As has been said many times earlier, the combat stability of the formations of domestic SSBNs is under a big question. Unfortunately, our submarine missile carriers, entering combat services, find themselves under the gun of enemy multipurpose atomarines much more often than we would like, and much more often than is permissible by our concept of nuclear deterrence of a potential adversary.
What allows the US Navy and NATO to achieve such a deplorable result for us? In the previous article, the author mentioned the "four whales" on which the American and European power of the ASW is based: this is the SOSUS submarine hydrophone system, the SURTASS hydroacoustic reconnaissance ships, multipurpose nuclear submarines and aerospace vehicles. At the same time, it is obvious that SOSUS can only be used against our submarines, which are striving or have already entered the ocean, and SURTASS operations have been largely curtailed today. Nevertheless, the Americans are quite successful in identifying our SSBNs even when the latter are on combat duty in the seas adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation. And this suggests that the US space and air assets, coupled with multipurpose nuclear submarines, have sufficient potential to reveal the underwater environment in the waters, which, generally speaking, should be ours.
Why is this happening? The author has already given a detailed answer to this question, so now we will confine ourselves to a short summary. American multipurpose submarines, almost throughout the Cold War, had an advantage in detection range over domestic SSBNs. The situation was aggravated as a result of the collapse of the USSR: the landslide reduction in the composition of the domestic navy significantly reduced our ability to detect and track foreign nuclear submarines and submarines even in our near sea zone.
At the same time, the capabilities of NATO anti-submarine aircraft have grown significantly in comparison with what they had in the last century. Judging by the available data, the Americans succeeded in a small anti-submarine revolution: if earlier the main aviation means of searching for submarines were hydroacoustics (dropped buoys, etc.), now it has been replaced by other, non-acoustic means. It is about identifying specific waves arising from the movement of a large underwater object, which, of course, any submarine, regardless of the type of its propeller, wake, and, possibly, something else. Thus, the capabilities of modern anti-submarine aviation have increased dramatically, and it is possible that today we should speak about a multiple increase in the effectiveness of US and NATO anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Alas, the secrecy of our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, respectively, decreased by about the same proportion.
What can we counter all this?
The latest technology?
First of all - the newest 4th generation SSBNs of the project 955A "Borey-A". As mentioned earlier, the first 3 Borei-class ships that became part of the Russian fleet are more likely SSBNs of the 3+ generation, since they used hull sections and (partially) equipment of the 3rd generation boats. But it can be assumed that, starting with the "Prince Vladimir", the Russian Navy will receive truly modern strategic cruisers. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the serial construction of Project 955A SSBNs alone will provide our NSNF units with the required levels of secrecy and combat stability, and the point is this.
For more than a decade, domestic shipbuilders have been trying to catch up and overtake the United States in terms of reducing the visibility of MAPLs and SSBNs. And, I must say, in this area, the late USSR and the Russian Federation achieved certain results. The author will not undertake to compare the mutual detection ranges of the "Prince Vladimir" and "Virginia" of the latest modifications - for this he simply does not have data. But progress is undeniable: since the 80s of the last century, the Land of Soviets has achieved a significant reduction in the noise level of its submarine fleet. In other words, it is quite possible, and even very likely, that the Americans still have not lost their leadership in the question of who will find whom first, but the distance of mutual detection has decreased significantly compared to what was before. And this, of course, significantly complicates the identification of domestic SSBNs by hydroacoustic means of US multipurpose nuclear submarines.
A good illustration of the above is the incident that took place in the Atlantic on the night of February 3–4, 2009. Two foreign SSBNs collided: the British Vanguard and the French Le Triumfant (excuse my French). Both boats entered service in the 90s of the last century, and are completely modern and adequate to their tasks ships, equipped, among other things, with the most powerful sonar systems. However, neither British nor French submariners were able to detect a dangerous approach of SSBNs, which indicates an extremely low guaranteed detection distance.
It can be assumed that our "Borei A", especially in the conditions of the northern seas, will also be "easier to grope than hear" - and this will make it extremely difficult for American submariners to search for our SSBNs.
But, unfortunately, noise reduction is just one of the components of submarine stealth. The emergence of effective non-acoustic search methods has resulted in patrol aircraft being able to locate even the quietest boat in the world with a very high probability. For example, the American "Poseidon" P-8, during only a two-hour flight over the Black Sea, managed to find 2 Turkish and 3 Russian submarines. We are talking, of course, about the newest diesel-electric submarines 636.3 "Varshavyanka" - they are really very quiet, but this did not help them.
Apparently, it is no longer possible to hide a modern submarine from the eyes of the enemy just by reducing the level of noise and other physical fields. I would like, of course, to hope and believe that our 4th generation submarines are less noticeable for non-acoustic reconnaissance and illumination of the underwater situation, but this is very doubtful. Firstly, it is completely unclear how this can be done technically - any submarine ship, whatever one may say, will create disturbances in the aquatic environment, from which it is hardly possible to get rid of, as, for example, from the wake. And secondly, of course, it may be possible to reduce the visibility of the submarine from the air. But in order to do this, it is necessary at least to recognize the existence of the very possibility of such detection, then - to study this "phenomenon" in as much detail as possible and already after the study - to look for countermeasures. At the same time, it seems that the non-acoustic methods of detecting nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines by the command of the fleet and the leadership of the Armed Forces and the military-industrial complex were largely ignored as unscientific.
So, the first and quite obvious conclusion of the author is that only by improving the design of SSBNs and its equipment can significantly reduce the likelihood of detecting our ship by an enemy submarine, but the task of ensuring the combat stability of NSNF formations cannot be solved. What else do you need?
Seen does not mean destroyed
An axiom that has often been overlooked in Internet publications. The thing is that in modern warfare, the discovered and destroyed submarines are, as they say in Odessa, two big differences.
Suppose that the American Poseidons really have the ability with a high degree of probability to detect our submarine in a submerged position by non-acoustic means. But this will not give an absolutely exact location, but the area of its location, and in order to destroy our ship, additional efforts will be required - dropping sonar buoys, analyzing noise, and finally, the attack itself. In peacetime, the Poseidon cannot attack a Russian ship in any way: but if a war has begun, the PLO aircraft itself must become the target of an attack. In other words, the areas of SSBN deployment must be provided with air monitoring and air defense equipment sufficiently to ensure and quickly destroy enemy patrol aircraft in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. And then they scattered here, you know …
Of course, the American patrol plane can "put" another "pig" - fixing the area where the domestic submarine is located, transfer its approximate coordinates to the command, so that it, in turn, sends a multipurpose nuclear submarine there. Thus, the Americans may well "sit on the tail" of domestic SSBNs in peacetime, and destroy them at the very beginning of the conflict. But here, too, not everything is as simple as it might seem at first glance.
Apparently, the Americans are really good at detecting submarines using non-acoustic methods. But to believe that the same "Poseidons" are able to classify the identified ships with such methods is much more difficult. In order for the acoustics to do this, it is required to shoot a "noise portrait" of the submarine, that is, to identify the noise inherent in a particular type of nuclear submarine and diesel-electric submarine. This is possible, and it can be assumed that the waves generated by submarines in motion at different types of ships, their heat trail, etc. will differ. But fixing these differences and classifying the detected target will not be so easy: it is far from the fact that Americans today or in the foreseeable future will learn to do this.
In other words, it is more than likely that the Americans today are able to identify our submarines from the air, but they are unlikely to be able to classify them. In conditions when there are 1-2 nuclear submarines in the sea at the same time for the entire fleet (including SSBNs), this is not too critical. But if there are 4-5 submarines in the sea at the same time? It is still necessary to guess which of them is SSBN, because it will be very difficult to "run and explain" each one. Especially considering that …
They could - we can too
To date, the best anti-submarine aircraft of the Russian Navy is the Il-38N with the Novella complex installed on it.
Alas, in this case, “best” does not mean “good” - the complex itself began to be developed back in the 80s of the last century, then it was abandoned in an era of lack of funds, but, fortunately, received an Indian order on time. As a result, in the early 2000s, India supplied the Il-38SD with the Novella, and then, when the RF Ministry of Defense had funds, they began to bring the domestic anti-submarine Il-s to the SD level. Unfortunately, the capabilities of our "newest" Il-38N are far from being on a par with the same "Poseidon". But this does not mean at all that the Russian Federation is incapable of creating a modern anti-submarine aircraft. If the Americans have achieved great results in the field of non-acoustic search for submarines, we can do the same. Yes, it will take time and money, but the result will obviously be worth it.
The appearance of domestic "Poseidons" as part of the Russian Navy can radically facilitate the task of evading domestic SSBNs from escorting US and NATO multipurpose nuclear submarines. Yes, today American submarines have superiority over domestic nuclear submarines and SSBNs in mutual detection range (although, perhaps, Borei-A and Yasen-M will still achieve parity), and the weakness of our surface and air forces does not allow us to identify and control the movement of "Virginias" and so on. in our coastal waters. But if the Russian Navy gets at its disposal a trump card, which is an PLO aircraft, "with an emphasis" on non-acoustic detection means, then this tactical advantage of foreign submarines will be largely leveled out.
After all, if non-acoustic means become as effective as it is attributed to them today, then the American "Seawulf" and "Virginia", waiting for the release of domestic SSBNs outside our territorial waters, will be in our anti-submarine ships in full view. The low noise and the most powerful SACs of the US and NATO multipurpose nuclear submarines will not help them in this case. And we, knowing the location of the "sworn friends" submarines, will be able not only to properly shake the nerves of their crews, but also to lay SSBN routes bypassing their positions.
And it turns out that …
To ensure the combat stability of the formations of our SSBNs, we need:
1. To provide air defense of their deployment areas at a level that ensures reliable escort, and in the event of the outbreak of hostilities - the destruction of enemy ASW aircraft.
2. "At home at sea." We must create a multipurpose submarine force of sufficient strength, and obtain from them such a number of combat services, in which it will be an extremely time-consuming task for the US and NATO anti-submarine forces to figure out where the diesel-electric submarine is, where is the multipurpose nuclear submarine, and where is the SSBN.
3. To develop and launch into series an effective anti-submarine aircraft "with an emphasis" on non-acoustic methods for detecting submarines of a potential enemy.
So what, back to the "bastions"? Not necessary at all. In the previous article, the author pointed out the need to test the capabilities of our newest submarine warships Yasen-M and Borey-A. And if it suddenly turns out that they are still capable of going out into the ocean unnoticed and acting there, then this is just wonderful!
But you still can't do without A2 / AD
The whole point is that the ability to keep our air and underwater situation under control, at least in the near sea zone, is still necessary. First, in order to timely reveal the deployment of enemy submarines near our waters and not to be targeted. Secondly, because modern military equipment has served for many decades, and, of course, becomes obsolete during this time. That is, if today it turns out that Borei-A is able to carry out combat services in the ocean undetected, this does not mean at all that it will be able to do the same in 15-20 years. No admiral can ever count on the fact that his fleet will consist exclusively of the latest ships, this is impossible even for the "rich" USA. And this means that the Russian Navy will definitely have a certain number of SSBNs of not the most modern projects, which will no longer be sent to the ocean - that's what “bastions” will be needed for them. Thirdly, you need to understand that if the third world war is still destined to happen, then the beginning of the "hot" phase will be preceded by a certain period of tension, possibly measured by weeks and months. At this time, both we and the United States and NATO will build up their ship groupings, putting ships out to sea, completing current repairs, etc. And, since the American and European navies are many times greater than us in numbers, at some point we will no longer be able to take our ships out into the ocean, they will have to be deployed in the near sea zone. And, finally, fourthly, it is necessary to be able to identify and be ready to destroy enemy nuclear submarines in our near sea zone, even without regard to the safety of SSBNs.
As you know, the Americans have long and quite successfully deployed Tomahawk cruise missiles on their submarines, and they still represent a rather formidable weapon. Obviously, the further we push back the line of launching such missiles, the better it will be for us, and, of course, the air and underwater situation control system will greatly help us in this.
Thus, we really need "bastions", but this does not mean at all that we should concentrate, lock ourselves exclusively into them - if practice shows that our newest nuclear submarines are able to break through into the ocean - so much the better for us!
And if not?
Well, one can imagine such a hypothetical situation: full-fledged 4th generation submarines have been built, modern PLO aircraft have been created, but we still fail to evade the annoying attention of NATO atomarines with the frequency we need. What to do in this case?
The answer suggests itself. In this case, we should deploy SSBNs in areas where there are no American submarines, or where they themselves will be under tight control and can be destroyed at the very beginning of the conflict.
Offhand, you can name two such regions: the Black Sea and the White Sea. At the same time, the latter is of particular interest: the fact is that the White Sea has a very peculiar geographical position and bottom topography. Looking at the map, we will see that the White Sea is an internal sea of the Russian Federation - it is surrounded on almost all sides by the territory of our country. It connects to the Barents Sea, but how? The throat of the Barents Sea (this is how the strait is called) has a length of 160 km and a width of 46 to 93 km. The greatest depth is 130 m, but basically the depths of the Gorlo are less than 100 m. And further, after leaving the Gorlo, the depths decrease even more - there begins a shallow with depths of up to 50 m.
It is obvious that at the current level of domestic anti-submarine technologies and with appropriate funding, it is quite possible to build an PLO barrier, completely excluding the covert passage of foreign submarines into the White Sea. In addition, one should not forget that the White Sea is considered the internal sea waters of the Russian Federation, and that submarines of other countries can be there only on the surface and under their own flag. In addition, foreign warships are only allowed to follow to their destination, but not to stay for a long time, maneuvers, exercises, they must inform in advance about entering inland waters, etc. In other words, any attempt of covert penetration of a foreign submarine into the White Sea while submerged is fraught with a very serious diplomatic incident.
At the same time, closer to the center of the White Sea, the shoal gradually turns into a fairly deep depression, with a depth of 100-200 m (maximum depth - 340 m), where SSBNs may well hide. Yes, the deep-water area is not so big - about 300 km long and several tens of kilometers wide, but it is very easy to "close tightly" both from PLO aircraft and from submarine hunters. And an attempt to cover SSBNs with a "square-nested" ballistic missile strike is deliberately absurd - in order to "seed" the specified water area to a state of guaranteed non-survival of the submarine, many hundreds of nuclear warheads will be needed. Our SSBNs are quite capable of hitting, say, Washington from the waters of the White Sea (a distance of about 7,200 km).
It should also be said that our submariners already have experience in military service in the White Sea. In 1985-86. From December to June, TK-12 was here, while the ship began its BS with one crew, and ended with another (the change was carried out with the help of the icebreakers Sibir and Peresvet. By the way, we are talking about a heavy SSBN of Project 941.
As for the Black Sea, everything is much more complicated here. On the one hand, today, in theory, nothing prevents the deployment of submarines with ballistic missiles on board in this region. The US Atomarin will not be in the Black Sea while the Montreux Convention is in effect, the diesel submarines that Turkey has are not very suitable for escorting SSBNs, and in our coastal waters, in the event of a conflict, we are quite capable of preventing the actions of enemy ASW aircraft. The naval power of the United States and NATO will in no way be able to ensure air supremacy off our Black Sea coast in wartime - it is a long way to fly from the Turkish coast, and to drive the AUG, even if the Turks allow it, would be outright suicide. If Turkish frigates or other non-aircraft-carrying ships, for example, the USA, venture to our shores - well, the BRAV will have enough anti-ship missiles for everyone. At the same time, the distance from Sevastopol to Washington is 8,450 km in a straight line, which is quite accessible for SSBN ballistic missiles.
On the other hand, the Turks are unlikely to let nuclear SSBNs from the Northern or Pacific fleets into the Black Sea, and to recreate production in the Black Sea to a level that allows building strategic missile submarines … Of course, in the Black Sea it is quite possible to get by with more modest ships than Borei A”, but still it will be a very, very expensive project. In addition, the Turks can get more efficient submarines with VNEU, which will expand their "hunting" capabilities. It cannot be ruled out that adventures of the type "Goeben" and "Breslau" ("completely Turkish" ships of German construction and with German crews) cannot be ruled out. After all, no one will prevent Turkey from taking some submarines … for example, on lease. And no international agreement prohibits American observers from aboard these submarines. And what paragraph will be violated if these "observers" turn out to be 99% of the total crew? Today, it makes no sense for the American Navy to resort to such tricks, but if Russian SSBNs appear in the Black Sea, the situation may change. And the emergence of Russian naval strategic nuclear forces in the Black Sea theater can cause such cataclysms in international politics that even the Montreux Convention will not resist. It is unlikely that it will be advantageous for us to lift restrictions on the presence of warships of non-Black Sea powers in the Black Sea.
In other words, for a number of reasons, the basing of submarines with intercontinental ballistic missiles on board in the Crimea may look quite attractive. But such a decision should be made only after thinking very well and weighing all sorts of political consequences.
At the end of the section on the prospects for domestic SSBNs, several conclusions can be drawn:
1. SSBNs were and remain the main striking force of the Russian Navy, and ensuring their combat stability is the most important task of the general-purpose forces of our fleet.
2. The main threat to the SSBNs of the Russian Federation is represented by submarines and patrol (anti-submarine) aircraft of the United States and NATO.
3. Regardless of the place of SSBN combat services (ocean, "bastions"), general-purpose forces of the Russian Navy must be able to build zones of restriction and denial of access and maneuver (A2 / AD). The latter will be needed both for the withdrawal of strategic missile carriers into the ocean and for covering them in the seas adjacent to our coastline.
But the author will dare to speculate about where, by what forces to build these same A2 / AD zones in the following materials of the cycle.
