Recently, a controversy has escalated on the Internet around the current state of affairs in the field of equipping the Russian Air Force with combat aircraft. At the same time, special emphasis is placed on the obvious advantage that the Sukhoi Design Bureau has, and the almost complete loss of the once strong positions of the MiG Design Bureau. Disputes are ongoing regarding the advisability of equipping our Air Force exclusively with Su machines. The legitimate questions that are raised in this case are why all orders go to one firm, and the second is degrading and undeservedly forgotten. The nature of the discussion comes to open accusations of the untidiness of the Sukhoi company, and on the other hand, the MiG-29 and machines based on it began to be called deliberately weak, unnecessary and unpromising. There is also an opposite opinion - the MiG-29 is a real masterpiece, which the Sukhovites deliberately crushed. It becomes insulting, and insulting at the same time for both sides, since the excellent Sukhoi aircraft are deservedly in demand, and the MiG-29 is no worse than the aircraft and just as deserves the most enthusiastic reviews. But that's why, despite all this, we do not see new MiGs in the ranks, and the old 29th Soviet-built ones are almost decommissioned? We will try to answer these questions, placing all the dots, over the "I", as far as possible.
PFI Competition
In order to understand why the MiG-29 and Su-27 have become exactly the way we are used to seeing them, we need to go into a distant history. The origins of the creation of both aircraft lie in the late 60s, when the Air Force began the PFI program - a promising front-line fighter to replace the existing fleet.
It is worth clarifying here that in the USSR, the Air Force was not the only one who operated combat aircraft. The Air Defense Forces were practically an equal player. The number of fighters in their composition even exceeded the number of those in the Air Force. But for obvious reasons, the air defense forces did not have bombers and attack aircraft - their task was to intercept enemy attacking aircraft, and not to retaliate. Therefore, there was a clear division in the country into front-line fighters and interceptor fighters. The first went to the Air Force, the second to the Air Defense. The former were, as a rule, light, maneuverable and inexpensive aircraft, while the latter were more complex, more expensive, had more powerful avionics, high altitude and flight speed.
Thus, the PFI program was originally launched by the Air Force. However, for the first time in front of a front-line fighter, rather complex tasks were posed. The reason for this was the appearance in the United States of a powerful F-15 fighter capable of conducting long-range aerial combat. Intelligence reported that the plane was almost ready and would fly in the early 70s. An adequate answer was needed, which was the PFI program. A front-line fighter under this program for the first time was supposed to acquire solid dimensions and powerful avionics, previously characteristic only for air defense fighters.
However, almost immediately, the PFI program began to be divided into two subspecies - LPFI (light front-line fighter), and TPFI (heavy front-line fighter). The rationale for this approach was numerous. The fleet of two types of aircraft promised to be more flexible in use. In addition, information appeared about a similar approach in the United States - a light F-16 was already preparing for flight there. There were also opponents of this concept, who believed that two types of aircraft complicate operation, supply, personnel training, etc. And most importantly, the construction of a large series of "light" fighters does not make sense - it is obviously weaker than the American F-15, as a result of which such a fighter will simply become a mass prey for the American.
Initially, in the PFI competition, the leader immediately stood out - the Sukhoi Design Bureau, which presented a project of an aircraft with an integral layout, which looked promising. OKB "MiG" presented an aircraft close to the classic, similar to the MiG-25. OKB "Yakovleva" from the very beginning was not considered as a leader. When dividing PFI into heavy and light, it is important to understand that initially, before the division, a single plane was seen as heavy, with a takeoff weight of about 25-30 tons, so the light fighter competition became, as it were, an offshoot and addition to the main competition. Since Sukhoi was already in the lead in the "heavy" project, the "light" version was quickly intercepted by the MiG design bureau, also showing a new design of an integrated aircraft.
Already in the course of the competition, customers of the Air Defense Forces joined in. They were only interested in the "heavy" option, as meeting the requirements of a long flight and powerful avionics. Thus, the heavy version has become a universal project - both frontline and fighter-interceptor. It managed to more or less link the conflicting demands of the two departments - the Air Force and Air Defense.
The essence of the differences between light and heavy fighters
After dividing the program into light and heavy, their differences were not clearly defined for a long time. Everyone seemed to understand what the essence was, but they could not formally define it. Modern analysts are also haunted by this problem - they hardly understand why there were two planes at all. They use far-fetched explanations about the fact that light is more maneuverable, half the price, etc. Heavy - distant. All these definitions reflect only the consequences of the adoption of the concept of two fighters of different weight classes, or are completely false. For example, a light fighter was never half the price of a heavy one.
However, an acceptable formulation of the differences was found even during the design of aircraft. And it is key to understanding the differences between these aircraft. A light fighter (MiG-29) had to operate in its information field, at tactical depth, and a heavy (Su-27) fighter, in addition, had to be able to operate outside the information field of its troops.
This meant that the MiG should not fly into the depth of the enemy's territory for more than 100 km, and its guidance and control of the battle was carried out from ground control posts. Thanks to this, it was possible to save on the composition of avionics, simplifying the aircraft as much as possible, and thereby improve flight characteristics and make the aircraft massive and inexpensive. In those years, “expensive” meant not cost (money was given “as much as needed”), but mass production (complexity of the product, laboriousness of assembly), the ability to assemble such aircraft quickly and a lot. In terms of the composition of the armament, the main caliber was the R-60 heat-guided missiles (and later the R-73), which in some cases supplemented the R-27. The airborne radar had a stable detection range of no more than the launch range of R-27 missiles, in fact, being a radar sight for these missiles. Complex and expensive means of electronic warfare or communications were not provided.
The Su-27, on the other hand, had to be able to rely only on its own forces. He had to independently conduct reconnaissance, analyze the situation and attack. He had to go behind enemy lines and cover his bombers in deep raids and intercept enemy targets over his territory, providing isolation of the theater of operations. Their ground control posts and radar stations on enemy territory were not expected. Therefore, a powerful airborne radar station was immediately required, capable of seeing farther and more than that of its "light" counterpart. The flight range is twice that of the MiG, and the main armament is the R-27, supplemented by the long arm of the R-27E (increased energy) and the R-73 melee missiles. The radar was not just a sight, but also a means of lighting the air situation and reconnaissance. It had to have its own electronic warfare and powerful communications. Ammunition - twice as much as that of a light, because it may take a long time and with high tension to fight in isolation from your forces. At the same time, the aircraft had to remain capable of maneuvering combat, as well as a light fighter. over the territory of the enemy, he could meet not only his "heavy" opponents in the form of the F-15 and F-14, but also the F-16, optimized for "dog dumps".
In short, it can be said that the Su-27 was a plane for gaining air superiority in the theater of operations as a whole, and the MiG-29 solved the more specific task of covering its troops from enemy air strikes over the contact line.
Despite the fact that both aircraft were originally divided into different weight categories, the competition between them began to manifest itself almost immediately. Various research institutes and specialists expressed a variety of opinions on this matter. The two-car system was regularly criticized. At the same time, some urged to "pull up" the light to the level of the heavy, others - to abandon the light, concentrating all their efforts on the more effective "heavy".
The evaluation of the system of two aircraft was carried out on a financial basis as well. It turned out that LFI cannot be made twice as cheap as PFI. This should be remembered, as the argument in favor of the MiG as a cheap but efficient aircraft is often heard in modern controversy. This is not true. By Soviet standards, where money was spared for defense, the LFI, costing 0.75 from the PFI, was quite an inexpensive aircraft. Today, the concept of "inexpensive" looks very different.
The final decision in the fate of the two aircraft remained with the USSR Ministry of Defense - both aircraft are needed, each will occupy its own niche and they will not interfere with each other. And so it happened in the Soviet weapons system.
In the ranks
By 1991, both aircraft took place and stood firmly in the ranks. It is of exceptional interest how they were distributed among the states of the Air Force and Air Defense.
Fighter aircraft of the Air Force consisted of 735 MiG-29, 190 Su-27 and 510 MiG-23. There were also about 600 MiG-21s, but they were all concentrated in training regiments. In the most powerful and efficient formation of the Air Force - the 16th Air Army in the GDR, there were 249 MiG-29s and 36 MiG-23s, and not a single Su-27. It was MiGs that formed the basis of front-line aviation, becoming the main striking force of the Air Force. The southern flank of the Soviet group was supported by the 36th VA in Hungary with its 66 MiG-29s and 20 MiG-23s.
It would seem that the current state of affairs clearly demonstrates which aircraft the Soviet command considered the main and best. There was not a single Su-27 in the forward units. However, the situation is somewhat more complicated. The MiG-29 was supposed to become a consumable material for the outbreak of world war, repelling the first blow. It was assumed that a significant number of these aircraft would quickly perish, but would ensure the deployment and launch of the USSR ground forces and the Department of Internal Affairs.
In the back of the troops stationed in the GDR, troops in Poland and Ukraine breathed, which were supposed to develop the initial success of the army. And now all the Su-27 FAs of the Air Force were there - two regiments in Poland (74 Su-27) and one regiment in Mirgorod (40 Su-27). In addition, it is obvious that the rearmament of the Air Force on the Su-27 was far from complete, the 831st IAP in Mirgorod received the Su-27 in 1985, the 159th IAP in 1987, and the 582nd IAP in 1989. Those. The saturation of the FA of the Air Force with Su-27 fighters was quite measured, which cannot be said about the air defense, where during the same time period, 2 times more aircraft of this type were received.
In the air defense forces there was practically no MiG-29 (in combat units - not a single one, and in total there were about 15 MiG-29s in the air defense, but they were concentrated in the Combat Training Center of the Air Defense IA) and about 360 Su-27 (and in addition, 430 MiG-25, 410 MiG-31, 355 Su-15, 1300 MiG-23). Those. at the beginning of mass production, MiGs went exclusively to front-line aviation, and Sushki first of all began to enter the air defense troops - in 1984 they appeared in the 60th air defense IAP (Dzemgi airfield). This is logical, since it was the MiGs that covered the primary need for the 4th generation fighters of the Air Force. And in the air defense forces at that time, the bulk of the MiG-23 and Su-15 could only be replaced by the Su-27. The MiG-31 stood apart and replaced, first of all, the outdated MiG-25.
In addition to the Air Force and Air Defense, the 4th generation fighters also received naval aviation - there were about 70 MiG-29s in it. However, as a promising deck version, the sailors chose the Su-27K version - as having a long flight duration and powerful avionics, which is important in sea conditions. The MiG-29s in the Navy turned out to be due to the Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe, which provides for concessions in relation to naval aviation. So two regiments of the 29th in Moldova and the Odessa region got to the sailors. They were not of great value precisely in the role of naval fighters.
Export deliveries were an important point in understanding the role and place of the MiG-29 and Su-27. Here an amazing picture is revealed - the Su-27 was not supplied abroad during the Soviet era. But the MiG-29 actively began to enter the Air Force of the Soviet allies. On the one hand, this was determined by the peculiarities of the geography of these countries - there is simply nowhere for the Su-27 to deploy. On the other hand, the Su-27, as a more complex and expensive aircraft, was "secret", and the MiG-29, being a simpler machine, was easily allowed to be released outside the borders of the native Air Force.
Thus, in the USSR Armed Forces, two new generation aircraft did not compete with each other, each solving its own problem. By the end of the existence of the USSR, the fighter armament system consisted of three types of promising aircraft - the light MiG-29 for the FA of the Air Force, the universal heavy Su-27 for both the FA of the Air Force and the IA of the Air Defense, and the MiG aircraft, which did not lend itself to fighter weight classification. 31 - exclusively for air defense aircraft. But already in 1991, this harmonious system began to collapse along with the country, giving rise to a new round of internal competition between two wonderful fighters.
On the issue of classification
Disputes still do not subside, what kind of fighter actually turned out in the MiG-29 project? Light or not? It comes to the point that ordinary people consider the MiG to be a kind of "medium" fighter that occupies an intermediate position between light and heavy.
In fact, the concepts of "light" and "heavy" were initially very conditional and relative. They existed together, under the PFI program, and their appearance was caused by the need to somehow separate the projects of two new fighters under one program. LPFI, the future MiG-29, became light, and it was not light in itself, but in combination with the future Su-27. Without the Su-27, the concept of "light" becomes meaningless.
As for the Air Force and Air Defense of the USSR, there was no weight classification. In the air defense there were interceptor fighters, in the Air Force - front-line fighters. It's just that the needs of the Air Force were such that there were always mostly smaller, simpler and cheaper cars. And in the air defense there was also a MiG-31, which was very, very heavy even against the background of the Su-27. So this weight classification is rather arbitrary.
Against the background of foreign analogues, the MiG-29 looked quite traditional. Competitors F-16, Rafale, EF-2000 had practically the same masses and dimensions. For most of the countries that operate these aircraft, they are neither light nor otherwise. They are usually the only type of fighter in service with most countries. Nevertheless, in terms that are understandable to the layman, all these aircraft may well be combined into a subclass of "light", against the background of clearly larger Su-27, F-15, F-22, PAK-FA. The only exception in this series will be the American F / A-18, which really is located almost exactly in the middle between the typical "light" and typical "heavy" fighters, but it is worth remembering that this is a very specific machine, created for special, naval requirements, based on aircraft carriers.
As for the MiG-31, with its dimensions and weights, it is a unique exception that does not exist anywhere else. Formally, it is also "heavy", like the Su-27, although the difference in maximum take-off weights reaches one and a half times.
