Prologue. Late 80s, Northwest Pacific. Kuril straits region
From the memoirs of an officer of the anti-submarine warfare department of the Kamchatka flotilla on the actions of diesel submarines (diesel-electric submarines) of the project 877 of the Kamchatka flotilla on the Kuril border (the style is slightly changed):
… American boats became frequent guests in the Sea of Okhotsk, so in 1986 it was decided to create the Kuril-Kamchatka anti-submarine line and attract submarines, project 877, aviation …
The hydroacoustic complex "Rubicon" made it possible to detect submarines of the "Los Angeles" type in the noise direction finding mode at a distance of up to 80 cab. Detections in 200 cabins were sometimes noted, but this was when it was running more than 10 knots. This is most typical during the passage by American boats of the strait zones of the Kuril border. The complexity and strength of the currents in the straits forced them to have a speed of 10 knots and above. Well, we naturally used it.
Objective: to close the straits of Kruzenshtern, Bussol and the Fourth Kuril straits. The US boats could pass through them without violating the territorial waters of the USSR. Although I had information that sometimes they slipped through both the First Kuril and the Severin Strait.
In March 1988, a B-404 in the Fries Strait, thanks to its excellent acoustics, detects a foreign boat at a long range and hits it with an active GAS transmission. The American performs a 180-degree lapel, due to the higher speed it comes off.
Upon arrival from the service, we torture the commander.
- Listen, what are they, these Americans, do you give a damn about your soup? With your Chapaevsky antics, you have outdone all the raspberries for us. Will the flotilla commander hand you over for experiments?
- Do not…
Well, then it started: B-405 in October 1988, B-439 in February 1988, B-404 in April 1989, and more and more.
Our gallant commanders, with the stubbornness of maniacs, continued to distribute sonar shells to all American boats that met on the way.
A quarter of a century before. Creation of SJSC "Rubicon"
In 1965, the Central Research Institute "Morfizpribor" completed the development of the MGK-300 "Rubicon" hydroacoustic complex (SAC) (for nuclear submarines of projects 661 and 671). At the same time, the Vodtranspribor plant was finishing the creation of the Kerch State Joint Stock Company for nuclear submarines, into which the huge Rubin antenna could not fit. Against this background, the Central Research Institute "Morfizpribor" (and, as will be shown below, with the active interest of CDB "Rubin"), the idea of creating a "reduced" "Rubin" with widespread use of the already created technical reserve, incl. for use on diesel-electric submarines. Despite the ambiguous attitude to this initiative, the customer (Navy) opened the topic of creating a new SAC. Shelekhov S. M. was appointed the chief designer of the new SJSC, which received the name "Rubicon".
In view of the very strict requirements for weight and size characteristics and energy consumption (taking into account the "sight" for the installation of the first experimental SJC on the Rubin Central Design Bureau, project 641B, which is being modernized at that time), the question of the fundamental appearance of the SJC and technical solutions that ensured the maximum possible range target detection. The main way to achieve this at that time was considered to be the largest main antenna for noise direction finding.
Mikhailov Yu. A., first deputy chief designer of the State Aviation Committee, recalled:
The coordination of the tactical and technical assignment (TTZ) was difficult. Customers put forward requirements that sometimes led away from the main goal, and their feasibility and usefulness were not always obvious. So, the requirement to include mine detecting equipment in the complex could torpedo the whole idea, since the problem of building well-functioning mine detectors at that time was not solved. The requirement to install onboard antennas did not make sense at all due to the high level of interference in the installation area. Only the eighth (!) Version of the TTZ was agreed and approved, when the development was already in full swing.
Thus, the industry has successfully “put the squeeze on” the fleet according to its vision of the issue, work on which has been in full swing for about a year.
The main idea of the Rubicon concept was to reduce the hardware part of the complex as much as possible (from 55 equivalent racks to 7, 5) while preserving the largest (according to the possibility of installation on carriers) main antenna of the SAC (placed on the carrier in a place with minimal interference). Taking into account the installation restrictions on the 641B project, the main antenna of the "Rubicon" was reduced by 1.5 times from "Ruby" to "truncated conical", with diameters of 4 and 3.5 m and a height of 2.4 m.
Today it is clear that the rejection of the on-board antenna for the GAK version for diesel-electric submarines was a big mistake. The problem of interference was acute for noisy nuclear submarines, but on diesel-electric submarines (with little interference), the implementation of an effective on-board antenna was possible and expedient already in those years.
In conditions of massive hydroacoustic counteraction (during tracking and in battle), only active paths of analogue SACs provided classification and generation of target data. However, with mine detection and sonar, everything was much more complicated …
The fact that sonar can detect mines, and we knew abroad even from the mid-40s. However, the problem was in the conditions and significantly increased requirements (of the customer) … But with the implementation of the latter during the 50s - early 60s, we had a breakdown after a breakdown (and with scandalous details such as dismissal and transfer to another organization of key specialists) …
For example, the first sonar station (SRS) "Plutonium", developed with the task of mine detection, turned out to be of little use for this task. At the same time, it cannot be said that the Plutonium RTU was bad. For example, its real operating range for the 613 project in the Baltic reached 25 cab. was two times lower (7 kHz instead of 15 for "Plutonium"). The surface variant of "Plutonium" - GLS "Tamir-11", incl. in the course of long-term tracking of submarines of a potential enemy, actively using hydroacoustic countermeasures (SGPD). Cm.: Techniques for evading a nuclear submarine from ships of a search and strike group (PUG) (based on the experience of pursuing a foreign boat by the ships of the 114th brigade of the OVR ships of the Kamchatka military flotilla in 1964).
Mentioned in the article “At the forefront of underwater confrontation: submarine hydroacoustics. From the beginning of the Cold War to the 70s " the mine detection path of the SJSC "Kerch", which perfectly "saw" not only submarines, but even torpedoes (!), successful GAS mine detection "Harp").
The first GAS mine detection, where the requirements of the Navy were met, was GAS "Olen". Its chief designer M. Sh. Shtremt (previously the developer of the extremely successful sound direction-finding GAS "Phoenix") carried out a large amount of experimental research in order to test actually working and effective solutions at sea at the initial stages of development. This has become a key success factor. Subsequently, on the technical groundwork of the GAS "Olen", a more compact GAS for mine detecting "Lan" was created, which became the first mass and effective GAS for mine detecting for minesweepers.
For submarines, the first successful mine detector was the "Radian", which also turned out to be an extremely successful GAS for "duels" with enemy submarines. For the first time he showed himself in this way back in 1968, most likely, on the K-38 under the command of the future Vice-Admiral E. D. Chernov. The article “At the forefront of underwater confrontation: submarine hydroacoustics. From the beginning of the Cold War to the 70s " there is a mistake in the caption to the photograph of the enclosure of the state joint stock company "Rubin". The main antenna of the "Rubin" was reversible (it worked both in noise direction finding and in sonar), and under it was placed a large antenna of the GAS mine detection "Radian".
However, these high characteristics and capabilities required significant hardware costs and the use of a very large antenna. Taking into account the fact that most of the mine detection topics were failed, a number of leading specialists left Morfizpribor, and Radian had just begun to show results, the Rubicon development managers pushed the customer to exclude the mine detection path from the SJSC.
It turned out differently with sonar. The navy demanded the provision of a long range of this tract (including for targeting missile weapons). Shelekhov initially put the question bluntly: the idea of a new SAC can be realized only on fixed antennas. Accordingly, the "Rubicon" received a separate radiating antenna for the "distance measurement" (sonar) path with one stationary narrow (about 30 degrees strictly along the nose) directional pattern.
For missile submarines of the 670M project, the ID tract was supplemented by two onboard radiating antennas with a very narrow beam pattern along the traverse, which turned out to be practically useless.
The noise control path (SN) had three identical channels with all-round viewing modes (in one of the three frequency ranges) or automatic target tracking (2 ASTs are possible simultaneously while maintaining a circular view with one channel in one (selected) frequency range.
To increase the detection range of low-noise targets, it was possible to work with the accumulation of signals (capacitive storage in the corresponding frequency ranges). However, the greatest detection range was provided not by the standard indicator of the complex, but by the recorder (the SAK pen recorder on paper tape).
The "Rubicon" did not have standard equipment for narrow-band (spectral) analysis, but the possibility of connecting it existed and was actively used in the future.
The distance measurement path (ID) had a separate emitting antenna; echo signals were received at the main antenna of the complex. Provided the determination of the distance and the radial component of the target speed.
The hydroacoustic signal detection path (OGS) had 4 separate frequency ranges with the ability to determine the frequency and direction to the detected signal. It should be noted that the direction finding accuracy in the OGS was much worse than in the SHP (the use of torpedo weapons according to the OGS data was out of the question), and in the 4 frequency range (torpedo detection) only the quadrant was determined.
The communication path provided modes of code (long-distance) communication, high and low frequency telegraphy and telephony.
The SAC really turned out to be compact, easy to learn and use. The large antenna provided a good potential of the complex and decent detection ranges (especially on diesel submarines of Project 877). Created in 1966-1973. SJSC still serves in the Russian Navy (diesel-electric submarines of project 877 and RPL SN "Ryazan") and a number of other countries, and practically unchanged.
Work on the "Rubicon" proceeded at a high pace, the production of a prototype began 17 months before the defense of the technical project (the usual stages of development: preliminary design, technical design, development of working design documentation, production of a prototype, preliminary tests ("tests of the chief designer"), state tests). In 1970-1971. at the stand there was simultaneous testing of two prototypes at once (for 641B and 670M projects). State tests "Rubicon" successfully passed in 1973, and by the end of the same year, two serial complexes were delivered. The Rubicon was adopted in 1976 under the designation MGK-400.
The first carrier: diesel-electric submarines of project 641B
The development of a project for the modernization of the excellent ocean diesel-electric submarine of project 641 began at TsKB-18 in 1964, i.e. even earlier than the beginning of the development of "Rubicon". The key issue of this modernization was the new hydroacoustics, and it was for the 641B project that the Rubicon SJSC was optimized (primarily for the main antenna)
The installation of the SJSC "Rubicon" dramatically increased the capabilities of diesel-electric submarines to detect low-noise targets, however, when the enemy used low-frequency SGPDs, our diesel-electric submarines, which did not have a mine detection HAS, became practically "blind". But there was no place for an additional antenna for an effective high-frequency GAS on the 641B project, the dimensions of the main antenna of the "Rubicon" became limiting even for large diesel-electric submarines. Because There was no SAC of a smaller dimension, and after 10-15 years this led to the "extinction" in the USSR Navy of the subclass of medium-sized diesel-electric submarines.
On nuclear ships
The first nuclear-powered ship to receive the Rubicon was the 670M project (developed by the Lazurit Design Bureau, the launch vehicle - Malakhit anti-ship missiles).
For nuclear submarines, the problem was that the "Rubicon" was "insufficient." And in terms of size, potential, and detection range, it was possible to have much more effective antennas. The development of such a complex was in full swing at the Research Institute "Morfizpribor", and the SJSC "Skat" had two modifications: small ("Skat-M") and large ("Skat-KS"). For nuclear submarines, the Skata-M installation was unambiguously preferable to the Rubicon. However, it turned out that the "Rubicon", "too large" for diesel-electric submarines, but "too small" for nuclear submarines, in the 70s "crossed the road" to the much more effective "Skat-M".
In addition to the 670M project, the Rubicon SJSC was installed on various ships of the 667 projects (as a regular SJSC - on the 667BDR project, on others - during repairs and upgrades). On nuclear-powered ships of the 1st generation, the "Rubicon" was massively installed (at the plant) on the 675 project and on one submarine of the 627A project (K-42).
"Information" about the installation of "Rubicon" on multipurpose nuclear-powered ships of project 671, circulating "in the domestic" underwater literature "does not correspond to reality. Nobody was going to give up the huge main antenna of "Rubin" on 671 projects. The only exception is the K-323, upgraded according to the 671K project with the installation of the Granat cruise missile complex. There was no other option for freeing up space and displacement to accommodate its firing system, except for replacing the Rubin with the Rubicon.
Already in the 80s, it became clear that the installation of the Rubicon SJSC on the second generation nuclear-powered ships was a mistake, the SJSC was very harshly criticized in the Navy due to its insufficient capabilities and the presence of a real (and much more effective) alternative in the form of the Skata-M …
"Main carrier": project 877
The main carrier of the "Rubicon" was the diesel-electric submarine of project 877, actually built "around" and "from" its large main antenna. At the same time, a set of measures was successfully implemented to de-noise the carrier and reduce the interference of the SAC.
Taking into account the very low noise level of diesel-electric submarines of project 877, the large potential of the antenna provided anticipation in detection in most tactical situations with diesel-electric submarines of other countries, even those that had more modern digital SACs (for example, with the German project 209/1500 of the Indian Navy). In the book "Jump of a Whale" (about the creation of BIUS "Knot"), an eyewitness testimony is given:
… witnessed the return of the submarine Sindhugosh from the campaign, in which a training encounter with the submarine of the 209th project took place, I guess it was just to assess their capabilities. It was in the waters of the Arabian Sea. Our lieutenant, a Hindu serving the "Knot", after this battle, in joyful excitement, with a gleam in his eyes, told me: "They did not even notice us and were sunk."
It is worth dwelling separately on the thesis “size is of decisive importance” from the article by Yu. N. Kormilitsin, general designer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau.and vice-admiral Barskov M. K. ("Marine Collection" No. 6, 1999).
It is optimistic about a 6-fold lead in the detection range, primarily due to the large antenna. In reality, everything, to put it mildly, is somewhat different.
From this graph (developed by SJSC - Central Research Institute "Morfizpribor"), it can be seen that SJSC "Rubicon" has 2.5 times more potential than SJSC "Rubin" (with a 1.5 times larger main antenna). Moreover, the digital SJC "Skat-3" has 2 times more potential than the analog "Skat-KS" (with similar dimensions of the main antennas). Those. size certainly matters, but signal processing is just as important.
Accordingly, the very "technique" for comparing submarines by antenna size is highly controversial in terms of reliability.
On the 877 project, a new GAS mine detection "Arfa-M" was installed. Like Radian, it was often used as a GAS for lighting and classification. The operator of the "Uzel" BIUS recalls about firing remote-controlled (TU) torpedoes at low-noise diesel-electric submarines:
I did it personally, pressed the buttons of the TU with my gnarled fingers 3 times in my life. Moreover, twice "Rubicon" (two attacks in a row) did not see the target literally at point-blank range and went on the attack on the "Harp" exclusively, Another time they went on the "Rubicon", but the "Harp" was included … “Pli” was sounded only when we were convinced of the accuracy of the data with the help of “Harp”.
This is a vivid example of how the Varshavyanka would have to fight in a real battle: the ShP tract is completely suppressed by interference and hears nothing, you can only count on the "Arfa" (working sector 90 degrees on the nose) and the ID tract (30 degrees on the nose) …
"Warsaw" against "moose" and "rods"
The memories mentioned at the beginning of the article are interesting primarily because they are the view of an anti-submarine officer of a higher command body (Kamchatka flotilla) with a comprehensive and retrospective analysis of the use of Project 877 diesel-electric submarines with the Rubicon SJSC (using spectral analysis equipment).
The noise of the boat at 5 knots … is less than that of the US Sturgeon boats and comparable to the noise of the Los Angeles at their 6-7 knots. If the "Varshavyanka" was at 2-3 knots, then it surpassed the American boats in the detection range by about 30%.
These figures depend on specific ships (years of construction), but are approximately correct. It is especially worth paying attention to the noticeable increase in the noise level of the 877 under the main propeller motor, as a result of which a reliable lead in detection was achieved only on the economical drive motor (and the speed is less than 3 knots).
We began to draw up schedules for entering the service, search speeds, cyclical search and battery charging. We agreed to "make noise" with diesels charging from the inner side of the islands, masking themselves with the noise of tidal currents. After that, go to the strait for 72 hours in 3-5 knots … The main effort is on hidden tracking, do not unmask yourself … Objectives: to detect, classify, determine the EDC (elements of target movement). On the air, even SDB (ultra-high-speed communication), do not grind. We have long learned to detect and find this parcel. And if, according to the Americans, their boat is there, then the burst of our parcel from this area is definitely its detection.
Wait five or six hours, if necessary, we will pull the aircraft, it will cover it. Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to work in the strait zones with aviation buoys: a decent excitement, quickly blows away by the current.
A very competent solution with an emphasis on the use of aviation and achieving the maximum tracking time (covert!) By it.
Well, "go first." "Varshavyanka" B-404 in February 1986. In the Fourth Kuril Strait, he discovers an underwater target going into the strait. I determined everything, recorded the noises, classified, well, you will follow her and make sure that she slipped into the strait. Not a fig. By actively sending GUS to her lobster. Babakh !!!
That, of course, is shocked, the lapel is 180 degrees. and comes off. After a while, knowing that there is a boat, that she found it, she finds a way to slip somewhere else.
And immediately gives an alert about detection by the fleet.
Well, we didn't know that then. The team in Mongokhto, Tu-142 puts a field of buoys at the exit from the strait. Blowing you with poppy seeds.
Those. departure on call of aviation by. The enemy, realizing that he was discovered, dodged. The reaction of the "operators" and the command was "appropriate":
At the end of the combat service, we drive the boat to Novoye Zavoiko and the whole headquarters pile on it.
- And why did you iron it with acoustics?
- So confirm what exactly the underwater target. Noises are noises, and a mark is a thing!
- So the acoustics confirmed it in passive mode. What do you want, little merry?
- It was I who simulated a torpedo attack.
- Why did you give the notification immediately? They asked, wait a couple of hours.
- And stealth after my torpedo attack is still down the drain. And in general, no figs to roam around our islands.
The logic is iron. One violation of instructions serves to justify the second. Well, okay, the first detection, at a long range, I myself did not expect this. Senior comrades educated the commander a little.
The question was really very good, because the 877 project had only TEST-71M anti-submarine remote-controlled torpedoes with very low performance characteristics, easily withdrawn by the SGPD. Our naval aviation at that time had excellent APR-2 anti-submarine missiles with anti-jamming homing systems, to which the US Navy's submarines could not oppose anything. Those. "Varshavyanki" were good at detecting, but had serious problems with the destruction of submarines, while the aviation was poor with detection, but "lethal" APRs were in service.
… by 1990, covert detections were over. Even attempts to spy on secretly came to nothing. The primary detection ranges suddenly leveled off. And now it happened that the Americans were the first to discover our super-low-noise "Varshavyanka" …
Modern modernization
At the end of the 80s, the 877 project was considered already obsolete, and its analogue SJSC "Rubicon" was simply "antique". However, in the new economic situation of the 90s. simple mastered 877 project went very well for export. The question of moral and technical obsolescence of its hydroacoustics has risen squarely. As a result, in the late 90s - early 2000s, the Central Research Institute "Morfizpribor" carried out a deep modernization (in fact, the development of a new SJSC) MGK-400EM at a very good technical level.
"Rubicon-M" has become fully digital, the detection range and noise immunity have sharply increased.
Interestingly, the Rubicon-M was viewed as a "modular SJC" with size options ranging from "small" (MG-10M antennas) to a huge SJC for Project 971I. However, the main version was the GAK for the 877 (636) project.
Along with a very good technical level, decent detection ranges, high noise immunity of the Rubicon-M SJC, he also inherited the "birth defects" of the original Rubicon SJC:
- limited sector of the sonar tract (increased to 60 degrees on the nose);
- lack of on-board antennas;
- extremely low accuracy of direction finding of hydroacoustic signals (torpedoes) in the high-frequency range (the parameter of the old "Rubicon" is preserved).
The problem of using a flexible extended antenna is more complicated. SJSC MGK-400EM has a variant of MGK-400EM-04 with GPBA (and very good one). For this reason, the supply of new SACs of the Navy without GPBA causes frank bewilderment. Saving? But this is saving on matches! GPBA dramatically increases the capabilities of diesel-electric submarines, providing not only an increase in detection ranges, classification capabilities due to the use of the infrasonic range, but also constant monitoring of the "blind" for the main antenna of the aft sector (including from a surprise attack by the enemy).
The passivity of the Navy (and Rosoboronexport) on this issue leads to the fact that foreign customers are beginning to install Western GPBA on our Varshavyanka.
Well, the most sore point is the preservation of submarines with the ancient original "Rubicon" in the combat composition of the Navy. Taking into account the fact that back in the mid-80s MGK-400 was not considered a modern SAC, nowadays naval submarines with it (RPLSN Ryazan and diesel-electric submarines of project 877) have a combat value close to zero. Here the installation of modern digital processing equipment on the old SACs could play a role, however, this was also overlooked by the Navy (this issue, including dramas and comedy (simultaneously) with the prefix "Ritsa", will be discussed in detail in the next article) … As a result, in 2016, in the Baltic Fleet TV series, we could observe the “highly professional” work of the Varshavyanka acoustics of the Northern Fleet, who “discovered” non-existent “turbines” near the corvette of Project 20380 on the ancient Rubicon State Joint Stock Company.
As a matter of fact, this shows well the attitude towards anti-submarine warfare in the Russian Navy, and against this background, the absence of GPBA on the newest diesel-electric submarines of the Navy of project 06363 is no longer surprising.
