Every year, farther and farther into the past, the history of the USSR goes, in this regard, many of the past achievements and greatness of our country fade and are forgotten. This is sad … Now it seems to us that we knew everything about our achievements, nevertheless, there were and still are blank spots. As you know, lack of information, ignorance of their history, has the most disastrous consequences …
At the moment, we are observing processes generated, on the one hand, by the easy possibility of disseminating any information (Internet, media, books, etc.), and by the absence of state censorship, on the other. The result is that a whole generation of designers and engineers is forgotten, their personality is often denigrated, their thoughts are distorted, not to mention an inaccurate perception of the entire period of Soviet history.
And moreover, foreign achievements are put at the forefront and are given out almost as the ultimate truth.
In this regard, the restoration and collection of information regarding the history of technogenic systems created in the USSR seems to be an important task that allows both to understand their past history, identify priorities and mistakes, and learn lessons for the future.
These materials are devoted to the history of creation and some technical details regarding a unique development that still has no analogues in the world - the anti-ship missile 4K18. An attempt has been made to summarize information from open sources, to compose a technical description, to recall the creators of unique technology, and also to answer the question: is the creation of missiles of this type relevant at the present time. And are they needed as an asymmetric response in confronting large ship groupings and single naval targets?
The creation of sea-based ballistic missiles in the USSR was carried out by the special design bureau of mechanical engineering SKB-385 in Miass, Chelyabinsk region, headed by Viktor Petrovich Makeev. The production of missiles was established in the city of Zlatoust on the basis of the Machine-Building Plant. In Zlatoust there was a research institute "Hermes", which also carried out work related to the development of individual missile assemblies. The rocket fuel was produced at a chemical plant a safe distance from Zlatoust.
Makeev Victor Petrovich (25.10.1924-25.10.1985).
Chief Designer of the world's only anti-ship ballistic
rocket R-27K, operated since 1975 on one submarine.
In the early 60s. In connection with progress in engine building, the creation of new structural materials and their processing, new missile layouts, a decrease in the weights and volumes of control equipment, an increase in power per unit mass of nuclear charges, it became possible to create missiles with a range of about 2500 km. A missile system with such a missile provided rich opportunities: the possibility of striking a target with one powerful warhead, or several dispersing type, which made it possible to increase the affected area and create certain difficulties for promising anti-missile defense (ABM) weapons, carrying the second stage. In the latter case, it became possible to carry out maneuvering in the transatmospheric segment of the trajectory with guidance to a maritime radio-contrast target, which could be an aircraft carrier strike group (AUG).
From the very beginning of the Cold War, it was clear that aircraft carrier strike groups with high mobility, carrying a significant number of aircraft carrying atomic weapons, possessing powerful anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense, pose a significant danger. If the bases of bombers, and in the future also missiles, could be destroyed by a preemptive strike, then it was not possible to destroy the AUG in the same way. The new rocket made it possible to do this.
Two facts should be emphasized.
First.
The United States has made tremendous efforts to deploy new AUG and modernize old ones. Until the end of the 50s. were laid down four aircraft carriers on the Forrestal project, in 1956 laid the strike aircraft carrier of the Kitty Hawk type, which is an improved Forrestal. In 1957 and 1961, the aircraft carriers of the same type, the Constellation and America, were laid down. The aircraft carriers created during the Second World War were modernized - the Oriskani, Essex, Midway and Ticonderoga. Finally, in 1958, a breakthrough step was taken - the creation of the world's first nuclear-powered strike aircraft carrier, Enterprise, began.
In 1960, the E-1 Tracker aircraft of early warning and target designation (AWACS and U) entered service, significantly increasing the capabilities of the air defense (air defense) AUG.
At the beginning of 1960, the F-4 Phantom carrier-based fighter-bomber entered service with the United States, which was capable of supersonic flight and carrying atomic weapons.
Second fact.
The highest military-political command of the USSR has always paid considerable attention to anti-ship defense issues. In connection with the progress in the creation of sea-based cruise missiles (which is largely the merit of OKB No. 51, headed by Academician Vladimir Chelomey), the task of defeating the enemy's AUG was solved, and the systems of aviation and space reconnaissance and target designation made it possible to detect them. However, the probability of defeat over time became less and less: nuclear multipurpose boats were created, capable of destroying underwater locky carriers of cruise missiles, hydrophone stations capable of tracking them were created, anti-submarine defense was strengthened by Neptune and R-3C Orion aircraft. Finally, the layered air defense AUG (fighter aircraft, air defense missile systems, automatic artillery) made it possible to destroy launched cruise missiles. In this regard, it was decided to create a 4K18 ballistic missile capable of hitting AUG, based on the 4K10 missile being developed.
A brief chronology of the creation of the D-5K SSBN complex, project 605
1968 - the technical project and the necessary design documentation were developed;
1968 - listed in the 18th submarine of the 12th submarine of the Northern Fleet based on the Yagelnaya Bay, Sayda Bay (Murmansk Region);
1968, November 5 - December 9, 1970 Was modernized according to project 605 at the NSR (Severodvinsk). There is evidence that the submarine was undergoing repairs in the period from 1968-30-07 to 1968-11-09;
1970 - the technical design and design documentation were corrected;
1970 - mooring and factory tests;
1970, December 9–18 - state trials;
1971 - periodic work on the installation and testing of gradually arriving equipment;
1972, December - continuation of the State tests of the missile complex, not completed;
1973, January-August - revision of the missile system;
1973, September 11 - the beginning of tests of R-27K missiles;
1973 - 1975 - tests with long breaks for the completion of the missile system;
1975, August 15 - signing of the acceptance certificate and admission to the USSR Navy;
1980, July 3 - expelled from the Navy in connection with the delivery to the OFI for dismantling and sale;
1981, December 31 - disbanded.
A brief chronology of the creation and testing of the 4K18 rocket
1962, April - the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers on the creation of the D-5 missile system with the 4K10 missile;
1962 - preliminary project;
1963 - pre-draft design, two variants of the guidance system were developed: with two-stage, ballistic plus aerodynamic and with purely ballistic targeting;
1967 - completion of 4K10 tests;
1968, March - the adoption of the D-5 complex;
the end of the 60s - complex tests were carried out on the second stage liquid-propellant engine of the R-27K SLBM (the second approved "drowned man");
1970, December - start of 4K18 tests;
1972, December - in Severodvinsk, the stage of joint trials of the D-5 complex began with launches of a 4K18 m missile of a project 605 submarine;
1973, November - completion of tests with a two-rocket salvo;
1973, December - completion of the stage of joint flight tests;
1975, September - by a government decree, work on the D-5 complex with a 4K18 rocket is completed.
Technical parameters SLBM 4K18
Launch weight (t) - 13, 25
Maximum firing range (km) - 900
The head part is monoblock with guidance on moving targets
Missile length (m) - 9
Rocket diameter (m) - 1, 5
Number of steps - two
Fuel (at both stages) - unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine + nitrogen tetroxide
Description of construction
Systems and assemblies of 4K10 and 4K18 missiles were almost completely unified in terms of the first stage engine, rocket launch system (launch pad, adapter, launch method, rocket-submarine docking, rocket silo and its configuration), shell and bottom manufacturing technology, and factory technology. refueling and ampulization of tanks, ground equipment units, loading facilities, the scheme of passage from the manufacturer to the submarine, to the warehouses and arsenals of the Navy, according to the technologies of operation in the fleets (including on the submarine), etc.
Rocket R-27 (4K-10) is a single-stage rocket with a liquid fuel engine. It is the ancestor of naval liquid-propellant rocketry. The rocket implements a set of schematic-layout and design-technological solutions that have become basic for all subsequent types of liquid-propellant missiles:
• all-welded structure of the rocket body;
• introduction of a "recessed" propulsion system - the location of the engine in the fuel tank;
• the use of rubber-metal shock absorbers and the placement of elements of the launch system on the rocket;
• factory refueling of missiles with long-term storage components of propellant with subsequent ampulization of the tanks;
• automated control of prelaunch preparation and salvo firing.
These solutions made it possible to radically reduce the dimensions of the rocket, sharply increase its readiness for combat use (the prelaunch preparation time was 10 minutes, the interval between missile launches was 8 s), and the operation of the complex in everyday activities was simplified and made cheaper.
The rocket body, made of Amg6 alloy, was lightened by the use of deep chemical milling in the form of a "wafer" cloth. A two-layer separating bottom was placed between the fuel tank and the oxidizer tank. This decision made it possible to abandon the inter-tank compartment and thereby reduce the size of the rocket. The engine was two-block. The thrust of the central engine was 23850 kg, the control engines - 3000 kg, which in total amounted to 26850 kg of thrust at sea level and 29600 kg in vacuum and allowed the rocket to develop an acceleration of 1.94 g at the start. The specific impulse at sea level was 269 seconds, in vacuum - 296 seconds.
The second stage was also equipped with a drowned engine. Successful overcoming of the problems associated with the introduction of a new type of engines at both stages was ensured by the efforts of many designers and engineers headed by the Lenin Prize laureate, the leading designer of the first "drowned" (SLBM RSM-25, R-27K and R-27U) A. A. Bakhmutov, who is the co-author of the "drowned man" (together with A. M. Isaev and A. A. Tolstov).
An adapter was installed at the bottom of the rocket to dock it with the launcher and create an air “bell” that lowers the pressure peak when starting the engine in a water-flooded mine.
For the first time, an inertial control system was installed on the BR R-27, the sensitive elements of which were located on a gyro-stabilized platform.
Launcher of a fundamentally new scheme. It included a launch pad and rubber-metal shock absorbers (RMA) placed on the rocket. The missile was without stabilizers, which, in combination with the PMA, made it possible to reduce the diameter of the shaft. The shipborne system of daily and prelaunch maintenance of the rocket provided automated remote control and monitoring of the state of systems from a single console, and automated centralized control of prelaunch preparation, missile launch, as well as comprehensive routine checks of all missiles were carried out from the missile weapon control panel (PURO).
The initial data for firing was generated by the Tucha combat information and control system, the first domestic multi-purpose automated shipborne system that provides the use of missile and torpedo weapons. In addition, "Tucha" carried out the collection and processing of information about the environment, as well as the solution of navigation problems.
Rocket operation
Initially, the design of a detachable warhead with high aerodynamic quality, controlled by aerodynamic rudders and a passive radio-technical guidance system, was adopted. The placement of the warhead was planned on a single-stage carrier, unified with the 4K10 rocket.
As a consequence of the appearance of a number of insurmountable problems, namely: the impossibility of creating a radio-transparent fairing for guidance antennas of the required dimensions, an increase in the size of the rocket due to the increase in the mass and volume of the equipment of control and homing systems, which made it impossible to unify launch complexes, finally, with the capabilities of reconnaissance and target designation systems and with an algorithm for accounting for the "obsolescence" of target designation data.
Target designation was provided by two radio engineering systems: the Legend satellite system of maritime space reconnaissance and target designation (MKRTs) and the Uspekh-U aviation system.
The ICRC "Legend" included satellites of two types: US-P (index GRAU 17F17) and US-A (17F16-K). US-P, which is an electronic reconnaissance satellite, provided target designations by receiving radio emissions emitted by an aircraft carrier strike group. US-A operated on the principle of radar.
The "Success-U" system included Tu-95RTs aircraft and Ka-25RTs helicopters.
During the processing of the data received from the satellites, the transmission of target designation to the submarine, the alerting of the ballistic missile and during its flight, the target could move 150 km from its original position. The aerodynamic guidance scheme did not meet this requirement.
For this reason, in the pre-design project, two versions of the 4K18 two-stage rocket were developed: with two-stage, ballistic plus aerodynamic (a) and with purely ballistic targeting (b). In the first method, guidance is carried out in two stages: after the target is captured by the lateral antenna system with increased direction finding accuracy and detection range (up to 800 km), the flight trajectory is corrected by restarting the second stage engine. (A two-fold ballistic correction is possible.) At the second stage, after the target is captured by the nose antenna system, the warhead is aimed at the target already in the atmosphere, ensuring hitting accuracy sufficient for the use of a low power class charge. In this case, low requirements are imposed on the nose antennas in terms of the viewing angle and aerodynamic shape of the fairing, since the required guidance zone has already been reduced by almost an order of magnitude.
The use of two antenna systems excludes continuous tracking of the target and simplifies the nasal antenna, but complicates the gyro devices and requires the mandatory use of an onboard digital computer.
As a result, the length of the guided warhead was less than 40% of the missile length, and the maximum firing range was reduced by 30% from the specified one.
That is why, in the pre-sketch design of the 4K18 rocket, an option was considered only with a two-fold ballistic correction; in it, the onboard control system, the design of the rocket and the warhead (i.e., the warhead), has been greatly simplified, the length of the rocket's fuel tanks has been increased, and the maximum firing range has been brought to the required value. The accuracy of aiming at the target without atmospheric correction has significantly deteriorated, therefore, an uncontrolled warhead with a charge of increased power was used to confidently hit the target.
In the preliminary design, a version of the 4K18 rocket was adopted with passive reception of the radar signal emitted by the enemy's ship formation and with ballistic trajectory correction by turning on the second stage engines twice in the extra-atmospheric flight phase.
Testing
The R-27K rocket has gone through a full cycle of design and experimental testing; working and operational documentation was developed. From the ground stand at the State Central Test Site in Kapustin Yar, 20 launches were carried out, of which 16 with positive results.
A diesel-electric submarine of Project 629 was re-equipped for the R-27K missile on Project 605. The missile launches from the submarine were preceded by throw tests of the 4K18 rocket mock-ups on the PSD-5 submersible stand specially created according to the design documentation of the Volna Central Design Bureau.
The first launch of a 4K18 rocket from a submarine in Severodvinsk was carried out in December 1972, in November 1973 flight tests were completed with a two-rocket salvo. In total, 11 missiles were launched from the boat, including 10 successful launches. At the last launch, a direct (!!!) hit of the warhead into the target ship was ensured.
A feature of these tests was that a barge with a working radar station was installed on the battlefield, which simulated a large target and the radiation of which was guided by the rocket. The technical leader of the tests was the deputy chief designer Sh. I. Boksar.
By a government decree, work on the D-5 complex with the 4K18 missile was completed in September 1975. The Project 605 submarine with 4K18 missiles was in trial operation until 1982, according to other sources until 1981.
Thus, out of 31 launched missiles, 26 missiles hit the conditional target - an unprecedented success for a rocket. The 4K18 was a fundamentally new rocket, no one had done anything like this before, and these results perfectly characterize the high technological level of Soviet rocketry. The success is also largely due to the fact that 4Q18 entered trials 4 years later than 4Q10.
But why didn't 4K18 go into service?
The reasons are different. First, the lack of infrastructure for reconnaissance targets. Do not forget that at the time when 4K18 was tested, the ICRTs "Legend" system was also not yet put into service, the target designation system based on aircraft carriers could not provide global surveillance.
Technical reasons are cited, in particular, "a designer's mistake in the electrical circuit, which halves the reliability of guidance of 4K18 SLBMs at mobile radio-learning targets (aircraft carriers), which was eliminated when analyzing the causes of accidents of two test launches," is mentioned.
The delay in testing occurred, among other things, due to the shortage of missile control systems and a target designation complex.
With the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty in 1972, the project 667V SSBNs with R-27K missiles, which had no functionally determined observable differences from the ships of Project 667A - carriers of the strategic R-27, were automatically included in the list of submarines and launchers limited by the Treaty. …The deployment of several dozen R-27Ks accordingly reduced the number of strategic SLBMs. Despite the seemingly more than sufficient number of such SLBMs allowed for deployment by the Soviet side - 950 units, any reduction in the strategic grouping in those years was considered unacceptable.
As a result, despite the formal acceptance of the D-5K complex into operation by a decree of September 2, 1975, the number of deployed missiles did not exceed four units on the only experimental submarine of project 605.
Finally, the latest version is the undercover struggle of the bureau chiefs who produced anti-ship complexes. Makeev encroached on the patrimony of Tupolev and Chelomey and, possibly, lost.
It should be noted that at the end of the 60s, work on the creation of anti-submarine systems went on a wide front: modified Tu-16 10-26 bombers with P-5 and P-5N missiles were produced, projects of Tu-22M2 aircraft (developed in Tupolev Design Bureau) with the Kh-22 missile and the T-4 "Sotka" with a fundamentally new hypersonic missile, developed at the design bureau headed by Sukhoi. The development of anti-ship missiles for the Granit and 4K18 submarines was carried out.
Of all this bulk of work, the most exotic ones were not carried out - T-4 and 4K18. Perhaps the supporters of the theory of conspiracy between senior officials and heads of factories on the priority of producing certain products are right. Was economic feasibility and lower efficiency sacrificed for mass production?
A similar situation developed during the Second World War: the German command, which relied on the wunderwaffe, an amazing weapon, lost the war. Missile and jet technologies gave an unprecedented impetus to post-war technological development, but did not help to win the war. Rather, on the contrary, having exhausted the economy of the Reich, they brought its end closer.
The following hypothesis seems to be the most probable. With the advent of Tu-22M2 missile carriers, it became possible to launch missiles from a long distance and evade enemy fighters at supersonic speed. Reducing the probability of intercepting missiles was ensured by the installation of jamming devices on parts of the missiles. As indicated, these measures were so effective that none of the 15 missiles was intercepted during the exercise. In such conditions, the creation of a new missile, having even a slightly shorter range (900 km versus 1000 for the Tu-22M2) was too wasteful.
D-13 complex with R-33 anti-ship missile
(quoted from the book / "Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering named after Academician V. P. Makeev \")
In parallel with the development of the D-5 complex with the R-27K anti-ship ballistic missile, research and design work was underway on other versions of anti-ship missiles using a combined active-passive sight-corrector and homing in the atmospheric flight phase to hit priority targets in aircraft-attack groups or convoys. In this case, in the case of positive results, it was possible to switch to nuclear weapons of small and ultra-low power classes or use conventional ammunition.
In the mid 60s. design studies were carried out for the D-5M missiles with an increased length and launch mass relative to the D-5 missiles. In the late 60s. R-29 missiles of the D-9 complex began to be investigated.
In June 1971, a government decree was issued on the creation of the D-13 missile system with the R-33 missile, equipped with combined (active-passive) means and warhead homing equipment in the descending sector.
According to the decree at the end of 1972. a preliminary project was presented and a new decree was issued specifying the stages of development (tests of a missile from a submarine were originally set for 1977). The decree stopped work on the placement of the D-5 complex with the R-27K missile on the submarine pr.667A; the following were established: the mass and dimensions of the R-33 rocket, similar to the R-29 rocket; placement of R-33 missiles on submarines of project 667B; the use of monoblock and multiple warheads with special and conventional equipment; firing range up to 2, 0 thousand km.
In December 1971, the Council of Chief Designers determined the priority work on the D-13 complex:
- to issue the initial data on the rocket;
- to agree on the tactical and technical tasks for the components of the rocket and the complex;
- to make a study of the appearance of the rocket with the equipment accepted for development in the preliminary project (the equipment on the launch vehicle is about 700 kg, the volume is two cubic meters; on the homing block of the multiple warhead - 150 kg, two hundred liters).
The state of work in mid-1972 was unsatisfactory: the firing range decreased by 40% due to an increase in the front compartment of the rocket to 50% of the length of the R-29 rocket and a decrease in the starting mass of the R-33 rocket compared to the R-29 rocket by 20%.
In addition, problematic issues related to the operation of the combined sighting device under plasma formation conditions, with the protection of antennas from thermal and mechanical effects during ballistic flight, with obtaining acceptable target designation, using existing and promising space and hydroacoustic reconnaissance means, were identified.
As a result, a two-stage development of the preliminary project was proposed:
- in the II quarter. 1973 - on missile and complex systems with the determination of the possibility of achieving the required characteristics, the level of which was set at the Council of Chief Designers in December 1971 and confirmed by the decision of the Board of the Ministry of General Machine Building in June 1972;
- in the 1st quarter. 1974 - for the rocket and the complex as a whole; At the same time, the task was to coordinate in the design process the development issues related to the enemy model, with the enemy countermeasure model, as well as with the problems of target designation and reconnaissance means.
The preliminary design for the missile and the complex was developed in June 1974. It was predicted that the target firing range would decrease by 10-20% if we stay within the dimensions of the R-29R rocket, or by 25-30% if the plasma formation problems were solved. Joint flight tests from a submarine were scheduled for 1980. The preliminary project was considered at the Institute of Armaments of the Navy in 1975. There was no government decree for further development. The development of the D-13 complex was not included in the five-year R&D plan for 1976-1980, approved by a government decree. This decision was dictated not only by development problems, but also by the provisions of the Treaties and the Treaty Process on the Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT), which classified anti-ship ballistic missiles as strategic weapons based on their external features.
UR-100 anti-ship missile complex (option)
Based on the most massive ICBM UR-100 Chelomey V. M. a variant of the anti-ship missile system was also being worked out.
Development of other variants of anti-ship missiles based on IRBM and ICBM
Already in the early 1980s, to destroy aircraft carrier and large amphibious formations on the approaches to the shores of the European part of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries on the basis of the 15Zh45 medium-range ballistic missile of the Pioneer mobile complex and the target designation systems of the Navy MKRTs "Legend" and the MRCTs "Success" MIT (Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering) created a coastal reconnaissance and shock system (RUS).
Work on the system was stopped in the mid-1980s due to the high costs of creating and in connection with negotiations on the elimination of medium-range missiles.
Another interesting job was being done at the southern rocket center.
By a government decree of October 1973, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau (KBYU) was entrusted with the development of the Mayak-1 (15F678) homing warhead with a gas engine for the R-36M ICBM. In 1975, a preliminary design of the block was developed. In July 1978, began and ended in August 1980, the LCI of the homing head 15F678 on the 15A14 rocket with two options for sighting equipment (by radio-brightness maps of the area and by maps of the terrain). The 15F678 warhead was not accepted for service.
Already at the beginning of the XXI century, another unconventional work was carried out with combat ballistic missiles, where it was important to use the maneuverability and accuracy of the delivery of combat equipment for ballistic missiles, and also associated with solving problems at sea.
NPO Mashinostroyenia jointly with TsNIIMASH proposes to create on the basis of the UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) ICBM ambulance missile and space complex "Call" by 2000-2003 to provide emergency assistance to ships in distress in the water area of the world's oceans. It is proposed to install special aerospace rescue aircraft SLA-1 and SLA-2 as a payload on the rocket. At the same time, the speed of delivery of the emergency kit can be from 15 minutes to 1.5 hours, landing accuracy is + 20-30 m, cargo weight is 420 and 2500 kg, depending on the type of ALS.
Also worth mentioning is the work on the R-17VTO Aerophone (8K14-1F).
Based on the results of the research, the Aerophone seeker was created, which is able to recognize, capture and homing on the target's photo-image.
Present time
Perhaps it is worth starting this part with a sensational message from news agencies:
"China is developing ballistic anti-ship missiles," Defense News reported.
According to a number of military analysts from the United States and Taiwan, in 2009-2012, China will begin deploying an anti-ship version of the DF-21 ballistic missile.
The warheads of the new missile are said to be capable of hitting moving targets. The use of such missiles will make it possible to destroy aircraft carriers, despite the powerful air defense of ship formations.
According to experts, modern shipborne air defense systems are not capable of hitting the warheads of ballistic missiles falling vertically on the target at a speed of several kilometers per second.
The first experiments with ballistic missiles as anti-ship missiles were carried out in the USSR in the 70s, but then they were not crowned with success. Modern technologies make it possible to equip a ballistic missile warhead with a radar or infrared guidance system, which ensures the destruction of moving targets"
Conclusion
As you can see, already at the end of the 70s, the USSR possessed the "long arm" technology against aircraft carrier formations.
At the same time, it does not even matter that not all components of this system: aerospace target designation and ballistic anti-ship missiles - BKR were fully deployed. The main thing is that a principle was developed and technologies were developed.
It remains for us to repeat the existing groundwork at the modern level of science, technology, materials and element base, to bring it to perfection, and to deploy in sufficient quantities the necessary missile systems and a reconnaissance and target designation system based on the space component and over-the-horizon radars. At the same time, many of them are not required. In total, with the prospect, less than 20 missile systems (according to the number of AUG in the world), taking into account the guarantee and duplication of strikes - 40 complexes. This is just one missile division from the times of the Soviet Union. It is desirable, of course, to deploy in three types: mobile - on submarines, PGRK (based on Pioneer-Topol) and a silo version based on a new heavy missile or the same Topol stationary in coastal areas.
And then, as they would say, the opponents of the AUG would be an aspen (tungsten, depleted uranium or nuclear) stake in the heart of aircraft carriers.
If anything, it would be an asymmetric response and a real threat, forever attributing the AUGi to the shore.
