The following abbreviations are used in the article: GSh - General base, Gra - army group, CA - Red Army, cd (kp) - cavalry division (regiment), md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (nn) - infantry division (regiment), PT - anti-tank, RM - intelligence materials, RO - the intelligence department of the military district, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, TGr - tank group, td (TP) - tank division (regiment).
In the previous part, materials were considered about the concentration of German mobile troops near our border in 1940 and at the beginning of 1941. In the RM, which arrived by 26.4.41, it was said about the presence of 16 motorized and tank divisions at the border. This information was considered verified because has been confirmed by several sources.
In fact, there were only three German TDs near the border, of which one was just beginning to arrive in the Poznan area. There was not a single MD near the border. In terms of the number of motorized and tank divisions, our reconnaissance forces made a mistake more than five times … Why did such a gross mistake appear? Why did the leadership of the Soviet Union and the spacecraft not raise troops until June 22? In the article, the author will present his version that will answer these and other questions.
Since May 1941, RU believed that the grouping of German troops concentrated against the USSR was deployed on the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja), Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary) and Slovakia.
The mobile troops in the German armed forces included motorized regiments, motorized rifle, tank and cavalry regiments, anti-tank battalions, motorcycle rifle, scooter and reconnaissance battalions. The author will limit himself to considering only the materials related to the presence and deployment of CP, TP, motorized rifle regiments, etc., infantry motorized regiments (hereinafter referred to as MP), CD, etc., infantry motorized divisions (hereinafter referred to as MD).
The absence of some RMs in the public domain
When discussing the events that took place on the eve of the war, the official point of view diligently does not consider some issues. For example, all published RM RU, which describe in detail the number of divisions and their locations near our border, are limited to the date of 31.5.41. After this date, there is no published RU information on the number and deployment of German troops. The next published summary of RU refers to the evening of June 22. This suggests that this information is being hidden from public access.
The same thing happens with the published RM, received from the intelligence of the NKVD border troops. Until the end of May, there are published reports and information on the deployment of enemy troops, and since June 1941, there are only documents published that do not contain the specified information.
A similar situation can be observed with the maps in the Russian-German project to digitize captured German documents. Currently, there are no publicly available maps with the situation after May 27 and before 21.6.41. Therefore, there are documents, the content of which should not be disclosed, but it was they who should have determined the decisions taken by the country's leadership and the spacecraft on the eve of the war. Let's try to figure out what may be hiding in the RM, which entered in June 1941.
The lack of this information allows individual writers to falsify our story using versions they have invented. A typical example is the version that the higher command staff of the spacecraft did not specifically follow Stalin's instructions on the eve of the war, or they specifically carried out measures that were supposed to lead to the defeat of the spacecraft and, consequently, our country.
The author decided to repeat some material that was previously published in other articles. This is due to the fact that articles published on the Voennoye Obozreniye site began to be posted on numerous other sites. Without repeating the above material, it will be difficult for new readers to understand the individual details. Therefore, readers who are waiting for the publication of links to the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces will have to wait until the release of the 4th part.
Reconnaissance on the organization of German armored and motorized divisions
From 1939 to 1940, the German TD consisted of a tank brigade (two TP), an infantry brigade (two MP), an artillery regiment (two divisions), an anti-tank battalion, a reconnaissance, motorcycle and sapper battalion, a communications battalion and other units.
MD consisted of three MPs, an artillery regiment, reconnaissance, motorcycle, sapper, PT battalions, a communications battalion and other units. Mp (md) SS did not belong to the mobile troops of the Wehrmacht. The figure shows the change in the number of formations that could be attributed to mobile troops. In the assessment, it is assumed that two brigades or three regiments are equal to one calculated division.
In the fall of 1940, the formation of 10 new TDs for staffing began, for which it was decided to withdraw one TP from the existing connections. After the reorganization, in all the TDs, one TP of two or three battalions remained. A similar situation was observed during the formation of new MDs. Since the end of 1940, in all the Wehrmacht MD, instead of three MPs, two remained.
On May 20, 1941, the head of the Main Armored Directorate prepared a report containing data that do not take into account changes in the structure of German tank and motorized divisions. The report was heard at a meeting of the Main Military Council of the Spacecraft on May 21. The co-rapporteurs were the heads of the RU and the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the spacecraft.
From the presented figures it can be seen that the RM did not correspond to reality. The leadership of the spacecraft fully trusted the RM, which came from intelligence. Therefore, one of the proposals of the report read: Thus, it was proposed in the future to increase the number of tanks in our TD, so that it would not be weaker than the German division.
However, the important advantage of the German TD was not the number of tanks, but the interaction of tanks, motorized infantry, artillery, reconnaissance, sapper units, supply and reinforcement units. The interaction of the division with the aviation was also important, but the groups responsible for communication with the Luftwaffe were not part of the compound.
Conducting operations in vast areas of Eastern Europe, taking into account the experience gained by the German command, required the formation of large motorized formations, including motorized corps, reinforcement units, tank repair, sapper and engineer units, communications and supply units. To control them in battle, the headquarters of the TGR were created, which were entrusted with the same tasks for the operational command of the troops as the headquarters of the field armies.
In the fall of 1940, our intelligence knew about the presence of up to 10 motorized corps in the Wehrmacht. At a meeting of the highest command personnel in December 1940, it was said about the use by the Wehrmacht in the war with Poland and in France from 3 to 5 mobile groups (TGr), but our reconnaissance could not establish the redeployment of such groups to the border. Also, it was not possible to find a concentration at the border of a single motorized corps. Therefore, on the eve of the war, the SC command had no idea about the places of concentration of the enemy's mobile strike groupings: neither corps nor army.
As an example, the article examined a German group in the area of the city of Brest. According to the RO of the ZAPOVO headquarters, on June 21, the presence of the 2nd TGr was not found near the border. The entire grouping consisted of three infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades, an infantry regiment and up to two TP. Therefore, such a grouping did not pose a threat to the southern flank of the Western Military District.
Confirmation that RU did not have any other information about the enemy troops in this direction is evidenced by the report of RU at 20-00 on June 22: Therefore, in the operational reports of the General Staff (in two reports of June 22 and in the morning report of June 23) there is nothing dangerous no in this direction was noted.
In fact, it was not intelligence that was bad, but our intelligence simply did not have sources of information in the German headquarters. We must pay tribute to the Germans: they turned out to be masters at disinformation, at lightning-fast and covert redeployment of their troops to the border. Much later, the right to the same skill passed to our command.
Concentration of German troops at our border
The absence of our sources of information in the German headquarters also confirms the significant discrepancies between the actual data and the RM on the number of German divisions in Germany and on the number of divisions concentrated on our border.
Intelligence also did not have reliable information about the presence of German large offensive groupings and their headquarters (the headquarters of the GRA, TGR and armies), as well as the headquarters of the army and motorized corps, near the border.
The radio intelligence, parts of which were subordinate to the RO of the military districts, could not correct the situation either. With the use of radio intelligence data, the RM did not become more reliable either in the RO or in the RU.
RM on the presence of the border of infantry units and formations
Earlier, the author assessed the reliability of the RM with the actual data in terms of the correspondence of the numbers of pd and pp, which were focused against PribOVO and ZAPOVO, as well as against KOVO.
Of the 51 infantry divisions concentrated against the ZAPOVO and PribOVO, our intelligence knew exactly the numbers of the 43rd. At first glance, it seems that RMs are good. However, fourteen PDs with "exact" numbers did not exist by 22.6.41. Eight more divisions, which, according to the RM, were concentrated against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO, were actually located in completely different places: 5 divisions - in France, 2 - in Romania and one - against KOVO. Another division (14th Infantry Division) from the fall of 1940 was reorganized into the 14th MD and was located in Germany. It should be noted that the insignia of infantry and motorized troops are different.
The information on the numbers of the pd, concentrated against PribOVO and ZAPOVO, rechecked with the help of several sources, turned out to be unreliable in more than 50% of cases.
The same happens with the "exact" numbers of the md, which were concentrated against KOVO. Of the 25 divisions with numbers known to our reconnaissance, 10 did not exist on June 22nd. Three divisions were actually in other places: one in the GRA "Sever" reserve, one in the Balkans and one in France. Another (18th Infantry Division) in the fall of 1940 was reorganized into the 18th Infantry Division and was located in Germany.
Intelligence regularly monitored the presence of divisions with "accurate" numbers at the points of deployment where they were originally discovered, and cross-checked this information. The information was confirmed, but in fact there were no such divisions in the area, or they did not even exist … How could this be?..
The site "Electronic Exhibition of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. The First Day of the War" has a map with the position of the troops of the Western Military District and the enemy as of June 21. This map began to be prepared after the start of the war, probably to justify the surprise of the attack by German troops. On the map, a lot of German divisions and regiments on June 21 are deployed in the same areas in which they were recorded by our reconnaissance by May 31. Some of the divisions and regiments by June 21 simply disappeared …
Interestingly, out of the missing nine units, six were never in the areas in which they were discovered and tracked by intelligence. The same thing happened with the PP: of the missing 52 regiments, 37 were never in the zone of responsibility of the ZapOVO and PribOVO.
The above regiments and divisions could regularly represent certain groups of military personnel in front of our intelligence. They spread rumors among the local population, they were seen with the insignia of fictitious military units, and when the intensive movement of troops to the border began, the need for these blanks disappeared, and they disappeared …
Methods for obtaining RM by our intelligence
Before the war, our intelligence services collected information at the strategic, operational-tactical and tactical levels. Information was collected on the military-economic potential of Germany and its allies. Any information was collected about Germany's plans in diplomatic circles, in conversations with the military who belonged to the highest echelons of power in different countries.
There were individual scouts in the German headquarters and in the headquarters of Germany's allies. However, as shown above, these sources could not get reliable information about the structure of German divisions and about their redeployment to the border.
There were numerous sources of information living on the territory of Germany and its allies, on the territory of occupied Poland. Border guards, scouts of artillery units, reconnaissance aircraft of the spacecraft were watching the adjacent territory. Repeated flights of Soviet aircraft over the border territory of Germany have been noted. Every day, at least twice a day, planes of the border troops flew along the border, whose task was also to monitor the movements of troops in the adjacent territory.
They tried to get information from Soviet employees traveling on the railways of the Reich, from smugglers and defectors. According to the memoirs of P. A. Sudoplatov, our counterintelligence officers knew that there were many Abwehr agents among the defectors. Therefore, their testimony could be particularly distrusted. However, RM's analysis showed that there was a lot of reliable information in the testimonies of the defectors.
Not many people in Germany knew that a war with the USSR was inevitable and would begin in June. For example, in the Ministry of Propaganda, only Goebbels knew about this. Numerous German officials were exposed to misinformation that was allegedly true but contradictory. These officials believed they had learned reliable gossip …
Information came either about an attack on Ukraine alone, now about the setting of conditions under which the war with the USSR would not start, then about the fact that Britain would first be defeated, and only then the Soviet Union. All these officials at different levels shared this information, which reached our leadership through intelligence officers located in many countries. The information received did not contain an unambiguous answer about the inevitable start of the war on June 15-22. When reliable information about the beginning of the war began to arrive within 1-3 days, they did not believe it because of the inertia of thinking and the inertia of the flow of information from the border areas. In addition, this information contradicted the vision of the spacecraft leadership on the tactics of warfare by the German command.
Since our scouts were not in the German headquarters, the main methods of obtaining information about the deployment of enemy troops near the border were visual observation (for traffic, the movement of columns, for insignia of German military personnel, etc.) and collecting information from the local population or tracking rumors … Consider two examples with the mention in the RM of information about the insignia on the shoulder straps of German servicemen. The first is a message from Arnold (30.5.41). The report also talks about ways to obtain RM through visual observation and rumor.
Special message of the NKGB BSSR People's Commissar for State Security of the USSR Merkulov on the military-mobilization preparations of the Germans (10.5.41):
Terespol is located almost at the border near the city of Brest. On the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces from 23.4.41 to 27.5.41, units of the 1st cd are deployed in this area. As part of this division, there are no servicemen who could wear signs or on their shoulder straps. Somewhat to the side is the 131st front-line servicemen, who also could not wear the indicated signs.
On April 12, the deployment of units of the 292nd Infantry Division is noted in Sedlec, but the servicemen of this division could only wear the signs "292", "507", "508" and "509". Thus, reconnaissance recorded the presence of an infantry unit, which could not be in the area.
There is a lot of information about signs on shoulder straps in RM. Here are some of them: "Established: soldiers and officers numbered 6, 17, 80 …"
“According to the violator of the state border … in the second half of April 1941, 48 tonnage units (75-80 tanks) arrived in the city of Johaninsburg, the tanks were armed with 105 mm artillery. Up to two regiments of artillery (60-65 guns) horse-drawn … Most of the soldiers have numbers 76 on their shoulder straps …"
“[29.5.41] … Data on the deployment of 1, 56, 66, 98 and 531 points in Warsaw # 711 received from shoulder straps. There are no numbers on the shoulder straps - they were cut off, but the prints remained on them. He saw such soldiers with numbers in the ranks from the company, passing through the city.
17 pp in Vyshkov was also identified by the disputed numbers, in addition, he clarified in conversations with the population …
50 pp was established in conversations with the population, and No. 711 himself saw soldiers with imprints on their shoulder straps before the company: "50" …
537 pp has not yet cut the numbers on the shoulder straps and continues to wear them, in addition, the whole Island knows about him that he came from the Greek front …"
Interestingly, the 537th regiment will only be formed in 1942 and, of course, it could not participate in the Greek campaign. We came across one example of German disinformation using insignia on shoulder straps and rumors spread through the local population. Somewhere around June 8-9, 1941, the intelligence agencies have doubts about the numerous information based on the open wearing of insignia on shoulder straps by German soldiers.
15.6.41 … The data on the location of Warsaw 531 pp, 1 and 14 kp are trustworthy …
The dislocation of parts of the city of Warsaw, marked on the shoulder straps and according to the conversations of local residents, raises doubts and requires careful verification …"
"As of 1941-06-20 … According to the latest verified data, it is known that privates, non-commissioned officers and officers of the entire army are strictly prohibited to wear on shoulder straps or disclose the current numbers of units and formations …"
It turns out that until the beginning of June, RU believed that the German command was so close that it did not know about the determination of the deployment of their units and formations by the signs on the shoulder straps.
Now we know that after the end of the war in Poland, in order to disguise the names of the field armies and the GRA, the overwhelming majority of them changed their names. Therefore, it is incredible that the German command missed such an obvious reconnaissance sign as the presence of true designations on shoulder straps. After all, it is quite simple to hide them: it is enough to put muffs made of uniform cloth on the shoulder straps, which was permissible, but for some reason this was not done …
RM on SS divisions
There is little information about SS divisions in the pre-war RM. Of course, there are exotic information such as. A regiment with this number was not in either the SS units or the Wehrmacht tank forces.
In the report of RU from 26.4.41 it is said about the presence in the armed forces of Germany: Similar information is available in the summary of RU from 15.6.41 (with the situation on 1.6.41):.
By June 22, there were up to 4, 3 SS divisions near the border, but in the RM there was no information about any of them. Although the SS divisions "Death's Head", "Reich" and the regiment "Great Germany" arrived at the border in early June. Only they were not found … This is strange, because the SS uniform differs in insignia from the Wehrmacht uniform.
Perhaps this was due to the strict observance of the rules and norms of the secrecy regime by the servicemen of the SS troops or the concealment of their insignia. The only mention of SS divisions was in Arnold's message from 30.5.41, received by RO ZAPOVO:
Based on information obtained from two sources: 1) workers of the county administration in Mlawa, who are constantly among the German military; 2) an officer of the former Polish army who has contact with the Germans, the Germans concentrated in the vicinity of Suwalki 2 selected armored divisions of the SS units, which should strike at Kovno, Vilna and Grodno, as well as 2 armored divisions of the same units in the vicinity of Przemysl, and their direction to Lviv, Kiev…
The information was based only on rumors. Visually, none of these divisions or servicemen from them saw. And, of course, it didn’t exist in the German military. In the area of Przemysl, there were also no SS divisions or the like. Therefore, the question of SS divisions in the Przemysl area was never again considered.
The information from Arnold's message was included in the report of the RO of the headquarters of the ZapOVO from 4.6.41: The report was sent on June 6 to the subordinate armies, to the RU and to the PribOVO. The author was unable to find information on whether or not such reports were sent from the ZAPOVO to KOVO.
15.6.41 RU issues Bulletin No. 5 (in the West), which also includes the specified information: Regarding this information, it is twice specified that it may be erroneous: and.
Since the data may be unreliable, in the summary of June 15, the indicated SS armored divisions are not taken into account in the number of troops opposing the PribOVO and ZAPOVO. On May 15, according to intelligence data, 23 … 24 and 30 divisions, respectively, were against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO. The same number of divisions against the indicated districts remained in the summary of June 15.
Reports from the ZAPOVO of June 4 and from the RU of June 15 arrived at the headquarters of the PribOVO. However, in the reports of the RO of the headquarters of the PribOVO on June 18 and 21, there is no mention of these SS armored divisions. Consequently, this information was not trusted at the PribOVO headquarters.
In the summary of RO PribOVO it is said only about the only TD (20th), which has long been listed against the troops of the district:
On 17.6.41 against PribOVO in the strip: on the left - Suwalki, Likk, Allenstein and in depth - Konigsberg, Allenstein: … armored divisions - 1, tp - 5 and up to nine separate tank battalions - no less than etc. … up to 4, 5 tank divisions.
The information about the arrival of two SS TDs was not considered plausible in RO PribOVO and in RU. Confirmatory information about the arrival of these divisions was not received until the very beginning of the war. On June 21, the information about the SS armored divisions was no longer included in the prepared report of the RO ZAPOVO "On the grouping of German troops at 20.6.41". this information could not be confirmed or denied.
Our intelligence is not to blame for this. the Germans simply closed off this area and civilians could not get there:
Markets are closed by the German authorities in Suwalki, i. E. entry into the city, the bazaar is prohibited. All private shops are closed, restaurants are also closed, except for those serving German military units …
The German command, together with the city administration, issued an order prohibiting entry and entry into the forest south and northeast of Suwalki. All persons detained in the forest and not living in the area are subject to execution as spies …
It is possible that similar measures were taken in all places of concentration of mobile groups. This may explain the fact of non-disclosure of these groups.
In the evening of June 21, a new report on the grouping of German troops is being prepared in the RO of the headquarters of the Western Military District. Since the ZapOVO reconnaissance detected a massive movement of German troops to the border, and in the evening discovered their exit to their initial positions near the border, then in the summary, probably for safety reasons, the presence of SS divisions was again noted:.
There were no tank or motorized divisions on the Suwalka salient until at least the evening of June 19. This can be seen from the fragments of the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces. The attacks from the Suwalki salient were supposed to be unexpected and the German command did not want to alert the SC command in advance. Therefore, there were no motorized and tank forces on the ledge until June 20. On June 22, only the only part of the SS (part of the connection) is noted in this area.
On the map with the situation for June 21, which is being prepared at the headquarters of the Western Front after the start of the war, there is a question mark behind the mention of two SS armored divisions, and in another inscription the word “. Even after the start of the war, the headquarters of the Western Front did not consider this information reliable.
Below is a fragment of a similar map, which was prepared after the start of the war at the headquarters of the North-Western Front. It also shows that on June 21, according to intelligence from the mobile troops, there were only two MD, two CP, TP and a tank battalion on the Suvalka ledge, according to intelligence from the mobile troops.
In accordance with the first operational report of the General Staff from the Suvalkinsky ledge, only one strike was made, consisting of 3-4 infantry divisions and 500 tanks. In the evening report of the General Staff, the number of TDs advancing from the Suvalka ledge increases to 3-4.
Since, unexpectedly for RU, a large strike group appeared on the ledge, it was necessary to somehow explain the appearance of tank divisions there. By the evening, the RU received a report from the ZAPOVO dated June 21, indicating the presence of TD SS:. The phrase about SS Panzer Divisions was inserted into the RU summary at 20-00 on 22 June. Only they decided not to mention the word … In the report of the RU, another TD appeared in the Letzen-Lyk-Avgustov area, operating from the front line in the direction of Grodno.
Interestingly, our intelligence has no information about the presence of tank divisions on the Suvalka salient or in the Letzen-Lyk-Avgustov area on the evening of June 21. The summary of RO ZAPOVO says:
The grouping of the German army on 21.6.41 is determined:
1. East Prussian direction. Within the borders on the right - Suwalki, Heilsberg; left - Shuchin, Naidenburg: the headquarters of the 9th Army Allenstein, four headquarters of the army corps - Elk (Lykk), Letzen, Ortelsburg, Allenstein; nine headquarters of infantry divisions - Seyny, Bryzgel, Suwalki, Oletsko (Troyburg, Margrabovo), Elk (Lykk), Aris and in the depths - Allenstein, Lyubava (Lebau), Lidzbark; up to two infantry divisions, two motorized divisions (PribOVO data), ten artillery regiments (up to two heavy artillery regiments); presumably two SS divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, up to four CP …
On the fragment of the map with the situation for June 22, the zone indicated in item 1 of the above summary is indicated.
No full-fledged TD was found in the PribOVO area of responsibility: north of the Suwalki - Helsberg line. The 3rd TGr turned out to be undetected by the intelligence services of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and RU. The same as the 2nd TGr …
The lack of information about the presence of a strike group in the form of the 3rd TGr is confirmed by the recollections of the chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Western Military District, General A. K. Kondratyev:
«20.6.41 [According to undercover information. - Approx. author] in East Prussia and, in particular, in the Lykk region, the Germans are concentrating large forces.
Up to 35,000-40,000 German soldiers are allegedly concentrated in the Lykk-Grajevo direction. He ordered the immediate transfer of this data to the headquarters of the district, about the establishment of surveillance of the state border.
New divisions are being pulled up from our rear to the state border. The 85th Rifle Division comes to us with Major General Bandovsky. The 17th Rifle Division is moving, which I met on the march on 16.6, the 37th Rifle Division moved from Vitebsk and Lepel, and the headquarters of the 21st Rifle Division - from Vitebsk.
What does this all mean ???
Yes, apparently, the clouds are gathering, serious days are approaching!
21.6.41 … Why, however, there are no instructions on the command line?..
Recently, during my report to Pavlov, I asked him what to do with the families of the command personnel in case of any complications.
Oh, what a question I was!.. “Do you know that I have 6 tank corps at the ready ?! I forbid not only talking, but also thinking about evacuation!"
“I'm listening,” I replied, but the thought remains in my head: aren't we too arrogant ?!
The 3rd Army is the right-flank army of the ZAPOVO. The command of this army should be greatly concerned about a possible strike by a mechanized group from the side of the Suvalka salient. However, General A. K. Kondratyev writes only about the concentration of 35,000-40,000 people. Apparently, these are the PDs, which are mentioned in the latest peace report of the RO ZAPOVO, which will be sent to addressees at 15-00 on June 22.
In the zone of the 3rd Army, a possible increase in infantry formations near the border was recorded. But it was not supposed to frighten the commander of the ZAPOVO, tk. intelligence did not tell him the main thing: about the completion of the concentration of two tank groups on the flanks of his district …
The situation on the Suvalka ledge did not cause concern among the command of the spacecraft. When the command of the ZAPOVO sent an encrypted message to Moscow about the continuous movement of the columns towards the ledge, probably few people in Moscow believed it … But they did not believe this information because, according to intelligence, neither the PribOVO nor the ZapOVO had so many tank divisions. And numerous echelons with tanks did not move from Germany to East Prussia and to former Poland … In addition, each TD had about 2900 vehicles. If the reconnaissance at the very least found something on the TP, but such a huge number of cars on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland did not pass through the Republic of Moldova … Therefore, the strike from the Suwalki salient turned out to be unexpected for the command of spacecraft, PribOVO and ZAPOVO …
