On the 70th anniversary of the famous evacuation of British troops near Dunkirk
"Britain has no permanent enemies and permanent friends, it only has permanent interests" - this phrase, who knows when and by whom, became, however, winged. One of the clearest examples of such a policy is Operation Dynamo (the evacuation of British troops near Dunkirk on May 26 - June 4, 1940). Less well known to the general public are the numerous Dunkirks of the British Expeditionary Force in other regions of Europe during that war, as well as the fact that such a Dynamo could have happened back in the First World War.
Remember the scene from the old Soviet film "Peter the First", which tells about the behavior of the English squadron during the battle of the Russian and Swedish fleets at Grengam (1720)? Then the Swedes called on the British to help them, and the British agreed to come as allies. So, the English admiral sits at a table abundantly laden with food and drinks, and he is reported on the course of the battle. At first everything: "It is not clear who prevails." Then they report definitely: "The Russians are winning!" Then the commander of the English squadron, without interrupting the meal, gives the command: "We are unanchored, we go to England" and adds: "We have done our duty, gentlemen."
The scene of the film, filmed on the eve of World War II, turned out to be downright prophecy: in the outbreak of the war, the British often behaved exactly like this admiral. But there was nothing supernatural in this insight of Vladimir Petrov and Nikolai Leshchenko. Britain has always acted in such a way as to stay away from the fray for as long as possible, and then reap the fruits of victory.
In principle, of course, everyone would like to do this, but England did it somehow more vividly
From the beginning of the 18th century, when (during the War of the Spanish Succession of 1701-1714) England first actively intervened in continental politics, its main principle has always been "balance of power." This meant that Britain was not interested in the dominance of any one state on the mainland of Europe. Against him, England always, acting mainly with money, tried to put together a coalition. Throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries, France was the main enemy of Britain in Europe and a competitor in the oceans and in the colonies. When Napoleon was defeated by the forces of the continental coalition, it seemed that France was finished. In the middle of the 19th century, England, together with France, came out against Russia, which, as it was seen from foggy Albion, had gained too much power in Europe and the Middle East.
Until now, the plot connected with the participation of England in the creation of the German Empire at the end of the 60s of the 19th century has been little studied, at least in Russia. The fact that Britain could not help but support the rise of Prussia at that time is obvious. After the Crimean War of 1853-1856. and, especially, the wars of France and Piedmont against Austria for the unification of Italy in 1859, the Second French Empire became clearly the strongest state on the continent. In the growing Prussia, England could not fail to see a natural counterbalance to the dangerously elevated France. In the defeat of France in 1870-1871. and the formation of the German Empire, Prussia did not meet any obstacle on the part of England (as well as Russia, by the way). It was then that a united Germany could cause trouble for England. But at that time it was more important for the British "lion" to strike with someone else's hands … to its ally - France.
It was in the British forces to prevent the First World War. In the power, but not in the interest
It was known that Germany could attack France only through Belgian territory. To do this, the Kaiser had to decide to violate the internationally guaranteed, in particular by the same England, the neutrality of this small country. So, in the midst of the crisis caused by the fatal shots in Sarajevo, signals were sent from London to Berlin through all diplomatic channels: England will not fight because of Belgium's violated neutrality. On August 3, 1914, Germany, anticipating France, obliged (but not at all in a hurry) to enter the war on the side of Russia, itself declared war on the Third Republic. On the morning of the next day, German troops invaded Belgium. On the same day in Berlin like a bolt from the blue: England declared war on Germany. So Germany was involved in single combat with a powerful coalition led by the "ruler of the seas" in order to eventually be defeated.
Of course, entering the war posed a great risk for Great Britain. It remained to be seen how strong the continental allies of England would prove to be, especially France, which fell upon the first blow of Germany. And so, in the summer of 1914, the "dress rehearsal" of the Dunker flight almost took place. In fact, it was even carried out, with the exception of the actual evacuation of the British troops.
A small English land army of four infantry and one cavalry divisions arrived at the front in northern France by the twentieth of August 1914. The commander of the British army, General French, had an order from the Minister of War, Kitchener, to act independently and not obey the French commander-in-chief even in operational terms. Interaction with the French armies was carried out only by mutual agreement, and for the British commander, the recommendations of His Majesty's government should have been a priority.
After the first attacks that the British were subjected to by the Germans, French ordered his army to retreat. Subsequently, the British army was involved in the general retreat of the French front. On August 30, French reported to London that he was losing faith in the ability of the French to defend successfully and that, in his opinion, the best solution would be to prepare to load the British army on ships to return home. At the same time, General French, whose troops were operating on the extreme left flank of the French position, disregarding the orders of the commander-in-chief, General Joffre, began to quickly withdraw his army across the Seine, opening the way for the Germans to Paris.
It is not known how all this would have ended if Minister of War Kitchener had not shown the energy these days. On September 1, 1914, he personally arrived at the front. After lengthy negotiations, he managed to convince French not to rush to evacuate and not to withdraw his army from the front. In the following days, the French launched a counterattack on the open flank of the Germans with a new army concentrated in the Paris region, which largely determined the victory of the Allies in the historic battle on the Marne (another important factor in the victory was the withdrawal of two and a half corps by the Germans on the eve of the battle and sending them to the Eastern Front to eliminate the Russian threat to East Prussia). In the course of this battle, the British, who had ceased to retreat and even launched a counteroffensive, suddenly found themselves in front of … a vast gap in the German front. Coping with the surprise, the British rushed there, which also contributed to the ultimate success of the Allies.
So, in 1914, the evacuation was avoided. But in 1940-1941. the British had to do this operation several times
There is an extensive literature on the Dunkirk escape. The general picture, which is reconstructed with sufficient reliability, is characterized by two main features. First: the German command had the most favorable opportunity to completely defeat the British pressed to the sea. However, for some reason, the Germans gave the British a chance to evacuate manpower to their home island. As for the reasons, then Hitler did not make a secret of them to his inner circle. He never concealed the fact that he was not interested in victory over England, but in an alliance with her. Judging by the reaction of his employees to the "stop order" near Dunkirk, they fully shared the Fuehrer's plan. The miraculously escaped British soldiers were supposed to bring fear to their homeland of the invincible steel columns of the Wehrmacht. In this, the Fuhrer miscalculated.
The second feature: the evacuation of the British took place under the cover of French and (at first) Belgian troops. The bridgehead, on which there were two French, British and Belgian armies, was cut off on May 20, 1940. On May 24, German tanks were already 15 km from Dunkirk, while the bulk of the British troops were still 70-100 km from this evacuation base. On May 27, the Belgian king signed the act of surrender of his army. Subsequently, this act of his was often regarded as "betrayal" (and the flight of the English army is not a betrayal ?!). But for the evacuation of the Belgian army, nothing was ready, the king did not want to shed the blood of his soldiers so that the British could safely sail to his island. The French, on the other hand, fully covered the landing of the British on the ships, obviously believing that after the evacuation they would land somewhere else in France and take part in the defense of their country from the common enemy. Along with 250 thousand British, 90 thousand French were evacuated. The remaining 150 thousand French, who were on the bridgehead, were abandoned by the British allies to their fate and were forced to surrender on June 4, 1940.
Simultaneously with the evacuation from Dunkirk, a similar drama unfolded in northern Europe. Since December 1939, the British and French commands have been preparing a landing in Norway to forestall the German invasion, as well as to help Finland in the war against the USSR. But they did not have time, and therefore the landing in Norway was a response to the landing of German troops that had already occurred there on April 9, 1940.
On April 13-14, the British landed their troops at the ports of Namsus and Ondalsnes and launched a concentric offensive from both sides on the second largest city in Norway, Trondheim, previously captured by the Germans. However, having undergone German air strikes, they stopped and began to withdraw. On April 30, the British were evacuated from Ondalsnes, and on May 2 from Namsus. Norwegian troops, of course, no one evacuated anywhere, and they surrendered at the mercy of the winner.
On the same days, British and French troops landed in the Narvik area in northern Norway. On May 28, 1940, the Germans surrendered Narvik to the enemy for several days so that he could freely evacuate from Norway through this port. On June 8, loading onto ships in Narvik was completed.
The most symbolic at the initial stage of World War II was the participation of British troops in hostilities in Greece
The British Corps, which included Australian and New Zealand units, landed in Greece in the spring of 1941. He took up positions … deep in the rear of the Greek troops, north of Mount Olympus. When the German invasion of Greece from the Bulgarian territory followed on April 9, 1941, another retreating epic of British troops began, seeking to get away from contact with the enemy. Already on April 10, the British withdrew from their original positions south of Olympus. On April 15, a new redeployment followed - this time to Thermopylae. Meanwhile, the German columns freely entered the exposed rear of the Greek armies. On April 21, the Greek command signed a surrender. The British did not linger in the favorable Thermopylae position and on April 23 began loading onto ships in Piraeus.
Nowhere in Greece did the British offer serious resistance to the Germans. However, the behavior of the Germans was also "gentlemanly": embracing the British positions from the flanks, they never sought to encircle the enemy, every time leaving him a way to retreat. The German command understood that its British colleagues were no less concerned with an early cessation of hostilities. So why spill extra blood? On April 27, 1941, units of the Wehrmacht entered Athens without a fight, from where the last British ship sailed shortly before.
Only in Crete, where evacuation by sea, due to the absolute supremacy of the Luftwaffe in the air, was difficult, did the British forces (and then the New Zealanders, and not the natives of the metropolis) put up somewhat more stubborn resistance to the Germans. True, the fact that the British command generally left a grouping of its troops in Crete was the result of a strategic miscalculation: it did not expect that the Germans would try to seize the island exclusively with airborne units. The landing began on May 20, 1941. And on May 26, the New Zealand commander, General Freiberg, reported upstairs that the situation, in his opinion, was hopeless.
It was not a matter of losses or the capture of key points by the Germans. According to the commander, "the nerves of even the most elite soldiers could not withstand the continuous air raids for several days."
Therefore, on May 27, he received permission to evacuate. At this time, German landings in a number of places in Crete were still fighting heavy battles, being surrounded by the enemy from all sides. The order of the British command brought unexpected relief to their situation. Due to the above reasons, only half of the British garrison of the island was able to leave Crete.
Of course, the British leaders cannot be blamed for the fact that in all circumstances they tried, first of all, not to expose their armed forces to destruction by the enemy and in every possible way tried to avoid not only hopeless, but also risky situations. However, all these episodes of 1914 and 1940-1941. serve as a sufficient basis for the actions of those politicians who avoided a military-political alliance with England, due to any obligations. In particular, this applies to the actions of the Soviet leadership in the fall of 1939.
