Why the military-political leadership of Germany did not order the use of chemical weapons
In the course of hostilities during the First World War, various toxic substances were widely used. Subsequently, in the 20-30s of the twentieth century, the issues of the use of chemical weapons and anti-chemical defense equipment became not only the topics of numerous theoretical studies and publications, but also objects of practical activity in the armed forces of all the leading states of the planet.
True, a member of the Paris Academy of Sciences Charles Mouret noted in 1920: "There is not a single person in the entire civilized world who would not tremble with horror at the mere thought of suffocating gases." However, military specialists had their own dissenting opinion on this matter. For example, the chief of the chemical forces of the US Army, General Amos A. Fries, stated in 1921: “… chemical warfare should not only be recognized in the future by all civilized countries, but also become the only way that all civilized nations will use without hesitation … Chemical warfare is the same honest means of struggle as machine guns."
In turn, the Soviet military chemist Y. Avinovitsky said: “For our part, we must admit that the chemical war put forward by modern capitalist reality is a fact that cannot be ignored. Therefore, the questions of the chemical defense capability of the Soviet Union should be the subject of special attention of all departments and workers of our country. The rule of conduct put forward by Comrade Trotsky in the defense of S. SS. R. "Eye for an eye, gas for gas!" we will have to put it into practice."
Meanwhile, the head of the British military-chemical department, General Hartley, the rector of the University of Pittsburgh, Dr. Bacon, professor of biochemistry at the University of Cambridge J. Eldan, the already mentioned General A. Fries and his compatriot E. Farrow, a famous chemist, professor of the University, wrote about the "humanity" of toxic substances. in Breslau J. Meyer.
And yet, on June 17, 1925, in Geneva, a number of states signed a protocol banning the use of asphyxiant, poisonous and other similar gases in war, as well as bacteriological agents. On December 2, 1927, the USSR joined this agreement.
At the same time, the Geneva Protocol did not prohibit research in the development, production and accumulation of chemical warfare agents and their delivery vehicles. Therefore, it is not surprising that all the leading militarily countries of the world continued the chemical arms race.
Years later, chemical troops (chemical mortar battalions and regiments) were included in the Wehrmacht formations that invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Warning the Red Army about the real threat of unleashing chemical warfare by German troops, our High Command demanded “to reliably organize the chemical protection of all troops and bring in proper condition the means of protection, degassing, chemical reconnaissance and surveillance in the troops ….
In order to fulfill these instructions, the chemical service and the chemical troops of the Leningrad Front in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War went through a difficult path of mobilization, formation and development. Difficulties were encountered in training personnel, solving problems of technical equipment and weapons, logistic support, and the use of chemical troops. With the beginning of the blockade, the state of affairs became even more aggravated. In the correspondence of some officials, the main reason for the difficulties in organizing anti-chemical protection was called "the lack of attention of the command of the Leningrad Military District and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in peacetime" to PCP issues.
Meanwhile, interrogations of prisoners, translations of captured documents, reports from military intelligence agencies and intelligence agents, information received from partisans - all testified to the strengthening of chemical discipline by the enemy, preparation for the use of chemical warfare agents.
Thus, in a telegram sent on September 6, 1941 by the military council of the front to the people's commissar of defense I. V. Stalin, the testimony of the prisoner of war F. Schneider was stated. Military engineer, Doctor of Chemical Technology, Associate Professor of the Berlin Polytechnic Institute and Senior Researcher of the branch of the research institute of the Farbenindustry concern, he flew on August 31 on the Junkers-88 aircraft, which was shot down and fell into the Gulf of Finland at 7 -8 km northwest of Peterhof. The crew of the plane was killed, the documents on board were destroyed, Schneider received serious wounds and died 32 minutes after being captured, but during this time they still managed to interrogate him.
The prisoner's oral testimony was as follows: the Farbenindustri concern and the Wehrmacht secretly prepared for the use of Obermüller's agent acting on unprotected skin, there was also a poisonous substance Obermüller bis, which could penetrate through a gas mask. According to the prisoner, "the above substances were decided to be used in a surprise attack on the British Isles."
Dr. Schneider also said the following: "… recent events may cause a sudden application of OM in the north-western and western directions of the front … Keitel intends to carry out quite suddenly and under favorable meteorological conditions (east wind)." True, the high command of Germany in the person of Keitel "hopes to achieve success in the same way, and leave Obermüller for a surprise invasion of England." However, "in recent days, Keitel gave the order to be ready for the use (against the Leningraders. - EK) Obermüller's OV."
In a note prepared for a meeting of the command and control personnel of the chemical service of the Leningrad Front, the degree of increase in the chemical hazard is obvious: “If until now there is no data on the use of weapons by the enemy, then reconnaissance and interrogation of prisoners show that the reality of the threat of chemical warfare is growing every day:
1. According to the data obtained by us, it is known that in September the Germans from Bucharest in the northern direction brought up gas equipment.
2. According to the same data, it is known that in September the Germans sent several hundred wagons with chemical ammunition to the Eastern Front.
3. Agent intelligence of the North-West Front established the presence of 3 warehouses with military equipment in front of the front of one of the armies.
The Nazis declare that they will use chemistry wherever they meet stubborn resistance, and on the 212th Rifle Division of the North-West Front they threw out leaflets with the following content: “If you use hellish weapons (meaning, obviously, Katyusha rockets.” - E K.), we will apply OB."
In a report to the head of the Main Military Chemical Directorate of the Red Army (GVHU KA) on December 10, 1941, the head of the chemical protection department (OHZ) of the front, Colonel A. G. Vlasov, describes the situation as follows: section of the Leningrad Front, which has favorable conditions for the use of chemical warfare agents.
In view of the fact that the front line from the south is almost closely adjacent to Leningrad, the enemy has the opportunity, in addition to aviation weapons of chemical attack, to influence from this area all rear and industrial facilities, as well as the population of the city with artillery fire, and under favorable weather conditions, the adjacent outskirts of the city may be in a sphere accessible to the wave of a toxic-smoky release”.
The documents of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation indicate that the danger of the use of chemical warfare agents by the Germans persisted throughout the entire blockade of Leningrad.
Surveys of prisoners, the study of trophy documents captured during Operation Iskra, allowed employees of the NKGB Directorate for the Leningrad Region and the city of Leningrad to prepare and, on July 7, 1943, send a special note about German chemical detachments to the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General D. N. Gusev and their structure.
The note has the following main sections: the structure of chemical units, weapons, equipment and instruments of chemical troops for contaminating (poisonous) units. A separate section presents "troops of throwing guns", which are armed with 15- and 30-centimeter throwing guns - 6-barrel mortars of 1941. Ammunition for them - "explosive, smoke, with flammable oil, also provides for the use of these mortars for firing projectiles with all types of weapons."
Much attention is paid to chemical warfare agents in service with the German army:
- marking "yellow cross" - Zh-Lost (viscous mustard gas), OMA-Lost (supposed decoding Oxol mit Arsen Lost), Stickstoff-Lost (nitrogen mustard gas), OO-Lost (presumably Oxol-Oxol-Lost is the chemical composition of this poisonous the substance was not known not only to the cadets, but also to the teachers of the military chemical school in the city of Celle in Germany);
- marking "green cross" - phosgene, diphosgene, pershtoff;
- marking "blue cross" - clark 1, clark 2, adamsite Klap;
- marking "white cross" - bromo-acetic ether BN Stoff.
The document clearly demonstrated the degree of readiness of Nazi Germany to conduct chemical warfare.
Therefore, the attention that the command of the front troops, the commanders of armies and operational groups, the Military Councils of the front and armies, the operational departments of the NKVD, the political administration of the front, and the military prosecutor's office of the front paid to the issues of chemical protection is not accidental.
Resolutions of the military council of the front "On countermeasures in case the enemy uses poisonous substances", "On providing the troops of the Leningrad Front with chemical protection means" (October 1941), order to the troops of the Leningrad Front No. 0124 dated 10/18/41 "On streamlining the maintenance of chemical defense equipment and liquidation of their unreasonable losses ", order to the troops of the 54th Army No. 019 dated 1941-18-10" On the state of the anti-chemical defense of units and formations ", order to the troops of the Sinyavinsk operational group No. 013 dated 01/04/42" On the state of chemical service in units 286, 128 SD, 1 GSBr, 6 MBR and 21 TD and the replenishment of chemical units ", the decree of the Military Council of the front No. 00702 dated 05.03.42" On measures to strengthen the anti-chemical protection of troops ", order to the troops of the 55th Army No. 0087 dated 12.04. 42 years "On preparation for the anti-chemical protection of troops from a chemical attack of the enemy", Resolution of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front No. 00905 dated 30.0 5.42 years "On strengthening the forces and means of degassing and anti-chemical protection of the city of Leningrad", order to the troops of the Leningrad Front No. 00105 dated 04/26/43 "On the results of checking the readiness of troops for PHO", order to the troops of the 2nd Ud. And No. 00114 dated 06/10/43 "On checking the readiness of troops for PCP and measures to improve it" - this is not a complete list of directive documents on the chemical service of the Leningrad Front.
The frontline, army level of decrees and orders suggests that in the lower levels (formation, part) the number of documents on the anti-chemical protection of troops and objects increased like an avalanche. Their development and implementation took on a systemic nature, which ultimately led to a fairly high chemical discipline, the readiness of troops to act in conditions of the use of chemical warfare agents by the enemy.
The question involuntarily arises: why did the military-political leadership of Germany not give the order to use chemical weapons on the fronts of the war?
Is it only the desire of the German generals to end the war with “the weapons with which it was started”?
Or was Hitler frightened by the possibility of retaliation from Great Britain, the USA and the USSR?
Or did the aggressor refuse a chemical strike due to a sufficiently high assessment of the anti-chemical protection of the Red Army?
These and many other questions still remain open …
