We often talk and write about the old, Soviet army. We speak in excellent tones. Many of the veterans of the army remember how and what we trained soldiers. And they cooked mostly well. The soldiers more than once or twice in the post-war period showed not just courage, but heroism, dedication, readiness to die for victory.
And - what is probably the most important thing - to win and stay alive.
The most prepared and trained were, perhaps, the airborne troops and the marines. This is not a whim of commanders and chiefs. This is a dire need. Airborne and MP units were to fight the enemy on its territory, with a huge numerical superiority not only in manpower, but also in equipment and weapons. In fact, the paratroopers were suicide bombers.
However, military operations in Afghanistan, and then in the Caucasus, where paratroopers and marines were actively involved, revealed the shortcomings of such units and formations. Quite indicative, in this regard, is the reaction of one of the generals, the commander of a motorized rifle unit, at the exams at the Academy of the General Staff, after getting acquainted with the weapons and equipment of the airborne division. "Well, how to fight this?"
Last year we wrote about the reinforcement of air infantry units with new artillery systems, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers. They also wrote about tank units that became mandatory for the Airborne Forces. And now the time has come for innovation for the Marine Corps. The fleet will receive heavy weapons.
Talks about the need for such weapons have been going on for a long time. The tactics used by the Marines are long outdated. In fact, this tactic was born in World War II.
Has the world changed? Yes.
75 years ago, everything was simpler. During operations on the coast, support was provided by artillery ships and aircraft. During the Second World War it was quite a feasible task. Coastal batteries were stationed in certain places, and the ships were not afraid of field artillery, even of large calibers. And the air defense of ships more or less protected from enemy aircraft.
The emergence of missile systems has completely changed the situation. Coastal anti-ship complexes "drove away" the ships from the landing site and actually deprived the Marines of support from the sea.
In fact, the ship / connection of ships has become more vulnerable as a target for coastal missile systems. And don't forget about electronic warfare systems.
Seriously though, in such a serious operation as the landing of an assault force and the capture of, for example, an island, ships should pay more attention to their own safety. Using all the means of air defense, missile defense, electronic warfare.
Why? Everything is simple. The cost of the same BDK is not comparable to the cost of the Marine Corps battalion that the ship transports.
It turns out that as soon as the ships come into real contact with the enemy, the protection of the marines is the business of 80% of the marines themselves.
And while ships and coastal complexes will be thrown by missiles, jamming and suppressing enemy complexes, the Marines will have to land and carry out assigned tasks.
It is clear that if we are not talking about uninhabited islands, but something like the Kuril Islands, then they will wait there. Accordingly, the amphibious assault must have something that will allow them to fight on equal terms with the enemy.
BTR and BMP in these conditions will not be able to provide real fire support. Not to mention the old PT-76 tanks. And the release of these rarities was stopped back in 1967.
For a long time, among the commanders of the landing and the marines, there was an opinion that the military equipment for such units should, respectively, "jump with a parachute" or land on the coast "by swimming." And such an opportunity appears only when other things necessary for the battle suffer - the caliber of guns, armor, some kind of equipment that is already quite common for the infantry.
As a result, it was decided to create tank units (battalions) in the marine brigades.
Moreover, depending on the location of the brigades, the tanks will be different. The Southerners will receive the T-72B3, while the Northerners will get the T-80BV gas turbine. The reason is simple. Despite the efficiency of the T-72 diesel, such tanks are less reliable in the Arctic. And in terms of armament and equipment, the machines are comparable.
Naturally, smart people will have questions.
And first of all, what can tanks on the coast do? Wouldn't they be perfect targets for the enemy? There will be! And they will be the target of the first, most important. And any paratrooper? Any sailor, midshipman, officer will not? But when captured, it will also be a fortress capable of destroying enemy firing points and supporting the landing with "fire and maneuver." And after the capture, the tank will become the most important link in the defense.
Our recent historical investigation on the feat of Alexander Matrosov immediately came to mind. If the attackers had at least one T-26 or BT-7 then, the infantrymen would not have had to perform feats. The 45-mm cannon of the tank would calmly open the bunkers without coming close.
What is not an argument?
The second question that arises for a thinking person is why increase the staff of the brigade? After all, a tank battalion is not only tanks, but also many service services. Isn't it easier, if necessary, to attach tank subunits and even units to the brigade commander?
Alas, the effectiveness of the attached subdivisions is much lower than that of the regular ones. And the point is not in the preparation of these units, but in the fact that in a specific situation a specific brigade commander will not know in detail the strengths and weaknesses of a particular attached unit. And this is an important aspect in a landing situation.
And the third question. Not less important. Does our fleet today have a means of delivering heavy equipment to the coast? After all, a tank, unlike an armored personnel carrier / infantry fighting vehicle, does not float. He can drive along the bottom, but he was not taught to swim.
There are delivery means. BDK, large landing ships according to our classification, are called tank landing ships according to the western one. They are capable of deploying units over long distances and with heavy weapons.
And there are also the newest boats of the project 21820 "Dugong". The newest air cavity boats, capable of transporting tanks as well.
There are the same boats of the project 11770 "Serna". True, "Serna" "lifts" only 45 tons of cargo, but …
Finally, there is the Project 12322 Zubr small landing ship. The largest hovercraft, capable of lifting 150 tons of cargo and landing troops almost anywhere on the coast of the world ocean.
Now it's time to go back to the beginning of the article. What's new in the fact that the marines are reinforced with tanks in terms of the spectrum of tasks solved by such formations?
Let's remember recent history. Marine brigades today are involved in hostilities in exactly the same way as airborne divisions and parachute regiments. They solve completely different, previously uncharacteristic tasks. These are units and subunits, if you will, of the expeditionary forces.
Was anyone surprised by the participation of Marine Corps brigades in the Chechen wars? Is anyone surprised by the appearance of naval officers in Syria or elsewhere in the world? The Marine Corps today performs the tasks that are performed by other units and formations of high combat readiness. And these tasks in particular require strengthening the power of the brigades.
It is necessary to achieve such a state of affairs in which the marines could not only seize bridgeheads on the coast and hold them until the main forces approach, but also conduct combat operations on their own for a sufficiently long time with enemy ground units and formations.
And the last thing. The modernization of the existing T-72 fleet is being carried out quite actively today. More than a hundred tanks will be delivered in the near future to army units and subunits. By the end of the year, the figure should grow to one and a half hundred. It seems that the first brigade will receive them soon. In general, the formation of battalions will be completed in a year or two.
