However, even today Russia is capable of inflicting guaranteed unacceptable damage to any aggressor.
On April 8 this year in Prague, the presidents of Russia and the United States, Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama, signed a new Treaty on Measures to Further Reduce and Limit Strategic Offensive Arms (START III). In drafting this document, the Russian side, until the very last moment, made persistent diplomatic efforts to link the agreements on the reduction of strategic offensive arms with the obligations of the parties to limit strategic defensive arms. At the same time, of course, it was not a question of reviving the 1972 ABM Treaty, but nevertheless establishing a certain framework for the deployment of strategic missile defense systems in order to give practical significance to the understanding reached in the negotiations of the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons and the growing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.
In reality, the START-3 Treaty managed to include only the only essential limitation on missile defense systems, concerning the deployment of interceptor missiles. According to paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty, "each of the parties does not re-equip and does not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers to accommodate interceptor missiles." The above-mentioned interconnection between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons, declared in the preamble of the document, does not in any way violate the US plans to deploy a global missile defense system. That is why, despite the opposition of the American side, Russia was forced to accompany the signing of the START-3 Treaty with a statement on missile defense. It emphasized that the treaty "can operate and be viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative build-up of the capabilities of the missile defense system of the United States of America." And further: "Consequently, the exceptional circumstances mentioned in Article XIV of the treaty (the right to withdraw from the treaty) also include such an increase in the capabilities of the United States missile defense systems, which would threaten the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation."
Could Moscow, in the current negotiating situation, have achieved more from Washington on missile defense issues? It seems that this was impossible. The only alternative could be the breakdown of negotiations and as a result not only the absence of new Russian-American agreements on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, but also the end of the process of "reset" in relations between the two powers. This development of events did not meet either the national interests of Russia, or the preservation of strategic stability in the world, or the aspirations of all sane humanity. Therefore, Moscow chose the option of concluding the START-3 Treaty, honestly warning about the possibility of withdrawing from it in the event of a threat to the potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces.
Nowadays, many Russian critics of the START-3 Treaty, using the fact that it does not contain any restrictions on missile defense systems, argue that after its implementation, Russia's strategic nuclear forces will lose the potential of reliable nuclear deterrence.
Is this really so? To answer this question, it is necessary to assess, firstly, Washington's intentions and plans to create a global missile defense system, and secondly, the effectiveness of measures taken by Moscow to increase the anti-missile potential of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.
PENTAGON'S PROJECTS AND INTENTIONS
In February of this year, the US Department of Defense published the Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. It argues that given the uncertainties of the future missile threat, including the likely escalation options, the United States intends to:
- to maintain combat readiness and continue R&D in the interests of improving the ground component of GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) with GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor) anti-missiles in Fort Greeley (Alaska) and Vandenberg (California);
- to complete the preparation of the second launch site at Fort Greely for insurance in case of the need for additional deployment of GBI interceptors;
- to place new information facilities in Europe for the issuance of target designations for missiles launched on the territory of the United States by Iran or another potential adversary in the Middle East;
- to invest in the development of the next generations of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor missiles, including for their potential ground deployment;
- to increase funding for R&D on information assets and anti-missile systems of the earliest possible interception, especially when the enemy uses means of overcoming missile defense;
- continue to improve the ground component of GMD, create next-generation missile defense technologies, explore alternative options, including developing and assessing the capabilities of the GBI two-stage anti-missile.
At the same time, the Pentagon announced the termination, within the framework of the 2010 budget, of projects to create an MKV (Multiple Kill Vehicle) intercept stage with multiple submunitions and KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor) anti-missile missiles to intercept ballistic missiles in the active phase of the trajectory, as well as the return of the project of an aircraft complex of laser weapons ABL (Airborne Laser) from the R&D phase "system development and demonstration" to the previous one - "concept and technology development". According to available information, funding for the MKV and KEI projects is not envisaged in the application for the 2011 financial year either - this is due to the limited resources allocated to the Pentagon for missile defense needs. At the same time, this does not mean at all that these projects have been given up. In the Overview Report, one of the priorities proclaimed the creation of promising anti-missile systems designed for the earliest possible interception of ballistic missiles, so it is quite expected that with an increase in funding for the missile defense program, the MKV and KEI projects will most likely be revived in a modified form.
To ensure proper control over the implementation of the missile defense program, the Pentagon has increased the status and responsibility of the executive bureau of the MDEB (Missile Defense Executive Board). Established in March 2007, this bureau collegially oversees and coordinates all the organizations involved in the missile defense program of the US Department of Defense and some other federal agencies. The MDEB's requirements analysis activities are complemented by the US Strategic Command's combat expertise. The Bureau also oversees the lifecycle management of anti-missile systems.
The existing plans of the Pentagon provide for the deployment of a two-element missile defense system in the near (until 2015) and long term. The first element is the protection of American territory from the missile threat, the second is the protection of US troops, allies and partners from regional missile threats.
As part of protecting US territory from a limited missile strike, it is planned to complete the deployment of 30 GBI interceptors in 2010 in two positional areas: 26 at Fort Greeley and 4 at Vandenberg. In order for these anti-missiles to be able to successfully intercept ballistic targets in the middle section of their trajectory, early warning radars in Alaska, California, Greenland and Great Britain, as well as AN / SPY-1 radars on destroyers and cruisers equipped with the Aegis air defense / missile defense system, are used. and the Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) X-band radar, which is deployed on a mobile offshore platform in the Pacific Ocean. To ensure the possibility of deploying an additional number of GBI interceptors at Fort Greeley, work will be performed there on the equipment of the already mentioned second launch site of 14 silo launchers.
In the long term, in addition to improving the ground component of GMD, the American ABM Agency envisages the development of next-generation anti-missile defense technologies, including the possibility of intercepting ICBMs and SLBMs in the ascending segment of their trajectory, launching a GBI anti-missile for preliminary target designation of space optoelectronic systems before capturing a ballistic target of a radar. integration of various types of information and intelligence systems in the network of the new architecture.
With regard to protecting US troops, allies and partners from regional missile threats, over the past decade, the Americans have made significant progress in the development and deployment of missile defense systems to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Among them are the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system upgraded to the PAC-3 level, the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system and the Aegis shipborne system with SM-3 Block 1A anti-missiles, as well as the powerful AN / TPY-2 mobile radar of the three-centimeter range for detection and tracking of ballistic targets. It is believed that so far these funds are available in quantities that are clearly insufficient in the context of the growing regional missile threats. Therefore, as part of the 2010 budget, the US administration took steps to allocate additional targeted allocations for the purchase of THAAD and SM-3 Block 1A antimissiles, the development of the SM-3 Block 1B antimissile and the equipping of more ships of the Navy with the Aegis system, adapted for missile defense missions. The FY11 budget proposal further expands these options. It is expected that by 2015 there will be a modification of the ground-based SM-3 Block 1A anti-missile. This will increase the capabilities of future regional missile defense systems against medium and intermediate-range missiles (up to 5000 km).
Another tool slated for development before 2015 is an airborne infrared optoelectronic system. The goal of the project is to provide simultaneous detection and tracking of a large number of ballistic missiles using unmanned aerial vehicles. These spatially distributed air platforms should significantly increase the depth of the regional missile defense system.
According to Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by 2015 the Pentagon will be able to purchase 436 SM-3 Block 1A and Block 1B missiles, which will be located on 9 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 28 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis system. and also deploy 6 batteries of the THAAD anti-missile complex, for which it will buy 431 interceptor missiles. In addition, the military department will have about 900 Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles. The number of AN / TPY-2 mobile radars will be increased to 14 units. This will allow the United States to create the necessary grouping for regional missile defense against ballistic missiles of Iran and North Korea.
In the long term, by 2020 America's plans include the development of more advanced fire and information weapons for regional missile defense. The SM-3 Block 2A anti-missile missile, created jointly with Japan, will have a higher acceleration rate and a more effective homing head, which will surpass the capabilities of the SM-3 Block 1A and Block 1B missiles and expand the defense zone. The next SM-3 Block 2B interceptor missile, which is now in its early stages of development, will be even more advanced than the 2A modification. Possessing high acceleration speed and maneuvering characteristics, it will also have certain capabilities for early interception of ICBMs and SLBMs.
Allocations are also planned for the development of the remote target bombardment technology, which provides not only for the launch of an anti-missile based on external target designation data from a remote source, but also for the possibility of transmitting commands to its board from information facilities other than the ship's radar of the Aegis system. This should allow the missile to intercept an attacking ballistic target at long ranges.
For Russia, the US plans to deploy a regional missile defense system in Europe are of particular importance. The new approach announced by US President Obama in September 2009 envisages a phased deployment of this missile defense system in four phases.
In phase 1 (by the end of 2011), cover should be provided for several areas in southern Europe with the help of ships equipped with the Aegis system with the SM-3 Block 1A anti-missile system.
In phase 2 (until 2015), the capabilities created by the missile defense system will be increased due to the more advanced SM-3 Block 1B, which will equip not only ships, but also ground complexes created by that time, deployed in southern Europe (in particular, the United States reached an agreement with Romania on the deployment of an anti-missile base in this country, consisting of 24 interceptor missiles). The cover zone will include the territories of the southeastern European allies of the United States in NATO.
In phase 3 (until 2018), Europe's protection zone against medium and intermediate-range missiles will increase by deploying another similar anti-missile base in the north of the continent (in Poland) and equipping the SM-3 Block 2A with both ships and ground complexes. This will protect all of the US's European NATO allies.
In phase 4 (until 2020), it is planned to achieve additional capabilities to protect US territory from ICBMs launched from the Middle East region. During this period, the SM-3 Block 2B interceptor missiles should appear.
All four phases include the modernization of the combat command and control infrastructure and communications of the missile defense system with an increase in its capabilities.
The foregoing testifies to the fact that the US administration is consistently pursuing a policy of creating a global missile defense system and does not intend to conclude any international agreements that would impose restrictions on missile defense systems. The current Republican opposition in Congress adheres to the same position, which excludes the possibility of changing this course with the coming to power of the Republican Party. In addition, there is no final configuration for the US missile defense system. Therefore, the possibility of its escalation cannot be ruled out, right up to the deployment of a space strike echelon, which will significantly increase the combat potential of this system. A weighty sign of the possible appearance of an attack space echelon in the American missile defense system is the strong rejection by the United States since 2007 of a joint Russian-Chinese initiative to develop, within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a treaty banning the deployment of any strike systems in space.
OPPORTUNITIES IN MOSCOW AND MEASURES TAKEN
In the current situation, the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is taking measures to increase the anti-missile potential of domestic ICBMs and SLBMs so that no one ever doubts that the Russian strategic nuclear forces will fulfill their task of guaranteed nuclear deterrence.
As part of the strategy of an asymmetric response to the deployment of missile defense systems, which was tested back in the 80s of the last century, which is now adapted to the emerging and projected future situation in the confrontation "missile sword - anti-missile shield", the Russian missile systems being created are given such combat qualities that reduce there is no illusion of any aggressor to defend himself from retaliation.
Already, the Strategic Missile Forces are armed with the Topol-M silo-based and mobile ground-based missile system, the RS-12M2 missile of which is capable of reliably penetrating not only existing missile defense systems, but also all those that may appear in the world in the next decade. Land-based and sea-based missile systems, created in Soviet times, also have a considerable anti-missile potential. These are missile systems with RS-12M, RS-18 and RS-20 ICBMs and a shipborne missile system with RSM-54 SLBMs. Quite recently, the RSM-54 SLBM, as part of the Sineva development work, has undergone a deep modernization, which, along with an increase in the firing range, has given it the ability to reliably penetrate modern missile defense systems.
In the near future, the ability of Russian ICBM and SLBM groupings to overcome missile defense systems will be increased many times over due to the deployment of a new type of RS-24 multiply-charged ICBM and the adoption of the newest RSM-56 (Bulava-30) multi-charge SLBM. The first regiment, armed with the Yars missile system with RS-24 ICBMs, is already on experimental combat duty in the Teikovo Strategic Missile Forces compound, and the difficulties encountered with flight testing of the RSM-56 SLBM will soon be overcome.
Combined with the use of hypersonic maneuvering warheads, a huge arsenal of airborne means of jamming ballistic target detection and anti-missile targeting systems, and the use of a large number of false warheads, Russian ICBMs and SLBMs make absolutely useless any system of defense against a nuclear missile strike in the foreseeable future. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the chosen asymmetric option of maintaining the strategic parity of the nuclear forces of Russia and the United States in the context of the deployment of a global missile defense system by the Americans is the most economical and effective response to attempts to break this parity.
So the fears of Russian critics of the START-3 Treaty regarding the loss of Russia's strategic nuclear forces of the potential for reliable nuclear deterrence are unfounded.
Of course, Moscow will closely monitor all scientific and technical achievements in the field of missile defense and adequately respond to the threats posed by them to the potential of domestic strategic nuclear forces. Already now, Russia has such "homemade preparations" which, given the most unfavorable course of events, will make it possible to equip its strategic nuclear forces with nuclear missile weapons capable of inflicting guaranteed unacceptable damage to any potential aggressor. These funds will appear then and in the amount in which it will be necessary to cool the hottest heads of foreign politicians who are hatching plans to devalue the nuclear missile potential of the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is possible that in order to implement a number of "homemade preparations", our country will need to withdraw from the Russian-American agreements on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (for example, when the US is deploying strike systems in space).
But such an undesirable and destructive development of events for international security is not Russia's choice. Everything will be determined by the restraint of other leading powers in the world in the field of military preparations. First of all, this concerns the United States, which, with the participation of allies in Europe and Northeast Asia, is implementing a program to create a global missile defense system, as well as unrestrainedly building up the power of its conventional military potential, including through the deployment of long-range high-precision weapons systems.
It is safe to say that despite the difficulties Russia is currently experiencing in reforming its military organization, including the military-industrial complex, it is able to ensure its national security in the most unfavorable development of the situation on the world stage. Its strategic nuclear forces serve as a guarantor of this.
