On November 1, 1958, the lead USS George Washington (SSBN-598) SSBN was laid down at Electric Boat.
Our submarine missile carrier K-19 was laid down earlier - on October 17, 1958, but the acceptance act was signed only on November 12, 1960. And on November 15, 1960, George Washington went on the first combat patrol in readiness to destroy Soviet cities.
A strategic underwater confrontation began.
The beginning of a strategic underwater confrontation: the score is 1 to 50 against us
3 ballistic missiles of our K-19 (Project 658) against the background of 16 George Washington looked frankly insufficient, but the main thing was that the US Navy launched a large-scale program of rapid construction and commissioning by 1967 of a naval strategic group of 41 SSBNs (City killer ).
By this time, the ratio of the naval strategic strike potential between us and the United States was about 1 to 50 (and this is without taking into account heavy bombers with nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers).
Work on the creation of a second-generation submarine missile carrier was started back in 1958 by TsKB-18 (future TsKB "Rubin") under the leadership of chief designer A. S. TsKB-18 worked "on the basket" - the elaboration of its appearance was too exotic and unrealistic.
To a certain extent, this was a consequence of the unclear situation with the main missile system - right down to its fundamental decisions and appearance. And a big role in the creation of truly effective domestic strategic nuclear submarines was played by the initiative of the chief designer V. P. Makeev to create in SKB-385 (Miass). Liquid fuel (but with ampulization of components) rocket small-sized the D-5 complex with ballistic missiles (SLBMs) R-27 (weighing 14.5 tons each and a range of 2,400 km), originally developed for Project 705B missile carriers (with 8 SLBMs), created with maximum use of the backlog of Project 705 multipurpose nuclear submarines (for more details about project 705 "Goldfish" of project 705: a mistake or a breakthrough in the XXI century? ").
Work on the atomic submarine pr. 667A was set by Resolutions of the CM No. 316-137 of April 14, 1961 and No. 565-234 of June 21, 1961. SN Kovalev became the new chief designer of the 667 project (in a new look, with 16 SLBMs in a solid hull). In 1961, the development of the technical project 667A with 16 solid-propellant SLBMs of the D-7 complex, placed in stationary vertical mines, was started. However, the development of the D-7 complex was delayed. And in terms of its performance characteristics, it was inferior to the D-5 complex. Taking this into account, the corrected technical project 667A (approved in 1964) with 16 SLBMs of the D-5 complex was completed in the shortest possible time.
The head submarine pr. 667A K-137 was laid down at the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise on November 4, 1964, launched on August 25, 1966, and in the fall of 1967 presented for state tests.
The first "throw" of the Navy and the defense industry of the USSR to restore parity was the construction of 34 SSBNs (strategic missile submarine cruisers) of Project 667A and 667AU within only 6 years!
From the book of S. N. Kovalev "About what was and what is":
It was supposed to be a ship capable of patrolling in any area of the World Ocean, including the Arctic basin … The design … was supposed to ensure the possibility of its serial construction on the NSR and ZLK at the maximum rate. The submarine was supposed to be based in the existing bases of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet.
Therefore, the two-shaft, two-reactor scheme of the power plant was retained, and its reliability was significantly increased. On the initiative of my dear deputy Spassky, an echelon layout of the power plant was implemented, when both turbines were placed not side by side in the same compartment, but sequentially, in two turbine compartments, and steam from any reactor could go to any turbine.
For this decision, which significantly increases the displacement, with the filing of Derevianko I was criticized for a long time in the ministry.
However, the advantages of such a layout made it possible to consistently implement measures to reduce noise on this and subsequent modifications of the second generation missile carriers and achieve dramatic success. in solving this problem, fully confirmed in the future.
Speaking about a strategic missile submarine, it is necessary to emphasize a factor that usually remains in the "shadow" - navigation support (navigation complex - NK) for solving the tasks of the SNR, which determines the effectiveness of the missile system, and, accordingly, the solution of tasks for its intended purpose as a separate RPK SN and the entire NSNF grouping.
Chief Designer S. N. Kovalev on the dramatic details of the creation of the 667 project in terms of navigation aids:
For submarines of project 667A, NPO Azimut (now TsNII Elektropribor) created a solid all-latitude NK Sigma (chief engineer and chief designer V. I. Maslevsky), based on air suspension ball gyroscopes. Maslevsky saw further improvement of navigation in the consistent improvement of the Sigma complex. In this he was supported by the Ministry, including Minister Butoma himself, with whom I had many discussions on this topic.
Central Research Institute "Dolphin" came up with a new progressive idea of creating an inertial navigation complex (chief designer O. V. Kishchenkov), built on float gyroscopes and distinguished by complex mathematical processing from various sources. Kishchenko's opponents were Maslevsky and practically the entire leadership of the Ministry. Kishchenko's persistence is admirable and surprising. In the Ministry he was kicked out of meetings, and he came back … Personally, I supported Kishchenko, realizing that only inertial navigation can provide a long voyage under water, incl. and in high latitudes, and provide the necessary parameters for the missile system.
As a result of all battles, Kishchenko and inertial navigation won, and the Tobol navigation complex was created for the serial submarines of Project 667A at the Dolphin Central Research Institute.
In 1967, the head and first serial RPK SN were handed over to the Navy by the Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (SMP). The term is simply astounding in today's times. But even more vividly is how they worked then in the Far East at the shipyard named after V. I. Lenin Komsomol (SZLK) in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur.
From the article by A. Ya. Zvinyatsky, I. G. Timokhin, V. I. Shalomov "The first nuclear-powered submarine cruiser in the Far East":
Preparations for the construction of new strategic nuclear submarines of Project 667A were carried out by the plant in the conditions of fulfilling a tense production plan.
Suffice it to say that in 1966, the plant was under construction seven nuclear submarines of project 675, four submarines of project 690, six icebreaking transport vessels of project 550, a floating base for recharging reactors of project 326 … another nuclear submarine was undergoing refurbishment and modernization (according to project 659T) project 659 …
The duration of the construction of the nuclear submarine from the date of the laying and signing of the act was 1 year 10 months and 1 day, and from the moment the manufacture of mechanical engineering components began - 3 years 9 months and 3 days.
Moreover, it is especially necessary to emphasize the high quality of the construction of new submarine cruisers.
Rear Admiral A. N. Lutsky (then - commander of the RPK SN K-258):
State tests, against expectations, were somewhat delayed. I don’t remember why, but I had to make several exits. I remember only one well.
I had to go out again to measure the underwater noise of the ship. The fact is that they did not believe the results of the first measurement, they thought that the error was:
the noise turned out to be much less than expected, almost the same as that of the American boats. Someone said: "It can't be!"
We prepared special equipment, the measuring vessel hung it out at a certain depth, and we went under it a couple of times.
So what?
The first result was confirmed.
Designers and shipbuilders smashed their heads over the phenomenon, but could not explain.
A. N. Lutskiy especially noted the very high maneuverability of the RPK SN (despite the very significant displacement).
Note
Despite the massive construction of the defense industry complex of the new PKK SN, the Navy faced serious problems in creating their effective groupings. From the book of the former head of the Operations Directorate of the Northern Fleet Rear Admiral V. G. Lebedko "Loyalty to Duty":
Before his arrival at the headquarters of the Northern Fleet, Rear Admiral Kichev, being the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Navy, with the help of his assistants, drew up a schedule for the use of SSBNs for a decade. According to the schedule, the number of our missile carriers at sea should have been constantly increasing, but in fact this number was decreasing. This could not but disturb the Main Command of the Navy. The General Staff demanded an answer.
The Americans have 18 missile carriers constantly on combat patrols, and instead of 12 according to the schedule, we have only 4 or 5. The whole point was that we did not have elementary experience in the cyclic use of the PKK CH. By the cycle, we understood the totality of interrelated processes that form the completed period of use of the PKK SN in the base, in combat training and in combat service.
By order of Kichev, we … analyzed the entire cycle of the RPK SN, drawing it on long rolls of graph paper … As a result, we developed the so-called small cycle … This work revealed that the decrease in the number of submarines at the base station is due to the lack of repair lines that carry out inter-trip repairs.
The boats arriving from the BS were queuing up. This shortcoming had to be urgently eliminated. In addition, the boats were built at different times of the year, and they had to be linked into a single system according to the cycles of use. This led to the most severe accounting of the motor resource …
Subsequently, the cyclical use of the PKK SN was introduced in the fleets by order of the Main Committee of the Navy. But already in 1974, we managed to almost double the number of missile carriers permanently on the BS. It was a gigantic work of submariners, headquarters, logistic support agencies, shipyards and docks.
RPK SN project 667A were quickly and completely mastered by the crews and began active combat service. Interesting and ironic sketches of its different sides remained, for example, in the drawings of the caps. 2nd rank O. V. Karavashkina.
An example of successful and covert patrolling is the combat service of commander Lutskiy on K-258. Link to a chapter from the book by A. N. Lutskiy "For the strength of a strong hull" "Combat patrol".
In terms of missile firing, it is necessary, of course, to note the "first hippopotamus" - the shooting in 1969 of the K-140 SSBN with half ammunition (8 SLBMs). Some details on it are contained in the article of its commander, now retired Rear Admiral Yuri Beketov in the "VPK":
Already after the successful salvo firing at the meeting on preparation for the "Ocean" exercises, a conversation took place between the Naval Chief Directorate and the K-140 commander:
Gorshkov asked who carried out the eight-rocket salvo? I got up and introduced myself. The commander-in-chief says: "Tell us how you performed the shooting, what are your impressions and feelings?" Within 4-5 minutes I reported on the peculiarities of the shooting. Gorshkov asked: “Are you confident in the combat capabilities of the missile system? If you are instructed to launch 16 missiles? " I answered in the affirmative.
At the same time, Project 667A SSBMs were intended not only for solving strategic tasks to defeat the most important ground targets, but also operational and tactical ones, including ensuring the deployment and breakthrough to the areas of missile use at strategic SSBN targets. Such nuclear strike support is usually forgotten by those who argue about the low effectiveness of the Navy's SSBN grouping. An example of such a real combat training is contained in the memoirs of Rear Admiral A. N. Lutsky.
In the summer of 1973, our K-258 SSBN was lucky to fire two missiles in a salvo at the sea field, … replacing two missile warheads at the RTBF pier with practical missile warheads with inert warheads, unloading a couple of neighboring ones for security purposes, and went into the ocean. On board the senior on the campaign is the commander of the 2nd flotilla of submarines, Vice-Admiral E. N. Spiridonov. It turned out that the firing position is located almost at the very American naval base on the island of Midway!
In a given time, they occupied the area of firing positions … In one of the communication sessions, the long-awaited conditional "signal" came …
- Rocket attack!..
- The rockets came out, no comments.
- Boatswain, ascend under the periscope … Radio operators, pass the RDO!
And at that moment the bulkhead door opens, the commander enters the central post.
- What are we doing?
- We dive to a depth of … meters, develop a full speed to get out of the "retaliatory" strike …
- And the rockets?
- They're gone. RDO too.
The commander looks at his watch in bewilderment.
- We have it quickly, … twenty minutes - and missiles in the air. The crew worked out in excess of the standard shooting.
Having designated an evasion maneuver, they lowered their readiness, and began to wait for the command to return to the base. We, the GKP rocket crew, stayed at the BIUS …
Then the first mate drew attention to the fact that the bearing of the missile firing on the BIUS screen was almost to the north. The two missiles left exactly in the direction of another American military base on the island of Adah, a small island in the Aleutian Islands chain.
In the fleets, there was intense work to maximize the effectiveness of the created SSBN grouping. When developing the operational-technical assignment for the creation of a nuclear-missile system with SSBNs of project 667A, the Operations Directorate of the Main Staff of the Navy put forward the requirement to ensure the value of the operational voltage ratio of 0.55. In reality, by the mid-70s, only 0.23 was achieved. But it was colossal. labor of crews, headquarters, industry. However, the key problems turned out to be the weakness of the ship repair base and the insufficient resource of some of the mechanisms and complexes.
A. M. Ovcharenko, "Analysis of the effectiveness of groupings of strategic missile submarine cruisers of the project 667A (AU) in the system of strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union":
Factory overhaul of Project 667A SSBNs was supposed to last no more than 24 months, due to the underdevelopment of the production base in the 70s, factory overhaul lasted 3-4 years …
Production capacities in the Northern Fleet were brought to the required level only in 1982–1990, after which the repairs began to be carried out within the specified time frame. In the Far East, even at the end of the 1980s, average repairs lasted at least 30 months.
Rear Admiral Aleksin, Chief Navigator of the Navy, recalls:
… we managed to reduce the launch time of the Tobol type INK tenfold, which made it possible to effectively use missile weapons not only from the pier, but also from any point on the routes of dispersal and operational deployment of forces of the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet …
It wasn't all that simple.
For example, I was … many times tried to stop representatives of the Central Research Institute and manufacturers, warning about responsibility for the possible incapacitation of the INK RPK SN.
They complained to their superiors, … they threatened to jail, but we did not stop our research work, we did not break the navigation systems, ensured the full development of the established service life of their systems.
As a result, the new planned launch schedules of the INK RPK SN were appreciated and included in the new rules for the use of SSBN navigation complexes, published by the GUNiO MO.
I would like to emphasize once again that the capabilities of navigation aids for SSBNs are not “abstract technical characteristics”, but parameters that specifically affect not only the effectiveness of the use of the main weapon, but directly ensure its use.
Over the entire period of operation of the D-5 (D-5U) complex, about 600 missile launches were made, more than 10 thousand missile loading and unloading operations, 590 combat patrols in various regions of the World Ocean were carried out. The last R-27U missile was unloaded from the Project 667AU (K-430) SSBN of the Pacific Fleet on July 1, 1994.
Second "throw": projects 667B and DB - to catch up and surpass
The insufficient range of SLBMs of the D-5 complex led not only to the need to overcome the enemy's anti-submarine lines, but also significantly reduced the number of SSBNs ready to strike at designated targets in patrol areas (which still had to reach many thousands of miles).
Therefore, the plan for naval shipbuilding for 1969-1980 provided for a much more effective strategic nuclear missile submarine system with intercontinental SLBMs. In 1963, the development of such a new missile system, the D-9, began. The capabilities of the SSBN navigation complex did not provide the required firing accuracy for SLBMs with a traditional control system, which required the creation of an onboard azimuthal astrocorrection system for SLBMs, which would make it possible to refine the position of the rocket in space by the stars and correct its movement.
The tactical and technical assignment of the Navy for a nuclear submarine equipped with the D-9 complex was approved in 1965.
That is, the existing opinion that intercontinental SLBMs and new SSBM projects were "a response to SOSUS" (stationary sonar system of the US Navy) is unfounded. The navy and the military-political leadership of the USSR worked effectively to "preempt", but the main incentive for this was precisely the increase in the missile readiness of SSBNs and their number, immediately ready to defeat the assigned targets.
It should be borne in mind that objective data on the very high real effectiveness of SOSUS by the military-political leadership of the USSR were obtained through intelligence channels only in the 1970 region.
The construction of a series of 18 nuclear submarines of project 667B with 12 SLBMs of the D-9 complex was carried out at the Sevmash enterprise in the city of Severodvinsk, where 10 SSBNs were built, and at the plant. Lenin Komsomol (Komsomolsk-on-Amur), where 8 more SSBNs were built.
Together with 4 Project 667BD SSBNs (which had an ammunition load increased to 16 SLBMs), only 22 SSBNs with intercontinental SLBMs were completed in 5 years. The areas of combat patrolling of SSBNs with intercontinental SLBMs were usually located within 2-3 days of the transition from the basing points, which sharply increased the effectiveness of SSBNs of projects 667B and 667BD.
Interesting memories of the construction of the first "Komsomol" SSBN of project 667B are contained in the memoirs of its chief designer:
The subject of my pride was the upper deck of the turbine compartments, where the electrical panels were located, and between them there were convenient passageways where a tall person could walk in full growth. Arriving in Komsomolsk in 1973 to build the lead boat of Project 667B, I was horrified. Pipes and cables on the deck of the compartment were installed so that instead of passages, there were slots. Having scolded the plant, designers and military representatives, I forced everything to be redone. Before leaving for Leningrad, I went to the director A. T. Deev to say goodbye. He calls the chief builder Shakhmeister on the selector: they say, the chief designer is leaving, are there any questions for him? In response, a hysterical cry: "Let him leave as soon as possible and as far as possible, he made us redo half of the boat!"
The achievement of strategic parity with the United States in the field of strategic weapons led to the conclusion of the SALT-1 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the withdrawal from the Navy of part of the still quite new Project 667A SSBNs (the first was K-411 in April 1978).
Subsequently, these ships (with missile compartments cut out according to SALT-1) were planned to be converted into multipurpose nuclear submarines and special-purpose nuclear submarines, but not all ex-SSBNs were waiting for this.
There is an opinion that a big mistake was the refusal to modernize the SSBNs of project 667A for the D-9 complex (similar to project 667B), however:
• for SSBNs, a large number of R-27 SLBMs were produced (which solved not only strategic tasks, but also operational ones in the theater of operations);
• Since the beginning of the 70s, the problem of noise of the Navy submarines has sharply emerged, and the whole complex of measures to de-noise the 667B project was impossible or extremely expensive to implement to modernize the 667A project.
Accordingly, Project 667A SSBNs served with the D-5 complex (only the K-140 was upgraded to the D-11 experimental complex with a solid-propellant SLBM).
Taking into account the acute problem of secrecy and ensuring the combat stability of the RPKNS against the powerful and effective anti-submarine forces of the United States and NATO Naval Forces, active and systematic work began in the late 70s on the development of the Arctic theater of operations, including patrolling under the ice of the Navy's SSBNs. By 1983, the USSR Navy completed about 70 sub-ice cruises of nuclear submarines (our probable enemy at that time was three times less).
The first launch of the R-29 intercontinental SLBM from the Arctic region was made on July 3, 1981, and it took place just 9 minutes after receiving the launch command.
The third "throw": to sharply increase the strike potential - Project 667BDR with SLBMs with MIRVs (MIRV)
In the mid-70s, the US Navy again, due to the massive equipping of SSBNs with SLBMs with MIRVs, significantly pulled ahead of the USSR Navy in terms of the number of SLBM warheads. Accordingly, the measures of the USSR to restore parity followed.
In 1979, the R-29R SLBM was put into service with a firing range of 6500–7800 km (depending on the MIRV configuration) for the SSBN of the new project 667BDR. At the same time, a large set of measures was introduced to reduce noise, new radio-electronic devices were installed, including the Rubicon State Joint Stock Company (for more details "Rubicon" of underwater confrontation. Successes and problems of the MGK-400 hydroacoustic complex ") and a flexible extended towed antenna for detecting targets by discrete components (including in the aft sector).
The pace of work was such that the lead boat of the 667BDRM K-441 project was actually the second, since the 5th hull of the 667BD K-424 project was completed according to the 667BDR project. In total, 14 SSBNs of project 667BDR were built.
The last SSBN project 667BDR - K-44 "Ryazan" is still in the Navy (Pacific Fleet).
Organization of the NSNF of the USSR Navy
From the memoirs Ocean Parity. Notes of the Commander of the Fleet Admiral A. P. Mikhailovsky (early - mid-80s):
The defeat of strategically important objects on the enemy's overseas territory, with the approval of the military-political leadership of our country, can be carried out by conducting an operation of strategic nuclear forces under the direct control of the Supreme Commander, who decides on the operation and gives the order for the first nuclear strike.
Role of the General Staff:
The success of the operation is ensured by long, advance preparation and careful planning, taking into account many options for solving the problem. This is constantly being done by the General Staff, which determines ahead of time and, if necessary, clarifies the list and coordinates of objects to be destroyed. Assigns the order and degree of damage to each object. Establishes the share of participation, the resource of ammunition and the distribution of target complexes between the components of the nuclear triad, as well as the issues of their interaction with each other. The General Staff puts into operation and periodically modifies the command and control signal system.
Directly the forces of the NSNF and the forces and means supporting them were controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (General Staff of the Navy) and the fleets (we emphasize that this was a very reasonable and optimal system, today it is actually destroyed - see, for example, A. Timokhin “Destroyed management. There is no single command of the fleet for a long time ).
The combat operations of the naval strategic nuclear forces are personally directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (with the help of his General Staff), determines the composition of the Atlantic and Pacific groupings of naval strategic nuclear forces required to defeat the facilities allocated to the Navy, as well as the number and type of strategic nuclear-powered ships intended for reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The commander-in-chief establishes patrol zones in the oceans and seas, the number of submarine cruisers in combat service, the required degree of ensuring their combat stability in each of these zones …
The group of submarine cruisers in the Atlantic and in the Arctic is directly controlled by me, the commander of the Northern Fleet. It is I who must establish routes, areas and patrol terms, the procedure for the deployment and build-up of both combat service forces and the grouping as a whole. I am obliged to organize its interaction with the rest of the forces of the fleet, to provide everything necessary.
And the specific features of the performance of tasks by each SSBN with their cyclical use:
The naval life of any missile submarine is provided, as a rule, by two crews and is scheduled according to the so-called large and small cycles. A similar cycle, for example, includes the following steps:
• going out to sea for combat patrols with the first crew;
• return and transfer of the missile carrier to the second crew; inter-passage repair; going to sea for combat training;
• again going out on combat patrol, but with the second crew.
With the return, the cycle repeats.
After several such small cycles, a large one is planned, including factory repairs, and even modernization with the complete unloading of all missiles, which, in turn, requires significant time for combat training and the introduction of the cruiser into the permanent readiness forces.
And the general assessment of the entire NSNF grouping:
Two-thirds of the total number of missile carriers are always loaded with missiles and are in constant readiness for action. Some of them are constantly at sea, in combat service. The other part is on alert. The rest are busy with their daily activities in the bases. A grouping deployed at sea can be reinforced through combat alert or build-up forces. However, in extreme conditions, cruisers of constant readiness located in bases should be able to launch their missiles directly from the berths. A similar demand was expressed to me by the Minister of Defense Marshal DF Ustinov when he was giving instructions to the post. However, how to ensure such launches organizationally and technically, the minister did not explain, he recommended thinking.
The task of ensuring the launch of SLBMs directly from their bases was not as simple as it seems at first glance. And one of the main problematic issues (eventually resolved) was again navigation.
Rear Admiral Aleksin, Chief Navigator of the Navy, recalls:
Not without incidents. At the Northern Fleet, for example, they came up with the idea of using missile weapons from the pier without the initial NK and the main power plant of the RPK SN, just a few minutes after the order. In the form of navigation firing data, the operator of the missile combat control system (RBUS) "Alpha" (on the RPK SN pr. 667B, 667BD) was given geographic coordinates, the course of the RPK SN and a speed equal to zero.
However, they found out that even when moored at the berth in the frozen Krasheninnikov Bay in Kamchatka, with an ice thickness of about one meter, the SSBNs are blowing along the course along with the berth by tidal currents by an amount more than the limit established by the governing documents. With salvo firing from the berth, the yaw and roll of SSBNs would all the more exceed the permissible values. We have developed our own measures.
However, the northerners have already managed to introduce their "rationalization" into the draft operational documents. An end to the innovations was put by the experimental rocket firing, appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The navigation complex worked according to the full scheme, but fixed data were entered into the missile weapon complex according to the methodology of the Severomors. As a result, out of four launched SLBMs, only the first two missiles of the salvo arrived at the Kura battlefield in Kamchatka, and the other two self-destructed on the trajectory, so their astrocorrectors, due to a large error in the ship's course, could not aim at the given stars. The analysis showed that both the yaw and the pitching of the RPK CH after the release of the first two missiles of the salvo significantly exceeded the permissible limits.
To save the motor resource of the INK and to fulfill the assigned operational readiness, under the leadership of the chief navigator of the Navy and the Main Navigator of the Ministry of Defense of the Ministry of Defense, schemes were developed for broadcasting the "live" course, quality of the ship and other VAT for all RPK SN projects, which also ensured the effective use of the entire SLBM ammunition from the berth in one salvo, and saving the motor resource of the main INK systems.
Since the mid-70s, after the intercontinental SLBMs entered service and it became possible to launch missiles from their home bases, up to 20-22 SSBNs were in high readiness for launching missiles (on combat patrols at sea and on alert at bases). This intensity persisted until the early 90s.
With the sharp exacerbation of the Cold War confrontation in the early - mid-80s, the Navy did everything to maximize (in fact, prohibitively) to raise the operational stress ratio of the NSNF (first of all, Project 667A SSBNs, as opposed to the new US medium-range missiles in Europe). In 1983-1986, the KOH was about 0.35, but the exhaustion of the resource of equipment and people led to the death of the SSBN K-219 in 1986 (which entered combat service with unacceptable malfunctions in the outboard fittings of the missile silos).
Stealth and noise
The chief designer of the project S. N. Kovalev wrote about understanding and taking into account the issues of low noise when creating an SSBN of project 667A:
It's not that we didn't pay attention to this problem, but that we were not scientifically and technically prepared to achieve low noise levels …
In the same period of time, large-scale work was launched to study the issues of secrecy and a sharp decrease in the noise of mechanisms and ships.
In 1968, fundamentally new requirements for the vibroacoustic characteristics of the main component equipment (VAH-68) were developed, which ensured significant progress in reducing the noise level of SSBNs pr. 667B and 667BD. In 1974, new, more stringent requirements were adopted (VAC-74).
However, the main thing (along with a significant increase in the technological level of the defense industry enterprises) was fundamentally precisely the methodological understanding of how to build low-noise submarines. It did not come immediately, after a number of mistakes and misconceptions (for example, an unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem by increasing the number of cascades of depreciation), catching up with the “potential adversary” that had gone far ahead. In full, these modern approaches to "acoustic design" of nuclear submarines were already implemented in modern nuclear submarines of the 4th generation, however, the presence of significant modernization reserves of the original project 677A made it possible to dramatically reduce the noise level of SSBNs - both from project to project and during the construction of series and repairing ships in fleets.
The complex of works to reduce noise has led to an outstanding result - the 2nd generation nuclear submarine developed in the early 60s in its last modification (project 667BDRM reached the level of new 3rd generation nuclear submarines in low-noise moves).
However, secrecy is not only low noise, it is a complex of measures, where the level of acoustic fields is only a part. Much depends on the organization and tactics of effective use of false conditions. But with this, not everything was always good.
Starting from the sometimes insufficient level of training of individual crews and military command and control bodies and ending with simply stringent requirements to maintain the established cyclicity of use. For example, the US Navy's Yankee Class Ballistic Missile-Launching Nuclear DIA Report, June 1976 explicitly stated:
the frequency of exits of the Project 667A submarines was kept quite strictly, which was one of the reasons for the high efficiency of the tracking system for them by the US anti-submarine defense forces in the 70s.
Wherein:
The speed of movement of the boat during the transition was chosen on the basis that the transition had to be made … in the shortest possible time. In the Atlantic, the average speed of Project 667A SSBNs during the transition was 10-12 knots, and the SSBNs arrived in the combat service area in 11-13 days.
Of course, there could be no question of any "secrecy during the transition" at such a speed. Such an SSBN was taken by SOSUS at very, very long distances, ensuring the maintenance and transfer of contact with it to various anti-submarine forces in the theater.
The above was an example of very competent and effective tactical actions of the commander of the SSBN A. N. Lutsky, but, alas, this was not always the case. For example, one of the most serious troubles that sharply worsened the secrecy of SSBNs was their prolonged "walking on one leg" (shaft lines). And here considerations could be from an illiterate opinion that it was so, "American-style", supposedly "quieter" (and the level of broadband noise did decrease, but with a sharp increase in low-frequency discrete components, according to which the enemy detected SSBNs from very large distances) to hard directive requirements for saving the equipment service life.
The controls were not always at their best, recalls the former commander of the K-182 Rear Admiral V. V.
Checking the absence of tracking of SSBNs heading to the Atlantic did not always give positive results, primarily due to the insufficiently thought out method and the choice of means to carry out this check. For example, checking the lack of tracking of SSBN K - 182 in 1977 was carried out by the submarine 633 of the project on the North Cape - Medvezhiy line, for a long time being in its position for this purpose, periodically charging the AB with diesels, which easily allowed the multipurpose submarine of the US Navy at that time to find it and settle down next … After the submarine 633 of the project found the K-182, crossing its course from right to left, and approached the course line of the K-182, she unexpectedly discovered the turbine noise that arose on the left course 120 °, which later moved away along the bearing to the departed K- 182. It is natural to assume that the US Navy submarine was secretly in a waiting position west of the project submarine 633, therefore it did not cross the course of the middle submarine, but, having found the K-182, set in motion and followed it. So it was more reliable and easier to detect SSBNs for US Navy submarines than to search all over the Barents Sea. In response to this assumption I expressed in the department of the submarine submarines of the Northern Fleet, I was told that they did not have data on the tracking of US Navy submarines for diesel submarines.
And as an example - competent tactical actions to maximize secrecy against SOSUS (at the "level of knowledge" about it in the late 70s - early 80s):
Actions to increase the secrecy of SSBNs from hydrophones of the SOSUS system:
- the choice of the operating mode of the mechanisms, in accordance with the results of the pre-travel measurement of noise;
- do not exceed the speed of 4–5 knots unless absolutely necessary;
- avoid the use of mechanisms for which there are data or assumptions that they are unmasking the ship due to exceeding the noise standards during the period of operation;
- if there is a jump layer, you should patrol above it, and best of all, in the near-surface layer of 35-40 m, especially in fresh weather, which, due to the noise of the sea waves, completely masks the ship from the SOSUS system, it should be remembered that diving under the jump layer from any the goal is to dramatically increase the efficiency of the SOSUS system …
The pinnacle of development - 667BDRM
A promising third-generation SSBN was considered Project 941 with a solid-propellant SLBM. More about the motives of this and the project itself - Project 941 Shark. The pride of the domestic submarine shipbuilding? Yes!"
However, technological difficulties did not allow the creation of a missile system with a solid-propellant SLBM with the required characteristics, which led to a sharp increase in the displacement of the new SSBN and a decrease in its serial production.
At the same time, in the mid-70s, technical solutions were identified that ensured a sharp increase in the efficiency of the SSBN missile complex of project 667 and a decrease in its noise (along with the introduction of new radio-electronic means).
The decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the development of a new modification of the project - 667BDRM was issued on September 10, 1975.
The lead missile carrier of Project 667BDRM - K-51 "Verkhoturye" - was laid down in February 1981 and commissioned in December 1984. In total, in the period from 1984 to 1990, 7 SSBNs were built (one of them was subsequently converted into a special purpose nuclear submarine BS-64).
The creation of the SSBN project 667BDRM was the pinnacle of the development of the project 667. Yes, the new project was inferior to the newest SSBNs of the US Navy "Ohio" (including in terms of low noise). However, in the USSR there was no technological reserve at that time in order to reach the "Ohio" level. At the same time, the 667BDRM project received good stealth, new radio electronic means (including a modification of the new Skat-M SJSC - MGK-520) when performing in the 2000s a medium repair with "separate modernization works" of the AICR, replaced by a very good digital SJSC MGK-520.6 is a new missile weapon system with very high performance.
Did he have serious flaws and problems?
Of course, for example, weak countermeasures and underwater weapons. However, this was a common disadvantage of all our submarines.
Underwater weapons and countermeasures for the PKK SN
Initially, the torpedo armament of Project 667A consisted of 4 torpedo tubes (TA) of 53 cm caliber for torpedoes with mechanical (spindle) data entry and a quick-loading device with a double ammunition load of torpedoes on racks (a total of 12 torpedoes of 53 cm caliber).
In the "special period", due to the disassembly of part of the structures of the 2nd compartment, it was possible to place additional spare torpedoes in the second compartment, as provided for by the project.
Initially, the APCR could accept a wide range of torpedoes with spindle data entry, but already in the mid-late 70s, loading from SET-65 anti-submarine torpedoes and 53-65K anti-ship torpedoes (including 1–2 in the nuclear version) became almost the standard. Unfortunately, despite the small ammunition and the number of torpedo tubes, until the end of the USSR, SSBNs did not receive a universal torpedo. The timing of its creation was disrupted by the industry. And the work on it (USET-80 with mechanical data input) was completed only in 1993 (RA Gusev “This is a torpedo life”).
In addition to the project 667BDRM SSBN torpedoes, thanks to the installation of a new BIUS "Omnibus", it became possible to use anti-submarine missiles.
In addition to the 53 cm TA, on most (except for the BDRM) SSBNs of Project 667 there were two 40 cm TA for self-propelled countermeasures (usually self-propelled MG-44 simulators) with reloading (a spare item on the rack) or 40 cm torpedoes (SET-40 or SET-72).
The self-propelled simulator MG-44, created simultaneously with the APKR project 667A, had high and very well-balanced characteristics for its time, providing effective imitation of submarines for both hydroacoustic stations (GAS) of ships and helicopters, and torpedoes of the Mk48 and Mk46 types, and the capabilities of the created in the early 60s, complex electronic self-propelled products were at the height of tactical requirements until the 90s of the last century.
Alas, for SSBNs of project 667BDRM TA 40 cm caliber were removed and instead of relatively small MG-44 devices, multipurpose self-propelled devices for hydroacoustic counteraction MG-74 could be adopted, which, with formally higher characteristics and higher modes than MG-44, were in fact inferior to it. (since they did not provide a number of the most urgent tactical tasks).
Of course, we have to regret the refusal to install on it the highly effective “Shlagbaum” countermeasures complex (developed in the second half of the 80s), while objectively we have to admit that instead of the extremely complex and problematic in operation “Shlagbaum” complex with outboard storage of self-propelled devices, The Navy could well have received an effective MG-104 device, but in a caliber of 40 cm (the mass of MG-104 and MG-44 are close), thereby immediately providing the latest (in the late 80s) countermeasures a huge number of submarines (including including from the MASSYAS) Navy.
However, the head of the "Shlagbaum" SPBMT "Malakhit" preferred to master funds on a new launcher (and therefore a different caliber of products), installed only on nuclear submarines of project 971 and 945A and the modernized APCR of project 941U.
The "Stanovy ridge" NSNF did not receive effective countermeasures. Despite the fact that for their creation there were all the technical possibilities. And, moreover, they were created (MG-104 "Throw"), but could not be used from the overwhelming majority of the Navy's submarines (including all Project 667 SSBNs with modifications).
As a result, the setting of countermeasures (ineffective devices MG-34 and GIP-1) could be carried out through two devices VIPS ("small special torpedo tube 5 inch caliber") and DUK.
Conclusions and lessons of the creation of SSBN project 667 (A, B, BD, BDR, BDRM)
Since 1967, when the lead and first serial ship of Project 667A were delivered, until 1990, when the last SSBN of Project 667BDRM was commissioned, 77 SSBNs were built according to five projects … That is, on average, more than 3 ships per year.
These SSBNs were not "engineering masterpieces" for "ultimate performance", they were not "something unique." These were simple and reliable ships with a sufficient level of efficiency to solve their main task - strategic deterrence (albeit at the cost of heavy losses).
Both the ships of Project 667 and their crews did it, including in the most difficult post-perestroika years. And when in 1999 our paratroopers were rushing to Pristina, they knew that behind their backs were not only the "strangled" START-2 treaty in the places of permanent deployment "Topoli", but also several RPK SN project 667BDR and BDRM on duty and patrolling …
Moreover, there was a practice (very wise) before serious political events and meetings of practical missile launches of SLBMs - to show the "so-called partners" that even though the "Russian bear" turned out to be "knocked down" and "lying", stand up and be very strong He may well "embed".
And the chief designer of the project S. N. Kovalev played a huge role in maintaining the capabilities and potential in these difficult years.
Yes, theoretically, much more could be done to significantly increase the combat capabilities of these SSBNs … However, too often unsolvable problems in our country are not technical, but organizational, or rather, even often the flaws of the very organization of the development and operation of AME (as in its military unit, and in industry).
And with this in mind, SN Kovalev made 101% of the possible: both for his ships and for the country.
