The Americans are sincerely convinced that the success of their submarines in the confrontation with the Soviet Navy became decisive in the success of the US Navy as a whole, and the success of the US Navy contributed to Gorbachev's surrender to the West. According to John Lehman, Secretary of the US Navy under Reagan, during a meeting in Malta, Gorbachev told Reagan upset:
"We are surrounded by your fleet."
Here you need to understand that through foreign intelligence, the top political and military leadership received real and objective information on the superiority of the US Navy's submarine forces.
What's the saddest thing? The situation was not hopeless, we could well effectively counteract the Americans (if we bear in mind purely military considerations, and not the economy, which was the main problem).
As a result, the USSR lost the underwater confrontation, at the end of the day replacing real achievements with propaganda completely divorced from reality (for example, the alleged success of the Atrina search operation). And outright lies, and not even to society, but to the top political leadership on "Atrina" by the command of the USSR Navy, is a clear example of this.
The beginning of the confrontation
In the early years of the underwater confrontation, diesel-electric submarines (including for the US Navy) played a key role in it. While the "military atom" was making its way into the submarine, it was necessary to "fight on batteries."
The Americans, fearing that the German technologies that had ended up in the USSR would make it possible to increase the number and quality of the submarine fleet, have been actively experimenting with various types of sonar equipment since the forties, which would allow them to direct anti-submarine forces to an enemy submarine. Basically, we were talking about stationary hydrophones. In the late forties, it became clear in the Navy that submarines can also act as carriers of effective hydroacoustic stations and be used in PLO. The case was also widely known when the British diesel-electric submarine HMS Venturer destroyed from a submerged position the German submarine U-864 also going under water on February 9, 1945. The result of realizing these things was the Cayo project - a program to create a submarine capable of fighting submarines.
The Barracuda-class submarines created as a result of this project were unsuccessful. But the understanding of the failure with the "Barracuda" gave rise to a type of submarine that has become a legend of the American non-nuclear submarine - the "Teng" submarine.
It was the boats of this type that became the first that the Americans began to send en masse to Soviet territorial waters for reconnaissance. Before that, there were only one-time trips of the old "Tenches" without any impudent antics.
While the atomic "Nautilus" was used in experimental exercises, diesel-electric "Tengi" began to actively develop the Soviet coastal waters. Sometimes this led to different incidents.
So, in August 1957, the USS Gudgeon, a boat of this type, was discovered by naval ships near Vladivostok. The result was a 30-hour chase with the use of real depth charges, the boat was never released: as a result of the chase, it had to surface.
In early 1958, a similar incident occurred with the USS Wahoo, which was also forced to surface by Soviet ships.
It should be understood that there were many more cases when the Americans were undetected.
From the early forties to the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the number of American submarine raids to the shores of the USSR exceeded 2000. During one of them, the American diesel-electric submarine USS Harder, type "Teng", having entered the Soviet terrorists in 1961, passed unnoticed directly into the harbor of Severomorsk and took photographs of the berths and the ships standing at them. The boat went unnoticed.
In the early 60s, the already atomic Skipjack entered the Severomorsk raid and after half an hour went unnoticed, and this was the decision of the boat commander, contrary to his orders (he just “wanted to see” Severomorsk).
In 1975, during a hearing in the Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives of the US Congress, it was announced that over the years, American submarines participated in 110 incidents such as collisions with Soviet submarines or in skirmishes with anti-submarine forces of the USSR. As you can see, the statistics are very eloquent.
In the 60s, when the Soviet Navy acquired significant quantities of nuclear submarines, the American experience of operations in our waters turned out to be very useful for them already in a completely underwater confrontation.
By themselves, the Teng submarines belonged to the high-priority programs of the Navy, including so that future American submariners could train in underwater combat against truly quiet, secretive and effective diesel-electric submarines.
Although the decision that in the future all American submarines will only be atomic was made by the then commander Arleigh Burke back in 1956, the Tengis served for decades after that.
At the same time, in the fifties, the high noise level of the Nautilus in comparison with the American diesel-electric submarines forced the Americans to resolve another important issue.
Since the USSR Navy expected the widespread use of diesel-electric submarines, and since they would obviously have (in those years) an advantage in stealth over American nuclear submarines, then with a high degree of probability the first torpedo salvo would have been behind them. This meant that for the American submarine, the battle would begin with a sudden targeted salvo of torpedoes at it.
In order not only to survive in such a situation, but also to win, it was necessary to evade defeat. For this, in the United States since the beginning of the 50s, unprecedented in scale (we have not even carried out anything like that) research and experimental exercises with the massive use of various means of hydroacoustic counteraction. In general, the problem of the first salvo was solved by the United States completely by the end of the 50s and still retains an overwhelming advantage in the means of the SRS.
By the time the Skipjack nuclear submarines appeared, with which the US Navy's submarine forces reached a qualitatively new level, the American submarine already had very serious experience in working against submarines and operating in the zones of dominance of Soviet anti-submarine forces.
It was much more difficult for the Soviet sailors. For many years, the tasks that in the United States were already solved by nuclear submarines, our fleet continued to solve with diesel-electric ones. This even applied to the tasks of nuclear deterrence, which were partially solved by Project 629 submarines and their modifications. The conditions in which the sailors of the Soviet missile diesel-electric submarines had to serve right off the American coast were extremely difficult and very dangerous.
It was during such a combat service that the K-129 missile diesel-electric submarine, which sank near the Hawaiian Islands, perished.
Nevertheless, these "suicide bombers" of Project 629 made a very large contribution to strategic deterrence, and in those years when the USSR was an order of magnitude behind in terms of delivery vehicles, and the US Navy was perceived as a very serious threat.
The story of the cruise of diesel submarines to Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis is also widely known and does not require retelling, as well as conclusions from it.
But still, the main content of the submarine (submarine versus submarine) confrontation was the operation of atomic submarines. And in them, the United States also had an initial technical superiority, largely due to the personality of a single person.
Hyman Rikover and his atomic fleet
Admiral Hyman Rikover became the de facto creator of the US nuclear submarine fleet. Having extensive connections in the political establishment, he actually had powers close to "dictatorial" in "his" submarine fleet.
According to memoirs, Rikover was distinguished by a very difficult character. However, this happens quite often with outstanding people.
Hyperactive, politicized, harsh, poisonous, intolerant, unceremonious, incredible workaholic, extremely demanding boss, spitting on his official position and ranks, Rikover evoked mixed feelings even among his colleagues who appreciated and respected him.
Even President Nixon, in a 1973 speech at Rickover's fourth admiral's star, said bluntly: “I'm not trying to say he's free of controversy. He says what he thinks. He has opponents who disagree with him. They are right at times, and he is the first to admit that he was wrong. But today's ceremony symbolizes the greatness of the American military system, and the navy in particular, because this controversial person, this person who implements innovative ideas, was not drowned by bureaucracy; for if the bureaucracy drowns genius, the nation is doomed to mediocrity."
Rickover hated mediocrity to such an extent that he believed that a mediocre man was better off dead.
In the early 1980s, it was revealed that falsified reports of hull welding defects had delayed the launch of nearly finished submarines. They were built at the Electric Boat shipyard … The shipyard, of course, tried to blame the fleet for the gigantic waste of money and time, but Rickover used teeth, claws and ties so that the shipyard itself and at its own expense corrected what it screwed up.
However, he failed … Rikover was furious: in fact, the fleet was forced to pay for the incompetence and lies of the shipyard!
Reagan agreed with Rickover's resignation, but wanted a personal meeting. In the presence of President and Defense Minister Kaspar Weinberger, Rikover turned around in all its glory: right in the Oval Office, he called Minister Lehman "an arrogant ant" who "does not understand anything in the navy," the whole program? Yes, he is lying, lying, because he serves contractors, and they want to get rid of me, because in the government, I alone do not let them rob taxpayers! " Then the violent admiral attacked the president with the question: “Are you a man? Can you make decisions on your own?"
So on January 31, 1982, the 63-year-old naval career of 80-year-old Hyman Rikover ended.
(Tatiana Danilova. "Rampant Admiral H. Rickover, Father of the US Atomic Fleet".)
The result of Rickover's efforts (for all his extravagance and ambiguity) is not just massive US Navy submarines, but massive low-noise submarines. The situation with the ratio of noise between domestic and US Navy submarines clearly shows the graph:
Taking into account the fact that the key tactical property of submarines is stealth, the US Navy submarines had a significant advantage over the submarines of the Navy.
But the Americans did not stop at achieving superiority in stealth. The second step to gaining absolute dominance underwater was their approach to target acquisition. And here they made a real revolution, again demonstrating a much higher level of R&D organization and the use of new means of searching for submarines in the fleet than their adversary, us.
Initially, the search for a target was based on the fact that, having some preliminary data on the location of the target, or even conducting a search in a given area without preliminary information, the target needed to be heard. Taking into account the large number of false contacts and complex background conditions, a very difficult stage of contact classification followed. But later, the Americans made a breakthrough in the use of sonar systems, in fact, putting the classification stage before the detection stage.
This was due to the purposeful search and accumulation of databases of "acoustic portraits" and characteristic samples of submarines. Before this "data bank" was created, there was a difficult and risky process of accumulating the necessary data, an example of which is the long-term tracking of the "Lapton" submarine (USS Lapon, a submarine of the "Sturgeon" type) behind the SSBN of Project 667 in the Atlantic.
From the book by D. Sontag "History of underwater espionage against the USSR":
On September 16, a system of underwater hydrophones detected the passage of a Yankee-class submarine north of Norway …
The Lapon arrived at the strait the next day and began patrolling … off the coast of Iceland … The Yankee's noises were so weak that the hydroacoustics could hardly hear them against the background of the nearby fishing trawlers and swarming marine life …
The Yankees showed up, but soon disappeared again … In the next few days, Lapon found and lost Yankees more than once. … Mack's disappointment was shared in Norfolk and Washington by Captain First Rank Bradley, Vice Admiral Arnold Shade, still the commander of the submarine forces in the Atlantic, and Admiral Moorer, the commander of the Navy in the North Atlantic. They were in the know, as Mac was sending short VHF messages from the planes overhead of the operation. In turn, the Navy informed the presidential aides in a timely manner, and Nixon was informed about the progress of the operation in real time.
Mack decided on a very risky maneuver. Having invited the navigators and other officers to the wardroom, he announced that … we must try to guess where she went next in order to intercept her at her destination.
… 12 hours later, the Yankees appeared. This time Mack was determined not to miss the Soviet boat …
Mack began mapping the Soviet submarine's area of operation, perhaps one of the most important intelligence he could bring home. The Soviet boat settled in an area covering about 200 thousand square miles. She patrolled 1,500 and 2,000 miles off the coast of the United States … checking to see if she was being followed.
… The fifth week has come… By this time, the three Lapon officers on duty realized that their watches coincided with those of the officers on the Yankees. Every American could now identify his Soviet "partner" by his characteristic features when performing this or that maneuver. They even gave nicknames to their "partners": among themselves the American watch officers even began to bet on who would better predict the next Yankee maneuver …
The Lapon pursued the Yankees during the entire period of her patrol and then for some time, when the Soviet boat went home, for 47 days.
For a long time, the US Navy (and our Navy - and now) worked according to the following scheme: detection of a target or something similar to it, then classification, that is, identifying signs that characterize a particular type of submarine. Frightened by Soviet activity in the ocean and faced with constant breaks in contact, the Americans changed their approach. At first, for several decades, they tried to approach the Soviet submarines as close as possible and record their acoustic parameters at close range.
The wave of collisions that took place between our and American submarines in recent years was due precisely to this: the attempts of the Americans to line up with our boats literally tens of meters away and to write off the noises. From 1968 to 2000, there were 25 clashes, 12 of which occurred near our shores: the Americans took risks to get the information they needed.
Then this data, as well as the previously collected records (for example, the above-mentioned story with tracking SSBNs), were used to create the so-called "hydroacoustic portraits" - a set of acoustic spectra characteristic of one or another type of our submarine, recorded in this format,in which the computing subsystems of hydroacoustic complexes (GAC) of submarines could identify them and compare them with the spectra of the noise of the aquatic environment around the boat received from the antennas.
And when it did, there was a revolution. Now, from the acoustic chaos of the world's oceans, the computer selected those "pieces" of the spectrum that belonged specifically to the submarine. The computer could decompose a complex spectrum and find in it what related specifically to the submarine and cut off everything else.
Now the situation has changed. It was no longer necessary to feverishly listen to the underwater world, now all the noise of the ocean was decomposed and analyzed in automatic mode, and if the acoustics found that there were frequencies characteristic of an enemy submarine in the array of recorded data, they determined (if possible) its type, and only then started looking for her. The classification and detection of the target now often changed places, and at first, from a great distance, the American submarine detected specific discrete components of a particular submarine.
If, in terms of broadband levels, the mutual detection ranges of domestic and American second-generation submarines were approximately 1, 5: 2, then during the work of the US Navy submarine acoustics, this ratio changed almost by an order of magnitude in discrete steps (not in our favor).
In this situation, success for our submariners could only be in unconventional decisive actions using the capabilities of their submarines (and their weapons) by "101% of the possible."
For a long time, our submariners did not have the opportunity to use the same methods, both for reasons of both greater noise and a long misunderstanding of its nature (in terms of discrete components), and for reasons that were outdated, compared to the Americans, the "ideology" of building hydroacoustic complexes that did not have (up to "Skat-3") standard means of narrow-band spectral analysis. The "efficiency" of the standard domestic spectroscopes SK74 (attached to the SJSC "Rubicon" and "Skat") is characterized by the phrase: "They are not suitable for work on low-noise targets."
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the tracking of our nuclear submarines for the "probable enemy" was unconcealed, very often at high speeds, using active paths (sonars).
It is important to emphasize once again that one of the critical factors was the active use of hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD) of the US Navy submarines. Their effectiveness, taking into account the low noise immunity of our analog SACs, was such that in the conditions of the use of the SRS, our SACs were practically “jammed” and “did not see” just anything. The high-frequency mine detecting stations ("Radian", "Arfa" …) helped out, which made it possible to effectively classify the SPDT and real targets and successfully maintain contact even at high speeds, ensuring the accurate use of weapons about the "probable enemy".
In fact, the "underwater duels" of the 70s often resembled the "dog fights" of WWII fighters. At the same time, the superiority in the speed and maneuverability of our nuclear submarines, before the appearance of the US Navy's Mk48 torpedoes, gave us a good chance of success in underwater combat. However, these conditions set very stringent requirements for submarine commanders, which objectively did not meet all.
In a sense, all our successful anti-submarine men were, shall we say, "hooligans", "pirates" who acted skillfully, toughly and decisively. Knowing many of them, no one comes to mind who would be “quiet”. Taking into account the military-technical lagging behind, only "violent" ones could snatch success in submarine battles.
Here is indicative of the discussion that unfolded in the discussion of "some memoirs of retired submarine commanders of the Navy" on the Avtonomka website (later, due to the acuteness of the discussion, this was deleted by the owner of the site, but saved in a copy). The bottom line is that the "polite and correct" ex-commander (nuclear submarines of projects 671V and 667BDR) said that we had "wrong" (and even wrote about the lag in low noise in the Central Committee of the CPSU), while personally doing nothing for that to take advantage of the capabilities it already has. During the discussion, it became clear that he had extremely poor knowledge of the characteristics and capabilities of his hydroacoustics and weapons (for example, active GAS and a torpedo telecontrol complex), which he simply did not use, because allegedly "it did not work."
The objections that "for some reason" all this (active means of search, telecontrol) worked successfully with other commanders of the 671B project of the same division and they toughly and skillfully "put in place" the US Navy submarines, followed by "personal attacks" in the attitude of these commanders (in particular, A. V. Makarenko).
Yes, according to the story of his colleagues, Makarenko was a very tough and "heavy" commander, and not only for his subordinates, but also for the command. For example, after a serious conflict with the command of the squadron, wearing overalls, he personally climbed into the sewers and cut off the heating (it was in winter) and hot water supply … to the "admiral's house" (and so that the staff department of the marine engineering service "could not, and the command had to "negotiate" with the commander).
However, everything worked for Makarenko at sea, incl. active tracts of the SAC, remote-controlled torpedoes were guided, and the submarine of the "potential enemy" he simply "flogged":
In 1975, during the Ocean-75 exercise, the K-454 with the 89th crew (Captain 2nd Rank A. V. Makarenko) monitored the foreign submarine for 72 hours. The contact was interrupted only by order of the higher command, since the "adversary" on the move 28 knots, to which it was "dispersed" by the K-454, "flew" to the BP area, where the command did not have time to raise to the surface the submarine submarine there.
Subsequently, the aforementioned commander (“Makarenko's opponent”) was transferred from a multipurpose nuclear submarine (Project 671V) to a “strategist” (Project 667BDR), and against his will … With a high probability, the 45th division of multipurpose submarines simply got rid of the “passive” commander, however, alas, it was received by the SSBN unit, with all the ensuing consequences in the event of a war.
Another example is the commander of K-314, Captain 1st Rank V. P. Gontarev.
Captain 1st Rank V. P. Gontarev, who was considered a veteran of the submarine among the division's submariners and who had become a universal favorite by that time, intercepts US Navy SSBNs on his K-314 on the way of its deployment from a base on about. Guam and tough tracking forces her to stop deploying and return to base (the emerging "adversary" was photographed on the surface through the periscope).
This problem (the quality and conformity of the command staff: commanders "for peacetime" and "for war") is not unique to the Navy of the USSR and the Russian Federation. Those interested are highly recommended the book by Michael Abrasheff "This is your ship" by the ex-commander of the USS Benfold destroyer URO USS (such as "Arleigh Burke") of the US Navy, who brought his lagging ship to the best. Despite the great successes achieved (and in fact, precisely because of them), he did not become an admiral, had very "difficult" relations with some other commanders and was eventually forced to leave the US Navy. Here is a fragment from his memoirs:
On the sixth day, we were tasked with finding the US Navy submarine, which was playing the role of the enemy, and hide from it. The submarine's task was to locate and sink the ship on which the commander was. Commander Gary was in charge of this training session, which was determined by his superiority in rank, but three days before the exercise, the plan of action had not yet been communicated to all of us, and I realized that there was an opportunity to prove myself.
I summoned the sailors serving the sonar installation, as well as the appropriate officers to my captain's cabin … And I gave them the task to present their plan of action …
To everyone's surprise (and mine too), they came up with a cunning plan that I had never seen before. We left it at the discretion of our superiors, but both the commander and commander Gary rejected him …
When I heard their decision, I could not help it. Excited, almost insolently, I began to argue with them over the radio linking our ships. … In no uncertain terms, I was told that we would use the plan drawn up in Gary … Traditions and outdated orders won.
As a result, the boat destroyed all three ships, and her crew did not even sweat!
By the early eighties, the USSR Navy also began to master the work with the analysis of acoustic spectra. And one of the most striking victories of the Soviet submarine during the Cold War belongs to those first attempts.
Raid K-492 to Bangor
With the advent of new, relatively quiet submarines of Project 671RTM (and supplies "from behind the curtain" of Western civilian digital spectrum analyzers from Brüel & Kjer), it became possible not only to change the tactics of our submarine, but in a number of cases of anticipation in detection and a long (including covert) tracking, despite the continuing lag in low noise and acoustics due to tactics and military cunning.
It should be noted that the effective use of these spectrum analyzers requires a very high level of training of acoustics, commanders, and watch officers and, taking into account their single-channel nature, in fact, was not a "panoramic detection" but a search with one "narrow beam" of a controlled (manually) directional diagram of the submarine GAK, to the listening path which the spectrum analyzer was connected to. Obviously, in order to find a needle in a haystack (PLA in the ocean), one had to be very good at using such a "ray".
The most vividly new tactics and capabilities were manifested by the commander V. Ya. Dudko, who first worked out new tactics when defending his SSBNs in the Sea of Okhotsk:
… favorable conditions for the search and tracking of our PKK SN in the Sea of Okhotsk, and especially during the period of our planned combat service. From the point of view of the General Staff, it was a protected area, since it seemed that it made it possible to deploy ASW forces in the shortest possible time, but from the point of view of the RPK SN's concealment from detection by enemy boats with more powerful energy, this is an open and very favorable area, allowing long-term and covert tracking of our ships at great distances …
Our command and we, so we were taught and hammered into our heads, believed that the PKK SN is invulnerable. With such a mood, we went into military service.
… For the first time in the fleet, together with the commander of BCH-5, we changed the configuration of the operation of noise sources, which radically changed the acoustic field of the submarine …
As a result, during the next check, by their own methods of non-tracking, they found an American submarine … They set up tracking for it and, on command from the fleet headquarters, drove it across the Sea of Okhotsk for two days, until it went into the ocean …
Then he successfully applied the experience gained already on SSBN "Ohio", off the coast of the "potential enemy".
This story (with a number of defaults) is described in the book by V. Ya. Dudko (now retired rear admiral) "Heroes of Bangor"freely available on the Internet. It deserves to be summarized briefly.
During the provocative American exercises NorPacFleetex Ops'82 in the fall of 1982, the Americans were able to outplay the reconnaissance of the Pacific Fleet, deploy an aircraft carrier strike force of more than a dozen ships near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and work out a surprise strike on Kamchatka (with the invasions of Soviet airspace of the USSR over the Kuriles for several days later).
It was impossible to leave this unanswered, and the command of the Pacific Fleet decided to return a "courtesy visit" directly to the Americans' home, in Seattle.
By that time, the activity of the USSR Navy, on the one hand, and a sharp jump in the range of American SLBMs, on the other, made it possible to redeploy Pacific SSBNs to the United States, to Seattle, to the Bangor naval base. There, deep in the Gulf of Juan de Fuca, the exit from which was covered by numerous anti-submarine forces, they were completely safe until the moment they entered the open ocean, but even there they could count on help.
The Pacific Fleet command considered it necessary to show the Americans that their defenses were not at all impenetrable and that, if necessary, Soviet submarines could arrange a "massacre" for the US Navy right in their bases.
This was done, and the details of that operation are very well described in Heroes of Bangor. K-492 with a modified sonar portrait, which American computers "did not see" ("missed"), slipped through the SOSUS system unnoticed and took up a position off the coast of the United States. There she "took" SSBN "Ohio".
Had there been a war, and his raid would have cost the Americans a lot, and the destroyed SSBN is just one line in this list of potential losses (it was worked out, including inflicting a "dagger" missile strike on the base of the US Navy SSBN itself).
K-492 left this operation almost unnoticed, although the Americans were desperate to catch it and had multiple contact with it.
At the same time, our attitude to everything new was, to put it mildly, "ambiguous." Rear Admiral Dudko V. Ya.:
We received unique tools, methods and techniques for tracking submarines in their natural environment. A unique tracking experience, completely new ways of checking the absence of tracking of our missile carriers, which, unfortunately, did not interest anyone (either because of their employment, they either did not believe or did not want to admit the low secrecy of the PKK SN in the "protected" areas).
… the flotilla had only two spectral analysis instruments. One was always at the headquarters, and the second was taken by me …
An interesting comment by A. Semenov, officer of the anti-submarine warfare department of the Kamchatka flotilla:
After Dudko on K-492 in 1982 "festivals" near Bangor, the amers, together with the Canadians, quickly "plugged" the "hole", and Reagan made 12 out of 5 miles of territorial waters. As shown by the search operation "Whiskered Tit" in 1985.
Some details about the "Mustache Tit" are in the memoirs of N Veryuzhsky: “The Story of One Photo, or Non-Invented Events of the Cold War Period.”
Dudko's experience was developed by other commanders. Quote from one of the divers:
I asked … about the 360 and Ohio from Kulish, as it was agreed, from a punch line. Of course, he pecked, and at first he almost killed me, since I immediately started talking about the discovery of "Ohio" by the northerners. I got angry terribly. Yes, they can’t do it, don’t know how, yes… and so on. etc. I did tell about 360. It seems like it is true. Then the same "Ohio" was caught by Oleg Lobanov on the 492nd. At the same time, he told in detail how the RTMs were holding the Elks by the tail, they did not even know that the time of secret tracking was many, many hours and that all this could be achieved, only one had to be a master of his craft and not be afraid to violate the governing documents. In general, he also mentioned the anti-submarine operation, which at the Pacific Fleet was similar to the Aport / Atrina from the Northern Fleet, but was very successful and secretive and therefore is still classified. And "Aport" / "Atrina" - failed by the northerners and that they were chased there like kittens, but nevertheless they hung their chest with orders.
And this is the comment of a crew member of the submarine mentioned:
This is true, and Kulish is a truly unique commander, one of those who walk by intuition, “feel” how the target is moving. Well, he screwed the crew mercilessly. For which now we can say thank you - there were no accidents, and rare inclinations such as fires or water were instantly stopped by a trained l / s … Lobanov, if my memory serves me, caught another Ohio.
It is especially necessary to emphasize here: you have to be a master of your craft and not be afraid to violate the governing documents.
The governing documents of the naval submarine forces have long been outdated, to the point that it simply cannot be carried out as written in them: in battle it would be suicide. In practice, it comes to examples on the verge of idiocy, when the non-standard and successful actions of our submarines, incl. against the latest US Navy submarines, are not investigated or transmitted as experience "simply because" they are "castrated" in the reporting documents to "fit" the provisions and clauses of long-outdated guidelines …
Nevertheless, the initiative officers and commanders of the Navy did everything possible and impossible in the underwater confrontation.
Pocket card so that you don't bother with the secret part and think about it in your free time.
Foreign submarine blue. Inside - who found it. If on the SSBN tracking check - a red SSBN sign is drawn next to it. And a "ray" of tracking. If in a yellow circle, it is likely that we were watching secretly. NS is not covert tracking. The circle crossed out inside is the use of the GPA by the enemy. Maneuvers of a foreign boat when tracking (evading). Well, also the map behind is all covered with thoughts, options, assumptions and a forecast of the enemy's actions. And conclusions - how to detect in perspective …
Someone may grin at how many times the enemy was covertly tracked, but here is what the Chicago Tribune newspaper wrote in 1991, based on information from veterans of the US Navy and the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee (in electronic form). available on the Daily Press website):
“Retired Captain Henry Schweitzer, who was involved in nearly all submarine reconnaissance missions in the Pacific from 1965 to 1967, reported that“incidents could have occurred where the submarine commanders under my command felt they had been discovered. But people are people, and they did not include this in their reports on the results of military service."
In general, it was so in the end. The underwater confrontation was not a one-sided game, and it was especially acute in the 1980s in the Pacific Ocean, where in many cases the “game” was on the verge (or beyond) a foul.
The map and what is depicted on it clearly show that with non-standard and creative approaches to solving the assigned combat missions, it was possible to successfully detect foreign submarines even with our equipment. Yes, and now sometimes it works. Tactics and ability to fight have compensated (in part, at least) the gap in technical capabilities, which was and remains significant. But a departure from the traditional principles of anti-submarine warfare, enshrined formally, was necessary for success. And there was success only where and only when and where the initiative won out blindly following the letter of the charter.
However, this was not always the case. Often it was necessary to "freeze" and act literally on the brink of disaster.
One of these cases is described in one of the books of the American submariner, and now the writer of militants Michael DeMercurio, and reflects his real service experience on the US Navy submarine, tracking our nuclear submarine of Project 671:
… the ship's control team was on watch as the sub was pursuing a Soviet attack submarine of the Victor class, moving quietly on its tail at a speed of 12 knots - the main cooling pumps were operating at low speed (these are giant pumps the size of a car that water through the reactor, at low speed they are quite quiet, but they rattle like a freight train at high speed).
The helmsman at this time wanted to cross his legs and touched the speed task device. The needle has moved from Forward 1/3 to Full Forward. Full speed ahead means 100% reactor power, speed over 30 knots and an automatic order to start the pumps at full power.
I was the engineer on watch in the turbine bay of the sub that night. We "hung" on the tail of the Russians, and therefore were tense. And suddenly a call with the order "full speed ahead."
My God! Ivan rushes at us, or he fired a torpedo, or he heard us and turns around to ram us. It was an emergency. I jumped up from my seat and stood behind the reactor operator, who was about to switch the second cooling pump to high speed. The pump doubled its speed, causing the check valve of the 30cm pipe to clatter and close to prevent backflow of water from the other pump. Hit! The check valve closed, the sound echoed in the surrounding water. A fraction of a second later, the reactor operator started the third pump at high speed. One more blow! Pump 4, then 5, two more hits …
The officer of the watch, the navigator, hears 4 check valves close and feels the deck shudder. He sees how the speed increases on the indicator. The helmsman was still not aware of what was happening.
The officer of the watch grabs his phone to yell at me, just in time to hear my report: "Control, reactor control team, all main cooling pumps are running at full capacity!"
“Stop everyone! - shouts the officer of the watch. - Switch the pumps to low speed!"
And then hell breaks loose. The captain comes running from his cabin, the captain's mate appears, and we almost ram Ivan into the steering wheel from behind.
"5 degrees right rudder!" - shouts the officer of the watch, trying to prevent our submarine from bumping into the propeller of the submarine "Victor". We were side by side with the submarine "Victor" after closing 4 check valves and making a lot of noise with the pumps running at full capacity. The next ten minutes were full of panic and anticipation. We didn't know if "Victor" heard us.
The Russians have a terrible habit of turning around and ramming the pursuing submarines in order to scare them away. But Ivan turned on the gas, not paying any attention. "Thank God that Dmitry was on watch!" - later said the duty officer on the ship. The duty officers on the ship gave each Russian watch officer a name, knowing their habits and behavior. "If Sergei had been on watch, we would have sailed home with a Soviet torpedo in our ass."
"A terrible habit" or, as the US Navy called it - "Crazy Ivan" - the Americans called the maneuver allowing "inspect" the aft sector, which the submarine's SAC did not listen to. The Americans were convinced that this was such a crazy Russian maneuver to avoid tracking. From their side, it really looked like a battering ram. And it was experienced accordingly.
Many episodes have been and still are associated with torpedoes. And not everything is so simple with them.
Torpedoes at the "probable enemy"
Rear Admiral A. N. Lutskiy in his memoirs "For the strength of a strong case" he wrote:
In the spring of 1974, he performed one of the tasks of combat training: a counterattack of a submarine. The goal is the SSBN of our division, the same as mine, project 667A. As we usually agreed, we came to the area, plunged, we are getting closer. At about the estimated time, the acoustician detected a low-noise target according to the expected bearing. By all indications, the target is underwater, the propeller turns are poorly audible, but almost ours. Well, and fired! Naturally, the target was lost behind the noise of the torpedo. When the noise of the torpedo subsided, they surfaced and went to the calculated ascent point of the torpedo, pointed at the surfaced torpedo of the torpedoes. When we arrived at the base, the head of the MTCH called:
- Your torpedo hit someone. The lower part of the practical loading compartment of the torpedo is damaged, it has caught some black pieces of unknown material along the body of the battery compartment of the corrugation. The torpedo will have to be written off. But the recorder worked, homing. That's it!
Taking into account that American submarines constantly patrolled near our bases in the training grounds of the Navy, there is significant statistics not only on their detection, but on the use of practical weapons against them (with recorders instead of a warhead). However, there is nothing to be proud of here, because there are good reasons to believe that the submarines of the so-called partners (as they have been called in recent years) deliberately "took over" our salvoes of practical torpedoes in order to conduct reconnaissance.
And such examples, alas, are more than enough, for example, in the mid-90s, not far from Kamchatka, the “partners” submarine found itself between the “leopard” and the SSBN tactical group with the Project 671RTM multipurpose nuclear submarine in escort, “taking over” 3 two-torpedo salvo (most of the torpedoes were raised with guidance).
It is worth noting that A. N. Lutskiy is one of those submariners whose boat at one time “passed through the SOSUS undetected,” and his words should be taken seriously.
Combat patrolling of SSBNs under the command of A. N. Lutskiy - on the website "Military Review"
One of the authors of the article had the experience of performing a combat exercise with two-way use of practical torpedoes ("bars" against the BDR), and the torpedo with the BDR aimed first at the "escaping" submarine of the "partners", and in the secondary search - already at our "bars" (ie the distances between the three submarines were "pistol").
Very characteristic in that situation was the very quick release of Los Angeles Improved to maximum power and acceleration - with a water reactor! Briefly: "Los (improved)" "escaped" from the 40-knot SET-65 torpedo.
And here it is impossible to bypass one more, and very "painful" and acute question: the facts of the use of torpedoes (usually in a practical version) or imitators (with torpedo noises) against our submarines by the "probable enemy". Such actions were taken by the US Navy submarines in order to reveal the tactics of our submarines, assess specific officers and commanders for actions in a critical situation and practice tactics and organize a sudden and covert "shooting" of our submarines during the threatened period (immediately before the start of hostilities).
One of the possible examples of such actions is the disruption by the Americans (by a Los Angeles-class submarine) of the combat service of the SSBN K-500 of the Pacific Fleet.
It is worth talking about this in more detail.
There were actually quite a few such episodes, even today, many years later, the Internet is replete with photographs of Soviet nuclear submarines taken through American periscopes.
Unfortunately, today the level of personnel training has dropped significantly since the "hot" times of confrontation. The main thing is that the attitude to business has changed significantly …
The film "The Battle of Submarine Fighters: Who Will Win the War" shows the "training element" of "evading" a torpedo attack by the crew of the multipurpose nuclear submarine "Cheetah".
Frankly speaking, from what he saw takes a shock! "Consilium" of officers built in the central post (instead of their combat posts) instead of quick actions, absolutely ineffective evasion techniques (from long-outdated governing documents) …
The four-torpedo salvo shown in the film in this situation is just a stupid "dumping of ammunition into the sea" …
At the same time, the guards commander of "Cheetah" in the film bravo declares his "readiness and ability to defeat" Virginia "in battle …
I would like to ask: what ?! USET-80 torpedoes, the homing system of which was "reproduced on a domestic base" from the American Mk46 torpedo of 1961?
In reality (according to the actual report of the acoustician about the torpedo), everything looks, to put it mildly, quite differently. In the last case known to the author (the real use of US Navy PLA "something very similar to a torpedo"), the commander of the BC-5 was the first to recover from the shock (!), The rest of the GKP "woke up" and began to control after the first commands of the "mech" …
It is very important to understand here that the issues of naval underwater weapons and countermeasures are the "edge" of the underwater confrontation. And if the enemy, figuratively, has a Colt (and the necessary means of detection), and we have a rubber rifle, then even excellent hand-to-hand training will be useless in a combat situation: the sad ending is predetermined
But the importance of torpedoes in the confrontations during the Cold War and after is a topic for a separate article.
