The development of any type of weapon often takes place in several iterations. And the more innovative a weapon is, the higher the chance that it will not be immediately implemented, shelved, or shown as an example of a failed concept or project. Examples of the creation of breakthrough weapons, ahead of their time, and the attitude towards them we have already considered in the material "Chimera" wunderwaffe "against the specter of rationalism". Nevertheless, technologies are developing, cruise and ballistic missiles, which were useless for Nazi Germany, have become a formidable weapon, laser weapons are getting closer to the battlefield, no doubt railguns and other promising types of weapons will be implemented. And to create them, you need the groundwork obtained just in the course of the development of useless "wunderwaffe".
One of the "wunderwaffe" is called the American missile defense (ABM) program "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) by Ronald Reagan, which, in the opinion of many, was only a way to make money for the American military-industrial complex and ended in a "puff", because following its implementation, it was put into service real weapon systems were not adopted. However, in fact this is far from the case, and the developments that were studied as part of the SDI program were partially implemented as part of the creation of the national missile defense (NMD) program, which is deployed and is currently operating.
Based on the tasks and projects being implemented under the SDI program, and extrapolating the development of technology and technology for the coming decades, it is possible to predict the development of the US missile defense system for the period 2030-2050.
Economy of missile defense
For a missile defense system to be effective, the average cost of hitting a target, including a false one, must be equal to or lower than the cost of the target itself. In this case, one must take into account the financial capabilities of the opponents. In other words, if the financial capabilities of the United States make it possible to withdraw 4,000 missile defense interceptors with a cost of $ 5 million apiece, and the financial capabilities of the Russian Federation allow the creation of 1,500 nuclear warheads at $ 2 million apiece, with the same percentage of expenditures from the defense budget or the country's budget, then The US wins.
In connection with the above, the main task of the United States in creating a global strategic missile defense system is to reduce the cost of hitting one warhead. To do this, you need to implement the following:
- to reduce the cost of deploying missile defense elements;
- to reduce the cost of the ABM elements themselves;
- to increase the effectiveness of individual elements of missile defense;
- to increase the effectiveness of the interaction of missile defense elements.
Diamond Pebbles and Elon Musk
The main subsystem of the SDI program, which was to be assigned the task of intercepting the warheads of the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the USSR, was supposed to be a "diamond pebble" - a constellation of interceptor satellites placed in orbit around the Earth and intercepting warheads in the middle segment of the trajectory. It was planned to launch about four thousand interceptor satellites into orbit. Not that it was completely impossible even at that time, but the cost of implementing such a program would be prohibitive even for the United States. And the effectiveness of the "diamond pebble" at that time could be questioned due to the imperfection of computers and sensors of the late 20th century. Since then, there have been major changes.
On the item "reduce the cost of deploying missile defense elements." To begin with, the United States has already gained the ability to launch cargo into orbit at a price comparable to or even less than that at which Russia can launch a payload into orbit. We can say that the United States has never had such a cheap way to put cargo into orbit. Taking into account the difference in the budgets of the United States and Russia, the situation looks far from in favor of the Russian Federation.
Of course, we must thank the beloved / unloved (underline necessary) by many Elon Musk for this. It was SpaceX's rockets that were able to reformat the commercial market that was previously dominated by Roscosmos.
To transport a ton of cargo to the Falcon Heavy launch vehicle is two times cheaper than on the Russian Proton launch vehicle and almost three times cheaper than on the Angara-A5 launch vehicle –1, 4 million dollars versus 2, 8 million dollars and 3, $ 9 million, respectively. SpaceX's fully reusable super-heavy rocket BFR and Jeff Bezos' Blue Origin's New Glenn rocket could be even more impressive. If Elon Musk succeeds in BFR, then the US armed forces will have the ability to launch cargo into space in such quantities and at such a cost that has never been experienced by anyone in the history of mankind. And the consequences of this are difficult to overestimate.
However, even without the BFR and New Glenn launch vehicles, the US has enough available Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy rockets to launch huge payloads into orbit at a minimal cost.
At the same time, Russia abandoned the Proton launch vehicle, the situation with the Angara launch vehicle family is unclear - these missiles are expensive, and it is not a fact that they will become cheaper. The project of the promising Irtysh / Sunkar / Soyuz-5 / Phoenix / Soyuz-7 missile may drag on for a decade, if it ends with a positive result at all, and the super-heavy launch vehicle Yenisei, contrary to Rogozin's words, is far from the fact that it will be reusable, and the cost of launching the payload is likely to be equivalent to the super-heavy and ultra-expensive American SLS rocket developed by NASA.
Russia still has competencies in the field of space technologies. For example, on February 7, 2020, 34 communication satellites of the British company OneWeb (satellites are developed by Airbus) were launched into target orbit from the Baikonur cosmodrome of the Russian Soyuz-2.1b launch vehicle with the Fregat upper stage. The situation with Roscosmos can be compared to the situation with the Russian Navy. There is technology, there is experience, but at the same time, complete confusion and vacillation regarding the general direction of development, lack of understanding of the goals and objectives of the space industry.
SpaceX can provide the US Armed Forces with technologies for solving problems in terms of the item "reduce the cost of the missile defense elements themselves." This assumption is based on the Starlink communications satellite network being deployed by SpaceX, designed to provide global access to the Internet. According to various estimates, the Starlink network will include from 4,000 to 12,000 satellites with a mass of 200-250 kilograms and an orbital altitude of 300 to 1200 kilometers. At the beginning of 2020, 240 satellites have already been launched into orbit, and by the end of the year it is planned to make 23 more launches. If 60 satellites are launched each time, then by the end of 2020 the Starlink network will have 1,620 satellites - more than all countries in the world combined.
What is striking here is not so much the ability of a private company to launch such payload volumes into orbit, but rather its ability to produce high-tech satellites in large-scale production.
On March 18, 2019, NASA successfully deployed an array of 105 KickSat Sprites nanosatellites in orbit at an altitude of 300 km. Each Sprites satellite costs less than $ 100, weighs 4 grams, and measures 3.5x3.5 centimeters, meaning it is essentially a printed circuit board equipped with a short-range telemetry transmitter and multiple sensors. For all the seemingly "toy" of these satellites, they are extremely interesting for the reason that this miniature unprotected platform successfully functions in space.
What does this have to do with missile defense? The experience gained by companies such as SpaceX or OneWeb (Airbus) in creating a huge number of high-tech satellites in the shortest possible time at a minimal cost can be used to build a new generation of missile defense satellites. Why at the lowest price? Firstly, because these are commercial projects and they must be competitive. Secondly, because low-orbit satellites in low orbit will gradually descend from it and burn up in the atmosphere, respectively, they will need to be replaced. And taking into account the number of satellites in the Starlink and OneWeb constellations, this will be a considerable number.
As we said earlier, within the framework of NMD, the US is developing MKV interceptors that will be deployed in clusters and designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads. At the same time, it is planned to significantly reduce their mass, almost to 15 kilograms per interceptor. It should be understood that MKV interceptors are being developed by "traditional" representatives of the "old school" American military-industrial complex, by Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company and Raytheon Company, whose products are traditionally not cheap. However, the market forces American companies to adapt flexibly and, if necessary, to cooperate to carry out joint projects. SpaceX's invasion of the military launch market has already forced the "old guard", accustomed to huge government orders during the Cold War, to optimize their activities. It is quite possible that, for example, SpaceX will join the Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company or Raytheon Company in the development and production of promising interceptors for missile defense.
What does this mean in practice? Yes, the fact that the task of launching a group of 4,000 or more missile defense interceptors into orbit, declared in the SDI program, may become a reality in the next decade. Considering that the private company SpaceX plans to launch 4,000-12,000 communication satellites into orbit, the US budget will allow a comparable number of interceptors to be launched into orbit, with a cost, for example, of the order of $ 1-5 million per unit
At the same time, the appearance of such a launch vehicle as the BFR will allow not only to launch interceptor satellites cheaply, but also to ensure their removal from orbit and return for maintenance, modernization or disposal.
Why place interceptors in space? Why can't they be launched from ground vehicles, as is done now under the GBI program?
First, because the early deployment of interceptors with commercial carriers will be much cheaper. The cost of launching a comparable number of interceptors with military missiles will always be more than that of private companies SpaceX or Blue Origin. However, a certain number of interceptors will be deployed on ground and submarine carriers, to ensure the possibility of operational replenishment / strengthening of the satellite constellation and to solve the tasks that we will consider below.
Secondly, the response time of the satellite constellation is significantly higher than that of the ground or sea components of the missile defense system. It can be assumed that in some cases, interceptor satellites will be able to attack a launching ICBM even before it disengages its warheads and decoys.
Thirdly, it is extremely difficult to destroy a huge group of orbital interceptors. Especially when in orbit, in addition to interceptor satellites, there will be several thousand, if not tens of thousands, commercial satellites. And yes, a bucket of nuts will not help destroy orbiting satellite constellations, just as foil or silver will not protect against laser weapons.
All this suggests that the space echelon of the US missile defense system will dominate in the future
But do Russia and China have interceptor satellites? And here the economic factor will already be decisive: whoever will be able to launch cheaper and more effective weapons into orbit at a cheaper rate, including taking into account the difference in the budgets of opponents, has an advantage. "God is always on the side of the big battalions."
In terms of timing, the US Missile Defense Agency wants to minimize the time it takes to move from existing ground-based interceptors to next-generation weapons. Some observers believe it will be ten years before the first next-generation interceptor is delivered, but others suggest that deliveries could begin around 2026.
PRO lasers
Periodically, information appears on the Internet, including from the lips of American politicians, that, within the framework of a promising missile defense system, it is planned to deploy orbital platforms with combat lasers designed to destroy ballistic missiles at the initial stage of flight. At the moment, the US industry is quite capable of creating laser weapons with a power of about 300 kW, in 10-15 years this figure may reach 1 MW. The problem is that it is extremely difficult to remove heat from a laser in space. For a laser with a power of 1 MW, even with an efficiency of 50% that is quite achievable at the current level of technology development, it will be necessary to remove 1 MW of heat. In this case, it will be necessary to ensure the removal of heat from the energy source for the laser, the efficiency of which will also clearly not be 100%.
Russia may have an advantage in this regard, since effective heat removal systems are being developed as part of the creation of a space tug with a nuclear power plant, while the competence of the United States in this direction is unknown.
What are the missions for orbital platforms with laser weapons, and what kind of threat can they pose?
It is possible to practically exclude laser damage to already separated warheads, since they are equipped with powerful thermal protection that ensures their survival when they descend in the atmosphere. Another thing is the defeat of ICBMs in the booster section, when the missile is just picking up speed: a relatively thin body is vulnerable to thermal effects, and the engine torch unmasks the missile as much as possible, allowing laser weapons and interceptors to be aimed at it.
Orbital laser weapons pose an even greater threat to the "bus" - the warhead disengagement system, since at an altitude of 100-200 kilometers, the influence of the atmosphere is already excluded, and the effect of a high-power laser beam can disrupt the operation of sensors, attitude control systems or engines of the dilution stage, which will lead to deviation warheads from the target, and possibly to their destruction.
An equally important task can be performed by an orbital laser weapon after the deployment of warheads and the release of decoys. As you know, decoys are divided into hard and light targets. The number of heavy targets is limited by the carrying capacity of ICBMs, but there can be much more light targets. If for each real warhead there are 1-2 heavy decoys and 10-20 light decoys, then even with the existing level of restrictions, to defeat 1,500 warheads with a "retinue" of decoys, more than 100,000 interceptor satellites will be required (if the probability of interception by one satellite is about 50%). Launching 100,000 or more interceptor satellites is most likely unrealistic even for the United States.
And here an orbital laser weapon can play an important role. Even a short-term exposure to powerful laser radiation on inflatable false warheads will lead to a change in their radar, thermal and optical signature, and possibly to a change in flight trajectory and / or complete destruction.
Thus, the main task of orbital laser weapons is, first of all, not to directly solve missile defense problems, but to facilitate the solution of this problem by other subsystems, primarily by a grouping of interceptor satellites, by ensuring the identification and / or destruction of false targets, as well as ensuring a decrease in the number of real targets, due to the destruction of part of the launching ICBMs and warhead disengagement systems in the initial phase of the flight
Ground segment missile defense
The question arises: will the ground segment remain as part of the promising US missile defense system and what is it for? Of course, yes. For several reasons.
Firstly, because the ground segment is the most developed and already deployed. The creation of an orbital constellation of thousands of interceptor satellites is a complex and high-risk task. Secondly, the ground-based missile defense segment can ensure the defeat of low-flying targets, for example, gliding hypersonic warheads, which are invulnerable to the space segment.
Now the main striking force of the ground echelon of the US missile defense system is GBI missiles in underground mines. After the reduction in the size of the interceptors and the receipt by the shipborne anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) "Standard" of the capabilities to intercept ICBMs, one can expect both an increase in the number of deployed anti-missiles on the ships of the US Navy and the ground launchers of these anti-missiles on the territory of the United States and their allies.
conclusions
It can be assumed that for the period up to 2030, the ground echelon will be the main one in the American missile defense system. By this time, the total number of interceptors on anti-missile missiles of various types can be about 1000 units.
After 2030, the deployment of the orbital constellation will begin, which will last about five years, as a result of which 4000-5000 interceptor satellites will appear in orbit. If the system is found to be workable, efficient and economically adequate, then its deployment will continue to 10,000 or more interceptor satellites.
The appearance of an orbital laser weapon capable of solving missile defense problems can be expected no earlier than 2040, since this is not just an interceptor satellite weighing 15-150 kilograms, but a full-fledged orbital platform with sophisticated equipment, which can take several decades to develop.
Thus, in the period up to 2030, the US missile defense system can be expected to have the ability to intercept about 300 warheads and decoys, by 2040 this figure may increase by an order of magnitude - up to 3000-4000 warheads and decoys, and after the appearance of orbital laser weapons, capable of “filtering out” light decoys, the US missile defense system will presumably be capable of intercepting about 3000-4000 warheads and heavy decoys and about one hundred thousand light decoys.
The extent to which these forecasts will become reality largely depends on the political course of the current and future US leadership. As we understood from the recent statements of US President Donald Trump, the United States. For the PRC, the missile defense that is being created will be redundant by 2035-2040. Only Russia remains.
There are no fundamental technical barriers to the creation of the above elements of the missile defense system. Technically, the most difficult is the creation of orbital laser weapons, but taking into account the current state of work in the United States on laser weapons by 2040, the tasks set may well be solved. As for the deployment of thousands of interceptor satellites, then indirectly the possibility of implementing this missile defense segment can be judged by how the plans of commercial companies will be implemented to create the latest reusable missiles and deploy global satellite networks.
At the beginning of work on the SDI program, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Scientific and Engineering Development Richard Deloyer stated that in the conditions of an unrestricted build-up of Soviet nuclear warheads, any anti-missile system would be inoperative. The problem is that now our nuclear triad is to a large extent "squeezed" by the START III Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Nuclear Arms, which should expire on February 5, 2021. What agreement will replace it, and whether it will come at all, is still unknown.
