February 1986 turned out to be quite hot for the Kandahar special forces. In less than a month, they managed to prepare and carry out two special operations to seize and eliminate large militant bases in their area of responsibility. At the same time, only one person died in the detachment and ten were injured. The main difficulties in completing the task arose from poor interaction with the attached forces. This is what caused the losses.
Information about the object was received from aerial reconnaissance at the very beginning of February. The pilots established the movement of a large number of pack animals loaded with bales from the Pakistani border to the west, deep into the Kandahar province. Having traced the path of the caravans, the pilots established that they were all moving in the direction of the gorge in the Khadigar mountains.
The commander of the 238th Aviation Regiment, Colonel Rutskoi, tried to reconnoitre the gorge on a Su-25 aircraft, but was fired upon from large-caliber anti-aircraft guns.
He reported this fact to the Chief of Staff of the Turkestan Military District, Lieutenant-General Gusev, who ordered a bomb-assault strike (BSHU) on the gorge. When trying to re-conduct aerial reconnaissance of the gorge, the planes again came under fire. This made it possible to conclude that the targets in the area were not suppressed. To solve this problem, BShUs were applied along the gorge at certain intervals for two days.
After the completion of the bombing, an inspection group headed by senior lieutenant A. Parshin was sent to the area to check its results. The landing task was not set. However, under the cover of fire support helicopters, using the factor of surprise, the group landed at the edge of the ravine at the outpost and seized anti-tank mines and packs of small arms ammunition. During the evacuation of the group, one of the Mi-24 helicopters was damaged by anti-aircraft machine gun fire, but arrived at the airfield on its own.
For his self-righteousness, Parshin received a disciplinary penalty from the commander of the detachment, Captain S. Bohan. However, the information obtained by the group helped to establish that, although the facility was subjected to prolonged bombing, it continues to function successfully. It was also possible to establish that the gorge is covered by four air defense positions, which include 2-3 large-caliber DShK machine guns. Long-term firing positions, well equipped in engineering terms, were located on the crests of ridges, two on each side of the gorge. These positions were key.
In this regard, it was decided to seize the gorge in the Khadigar mountains.
The idea was developed by the headquarters of 173 ooSpN. For its execution, the special forces detachment had to create ROSpN No. 300 as part of the vanguard detachment - BG No. 310 and four assault groups.
Captain Bohan was to be in command of ROSpN No. 300. The Kandahar detachment did not have enough of its own forces and means to carry out the operation. Therefore, it was necessary to involve the neighboring 370 ooSpN to form a reserve in the two groups. But even the involvement of these units did not make it possible to create the necessary grouping of forces. For this, it was decided to use the attached forces and means of the 70th Omsb Brigade as part of an airborne assault battalion, a tank battalion and an artillery battalion of D-30 howitzers.
Aviation had to solve a number of serious tasks during the operation. For this purpose, the Mi-8MT squadron and the Mi-24 squadron were assigned from 280 ops, and the Su-25 squadron was assigned from 238 oshap.
In accordance with the plan, the forward detachment of four BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles with a landing from the 1st company 173 ooSpN under the command of the deputy battalion commander Captain K. Nevzorov was supposed to, moving at the head of the 70th OMRB military equipment column, ensure its advance along the planned route through the populated points Takhtapul, Bar-Mel, Nargal, Grakalai-Makiyan. By 8.00 the convoy was ordered to arrive at the gorge in the Khadigar mountains.
The attached forces under the command of the deputy commander of the 70th Omsb Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolenko, led by the advance detachment, began to move at 00:00 on February 5, 1986 in the direction of the Khadigar mountains along the indicated route.
Arriving at the designated area, the artillery division was supposed to take up firing positions to deliver an artillery strike against the fortified area of the Mujahideen, and from 08.00 to 08.30 - to strike at the positions of the Mujahideen air defense. The tank battalion had to take up firing and defensive positions in order to prevent the mujahideen from breaking through from the fortified area.
The airborne assault battalion was to take its initial positions in readiness to support the actions of special forces.
The Mi-24 squadron and two Su-25 flights from 8.30 to 9.00 planned to inflict a BShU on air defense positions and special forces landing areas with the goal of inflicting maximum fire damage on the enemy and preventing the mujahideen from countering the air defense of the Mujahideen during the landing stage.
Immediately behind the BSHU, four Mi-8MT units with a landing party on board were supposed to enter the intended landing sites and complete the landing at 09.05.
Four special forces groups were to land on the indicated sites in order to destroy the DShK crews with daring and decisive actions, capture their positions and inflict fire damage on the enemy in the gorge.
The airborne assault battalion was supposed to enter the fortified area after being captured by special forces and inspect the elements of its infrastructure under the cover of fire from the RSSPN.
Capture. On February 4, 1986, Lieutenant General Gusev, who led the operation, set a task for all its participants.
When setting goals, special attention was paid to secrecy of actions and interaction. To this end, Lieutenant-General Gusev paid special attention to the order of communication and work in a common network.
To ensure secrecy, the 70th Omsb Brigade began to pull out a convoy of military equipment at dusk, and not in the daytime, as was usual.
At midnight, the vanguard began to move. A column of units of the 70th OMRB moved forward after him. Initially, she moved along the Kandahar-Chaman highway in the direction of Pakistan. The driver mechanics of the forward detachment, who had rich experience in night driving, drove without turning on their headlights. The rest of the convoy walked with the headlights on.
After walking about 50 kilometers, the vanguard turned left off the road and moved north over rough terrain. Senior Lieutenant S. Krivenko's excellent knowledge of the area of operations played an important role in fulfilling the task of the forward detachment.
At 7.40 the advance detachment arrived at the designated point, which was reported to the Central Bank of Ukraine. From there it was reported that Captain Bohan, the commander of 173 ooSpN, flew out to organize the forward command post and directly control the course of the operation. At 8.00, shelling of the positions of the Mujahideen began. In strict accordance with the plan of the operation, the shelling stopped at 8.30 and aviation began to work. By this time, Captain Bohan had also arrived.
At 9.00, immediately after the last BSHU, eight Mi-8MT helicopters with an assault force on board, taking advantage of the fact that the air defense calculations were in shelters at that time, freely carried out the landing.
In total, four special forces groups were landed, which in a short battle suppressed weak enemy resistance and captured key positions in the fortified area of Mount Khadigar. Some of the rebels who were in the gorge were destroyed, and some hastily retreated in a southeast direction. The fight ended by 9.30 am. After that, the airborne assault battalion was ordered to enter the gorge and conduct a thorough inspection to identify warehouses, positions and other elements of the infrastructure of the fortified area.
However, the information that the fortified area had already been captured by special forces was not communicated to the company commanders. Therefore, the battalion began to act as usual during the capture: one company went along the left slope, another on the right, and another company began to move along the bottom of the gorge. The general frequencies of interaction, as well as signals of mutual identification, were also not communicated to the commanders of companies and platoons. Because of this, a company that was walking along the right slope ran into a group commanded by Lieutenant Marchenko.
The paratroopers, finding people on the mountain, took them for the enemy and opened fire. As a result, one of the scouts was wounded. Neither an attempt to communicate by radio, nor the giving of light signals "I am mine" led nowhere. A storm of fire fell on the scouts. The commandos contacted the forward command post with a request to get in touch with the commander of the airborne assault battalion. But he left the air and did not answer inquiries.
When the paratroopers came closer, they were attacked by … a choice Russian mate. It was finally able to stop them and make them think. After a while they asked the question: "Who are you?" When they realized that it was special forces, they asked with surprise: "What are you doing here?" They were answered in the most accessible form, after which they were forced to contact their own people and warn that special forces were also working at the heights. Only after that did the fighters go downstairs and began to search and unload the gorge.
There were so many trophies that it was not possible to load them onto the vehicles on the first day. In order to exclude the possibility of the Mujahideen returning to the gorge under cover of darkness, three special forces groups were left in their occupied positions.
However, the command of the 70th Omsb Brigade also did not convey this information to their officers. As a result, at about 21.00 positions of one of the groups came under fire from D-30 howitzers. Luckily, no one was hurt. An attempt to contact the artillerymen by radio for a ceasefire was unsuccessful. Only the personal intervention of Captain Bohan, who arrived on the armor, helped to stop the fire.
The next day, the export of trophies resumed. At 17.00, the convoy of military equipment began to move to the point of permanent deployment along a slightly changed route. In the morning, the captured trophies were displayed on the parade ground of the 70th Omsb brigade in front of the headquarters building.
Lieutenant General Gusev analyzed the operation, noting the clear and well-coordinated actions of the special forces and the weak organization of actions in the motorized rifle brigade, which led to the only loss on the part of the Soviet troops - the injury of a scout of one of the RSSPN.
As reported by agents, the fortified area "Mount Khadigar" was recently created by the Mujahideen to counterbalance the formations of "General Istmath", who sided with the government with his detachment, based in the Adigar mountains, located 10-15 kilometers south of the Khadigar mountains. The destruction of the Mujahideen base for a long time stabilized the situation in the area.
In conclusion of the analysis of the operation, Lieutenant General Gusev said that such a practice should be developed, and set the task for Captain Bohan to outline the next target of capture and prepare the operation for his next arrival. Bohan immediately reported that such an object exists - the base area of Vsaticignai. The commander of the troops of the Turkestan Military District gave two weeks to prepare the operation.
