1943 year. The turning point in the course of the war
In 1943, the survivability of the main striking force of the Red Army Air Force, the Il-2 aircraft, reached 50 sorties. The number of combat aircraft in the active army exceeded 12 thousand vehicles. The scale has become gigantic. The number of Luftwaffe combat aircraft on all fronts was 5,400 aircraft. This is another explanation for the large accounts of the German aces.
The fact is that there is only one way to absolutely avoid combat losses - not to fly at all. And the Soviet aircraft flew. And flew a huge fleet on a huge front. And the German aircraft flew a much smaller number of cars. Simply by virtue of the laws of mathematics, a single German fighter had many times higher chances of meeting a Soviet aircraft on a sortie than its counterpart from the Red Army Air Force. The Germans worked with a small number of aircraft, constantly transferring them from one sector of the front to another.
This is confirmed by statistics. For example, the same Hartman, having completed 1400 sorties, met with the enemy and fought in 60% of the sorties. Rally - even more, in 78% of sorties it had contact with enemy aircraft. And Kozhedub fought only in every third sortie, Pokryshkin - in every fourth. The Germans achieved victory on average in every third sortie. Ours are in every eighth. It may seem that this speaks in favor of the Germans - they more often finished the relegation effectively. But that's only if you take the numbers out of context. There were really few Germans. Attack aircraft and fighters covering them flew, even when there was almost no German aviation left in their sector of the front. Even from single German fighters, attack aircraft had to be covered. So they flew. Even without meeting the enemy in the sky, they flew, covering their attack aircraft and bombers. Soviet fighters simply did not have enough targets to achieve a number of victories comparable to the German ones.
On the one hand, the tactics of the Germans make it possible to get by with a small number of aircraft, which can be seen in reality. On the other hand, this is flight work without respite, overstrain of forces. And no matter how ace the German pilot is, he cannot be torn to pieces and be in several places at the same time. In compact France or Poland, this was unnoticeable. And in the vastness of Russia it was already impossible to win based on experience and professionalism. All this is a consequence of the strategy of the Germans adopted at the beginning of the war: do not overextend industry and quickly deal with the enemy with a small number, speed of action. When the blitzkrieg failed, it turned out that for an equivalent confrontation, numerous air forces were needed, which Germany did not have. The current situation could not be corrected instantly: the USSR was preparing for a war of attrition in advance, and that was not fully prepared. All that remained to be done was to continue fighting as before, with a small number of aircraft forced to operate at double or triple intensity. It was necessary to expose some sectors of the front in order to create superiority in other sectors, at least for a while.
The Soviet side, in turn, having a large aircraft fleet, had the opportunity to increase the concentration of forces without exposing secondary sectors of the front and even maintaining a significant aircraft fleet in the far rear for the purpose of training pilots. In 1943-1944, the Red Army regularly conducted many operations simultaneously on different sectors of the fronts, and almost everywhere the overall numerical superiority in aviation was ours. Even if the average level of a Soviet pilot is a little lower, even if Soviet aircraft are no better than German ones, there are many of them, and they are everywhere.
Aircraft production statistics in Germany show that in part the Germans realized their mistake. In 1943 and especially in 1944, a sharp increase in the production of aircraft was seen. However, it is not enough to produce such a number of aircraft - it is still necessary to train the corresponding number of pilots. And the Germans did not have time for this - this numerous aircraft fleet, as it turned out, was needed back in 1941. The mass training pilots of 1943-1944 were no longer aces. They did not have the opportunity to gain the excellent experience that the 1941 Luftwaffe pilots had. These pilots were no better than the mass Soviet pilots of military training. And the performance characteristics of the aircraft on which they met in battles did not differ much. These belated actions could no longer turn the tide.
We can say that in comparison with 1941, the situation for the Germans turned exactly 180 degrees. Until now, the Germans have won due to the speed of their actions, having managed to defeat the enemy before he had time to mobilize his army and industry. With small Poland and France, this was easily achieved. Great Britain was saved by the strait and the stubbornness of British sailors and pilots. And Russia was saved by the vastness, the resilience of the Red Army and the willingness of industry to work in a war of attrition. Now the Germans themselves were forced to expand production of scarce aircraft and pilots with panic swiftness. However, such a rush inevitably began to affect the quality - as mentioned above, a qualified pilot must train for more than one year. And time was sorely lacking.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “In 1943, most of the German pilots were inferior to us in maneuvering combat, the Germans began to shoot worse, began to lose to us in tactical training, although their aces were very“tough nuts”. The Germans' pilots became even worse in 1944 … I can say that these pilots did not know how to "look back", they often openly neglected their duties to cover troops and objects."
The front of the war is expanding
In 1943, the chances of meeting a German plane in the sky for Soviet pilots began to diminish even more. The Germans were forced to strengthen the German air defense. At the same time, many analysts draw the stunning conclusion that everything was so good for the Germans in the East that it made it possible to remove part of the forces from the front and start a serious battle in the West without any effort. Basically, this version is based on the statistics of Luftwaffe losses in foreign (English, American) literature.
How well the Germans were doing on the Eastern Front is evidenced by the almost threefold increase in the number of combat sorties of the Red Army Air Force on strike missions in 1943. The total number of sorties by Soviet aviation exceeded 885,000, while the number of sorties by German aircraft fell to 471,000 (from 530,000 in 1942). Why, in such unfavorable conditions, did the Germans begin to transfer aircraft to the West?
The fact is that in 1943 a new front of war opened - the air front. This year, the heroic allies of the USSR - the United States and Great Britain - got out of suspended animation. Apparently, realizing that the USSR had withstood and a turning point was coming, the Allies decided to start fighting in full force. But preparations for the landing in Normandy will take another whole year. In the meantime, while the operation is being prepared, it is possible to build up air pressure through strategic bombing. 1943 is the year of a sharp, spasmodic increase in the bombing of Germany, the year when these bombings became truly massive.
Until 1943, the war for the Germans was somewhere far away. It's about the citizens of Germany. Yes, sometimes planes fly, sometimes they bomb. The Wehrmacht is fighting somewhere. But at home - peace and quiet. But in 1943, trouble came to almost every German city. Civilians began to die en masse, factories and infrastructure began to collapse.
When your house is being destroyed, you no longer think about the capture of someone else's. And then there are factories that make military equipment for the war in the East. The Allied offensive was airborne. And it was only possible to fight it with the help of air defense and aviation. The Germans have no choice. Fighters are needed to defend Germany. And in this situation, the opinion of the Wehrmacht infantry, sitting under the Il-2 bombs in the trenches, no longer worries anyone.
German aviation in the East was forced to operate with overstrain. The norm was to make 4-5 flights per day (and some German aces generally claim that they made up to 10 flights, but we will leave this on their conscience), while the average Soviet pilot flew 2-3 times a day. All this was a consequence of the German command's underestimation of the spatial scope of the war in the east and the real forces of the Red Army. In 1941, on average, for 1 German aircraft in the East, there were 0, 06 sorties per day, in 1942 - already 0, 73 departures. And in the aviation of the Red Army, a similar indicator was in 1941 - 0, 09, in 1942 - 0, 05 sorties. In 1942, the average German pilot flew 13 times as many sorties. He worked for himself and for 3-4 non-existent pilots, whom the Luftwaffe did not bother to prepare in advance, counting on a quick and easy victory over the USSR. And then the situation only began to worsen. By 1944, the total gross number of sorties in the Luftwaffe had dropped - the Germans did not pull such a load. There were 0.3 departures per plane. But in the Air Force of the Red Army, this same figure fell to 0.03 departure. In the Red Army Air Force, the average pilot still made 10 times fewer sorties. And this despite the fact that the Soviet aviation increased the total number of sorties, while the Germans, on the contrary, had a 2-fold drop from 1942 to 1944 - from 530 thousand sorties to 257 thousand sorties. All of these are the consequences of the "blitzkrieg" - a strategy that does not provide for an overall numerical superiority, but the ability to achieve such superiority in a narrow key sector of the front. In the Red Army Air Force, aviation was often assigned to the front or the fleet, and maneuver between them was rather rare. And they rarely maneuvered along the front - the pilots must know "their" terrain and their troops. The Germans, on the other hand, were constantly maneuvering, and in the directions of the main attacks they usually achieved a serious numerical superiority, even in the middle of the war. This worked perfectly in tight Europe, where the spatial scope simply did not provide for the possible existence of two or more "main directions" at once. And in 43-45, there could be several such main directions at the same time on the eastern front, and it was not possible to close all the cracks with one maneuver at once.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “The Germans were very good at maneuvering their aviation. On the directions of the main attack, they concentrated a large number of aviation, on the secondary directions at that moment they carried out diversionary operations. The Germans tried to surpass us strategically, in the shortest possible time to crush us in mass, to break the resistance. We must give them their due, they very bravely transferred units from front to front, they had almost no aviation units “assigned” to the armies."
1944 year. Everything is over
By and large, the war was lost by the Germans precisely at the beginning of 1944. They had no chance to turn the tide. Several world leaders - the USA, Great Britain and the USSR - got down to business at once. There could be no talk of building up efforts against the Red Army Air Force. Soviet pilots met Germans in the air less and less. That, of course, did not contribute to a sharp increase in their performance, despite the clear superiority in the air. Free hunting flights began to be carried out more often. 1941 was mirrored. Only 1,000 German aces in 1941 had more than 10,000 targets in the face of the numerous Soviet Air Forces. And in 1944, 5000 Soviet fighters had only 3-4 thousand targets. As can be seen from this proportion, the probability of a meeting with an enemy aircraft for a Soviet fighter pilot in 1944 was noticeably lower than that of a Luftwaffe fighter in 41. The situation is not conducive to the emergence of aces with hundreds of victories in the Red Army Air Force, but the radical breakdown of the entire system of armed struggle is obvious. And this scrapping is not in favor of the Luftwaffe.
The losses of the Il-2 in 1944 remained practically unchanged, but the number of sorties doubled. The survivability reached 85 sorties per plane. Only 0.5% of all sorties were intercepted by German fighters. A drop in the sea. It is no coincidence that in the memoirs of the Il-2 pilots who fought in the second half of the war, the 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun, and not a fighter, is called the most terrible enemy. Although back in 1942 it was exactly the opposite. Only in 1945 over Germany will the danger of fighters increase again, but this is primarily due to the collapse of the front to the size of a point on the map. At this point, almost all the remaining German aviation gathered around Berlin, which, even with a shortage of pilots and fuel, caused a certain effect.
And in the West, meanwhile, there was a large-scale destruction of the Luftwaffe, which surpassed, according to a number of Western sources, the total losses in the East. We will not dispute this fact (as well as the number of victories of the German aces). Many researchers conclude that this indicates the high skill of British or American pilots. Is it so?
By a strange coincidence, the Allied pilots are inferior in the number of victories even to the Soviet aces. And even more so for German. How then did the Germans manage to lose such a significant part of their fleet in the West? Who knocked them down?
The nature of the air war on the Western Front was completely different from that on the East. Here it was not possible to arrange a "swing" with quick attacks on defenseless fighters from the rear hemisphere. Here it was necessary to climb into the tail of the bombers bristling with machine guns. Under the bullets flying in the face. One B-17 could fire a salvo into the rear-upper hemisphere, like an Il-2 six. Needless to say, what the attack of hundreds of American bombers in close formation meant for the German pilots was just a flurry of fire! It is no coincidence that the fourth most effective ace in the US Air Force, who shot down 17 enemy fighters, is the B-17 airborne gunner. In total, the US Air Force gunners claim more than 6,200 shot down German fighters and about 5,000 more in the number of probable victories (damaged or shot down - not established). And these are only the Americans, and there were also the British! Combined with the victories of the Spitfires, Mustangs and other Allied fighters, the claim of "unrivaled" Luftwaffe losses in the west does not seem so implausible.
The Allied fighter pilots were not superior in training to their German or Soviet counterparts. It's just that the nature of the air war over Germany was such that the Germans did not have such freedom of action as in the East. They had to either shoot down strategic bombers, inevitably putting themselves under fire from the gunners, or simply evade the battle, flying just for show. It is not surprising that many of them in their memoirs remember the eastern front as lighter. Easy, but not because Soviet aviation is a harmless and weak enemy. But because in the East it was possible to wind up a personal score of victories and engage in all sorts of nonsense, like free hunting, instead of real and dangerous combat work. And the German ace Hans Philip in this matter equates the Eastern Front with the Battle of Britain, where it was also possible to have fun with the Spitfires.
Hans Philip: “Fighting two dozen Russian fighters or English Spitfires was a joy. And no one thought about the meaning of life. But when seventy huge "Flying Fortresses" fly at you, all your previous sins appear before your eyes. And even if the lead pilot was able to summon up his courage, how much pain and nerves it took to make every pilot in the squadron, right down to the very beginners, cope with him.
You have no idea how difficult it is to fight here. On the one hand, we live very comfortably, there are many girls and everything we could wish for, but on the other hand, it is a fight in the air, and it is unusually difficult. It is difficult not because the enemies are so heavily armed or numerous, but because from such conditions and an easy chair you immediately find yourself on the battlefield, where you look death in the face."
Excellent words, Mr. Philip! They are all your essence! And your attitude to the war. And admitting how afraid you are of doing your main job, dodging it to the last opportunity in a merry-go-round with Russian and English fighters. And that you have lost your former strength and are throwing newcomers into battle. And about the fact that cheating personal accounts with Spitfires is no more difficult than with Russian fighters. That is, in fact, you also had a "freebie" in the West. Until the massacre of strategic bombing began. But for some reason you do not remember either the Russian Pe-2 or Il-2, or the English Lancaster, Halifax and Stirlings. These guys, who scare you with dozens of contrails in the sky, actually fly to kill your wives and children, and you think about girls. It is a pity that there will be no answer, but I want to ask - were you really going to win this war of survival with this attitude?
In the East, no one forced the Germans to constantly climb under the IL-2 stern machine guns. If you don't want to, don't go. The command does not demand to shoot down the Il-2 or Pe-2. It simply requires knocking down as much "something" as possible. Shoot down the lone LaGG-3 in a dive! No threat. It's not a fact that someone will shoot at you on a combat mission. The command motivated them for such actions, and the result was the same as the task was set. The main mode of action of the Germans is "Free Hunting". The scores are high, and Soviet attack aircraft are bombing the Wehrmacht infantry more and more. And in the West, there is no choice - there is only one goal. And any attack from this target guarantees a dense return fire.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “In those places where the fate of the war is being decided, the pilot does not want to fly. He is sent there by order, because the pilot himself will not fly there, and humanly you can understand him - everyone wants to live. And "freedom" gives the fighter pilot a "legal" opportunity to avoid these places. The "loophole" turns into a "hole". "Free hunting" is the most profitable way of waging war for a pilot and the most disadvantageous for his army. Why? Because almost always the interests of an ordinary fighter pilot are fundamentally at odds with the interests of his command and the command of the troops that aviation provides. Giving all fighter pilots complete freedom of action is like giving complete freedom to all rank-and-file infantrymen on the battlefield - dig in where you want, shoot whenever you want. It is nonsense".
At the same time, the scrupulous Germans reduced the overestimation of victories. As mentioned above, victories are always overstated. The pilot can sincerely believe in victory, but he cannot be sure of this. The war in the East created conditions for inevitable exaggerations - he fired at a single-engine aircraft, which started to smoke. And fell somewhere. Or did not fall. Somewhere in the vastness of a vast country. Who will look for him? And what will be left of him after the fall? Burnt engine block? You never know them lying around in the front line. Write - downed. And in the West? The B-17 is not a small fighter, not a needle, you can't just lose it. And he will have to fall into the territory of the Reich - into densely populated Germany, and not into the desert Donetsk steppes. Here you can't overestimate the number of victories - everything is in full view. Therefore, the number of victories in the West among the Germans is not as large as in the East. And the duration of the hostilities is not that long.
In mid-1944, troubles for the Germans rained down one after another. To the "fortresses" bristling with machine guns were added escort fighters - "Thunderbolts" and "Mustangs", which now flew from continental airfields. Wonderful fighters, fine-tuned in production and well equipped. The second front was opened. The position of the Germans since 1943 has been disastrous. At the end of 1944, due to a combination of factors, it could no longer be designated a catastrophe - that was the end. All that the Germans could do in this situation was to surrender, than to save thousands of lives of German, Soviet and American people.
conclusions
As you can see, there is nothing surprising in the initially conflicting known facts. They all stand in a single harmonious chain of history.
The key mistake of the Germans was the decision to attack the USSR, without changing the well-established strategy, tactics, and without transferring the industry to a military regime. Everything that worked effectively in Europe, cozy, comfortable, compact, stopped working in Russia. To guarantee their success, the Germans had to arrange in advance the production of thousands of aircraft and train thousands of pilots. But they did not have time for this - such preparation would take a couple of years, during which the USSR had time to complete the rearmament of the army and air force with new equipment and neutralize a significant part of the prerequisites for a German victory. And most importantly, the Germans had no desire to sacrifice their measured and prosperous life for the sake of a war of attrition. Belief in the success of the blitzkrieg and in the weakness of the USSR, coupled with the unwillingness to change the well-fed life of Germany, led the Germans to defeat.
The actions of the German aviation, focused on profound high-quality training of pilots and excellent equipment, turned out to be insufficiently balanced. Mass character was sacrificed to quality. But in compact Europe mass character was not needed. However, one glance at the map is enough to understand that things will be different in Russia. There is not enough high-quality, but small air fleet here. Mass character is needed here. And mass character is contrary to quality. In any case, the task of making a massive and at the same time high-class Air Force with excellent technology and ace pilots requires incredible efforts and a long time, which history has not let go of either Germany or the USSR. Under such initial conditions, the defeat of Germany was inevitable - it was only a matter of time.
Golodnikov Nikolai Gerasimovich: “… when Mueller was shot down, he was brought to us. I remember him well, of medium height, athletic build, redhead. When asked about Hitler, he said that he didn’t give a damn about “politics”, in fact, he didn’t hate the Russians, he was an “athlete”, the result was important to him - to shoot more. His "cover group" is fighting, but he is an "athlete", he wants - he will hit, he wants - he will not hit. I got the impression that many German fighter pilots were such "athletes".
- And what was the war for our pilots?
- For me personally, the same as for everyone. Job. Heavy, bloody, dirty, scary and continuous work. It was possible to endure it only because you are defending your homeland. It doesn't smell like sports here."
In conclusion, I would like to add that the format of the article does not provide for the disclosure of many very interesting sides of the war in the air. The topic of the characteristics of military equipment, the industrial potential of the parties has not been touched upon at all, the topic of Lend-Lease has not been highlighted, etc. All this requires more detailed work than the humble work of a history buff. The same can be said about the quotes cited. We have to limit the amount of words cited by the direct participants in the events, limiting ourselves to only a few witnesses. All those interested in this topic need to refer to primary sources in order to get a truly complete amount of knowledge.
Used sources and literature:
1. Drabkin A. I fought on a fighter.
2. Drabkin A. I fought on the IL-2.
3. Drabkin A. I fought in the SS and the Wehrmacht.
4. Isaev A. V. 10 myths about the Great Patriotic War.
5. Krivosheev G. F. Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: the loss of the armed forces.
6. Combat operations of the Luftwaffe: the rise and fall of Hitler's aviation (translated by P. Smirnov).
7. Schwabedissen V. Stalin's falcons: analysis of the actions of Soviet aviation in 1941-1945.
eight. Anokhin V. A., Bykov M. Yu. All Stalin's fighter regiments.
9. Il-2 attack aircraft // Aviation and Cosmonautics. 2001. Nos. 5-6.
10.www.airwar.ru.
11.https://bdsa.ru.
