The Russian command took a tactical attack for a general offensive
The offensive operation of the 2nd Army of the Russian North-Western Front against the 9th German Army on January 18-24, 1915 is one of the bloodiest battles of the First World War and, unfortunately, remains little known.
The enemy's operational plan in the Polish sector of the Russian Front near Borzhimov and Volya Shydlovskaya was regarded by the command of the 2nd Russian Army and the North-Western Front as another attempt to break through to Warsaw. Everything was done to prevent this: a powerful grouping of corps was created, headed by the energetic General V. I. Gurko, and the reserves were tightened up. The core of the Russian defense at Volya Shidlovskaya was the 6th Army Corps, reinforced during the operation by other formations. From the German side, the troops of the 1st and 25th reserve, 17th army corps participated in the battles. Of particular tactical importance was the area of Volya Shydlovskaya, which the Germans had been trying to capture since January 18. Persistent enemy attacks were accompanied by heavy losses. The forward trenches passed from hand to hand, but the situation became more complicated when on the 19th the Germans captured Volya Shydlovskaya. Since that time, fierce battles with the use of heavy artillery unfolded for it. German sources confirm the presence of a powerful fist of fire - 100 batteries that supported the actions of the German troops.
Battle of the Distillery
The commander of the North-Western Front N. V. Ruzsky, not properly assessing the situation, finally convinced himself that the persistent German attacks at Volya Shydlovskaya were the beginning of a new major offensive against Warsaw. The Gurko units were tasked with returning the estate and restoring their former positions. Since the corps, consisting of three divisions, was not strong enough for this, 10 more divisions, not counting the brigades and smaller units, were transferred to the subordination of the commander of the 6th Army Corps, one after another.
The Germans managed to secretly install a large number of machine guns on the territory of the estate, and thanks to the ditches that surrounded it, the estate actually became a natural fort and a powerful firing point. At the same time, the stock of artillery ammunition from the Russian troops was so meager that it made sense to withdraw only a small part of the artillery at the position - the shells of the remaining batteries were transferred to the guns already in the firing line.
Two counterattacks did not bring success - in some places Russian infantry lines, using roadside ditches to cover, approached Wola Shidlovskaya at a distance of a hundred paces, but failed to capture it. On the frostbound ground, it was almost impossible to somehow hide from machine gun fire.
On January 21, parts of Gurko broke into the estate, but they could not take possession of the distillery turned into a fortress.
On the 22nd the Russians continued their attack on the distillery. Artillery fire is a constant companion of Russian and especially German attacks and counterattacks in these battles.
On January 23, the manor's yard was destroyed by shells, and the distillery was badly damaged. On the 24th, a decisive attack of the German positions was planned, but at first it was postponed to the night of January 25-26, and then completely canceled. The battle is over.
There are losses, no results
During the offensive on Volya Shidlovskaya, the German military leadership, on the one hand, provoked the command of the North-Western Front to conduct an operation in order to restore the lost positions, on the other hand, this diverted attention from the impending major strike in East Prussia.
Unprepared actions, consisting in intermittent counterattacks, ended in nothing. The damage of the 6th Army Corps and the attached divisions from January 18 to 23 amounted to 40 thousand people, the enemy's - at least the same. The Germans themselves estimated their losses at 40 thousand people, and in just three days of fighting, the enemy missed half of the group.
Taking into account the transience of the battle, we admit that the operation at Volya Shydlovskaya was one of the bloodiest in the First World War. The actual losses of the sides (if we assume that on the 23rd and 24th there was mainly a skirmish) reached 10 thousand people a day, and without a meaningful tactical result.
Attention is drawn to the enormous density of the battle formations of the German troops. The offensive zone is 1.5 kilometers per division, that is, the latter actually occupied a battalion combat area. The firing fist of the Germans is also significant - 100 batteries, of which 40 are heavy for 10 kilometers of the front. The density is 60 guns per kilometer.
The Russian army could not afford such a luxury. Moreover, interruptions in ammunition and materiel have already begun. A painful impression is produced by the information about Gurko's troops being handed over to the troops almost piece by piece. The curtailment of the operation happened on time - the Germans launched an offensive in East Prussia.
A curtain
As a result, although the Russian troops failed to achieve operational success in the battle at Volya Shydlovskaya, stability in the Polish sector of the theater of operations was maintained for the next six months. The Germans, realizing the futility of breaking into an established positional defense, shifted their operational activity to other sectors of the front. The battles at Volya Shydlovskaya, along with other operations, vividly highlighted the fact that in conditions of positional warfare, even a significant superiority in artillery and other technical means is not a decisive factor for breaking through the defenses of such an enemy as the Russian imperial army.
At the same time, if in the autumn-winter of 1914 Poland was the central theater of military operations of the Russian front both in terms of the decisiveness and scale of operations and the number of forces involved, then in 1915 its stabilization and the exhaustion of the troops of both sides led to the search for new operational solutions. the command of the German block. The Russian headquarters did not see that Poland was turning into a secondary theater and the operation at Volya Shydlovskaya was just a grandiose demonstration in order to divert forces and attention from the flank areas, where the enemy planned large-scale decisive actions within the framework of the winter strategic Cannes. True, the demonstration was paid for with a lot of blood from German soldiers.
