - triplex. So a person cannot cling to the sighting slit - he is forced to look through the slit from a certain distance determined by the thickness of the triplex, which naturally narrows the field of view even more. So, no matter how imperfect the periscopic observation devices of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks were, they were a priori an order of magnitude better than the sighting slots of German tanks. This disadvantage was to some extent compensated for by the tactics of the German crews, but more on that below.
Medium tank Pz. Kpfw IV Ausf. F (crew of 5 people)
The gunner for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TZF. Sa.
The commander had 5 sighting slots in the commander's cupola for target detection. The gunner and loader could use 6 sighting slots located on the frontal plate of the tower (two), on the sides of the tower (two) and on the side hatches of the tower (also two).
The driver had:
- rotary periscope KFF.2 and wide viewing slit. The radio operator-gunner had two viewing slots.
As a result: the drive is electric horizontally, mechanical vertically, there is no stabilization, there is a commander's cupola, the number of daytime optical devices is 2, the number of nighttime optical devices is 0, the number of sighting slits is 14 (!).
Thus, we can say that at the beginning of the war, our tanks in peacetime had incomparably richer and more diverse equipment with optical devices than their German opponents. At the same time, the number of archaic sighting slots was minimized (KV-1, T-26), or they were absent altogether (T-34). The absence of a commander's cupola is explained by its uselessness on the KB-1 and T-34 tanks, (so as not to increase the height of the tank) with specialized optical observation devices for the PT-K commander for target detection, which provide all-round visibility.
1943 year
This period is associated with the extremely difficult situation in the USSR. Huge losses at the front and the seizure of vast territories of the country by the enemy could not but affect the volume and quality of products. Changes were made to the design of Soviet tanks aimed mainly at simplifying and reducing the cost of their design. In factories at the machines were no longer skilled workers, but often women and children. Tank crews were also recruited from people who did not have sufficient training in this matter, which, combined with a not very competent organization of command and control, gave rise to expressions like: "A tank fights for an average of five minutes," etc.
Naturally, this left an imprint on the configuration and appearance of Soviet tanks of this period. Speaking specifically about optics, Soviet tanks lost an optical searchlight for illuminating targets at night, since in conditions of intense shelling, it very quickly fell into disrepair. It was abandoned on most tanks at the beginning of the war.
Optical, periscopic observation devices on the most massive T-34 tank in some places were replaced with simple sighting slits. They abandoned optical sights for machine guns, replacing them with dioptric ones. Obvious regression, but there was no other way out then. Often the tank was deprived of even the sights and instruments it needed in battle. In this sense, Soviet tanks produced in 1942-43 were far from their own pre-war relatives.
At the same time, one cannot fail to note the correct conclusions made by the Soviet military and designers. First, the KV-1S high-speed heavy tank was created (speed up to 43 km / h on the highway). And soon, in response to the appearance of the heavy tank Pz. Kpfw VI "Tiger" from the Germans, we got a new model - the KV-85 with a powerful and accurate 85 mm D-5T cannon, updated sights and fire control devices in a completely new spacious turret … This highly mobile (relatively, of course) tank with powerful armament, excellent optics and better protection than the German Panther tank in capable hands turned out to be a very effective means of dealing with enemy tanks of any type (the only exception was the King Tiger).
The main medium tank T-34 was also modernized, which also received new instruments and a commander's cupola. The German industry, although it suffered from the bombing, was still able to produce tanks quite comfortably and with high quality during the period described, without particularly saving on them.
Heavy tank KV-1S (crew of 5 people)
The gunner had two sights for targeting:
- telescopic sight 9T-7, - PT4-7 periscope sight.
The commander for target detection had:
- 5 periscopes in the commander's cupola, - for firing from the stern 7, 62-mm machine gun DT, the commander used a diopter sight.
The loader for observing the environment had:
- 2 periscopes in the roof of the tower. In addition, he had at his disposal 2 sighting slots along the sides of the tower.
The radio operator-gunner for observation had only a diopter sight of the course 7, 62-mm machine gun DT.
The driver watched the situation through:
- periscope device in the roof of the hull. In addition, he had a sighting slit in the center of the VLD of the hull.
The drive is electric horizontally and mechanical vertically. There is no stabilization. There is a commander's turret. The number of daytime optical devices - 10. The number of nighttime optical devices - 0. The number of sighting slits - 3. The tank implements the "hunter-shooter" principle.
Heavy tank KV-85 (crew of 4 people)
The gunner had two sights for targeting:
- telescopic sight 10Т-15 (magnification 2.5x, field of view 16 °), - PT4-15 periscope sight.
There was a side level for shooting from closed positions.
The commander used to detect the target:
- periscopic rotating device MK-4 giving a 360 ° field of view. As a backup means of observation, there were 6 sighting slots in the commander's cupola. For firing from the stern 7, 62-mm DT machine gun, a PU telescopic sight was used.
The loader monitored through:
- periscope device MK-4. In addition to it, there were 2 sighting slots in the sides of the tower.
The driver mechanic used:
- 2 periscopic devices MK-4 and a sighting slit in the center of the hull VLD.
The drive of the horizontal guidance is electric, the vertical is mechanical. There is no stabilization. There is a commander's turret. The number of daytime optical devices - 7. The number of nighttime optical devices - 0. The number of sighting slits - 9. The tank implements the "hunter-shooter" principle.
A distinctive feature of the tank was that its spacious fighting compartment provided good living conditions and easy maintenance of the accurate and rapid-fire 85-mm D-5T-85 cannon, which easily penetrated the Tiger's frontal armor from a distance of 1000-1200 m, that is at the distance DPV [3]. At the same time, the tank commander for detecting targets received at his disposal a high-quality wide-angle periscope prismatic device MK-4, which allowed him, without taking his eyes off, to smoothly trace the entire circular sector with a wide angle of view. Thus, the KV-85 commander, unlike the commanders of German vehicles, did not need to open the hatch and stick his head out of the tank, exposing himself to danger (domestic snipers, for example, watched the commander's hatches of German tanks).
Qualitatively and quantitatively, the KV-85 was equipped with optics at least as good as any foreign tank, including the Tiger with the Panther. It was the PT-K and MK-4 devices that became the embryos of the sighting and observation command complexes of Soviet post-war main battle tanks.
Medium tank T-34 (crew of 4 people)
This is the most massive domestic tank. In 1943, it was produced at as many as six factories with many related enterprises, and therefore is a real "designer for adults". Despite the huge number of copies produced (more than 60,000 units), it is unlikely that even two completely identical tanks will be encountered. Some of the enterprises that were engaged in the production of the T-34, during the war years, were reoriented to the production of it already during the war, and initially were not engaged in the production of such products. Naturally, the quality of the product and its good equipment, as was the case in the pre-war years, in 1942 could be safely forgotten. Tanks T-34 were produced at this time extremely "skinned" and simplified. The quality of assembly of components and assemblies made it possible to drive on their own from the gates of the plant to the battlefield. Despite such a sad situation, there was also a place for some innovations introduced into the design of this popular, mass tank.
The gunner (who is also the commander) had two sights for aiming at the target:
- telescopic sight TMFD-7, - PT4-7 periscope sight.
The commander (aka the gunner) had:
- periscope device MK-4 on the commander's cupola. As a backup means of observation, there were 5 sighting slots along the perimeter of the commander's cupola.
The loader had at his disposal:
- periscope device MK-4. In addition to this, there were 2 sighting slots along the sides of the tower.
The driver monitored through:
- 2 periscopic devices located in its hatch.
The radio operator-shooter did not have a means of observation, except for the diopter sight of his machine gun.
The drives are electric horizontally, and mechanical vertically. There is no stabilization. There is a commander's turret. The number of daytime optical devices - 6. The number of nighttime optical devices - 0. The number of sighting slits - 7. The principle of "hunter-gunner" is not implemented in the tank and this is one of its serious drawbacks.
One person (the commander, who is also the gunner) was not able to maintain the devices of both functional groups and it was very difficult for him to separate the attention loops into these two positions. Usually, hunting excitement forced the commander to look through the telescopic sight TMFD-7. At the same time, he no longer cared about the commander's cupola with a specialized MK-4 device installed in it. It was more convenient for the gunner commander to search for the target through the PT4-7 periscope sight located nearby. This sight had a 26 ° field of view and could be rotated to provide a 360 ° field of view. For this reason, the commander's cupola on the T-34-76 did not take root and it was not installed on many tanks of this type at all. The poor quality of glass of this period used for the optics of the tank reduced visibility even more.
Here is the opinion of American experts on the optics of the T-34 tank produced in 1942: "The design of the sight was recognized as excellent, even the best in the world known to American designers, but the quality of the glass left much to be desired" [4]. However, already in the middle of 1943, the Izium Optical Glass Plant (evacuated in 1942) was able to raise the quality of its products to world standards. At the same time, by their design, domestic sights have always been at least in the "top three".
Medium tank Pz. Kpfw IV Ausf. H (crew of 5 people)
The gunner for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TZF. Sf.
The commander had 5 sighting slots in the commander's cupola for target detection.
The driver had:
- rotary periscope KFF.2 and wide viewing slit.
The radio operator-gunner had only a machine gun diopter sight.
The horizontal guidance drives are electric (on some tanks, mechanical), vertical, mechanical, there is no stabilization. There is a commander's turret. Number of daytime optical devices - 2. Number of nighttime optical devices - 0. Number of sighting slits - 6.
Changes were made to the design of the tank aimed at maximizing firepower and protection. At the same time, equipping the tank with instruments and optics was greatly simplified. With the installation of on-board anti-cumulative screens, it was necessary to eliminate the sighting slots on the sides of the hull and turret. On some of the tanks, they also abandoned the electric turret rotation drive! Then they abandoned the KFF.2 driver's periscope device, so that all the optics of this tank began to be made up of only one gunner's sight.
Heavy tank Pz. Kpfw VI. Ausf E "Tiger" (crew of 5 people)
The gunner for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TZF.9b (2.5x magnification, 23 ° field of view). To observe the terrain, he could use the sighting slot in the left side of the tower.
The commander used 6 sighting slots in the commander's cupola for target detection. The loader could use:
- a periscope device in the roof of the tower and a sighting slot in the starboard side of the tower.
The driver mechanic used:
- sighting slit and fixed periscope device in the hatch cover.
The radio operator-machine gunner used:
- an optical sight KZF.2 7, 92-mm machine gun and a fixed periscope device in the hatch cover.
As a result, the tank had hydraulic horizontal and vertical guidance drives, there was no stabilization, there was a commander's cupola, the number of daytime optical devices was 4. The number of night optical devices was 0. The number of sighting slots was 9. The tank implemented the hunter-gunner principle.
As you can see, the difference between this tank and its lighter counterparts is mainly only in the fact that some of the auxiliary sighting slots (loader, gunner, mechanic) were replaced with fixed periscopic devices. At the same time, the commander had the same notorious commander's cupola with narrow and blind "sighting slots" at his disposal to search for targets, which was already used as a reserve on Soviet tanks at that time (the only exception was KB-1C).
The main advantage of this tank and one of its main disadvantages: hydraulic drives for horizontal and vertical guidance. This allowed the gunner to accurately aim the gun at the target without physical effort. But there were also disadvantages: extremely slow rotation of the tower and high fire hazard of the entire system. Soviet tanks had an electric turret turning mechanism (MPB) and manual vertical guidance. This provided a high speed of rotation of the turret and allowed them to very quickly transfer the cannon to a newly detected target, but it was difficult to aim right away from being unaccustomed. Inexperienced gunners then had to adjust it manually.
1945 year
The period can be described as extremely difficult for the German industry. Nevertheless, the agonizing "Third Reich" frantically tried to find a miracle weapon capable of turning the tide of the war. Unable to produce armored vehicles in the required scale, comparable to the volume of production in the USSR and the USA, the Wehrmacht made the only possible decision, as it was believed then: to create a model, albeit complex and expensive, but at the same time capable of superior quality to the opponents [5]. By the way, it was not possible to surpass it “by the head”. Nevertheless, this period is interesting with the appearance of such monstrous structures as the heavy tank "King Tiger", the self-propelled gun "Jagdtigr", the super-heavy tank "Mouse". Only the heavy tank Pz. Kpfw VI Ausf turned out to be a more or less viable specimen. In "King Tiger" or "Tiger II". Also, one cannot fail to note the appearance on the battlefield of a new, heavy tank Pz. Kpfw V "Panther" and a self-propelled gun "Jagdpanther", created on its basis.
Unlike Germany, the flywheel of Soviet power, including industrial power, continued to unwind. A new heavy tank, the IS-2, was created. The tank was armed with an exceptionally powerful 122 mm D-25T rifled cannon, which easily penetrated the frontal armor of any German tank at all distances of the tank battle of that time. The IS-2 was not a specialized anti-tank weapon - for this role, the rate of fire of its gun was clearly insufficient. It was a heavy breakthrough tank. Nevertheless, in the case of a duel with any German tank, the ISu needed to hit it only once. "One-two-two" usually made the death of any German tank instant and bright. In accordance with these performance characteristics, the tactics of using the IS-2 tank against enemy armored vehicles were developed. Now our tankers had no need to approach the German "cat" almost point-blank - there was no need to worry about the penetrating power of the D-25T. On the contrary, it was necessary to notice the enemy as early as possible and, turning his forehead towards him, begin to calmly shoot him from a distance at which the 75-mm Panther cannons and 88-mm Tigers cannons were still powerless in front of the heavy armor of the tank. IS-2.
To increase the effective range of the powerful cannon for the IS-2 tank, a new articulated, telescopic, monocular sight TSh-17 was developed, which had a 4x magnification.
The IS-2 tank was created back in 1943. In 1944, it was improved. And in 1945, the super-powerful heavy tank IS-3 was created, which for many years determined the path of development of Soviet heavy tanks.
A very successful and effective heavy tank KB-85 was discontinued (148 KB-85 tanks were produced with 85-mm NP D-5T, one KB-100 tank with 100-mm NP D-10T and one KB-122 tank with 122-mm NP D-25T) in favor of the IS-2, and the role of the fighter tank passed to the cheaper and more technologically advanced T-34-85. This medium tank appeared in 1944 on the basis of the famous "thirty-four" early production. He was very mobile, coped well with German medium-sized vehicles, although the T-34-85 still failed against the Tigers and Panthers - the lower level of booking affected. The manufacturing quality of the tank already corresponded to international standards. The same can be said about the American medium tank M4 "Sherman" supplied to the USSR via Lend-Lease.
Medium tank T-34-85 (crew of 5 people)
This vehicle is the result of a deep modernization of the T-34 tank. On the extended pursuit, a new spacious turret for three people with reinforced armor was installed. Depending on the modification, the tank could be equipped with 85 mm D-5T or S-53 rifled guns. Both guns are identical in ballistics. A gunner appeared in the crew (finally, in 1944!) As a result of which the "hunter-gunner" principle was implemented. The instrumental equipment has been significantly updated.
The gunner had two sights for targeting:
- telescopic sight TSh-16 (magnification 4x, field of view 16 °), - PTK-5 panoramic periscope sight, as well as a side level for shooting from closed positions.
For target detection, the commander had:
- periscope observation device MK-4 in the commander's cupola. As a backup, there were 5 sighting slots in the commander's cupola.
The gunner had:
- periscope observation device MK-4 in the roof of the tower.
The shooter for firing a course 7, 62-mm machine gun DT used:
- telescopic sight PPU-8T.
The driver-mechanic conducted observations through:
- 2 periscopic observation devices in the hatch cover.
For the tank, the STP-S-53 armament stabilizer was developed in the vertical plane, but due to its low reliability, it was not implemented [6]. Thus, the horizontal guidance drive is electric, and the vertical one is mechanical. There is a commander's turret. There is no stabilization. The number of daytime optical devices - 7. The number of nighttime optical devices - 0. The number of sighting slits - 5. The tank implements the "hunter-shooter" principle.
Heavy tank IS-2 (crew of 4 people)
The gunner had two sights for targeting:
- telescopic sight TSh-17 (magnification 4x, field of view 16 °), - periscopic sight PT4-17. Side level for shooting from closed positions.
For target detection, the commander had:
- periscopic rotating device MK-4 giving a 360 ° field of view. As a backup means of observation, there were 6 sighting slots in the commander's cupola, - telescopic sight PPU-8T was used for firing from the stern 7, 62-mm machine gun DT, - collimator sight K8-T - for firing from an anti-aircraft 12, 7-mm machine gun DShK.
The loader monitored through:
- periscope device MK-4. In addition to it, there were 2 sighting slots in the sides of the tower.
The driver mechanic used:
- 2 periscopic devices MK-4 and a sighting slit in the center of the hull VLD.
The drives for aiming the gun horizontally are electric, vertically - mechanical. There is a commander's turret. Number of daytime optical devices - 8. Number of nighttime optical devices - 0. Number of sighting slits - 9. No stabilization. The tank implements the "hunter-shooter" principle.
Talking about the optics of Soviet tanks of the last year of the war, it should be noted that some of them were equipped with active infrared night observation devices for the driver. These domestic devices were still very imperfect at that time and provided a range of vision in complete darkness of no more than 20-25 meters. Nevertheless, they allowed the driver-mechanics to drive the tank quite confidently at night without turning on the usual headlights that unmasked them. Since these devices were used only for controlling the tank, and not for firing from it, I did not add them to the configuration of the Soviet tanks considered in the article.
Heavy tank IS-3 (crew of 4 people)
This super-powerful tank was created at the very end of the war on the basis of components and assemblies of the IS-2 heavy tank and did not take part in hostilities with Germany. The IS-3 had a very sophisticated and carefully calculated ballistic hull and turret. At heading and side angles, almost any point of impact on this tank gave a ricochet. All this was combined with the crazy thickness of the armor (the turret in a circle - up to 220 mm!) And the low hull height. Not a single tank of that time could do almost anything with the IS-3 armor, whose own 122-mm cannon quite confidently took, in general, any tank of that time at all distances (with the "Royal Tiger" it is certainly worse, but it was quite permeable). We also strengthened our firepower. The commander of this tank was the first in the world to receive an automatic targeting system for the gunner.
This innovation turned out to be very useful and, in a slightly modified version, is also used on modern tanks. The advantage of a tank equipped with such a system is obvious and here's why. If two tanks with similar performance characteristics meet in a battle, the victory is usually won by the one who was the first to detect the enemy. I already began to discuss this topic at the beginning of the article and now I will summarize its logical conclusion. If both tanks saw each other at the same time or almost simultaneously, the winner is the one who opens aimed fire first and hits the enemy. The time from the moment a target is detected to the moment an aimed fire is opened on it is called the “target reaction time”. This time includes:
1. The time required to load the gun with the required type of ammunition and prepare the gun for firing.
2. The time required for the gunner to see the target previously detected by the commander in the lens of his sight.
3. The time needed for the gunner to accurately aim and fire.
If everything is clear with the first and third points, then the second point requires clarification. In all previous tanks, the commander, after he found the target through his devices, began to voice (through the TPU, naturally) to explain to the gunner exactly where it was. At the same time, while the commander can choose the right words to describe the location of the target, until the gunner understands where it is, until he can “grope” it with his sight, which has a relatively narrow field of view … All this took precious seconds, which in some desperate situations became fatal for tankers.
On the new IS-3 tank, everything was different. The commander, having detected the target through his commander's prismatic device MK-4 (later replaced on the IS-3M with the commander's periscope, stereoscopic device TPK-1 having a variable 1x-5x magnification) and not saying a word to the gunner, simply pressed the button. The tower automatically turned in the direction where the MK-4 commander's device was looking and the target was in the field of view of the gunner's sight. Further - a matter of technology. Everything is easy and simple - I saw the target, a couple of seconds and the gunner was already aiming at it.
Another feature of the IS-3 tank is the rejection of the commander's cupola, which gave an "excellent overview" of the terrain, according to some historians of armored vehicles. From the previous explanations, it is clear that in Soviet tanks the commander looked for a target through a special commander's device: PT-K or MK-4 - it doesn't matter. It is important that the sighting slots in the commander's cupola were left as a backup (in case of damage to the commander's device, for example) and in reality they were almost never used. The view through them was not comparable to the view through the MK-4. So they decided on the IS-3, so as not to increase the mass and height of the car, to completely abandon this anachronism (as it turned out, it was still too early). The consequence of this was a large dead zone of the commander's device in the right-down direction (it was especially felt when the tank was tilted to the left side). Gone are the sighting slots in the armor of the tank.
So, IS-3. The gunner for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TSh-17.
To observe the terrain, he had:
- periscopic observation device MK-4. There was a side level for shooting from closed positions.
The commander used to detect targets:
- periscopic observation device MK-4 with the TAEN-1 automated target designation system, - collimator sight K8-T for firing a 12, 7-mm anti-aircraft machine gun DShK.
The loader had:
- periscope observation device MK-4 in the roof of the tower.
The driver-mechanic in a combat position monitored through:
- periscope observation device MK-4.
In the stowed position, he drove the tank with his head out of the hatch.
An advantageous distinguishing feature of the IS-3 was the so-called "pike nose", where the VLD consisted of three armor plates located at an angle to each other. In addition to enhanced projectile resistance, this shape of the nose allowed the mechanic of the IS-3 tank driver to calmly climb in and out of the tank with the cannon turned directly at the nose and zero elevation angle. And this despite the tower moved to the bow. It would be great if the creators of modern domestic main battle tanks turned their attention to this remarkable design. And the tower will not have to be kept turned to the side all the time and the life of the driver-mechanics would be made easier.
The drives are electric horizontally, and mechanical vertically. There is no stabilization. There is no commander's cupola. The number of daytime optical devices - 6. The number of nighttime optical devices - 0. The number of sighting slits - 0. The principle of "hunter-shooter" is well implemented in the tank.
Later, a modernized version of this IS-3M tank was created, in which sights and fire control devices were improved, night vision devices were introduced, and the tank's ammunition load was replenished with new feathered armor-piercing sub-caliber projectiles (BOPS) for the 122-mm D-25T cannon, capable of at a distance of 1000 m, penetrate 300 mm thick armor along the normal.
Heavy tank Pz. Kpfw V. Ausf G. "Panther" (crew of 5 people)
Actually, according to the German classification, the Panther was a medium tank, but according to our classification, anything heavier than 40 tons was considered a heavy tank. And "Panther" weighed 46, 5 tons. The Soviet approximate analogue of this German "cat" was the KV-85, which was very close to it in its performance characteristics. The Germans turned out the tank quite good, although in its "philosophy" it was an example of a purely German approach to the design of tanks.
The highlight of the "Panther" was that a small part of the tanks of this type received active infrared night vision devices of the commander Sperber FG 1250. This device was installed on the commander's cupola and was not intended for shooting, but for detecting targets by the commander in the dark. It consisted of an image convector and an infrared illuminator designed to illuminate the target with an infrared beam. The range of vision of the device at night by modern standards was small - about 200 m. At the same time, the gunner did not have such a device and did not see anything in his sight at night, just like the gunners of any other tanks of that time. Therefore, he still could not conduct aimed fire at night. The shooting was carried out blindly at the verbal prompts of the commander. Likewise, the mechanic driver drove the tank at night, focusing exclusively on the commands of the tank commander. However, even in this form, these devices provided the Panthers with an advantage at night over Soviet and Allied tanks. Naturally, they were much more modern than the first domestic night vision devices, which I mentioned when describing the IS-2 heavy tank. The existence of such a "night" version of the "Panthers" by the enemy led to some nervousness of the crews of Soviet tanks in the dark.
The gunner for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TZF-12A (had a variable magnification factor of 2, 5x-5x and, in accordance with this, a changing field of view of 30 ° -15 °).
For target detection, the commander had:
- 7 periscopic observation devices in the commander's cupola, - active infrared night vision device Sperber FG 1250 (range of vision at night up to 200 m).
The loader had no observation devices.
The driver was driving the tank using:
- rotary periscopic observation device.
The radio operator-gunner had:
- optical sight KZF.2 7, 92-mm machine gun MG.34 and periscope observation device.
The horizontal and vertical guidance drives are hydraulic. There is a commander's turret. There is no stabilization. The number of daytime optical devices - 10. The number of nighttime optical devices - 2. The number of sighting slits - 0. The principle of "hunter-gunner" is implemented in the tank. There was a system for blowing the barrel with compressed air, which reduced the gas contamination of the fighting compartment. Soviet tanks of that time cost only the VU of the fighting compartment.
This tank, in fact, absorbed all the best that the German industry of that time could give. The latest modifications of the tank (Ausf F) were even equipped with optical rangefinders. "Panthers" were a formidable opponent for domestic and American medium tanks (most often encountered on the battlefield). At the same time, its organic shortcomings due to the "German" approach to design, namely: large dimensions, which with a mass of 46, 5 tons made its protection worse than that of the Soviet KV-85 tank of the same mass and much worse than that of IS-2. A clear discrepancy between the caliber of the 75 mm gun and this size and weight.
As a result, the tank did not withstand combat contact with Soviet heavy tanks of the IS-2 type. There is a known case of the complete defeat of the "Panther" with a 122-mm armor-piercing projectile of the IS-2 tank from a distance of 3000 m. The 85-mm KV-85 and T-34-85 cannons had no problems with this German beast either.
It is also interesting to note how the appearance of German tanks changed during the war. The Germans were initially very proud of the convenience of their tanks. Their light and medium tanks of the beginning of the war were full of numerous hatches, hatches, sighting slots and plugs. The example of "Panther" shows that the Germans ultimately followed the path of Soviet designers. The number of holes in the Panther's armor has been minimized. The sighting slits and plugs are completely absent.
Very few Panthers were produced at night, and they drowned in the mass of their usual, daytime twin brothers. However, I considered it necessary to dwell on this model in detail, since otherwise the silence about them can be regarded as playing along with the Soviet tanks. I have the courage to claim at least some objectivity.
Heavy tank Pz. Kpfw VI. Ausf V. "Royal Tiger" (crew of 5 people)
This tank was created at the very end of the war in a vain attempt to surpass the quality of the advancing Soviet tanks. Naturally, these tanks no longer smelled of "German quality". Everything was done very roughly and hastily (like the T-34 in 1942). His 88-mm cannon from the Ferdinand self-propelled gun was quite effective, but the tank itself, which is a kind of enlarged Panther, turned out to be as heavy and inactive as it was unreliable. In other words, the German designers managed to create a super-heavy tank. A good tank is not. And experienced German tankers still preferred to use ordinary "Tigers".
Here are the words of the authoritative German tanker Otto Karius (fought in Pz.38 (t), "Tigre", "Jagdtigre"), who, according to some sources, has about 150 destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns: "If you are talking about Konigstiger (Tiger II), then I I do not see any real improvements - heavier, less reliable, less maneuverable”[7]. Of course, Otto Carius is somewhat disingenuous, as he was very fond of his usual "Tiger". For example, the armor of the "King Tiger" cannot even be compared with the usual "Tiger", but on the whole his assessment is quite correct.
The gunner of the "Royal Tiger" for aiming at the target had:
- telescopic sight TZF-9d / l (had variable magnification 3x – 6x).
For target detection, the commander had:
- 7 periscopic observation devices in the commander's cupola.
The charger used:
- periscope observation device in the roof of the tower.
The radio operator-shooter used:
- telescopic sight to 7, 92-mm machine gun MG.34 KZF.2, - a periscope device in the roof of the hull.
The driver was monitoring through a periscope observation device.
Thus, the drives for horizontal and vertical guidance are hydraulic, there is no stabilization, there is a commander's cupola, the number of daytime optical devices is 11. The number of nighttime optical devices is 0. The number of sighting slits is 0. The principle of "hunter-gunner" is implemented in the tank.
In the course of analyzing the comparative characteristics of sights and observation devices of domestic and German tanks, equipping tanks with these devices and their functional distribution, a conclusion suggests itself that does not confirm the widespread opinion about the "high-quality optics" of German tanks and the "bad" field of view of Soviet tanks. In other words, this is another myth rooted in repeated repetition.
As can be seen from the comparative tables, Soviet tanks initially, even before the war, had on average richer optics equipment than their German opponents, except for the "fly in the ointment" in the form of a small number of "Panthers" with night observation devices. Where the German tanks had one sight, the Soviets had two. Where the Soviet tanks had a specialized commander's device for detecting targets, the Germans made do with a primitive turret with narrow sighting slots. Where the German tanks had sighting slits, the Soviet ones had periscopic devices.
Let's dwell on some of these positions in more detail.
What are two scopes? In battle, a tank sight can easily be, if not broken, then elementarily spattered with mud. The Soviet gunner could use the second sight, and put the first one in order after the battle in a calm atmosphere. In a similar situation, the German tank turned into a non-combatant "punching bag". He had to either be taken out of the battle, weakening his strength for a while, or right in battle, one of the crew members had to get out with a rag and wipe him. How this could turn out, I think there is no need to explain.
In what way the periscopic device is better than a simple sighting slit has already been explained above.
Now about the command devices of the first functional group, that is, those intended for target detection. In the creation of such observation devices, and later the commander's sighting and observation complexes based on them, we were ahead of the Germans for the entire war. Even the pre-war KB-1 and T-34 tanks had a special command panoramic PT-K rotating device and its modifications. German tanks did not possess such devices throughout the war. All models of German tanks for the commander's terrain had only commander's turrets, on which, however, later the sighting slits were replaced by 6-7 periscopic devices, giving a larger field of view. The commander's cupola appeared on Soviet tanks, but very soon (on the IS-3) it was abandoned as unnecessary. Thus, talk about an "excellent" field of view of German tanks is not true. The German commanders eliminated this lack of visibility of their tanks in a very simple and original way. If you hear a speech about a large field of view from German tanks, then the following pictures should be presented to you first of all:
Immediately striking is the commander's head sticking out of the hatch. This is the explanation for the excellent visibility from German tanks. Almost all the commanders of German tanks, even in battle, constantly leaned out of the hatch and monitored the battlefield with binoculars. Of course, they were at great risk of getting a splinter or a sniper's bullet in the head, but they had absolutely no other choice. They could not see anything from inside the tank.
German tanker Otto Karius commented on this problem: “Tank commanders who close the hatches at the beginning of an attack and open them only after the goal has been achieved are worthless, or at least second-rate commanders. There are, of course, six or eight observation devices installed in a circle in each tower to provide observation of the terrain, but they are only good for observing specific areas of the terrain, limited by the ability of each individual observation device. If the commander looks at the left observation device while the anti-tank gun opens fire from the right, it will take him a long time before he recognizes it from inside a tightly closed tank. " … “No one will deny that many officers and tank commanders died because they poked their heads out of the tank. But their death was not in vain. If they had driven with hatches closed, many more people would have been killed or seriously injured in their tanks. The significant losses in the Russian tank forces attests to the validity of this statement. Fortunately for us, they almost always drove over rough terrain with tightly battened hatches. Of course, every tank commander must be careful when looking out during trench warfare. Especially for the reason that enemy snipers constantly watched the turret hatches of the tanks. Even if the tank commander stuck out for a short time, he could die. I got a foldable artillery periscope to protect myself from this. Perhaps, such a periscope should have been on every combat vehicle”[8].
Although the conclusions of Otto Carius are close to the truth, they are fundamentally completely wrong. In the process of describing the tanks, I have already given an explanation of what is the superiority of a specialized rotating commander's observation device over a commander's cupola with several fixed sighting slits or periscopic devices. I will quote myself: "the commander of the tank for detecting targets received at his disposal a high-quality wide-angle periscope prismatic device MK-4, which allowed him, without taking his eyes off, to smoothly trace the entire circular sector with a wide angle of view." … “Having rightly decided that a primitive commander's cupola with narrow sighting slots along its perimeter is already an anachronism, since it is difficult to see through these cracks. A very small sector is visible through each specific slot, and when passing from one slot to another, the commander temporarily loses sight of the situation and its landmarks."
Otto Karius essentially meant this, forgetting that such a primitive measure as a "folding artillery periscope" transported in a tank, in Soviet vehicles, in fact, was already implemented in the form of commander's panoramas and wide-angle, rotary, periscopic, observation devices of the commander.
A few words about the MK-4 device. It was not a domestic development, but was a copy of the English MK. IV device. Otto Carius' conclusion that we suffered great losses in tanks due to the fact that our tank commanders did not protrude out of the hatch in battle is, of course, erroneous. The commanders of domestic tanks simply did not need to protrude from the hatches, since in the domestic tank they had all the necessary means for a high-quality view of the terrain. The reasons for the large tank losses of the USSR should be looked for elsewhere, but more on that below.
Comparison of the characteristics of the sights also does not give grounds to consider the sights of Soviet tanks to be bad. Their design was fully consistent with the world level of that time. Yes, the Germans experimented with stereoscopic sights and optical rangefinders, but such devices did not get widespread then.
Thus, a comparative analysis of tank sights also does not confirm the widespread opinion about their "primitiveness" on Soviet tanks during the Second World War. In some ways they were better than the German ones, in others - the Soviet models. Domestic tanks were in the lead in stabilization devices, surveillance and sighting systems, and were among the first to receive an electric gun trigger. German tanks were the first in night vision systems, perfection of guidance drives and post-shot blowing devices.
But since the myth exists, it means that there was some kind of ground for its emergence. There are several reasons for approving this point of view. Let's take a quick look at some of them.
The first reason. The main Soviet tank T-34, in which the commander combined the functions of the gunner. The flaw of such a management option is obvious and has already been explained more than once in the course of the article. No matter how perfect the observation devices of the tank are, there is only one man and he cannot burst. Moreover, the T-34 was the most massive tank of the war and, purely statistically, it was much more often "caught" by the enemy. Often transported on the armor, the infantry could not help here - the infantrymen had no connection with the tankers.
The second reason. The quality of the glass itself used in the scopes. In the most difficult years of the war, the quality of the optics of domestic sights and devices was very poor for obvious reasons. It worsened especially after the evacuation of optical glass factories. Soviet tanker S. L. Aria recalls: “The triplexes on the driver's hatch were completely ugly. They were made of hideous yellow or green plexiglass, which gave a completely distorted, wavy picture. It was impossible to disassemble anything through such a triplex, especially in a jumping tank”[9]. The quality of German scopes of this period, equipped with Zeiss optics, was incomparably better. In 1945, the situation changed. The Soviet industry brought the quality of optics to the required level. The quality of German sights of this period (as well as of tanks in general) at least did not improve. It is enough just to see detailed photographs of the "Royal Tiger" to understand that the former "German quality" is no longer there.
The third reason. The difference is in the level of training and tactics of combat. It is no secret that the level of training of German tankers was extremely high. They had ample time to prepare and had training tanks at their disposal, including everything needed for this purpose. In addition, the Germans had considerable combat experience in fighting enemy tanks. This was combined with the relative freedom of the German tank commanders and the special tactics of combat. German tankers were distinguished by the ability to "graze" on the battlefield, that is, choosing the most convenient positions to wait for their prey.
Even in the offensive, German tanks moved relatively slowly, preferring speed and control of the environment. All this happened with clear interaction with their infantry and observers. Such tactics of combat, as a rule, allowed German tanks, if not the first, then at least in time to detect the threat and adequately respond to it: open pre-emptive fire on the target or take cover in the folds of the terrain.
Domestic "elite" heavy tanks of the IS-2 type were the closest to this level of training and combat. Their crews were manned only by experienced military personnel with officer positions. Even the loaders had a rank of not lower than petty officer. They did not rush into attacks at maximum speed, since the IS-2 tank did not need this (the 122-mm gun did not require rapprochement with the target), and the IS-2 did not have the proper speed. Therefore, the tactics of using heavy tanks IS-2 was about the same as that of the Germans, and in dueling situations the IS-2 usually emerged victorious. But with the medium T-34, the situation was somewhat different. Their crews were usually soldiers, who, of course, also trained and knew the material part of their tanks well, but the level of their combat training, nevertheless, was significantly inferior to the German one. In addition, the low power of the 76-mm F-32/34 / ZiS-5 cannons required the maximum possible rapprochement with the target. All this gave rise to the tactics of attacks at the highest possible speed.
Everyone should understand that through unstabilized tank optical observation devices of that time, and even more so through sighting slits, in a tank galloping over bumps at a speed of 30-40 km / h, only a flicker of earth and sky could be seen. Control over the environment was completely lost. This is typical for any tank of that period and is not a reason to consider the visibility of the T-34 tank to be bad. It was just used like that, and aimed shooting was possible only from the spot. If Otto Karius or Michael Wittmann were ordered to attack our positions head-on and they would have dispersed their "Tiger" from the mountain to 40 km / h, then they absolutely would not see anything in the same way (unless, of course, they would not go into battle as usual, sticking his head out of the hatch) and would hardly have been able to destroy so many of our tanks and self-propelled guns.
Summing up the final result, I would like to note that the most modern layout and functional diagram of sighting and sighting devices was technically implemented on domestic tanks at that time. However, in the most difficult 1942 year of the war, the forced tactics of using medium tanks, poor quality glass of sights and some lag in tank artillery systems (why did the powerful 107-mm rifled gun ZiS-6 need to create huge monsters such as KV-3 / -4 / -5 and what for this gun, the usual, already existing KV-1 with a different turret did not fit - only God knows) nullified these advantages for that period of time. But all these problems were solved by Soviet designers by 1944.
