Raids on communications in the western part of the Black Sea
As already noted, on November 19, the People's Commissar of the Navy confirmed the need to organize combat operations of surface ships off the western shores of the Black Sea. At the same time, he pointed out that the first raid must be planned so that the enemy's communications were disorganized for a period sufficient to prepare and begin a second operation. On the basis of this instruction, the command of the fleet on November 27 assigned the squadron the task of systematically carrying out active operations in the western part of the sea in order to destroy the enemy transports and ships sailing along the Romanian coast, the first raid operation to be carried out from November 29 to December 1. The composition of the forces: the cruiser "Voroshilov", the leader "Kharkov", destroyers "Smart", "Boyky" and "Merciless".
The situation at the end of November was favorable for the operation. Owing to the diversion of enemy aviation to the Stalingrad area, the possibility of a covert and relatively safe exit of our ships to enemy rear communications was created. Difficult hydrometeorological conditions also contributed to this.
In the evening of November 29, the 2nd group of ships consisting of the destroyers "Merciless" (the braid pennant of the commander of the 1st destroyer battalion, Captain 1st Rank P. A. Melnikov) and "Boyky" arrived from Batumi to Tuapse. Taking fuel, at 0:50 on November 30, she went to sea. The 1st group consisting of the cruiser Voroshilov (the flag of the squadron commander Vice-Admiral L. A. Vladimirsky), the leader of the Kharkiv and the destroyer Soobrazitelny left Batumi at 17:15 on November 29. The exit of both groups was ensured by preliminary control trawling of fairways, search for submarines, patrolling of fighters and direct guarding of ships by patrol boats.
On the morning of November 30, both groups joined at sea and for several hours followed jointly to the west. At 12:50, at the signal of the flagship, the 2nd group separated and went south-west. Having reached a parallel of 42 ° 20 'and determined by the Turkish lighthouse Kerempe, she went to the area of Cape Kaliakria with the expectation of being there by dawn on December 1. The 1st group at 19:00 on November 30, passing the meridian of Cape Kerempe, lay down on a course of 325 °, expecting to approach Snake Island from the east by dawn.
The transition to the area of combat destination was covert. On the morning of December 1, the ships of the 1st group followed with the delivered paravans. The lead was "Clever" (commander 2nd rank captain SS Vorkov), in his wake - "Voroshilov" (commander 1st rank captain FS Markov), end - "Kharkov" (commander captain 3 - 1st rank P. I. Shevchenko). At 7:35 in the fog, visibility up to 5 miles, Fr. Serpentine, and at 7:47 am all the ships opened fire on him - more precisely, on the lighthouse, which from a distance of 45 kb began to be well distinguished in optics. And we are not talking about concentrated firing of several calibers at one target, when everyone, like a conductor, is led by the flagship artilleryman and at his commands certain batteries and ships come into play, but about simultaneous firing. It's just that everyone immediately began to shoot at one target, although according to the plan, only a destroyer was allocated for this, and only with the detection of boats or aircraft at the airfield - the leader. The distance was 40-30.5 kb, that is, they were beating at close range, with direct fire.
As a result, the ships' fire controllers got entangled in the explosions of the shells, the target was periodically covered by smoke and dust from the bursts of 180-mm shells, and then the "Smart" stopped firing the "Kharkov" altogether, giving five volleys, also ceased fire for a while, and only at 7: 58 began zeroing again. Having made two attempts and having received incomprehensible carry-overs, he transferred fire on the alleged airfield, that is, simply on the island. Then the leader began to move according to his plan. The cruiser ceased fire at 7:57, the destroyer at 8:00. As a result, 46 180-mm, 57 100-mm and about a hundred 130-mm shells were fired at the lighthouse, which was not even mentioned in the combat mission, and nowhere is it said about its destruction.
Let us repeat that the shooting was carried out from a distance of about 40 kb on the move at 12 knots. Approximately at the same distance to the south of the island there was an S-44 minefield, to which the detachment, lying on a course of 257 °, gradually approached at an angle of 13 ° - conditions under which a meeting with a mine is inevitable, even if the ships went without paramedic guards … At 7:57 am, simultaneously with the ceasefire on the cruiser Voroshilov, an incident occurred that violated the alignment order in the ranks. On the port side, at a course angle of 45 °, a periscope was found at a distance of 10 kb. The cruiser had already begun to grumble at the submarine, but it soon turned out that the signalmen mistook the pole for a periscope, and the cruiser, describing a smooth coordinate, lay down on its previous course; at the same time, instead of the formation of the wake column, a formation of the ledge to the left was formed.
Since the time when paramedic guards were placed on the ships, the main task of the "Savvy" was to produce mine reconnaissance ahead of the cruiser's course. In this case, after the cruiser, unknown to S. S. For the reason, Vorkova described the coordonat, "Smart", having increased the speed from 12 to 16 knots, turned it a few degrees to the left in order to gradually reach the head of the cruiser, and soon the speed was again reduced to 12 knots. At 08:04, when the destroyer, which had not yet managed to get out exactly at the cruiser's head, was at a 10-15 ° course angle of the starboard side at a distance of about 2 kb from the cruiser, the right-hand paravan of the "Savvy" captured the minrepe and a few seconds later hoisted the mine that had surfaced 10-15 m from the board.
After the discovery of the mine, S. S. Vorkov, it was assumed that the mines had been placed recently (this was evidenced by the appearance of the mined mine) and in the vicinity of the island, while the seaward encounter with mines was less likely (this assumption was true). Therefore, the commander of the "Soobrazitelny", turning around by cars, turned the ship abruptly to the left and under the nose of the cruiser, which continued on the same course, again and extremely successfully crossed the line of mines, standing at an interval of 100 m, and left the dangerous area to the south. Apparently, on a steep circulation in combination with a low speed of movement, the paravans went wrong, the width of the guard's capture sharply decreased, as a result of which the ship "slipped" in the mine interval.
The destroyer commander violated all existing rules, according to which ships, in the event of a mine fence, should either continue to move on the same course and at the highest speed allowed when using a paramedic guard, or retreat along the traversed path in reverse, making sure that the stern does not go to the side. The choice of this or that method of maneuvering, which makes it possible to reduce the likelihood of encountering a mine, depends on the nature of the task being performed and on the degree of reliability of the available self-defense against mines.
In this case, acting on intuition and contrary to all rules, S. S. Vorkov really dodged a serious danger. The next mine cutting on the same southern lane (with the left paravan) or in the northern lane, which still had to be crossed (if the destroyer had not deviated to the south), in all likelihood, would have been accompanied by a mine explosion - and according to the Baltic experience, such explosions of EMC mines on a short distance from the side are very dangerous for destroyers.
Since immediately after the mine was hit, the signals were given by beeps, raising the flag "Y" and a semaphore, S. S. Vorkov believed that the Voroshilov cruiser would lie in his wake and also evade to the south of the discovered obstacle. But on the cruiser they judged differently. L. A. Vladimirsky believed that the detachment got to the recently placed mine bank, and since he did not know its borders, he did not try to bypass it. He also did not want to reverse, as this would lead to a confusion of the paravans and cause a loss of time in front of the enemy, and therefore ordered the cruiser commander to continue moving without changing the course. At least that is how he explained his decision to come to the base. What the squadron commander actually proceeded from at that moment remained a mystery. Most likely, he was guided by exactly the instructions mentioned above.
At about 8:06 the Voroshilov crossed the destroyer's wake and after that a strong mine explosion occurred in the cruiser's right paravan at a distance of 12-15 m from the side. On the entire ship, the lights went out, the steam in the boilers sat down, the machine telegraphs and the telephone went out of action. Having passed after the explosion on the right wing of the bridge and not finding any signs of destruction on the deck and on board, the squadron commander immediately returned to the machine telegraph, where the cruiser commander was, who had just ordered back through a messenger. Considering this decision of the commander wrong, L. A. Vladimirsky ordered to give full speed ahead, which was done. All this happened while the ship was crossing the southern row of the S-44 minefield. Less than a minute later, at 8:07 am, a second mine exploded in the left paravan. Since the cruiser's vehicles worked in reverse for 10–20 seconds, the forward speed dropped to 6–8 knots. For this reason, the paravans went closer to the side than at the time of the first explosion, and therefore the second also occurred closer to the ship. As a result, many devices and mechanisms failed, radio communication was disrupted and a leak appeared in the case. Both paravans were lost, but the trawling units survived. A minute later, at 8:08 am, lighting was restored on the ship, and it became possible to use the emergency machine telegraph.
The damage received by the cruiser forced the squadron commander to abandon the artillery shelling of the port of Sulin. The cruiser, being between both rows of mines, described the circulation, successfully crossed the southern row of mines and dodged a minefield, the western end of which was still two miles west of the detonation site. That is, the cruiser left the permanent course. We can say that this saved the ship: on the previous course, when crossing the northern row of mines, the Voroshilov, which had lost its paravans, would probably have been blown up by one or two mines. But no one guaranteed that there was no more mine line to the south. Therefore, most likely it was necessary to try to get out of the minefield in reverse - especially since the cruiser had already expanded the passage from 100 to 300 m. But they did as they did, and everything worked out.
In this situation, the squadron commander made a natural decision to terminate the operation and return to base. The only question was whether everyone should leave or not. After all, the leader, like the second detachment, had already acted according to his plans. At first, when a leak was discovered on the cruiser, the squadron commander considered the ship's position serious and therefore decided to return the "Kharkov" to himself.
At about 9 o'clock, still far from the coast, about 16 miles southeast of the Burnas sign, the leader "Kharkov", in accordance with the order received by radio, stopped the search and, turning southeast, went to join the flagship. In the afternoon of December 2, the ships of the 1st group returned from the sea to their bases.
The ships of the second group "Merciless" and "Boyky", on the morning of December 1, in poor visibility conditions, approached the Romanian coast, began to clarify their position according to the depths measured by an echo sounder and a mechanical lot. It turned out that the ships were seaward than the numbered place; it was later revealed that the discrepancy appeared to be about four miles to the east. At about 8 o'clock, heading west, the destroyers entered a strip of fog; visibility dropped to 3-5 kb. I had to give first a small, and then the smallest move. At the same time, the paravans, posted at 5:30, when the detachment was still 40 miles from the coast, were almost inactive, since the paravans were not withdrawn from the ship's side.
Unsure of his position, the battalion commander did not want to go north to Mangalia until the coast opened. However, at 8:04 am, when the echo sounder showed a depth of 19 m (which, judging by the map, corresponded to a distance to the coast of no more than 4–5 kb), there was nothing left but to turn to the right. A minute after the turn, the shore appeared, and at 8:07 am they found a silhouette of a transport. Soon three more silhouettes of transports were noticed, of which one was later identified as a warship, similar to a gunboat of the Dumitrescu class. Almost immediately, enemy coastal batteries opened fire, shells fell 15 meters from the side and covering volleys were observed.
At 8:10 the destroyers opened fire using the night sighting device 1-N, however, on the Merciless, instead of the commanded distance of 2 kb, they set 24 kb by mistake, and 12 kb on the Boykom, and there the first stage also gave a flight. Having introduced the amendment, the fire manager achieved coverage with a second volley, but the third round was not observed due to the fog. At 8:13 the fire was stopped as the targets disappeared. The destroyers turned on the opposite course and after 20 minutes again attacked the transport with artillery and torpedoes, but after a few minutes the fire ceased, since all the targets were hit and disappeared into the fog. In total, 130-mm shells were used up - 88, 76, 2-mm - 19, 37-mm - 101, as well as 12 torpedoes. Three enemy transports were considered sunk. Unfortunately, as it turned out later, coastal shoals and rocks were attacked.
Poor visibility made it impossible to establish exactly where the events described above took place. On the "Merciless" it was believed that everything happened in the area of the village of Kolnikoy, two miles south of Cape Shabler. The commander of the Boykoy believed that the ships were in the area of the port of Mangalia, 18 miles north of the numbered place. Based on the analysis of reports at the squadron headquarters, they came to the conclusion that, judging by the measured depths and by the nature of the observed coast, which was rather low-lying miles north of Cape Shabler.
Since the visibility did not improve, and the place of the detachment remained undetermined, P. A. Melnikov refused to complete the second part of the task, believing that the artillery shelling of the port of Mangalia would simply turn into unloading the cellars, and the destroyers would needlessly run the risk of being blown up by mines. Therefore, the detachment turned to the base. After leaving about 20 miles from the coast, about 10 hours, the ships began to clean up the paravans. On "Boykom" there were neither paravans, nor trawling units of the guard - they did not even notice on it when they were lost. On the "Merciless" even earlier, they noticed that the left paravan had moved to the right side during the circulation. When trying to remove the guard, it turned out that both trawling parts got mixed up and it was impossible to pick them up without a big loss of time. And a little earlier, as it turned out later, there was a false detection of the periscope, which was fired upon. Soon they received radio messages about the explosion of the cruiser Voroshilov by a mine and about the order to the leader of the "Kharkov" to return. The last radio message, transmitted from the "Soobrazitelny" on behalf of the squadron commander, gave reason to assume that the cruiser had died, and L. A. Vladimirsky switched to a destroyer. Taking into account the created situation on the "Merciless", both trawling units along with the paravans were chopped off, and the destroyers went to join the flagship. December 2 "Merciless" and "Boyky" moored in Tuapse.
We specifically examined in such detail the operation of the ships of the squadron off the Romanian coast. First of all, because it became the second of its kind since the beginning of the war. The first, as we remember, was held on June 26, 1941, that is, almost a year and a half ago. What has changed since then?
The raid operation on June 26, 1941 was aimed at shelling the port of Constanta. The purpose of the last operation was enemy communications along the Romanian coast, convoys at sea, the ports of Sulina, Bugaz and Mangalia. Additionally, we set the task of shelling the Snake Island. In general, this small island has long been an attractive force for Soviet ships and aircraft. At the beginning of the war, it was planned to seize Serpents by landing an amphibious assault. The General Staff's agreement in principle was obtained, and on July 3, 1941, the Black Sea Fleet aviation began systematic bombing of objects on the island. However, even before that, Serpentine was regularly assigned as a backup target when striking the cities of Romania. There was nothing on the island except a lighthouse and a radio station, and the plan to capture it on July 6 was abandoned. However, aviation methodically continued to bomb the Serpentine until July 10, thus unloading several tons of bombs on it. There is no information about the destruction of the lighthouse.
Around the same time, Soviet submarines began to appear on the island on a regular basis, since it was easy to find out where they were before taking assigned positions. Naturally, the Romanians eventually discovered this - just the S-44 minefield placed on October 29, 1942, and was their reaction to the frequent visits to this area by Soviet boats. By the way, the submarine Shch-212, which went out to sea on December 2, 1942, died on the same minefield. Moreover, she died after December 11 - apparently, when, when changing position, she decided to clarify her place on the Serpentine.
It can be assumed that this island was included in the operation plan of the ships of the squadron also because of the desire to once again decide before raids on ports. They went for it even though the appearance of the Serpentine in sight was likely to lead to a loss of secrecy. At the same time, during the transition, the ships carried out astronomical observations and thus knew their place. Under these conditions, already at sea, it was possible to abandon the solution of a secondary task in order to achieve the main goal of the operation. However, the squadron commander did not do this.
It is noticeable that the planning of the December 1942 operation was carried out much better than the June 1941 operation. Of course, the experience of one and a half years of war had an effect. Actually, with the exception of the underestimation of the available data on the mine situation when assigning the combat course of the first detachment south of the Serpentine, there were no more special flaws. This is even taking into account the real situation, which became known to us after the war. That is, the operation was planned reasonably enough. But they spent …
Thus, the second operation of the squadron during the war against the Romanian communications was unsuccessful. And this despite a number of favorable factors. For example, maintaining the secrecy of the actions of the forces, the absence of strike aircraft in that area by the enemy, the availability of relatively reliable and complete information about the mine situation. The reason for the failure of a sufficiently well-planned operation is the weak operational-tactical and special training of the officers.
However, the People's Commissar of the Navy assessed this campaign as a whole as a positive manifestation of activity and ordered to organize and carry out such actions every time with his personal permission and upon presentation of the developed plan. It should not be forgotten that the result of the operation at that time was considered three supposedly sunk vehicles. By the way, using this operation as an example, you can demonstrate how simply we were misled.
Here is a quote from N. G. Kuznetsov "Heading towards victory":
“We've learned the lesson of the raid on Constanta. In November 1942, the Voroshilov cruiser was sent to shell the enemy ship base in Sulin. He completed the task successfully and without loss, although the enemy resisted more strongly than during the raid on Constanta."
How many people have read Kuznetsov's memoirs? Probably several tens of thousands. About the same number believe that Voroshilov defeated, despite the desperate resistance of the enemy, Sulin's naval base and returned home unharmed with a victory. This shows once again that studying history from memoirs is just as dangerous as it is from fiction.
The assessment of the People's Commissar, a qualitative analysis of the operation carried out, the opening of all the main mistakes gave the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet confidence in the need to repeat the operation. However, the situation has changed somewhat. First, the enemy strengthened aerial reconnaissance of approaches to the western coast of the Black Sea. Secondly, one of the conclusions of the operation was that the paramedic guards did not guarantee the safety of cruisers and destroyers in the event that they forced the minefields. In subsequent operations, it was proposed to escort attack ships behind trawls in mine-hazardous areas.
Despite the difficulty of conducting raiding operations in providing minesweepers, it might have been done, especially since there were suitable minesweepers. But there were almost no combat-ready ships in the squadron, since both modern cruisers, as well as most of the destroyers, were under repair. Therefore, they decided to carry out the raid operation not to provide for the minesweepers, but by themselves. For this, two strike groups were formed, consisting of: the first T-407 (braid pennant of the commander of the 1st division, captain of the 3rd rank A. M. Ratner) and the T-412; the second T-406 (braid pennant of the commander of the 2nd division, captain of the 3rd rank V. A. Yanchurin) and the T-408. However, the squadron did participate - the flagship of the operation, the destroyer "Soobrazitelny", was allocated from it, on board of which was Rear Admiral V. G. Fadeev, who led all the forces at sea.
The task of the detachment was to search for and destroy convoys in the area of Constanta - Sulina - Bugaz. In addition, "for the purpose of moral influence on the enemy and to disorganize his communications," they decided to shell the Olinka lighthouse and the village of Shagani, which had no military significance.
According to the available reconnaissance data, the passage of enemy convoys off the western shores of the Black Sea was provided by destroyers of the "Naluca" type, patrol boats and aircraft. The Romanian destroyers were clearly inferior to the minesweepers of projects 53 and 58 in artillery armament. Therefore, the ships were divided into two groups of two units. This made it possible to start searching for convoys simultaneously on two sections of communications that are distant from each other: on the approaches to Portitsky arm and in the area of the Burnas sign. That is, where submarines repeatedly detected and attacked enemy convoys and where at the same time freedom of maneuvering of minesweepers was ensured, since in both of these areas the mine situation was considered favorable.
In case of a sudden meeting of minesweepers with a stronger enemy ship (for example, a destroyer), it was supposed to use the "Smart" as a support ship. However, the possibility of timely provision of such support was initially considered dubious - the combat areas of the strike groups were too far apart from each other. But they also did not want to abandon the division of forces, since the fuel supply on the minesweepers allowed only the shortest search (no more than four hours), and the separation of areas made it possible to increase the probability of detecting the enemy. The operation plan provided for the use of aviation, primarily for reconnaissance purposes. However, her participation was expected to be purely symbolic.
Going out to sea was originally scheduled for December 8, but unfavorable weather forecasts forced the start of the operation to be postponed until the evening of December 11. The strike groups left Poti at one hour intervals - at 17:00 and 18:00. The destroyer "Savvy" left Poti at midnight on 12 December. During the passage, both groups and the destroyer determined their place by the Turkish lighthouses Inebolu and Kerempe, which allowed the minesweepers to approach the area of Serpents Island on the morning of December 13 with residuals of no more than 4.5 miles [70]. At the same time, the first group did not approach the island at a distance of less than 14 miles, and the second group approached it at a distance of 9.5 miles. Visibility was excellent both in the morning and during the day, reaching 12-15 miles and sometimes 20-22 miles.
Now let's see the alignment of forces of the enemy. On December 13, on the day of our minesweepers' raid, the destroyers Marasti and R. Ferdinand”, in Sulina - the destroyer“Smeul”, in Constanta - the minelayers“Dacla”and“Murgescu”, and in the river port of Vilkovo - monitors of the river division. Other Romanian ships were in Constanta, under repair, and could not be used that day for military operations at sea.
The first group of ships, after determining the location on the Serpentine Island at 9:10, lay down on a course of 341 ° - with the expectation of approaching the coastal strip east of the Burnas sign. Along the way, the minesweepers crossed the middle of a wide 25-mile pass between minefields S-42 and S-32. At 10:49 on the left, behind the traverse, we noticed the smoke of the ship, and after 5 minutes the masts of a large transport appeared. Then a second transport was found, but the escort ships had not yet been observed. At 11:09 the minesweepers turned to the left on a course of 230 ° and began to noticeably approach the enemy convoy. At 11:34 am, they found a destroyer of the "Naluca" type, from which an identification signal was made, and after it two transports with a displacement of 7-9 thousand tons and six large boats were clearly distinguished.
The meeting took place with the Romanian transport "Oituz" (2686 brt) and the Bulgarian "Tzar Ferdinand" (1994 brt). At 8:15 they left Sulin for Odessa, having the destroyer Sborul and four German boat minesweepers under guard. At 11:37 a.m., when the convoy was about 14 miles south of the Burnas sign to the left along the bow, at a distance of about 65 kb they found "two destroyers."
The escort ships were clearly inferior to the Soviet minesweepers in combat capabilities, but the group commander did not think so and acted indecisively, losing his advantage, provided by the surprise of the attack. First of all, A. M. Ratner sent a radiogram to "Soobrazitelny" with a request to provide support for the destruction of the discovered convoy - which is probably correct, since the minesweepers would have drowned the transport for a very long time with their two 100-mm guns.
At 11:45, the T-407 opened fire on the head transport, and a minute later the T-412 - on the destroyer. The convoy commander immediately ordered the transports to withdraw to the Ochakovsky arm, and the destroyer and boat minesweepers set up a smoke screen. In the future, the boats, keeping close to the transports, covered them with smoke screens, and "Sborul" at first continued to approach the "destroyers", but soon lay down on a return course and at the same time hit the fork at 11:45. The fire opened by the destroyer from the 66-mm gun was invalid, as the shells fell shortly. Soviet ships fired no better, starting the battle from a distance of 65 kb. It should be remembered that there are no fire control devices on the minesweepers; all the gunners had at their disposal were gun sights and a rangefinder. The result of the shooting was zero. In addition, the German boat minesweepers simulated a torpedo attack several times and made sure that the Soviet ships were turned away.
Under the cover of a smoke screen, the transport began to return to the opposite course. Gradually, the distance of the battle was reduced. All this time, the Romanian destroyer bravely diverted the fire to himself, and the boats set up smoke screens. The relatively high-speed transport "Tzar Ferdinand" began to move forward and withdrew in the direction of Zhebriyan, so that in the future only "Oituz" was under fire. At 12.42, the minesweepers noticeably approached him, so the destroyer "Sborul" soon turned to the right, to approach the "destroyers", thereby diverting their fire. He also opened fire, but the accuracy of shooting from both sides remained ineffective, and no hits were achieved, despite the fact that the fighting distance was reduced to 38 kb. Nevertheless, at 13:26, the fall of shells around the destroyer became dangerous, which forced it to retreat with an anti-artillery zigzag. The wind direction, first south-south-east, after 13:00 changed to south-west. Therefore, the Romanian destroyer disappeared behind a smoke screen, and our minesweepers from 13:35 lost contact with it.
From our ships at 11:53 and 12:45 we observed up to 28 hits of 100-mm shells in one of the transports. At the end of the battle, a fire broke out on it, but the destroyer again allegedly did not allow to come closer to him and finish off. By that time, that is, by 13:36, the minesweepers had already used up 70% of their ammunition, so the battalion commander decided to end the battle and ordered to break away from the enemy.
Ha "Sborul" did not see that our ships left the transport alone and started shelling the village of Shagani; therefore, the convoy commander who was on the torpedo boat, taking advantage of the respite, at 13:45 requested radio assistance from a detachment of river monitors. At 14 o'clock, when our minesweepers had already laid down on the course of withdrawal, "Sborul" again turned to approach them in order to divert their fire to itself and thereby enable the convoy to slip south to the port of Sulina. However, by that time, the Soviet ships were no longer paying attention to the enemy, and at 18:05 the convoy in full force, with all security and without any losses, returned to Sulina.
Perhaps the situation could radically change with the arrival in the area of "Soobrazitelny". When at 11:59 a.m. a radiogram was received on it with a request for support, the destroyer was 25 miles south of Serpents Island. Judging by the received radiogram, the enemy convoy, found near the Ochakovskiy arm, was apparently going in the direction of Odessa. Only at 12:20 pm the brigade commander understood the situation, after which the "Smart" increased its speed to 20 knots and lay down on a course of 30 °. But even this excess of the established speed with the set guardian could not help the matter, since about 70 miles remained to the place of the supposed meeting with the first group of minesweepers. Moreover, the destroyer was going in the wrong direction: A. M. Ratner did not inform the brigade commander that the convoy was on the opposite course at the beginning of the battle, and therefore the "Smart" was heading to the anticipated meeting point with the convoy on its way to Odessa.
After the end of the battle, allegedly due to the almost complete use of ammunition, the first strike group did not leave the area, but went to shell the village of Shahany, using up another 26 100-mm shells. The real reason for the end of the fight is that the squad simply could not handle the convoy. Indeed, who interfered with finishing off the transport, which allegedly had already been hit by 28 (!) Shells? But the destroyer, which was armed with a 66-mm cannon of the early 20th century and also allegedly received several hits from 100-mm shells, did not allow him to get close to him. Any transport (maybe, except for a timber carrier), having received more than two dozen 100-mm shells, would be a wreck, and from being hit by two or three 100-mm shells, the destroyer would most likely have sunk.
The second group of minesweepers, after determining the location on the Serpentine Island at 9:16, lay down on a course of 217 °, and on this course an hour later it was first discovered by an enemy reconnaissance aircraft. At 11 o'clock, the minesweepers laid down on a course of 244 °, and then, with good visibility, made a five-hour unsuccessful search on the approaches to Portitsky arm. During this time, planes approached the minesweepers several times, on which anti-aircraft fire was opened in three cases. Two planes transmitted radio messages in plain text in Romanian (and partly in Russian), with the names "Maria" and "Maresti" (the names of the Romanian destroyers) being mentioned.
During the maneuvering, carried out at a speed of 16 knots, the minesweepers, judging by the reporting tracing paper, crossed the S-21 obstacle twice and once the S-22 minefield, but there the mines stood there with a deepening of 10 m, and therefore were completely safe for surface ships. However, it is possible that the minesweepers were generally away from these obstacles: the fact is that from 9:16 this group was maneuvering by dead reckoning. Occasionally a coast appeared on the horizon, but it is possible that what was considered the coast of the Portitsky arm was in fact a haze that from afar was taken as the coastline. According to a number of indications, taking into account the Romanian data, it can be assumed that the second group of minesweepers was not maneuvering as close to the coast as V. A. Yanchurin.
Having fired on the Olinka lighthouse area, the minesweepers at 16:16 laid down on the withdrawal course. Three times from 16:40 to 17:40 on December 13, and also on the morning of December 14, enemy reconnaissance aircraft appeared over the ships. At 4:40 on December 15, the second group of minesweepers returned to Poti.
As we can see, the operation was unsuccessful - although at that time it was believed that the minesweepers at least seriously damaged the transport and the destroyer. If we take planning, then we can state that the allocation of one destroyer as a support ship for two groups of minesweepers turned out to be insufficient: in reality, it could not provide assistance not only to two groups at the same time, but even to the first one. This was so obvious that at 14:24, having not yet received a radio report from the commander of the first group about the accomplishment of the mission, the brigade commander ordered the commander of the "Smart" to retreat to the southeast, that is, to the Caucasian coast. Reports on the completion of the mission were received from the first group of minesweepers at 14:40, and from the second group at 16:34. At that time, the destroyer was sailing at a speed of 28 knots towards Poti, where she arrived safely on the afternoon of December 14.
The choice of minesweepers as strike ships cannot be called successful. The available forces made it possible to send several destroyers to the Romanian shores, but they feared a repetition of the incident with the detonation of mines in the guards of the cruiser. If something like that happened to a destroyer, the consequences would most likely be much worse. It was possible to send a destroyer with a minesweeper - but not to go first for the entire raid operation for the trawl. Today we know that the minesweepers during the operation on December 11-14, 1942, safely avoided encounters with minefields, but at that time no one could guarantee this.
But even with such a composition of strike groups of minesweepers, the operation could be effective: the convoy was found. And then there was a variation on the theme of the previous operation: the group commander was not able to conduct a sea battle, and the artillerymen showed low skill. Fleet aviation covered ships on the transition in the eastern part of the Black Sea.
Encouraged by the fact that as a result of the two previous raids on Romanian communications, as it was believed then, the enemy suffered significant damage, and also wishing to be involved in the successes of the Red Army on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet decides to strike one more blow. For these purposes, all the same minesweepers T-406 (braid pennant of the commander of the 2nd division captain of the 3rd rank B, A. Yanchurin), T-407, T-412 and T-408 are allocated, but they supported them this time two destroyers - "Soobrazitelny" (flag of the commander of the trawling and obstacle brigade Rear Admiral V. G. Fadeev) and "Merciless".
It seems that the experience of the previous operation was taken into account, when "Smart" was physically unable to make it to the place of battle of one of the two shock groups. But in this case it did not matter, since now the minesweepers had to act together, one reconnaissance and strike group. The number of support ships was increased due to the location, according to intelligence, of two Romanian destroyers in Constanta and two gunboats in Sulina.
Let's remember another drawback of the previous raid - the lack of aerial reconnaissance. True, the first group of minesweepers managed then to detect the enemy convoy without the help of aviation; more precisely, the convoy went straight to meet the minesweepers at the moment when they were just about to start searching. However, everyone understood that it was impossible to rely on luck, and this time the fleet aviation was ordered to carry out aerial reconnaissance in the Sulina-Bugaz communications section, as well as the ports of Constanta, Sulina, Bugaz and Odessa, and, finally, three days before the ships went out to sea. Crimean airfields of the enemy. In the future, the aviation of the fleet was supposed to conduct tactical reconnaissance to guide ships to convoys and deliver strikes together with them, as well as cover ships during the transition.
For a number of days, unfavorable weather conditions prevented the fleet aviation from starting preliminary reconnaissance. According to the forecast, the weather could only get worse in the future. That is, it became obvious that there would be no air reconnaissance, no joint attacks on the convoy, no fighter cover. Apparently, in such a curtailed form, the operation could be successful only by chance, and taking into account the well-known truth that with equal damage the probability of losing ships off the enemy's coast is always higher than that of our own, it is also unjustifiably risky. However, they decided to carry out the operation.
The simplest way would be to explain this to the Russian "maybe": there is no intelligence - well, maybe they themselves will stumble upon something; there are no bombers - well, if the ships find the convoy, then, probably, they themselves will cope; There are no fighters - well, if ours are sitting on airfields, then why will the enemy fly. But this is not serious reasoning. There are no documents explaining why, given the worsening weather forecast, they decided to carry out the operation, no. But there are assumptions. Apparently, initially they did not really count on their aviation: since the beginning of the war, there was no example of at least one really successful joint operation of surface ships and the Air Force. Those isolated cases when spotter planes got in touch with a firing ship and gave some information about the fall of their shells, the naval gunners were pessimistic.
Indeed, the whole process of correction, as well as the observation of the results of firing from an airplane, was of an exclusively subjective nature and was not confirmed by any means of objective control. Moreover, the gunners sometimes neglected the corrections issued by the pilots and continued firing at the same sight and rear sight settings - which the pilots, of course, did not know about, but reports began to arrive from the plane that the shells were hitting the target. And how many times has it happened that aviation, for whatever reason, refused to complete missions at the last moment? Thus, it turns out that the deliberately known non-participation of the Fleet Air Force in the operation was not critical, since in practice nothing was expected from it. Unfortunately, the subsequent events of 1943-1944. will largely confirm this conclusion.
However, back to the raid operation. Four designated minesweepers left Poti at 4:00 on December 26, with a slight delay against the target date, and the destroyers left this base at 19:00. At 10:52 on December 26, when the reconnaissance and strike group was 100 miles west of Poti, a reconnaissance aircraft appeared, which subsequently for 3 hours 20 minutes continuously monitored the movement of the group. During this time, depth charges were dropped from the minesweepers in the area of detection of one or two periscopes, but they did not do the main thing - they did not lay down on a false course, as envisaged by the plan. At 14:20 the enemy plane disappeared. Believing that he would call bombers to attack the minesweepers on the already reconnoitered course, the battalion commander at 14:35 sent a radiogram to the Fleet Air Force with a request to send aircraft to cover the minesweepers - but, of course, no one arrived. At 14:45 V. A. Yanchurin reported on the radio to the brigade commander to the "Smart" about the attack of a submarine and about the detection of minesweepers by an enemy aircraft.
It should be noted here that during the entire military campaign, discipline was not observed on the air. In total, V. A. Yanchurin sent twenty-seven radio messages, of which twenty-six were transmitted and received clearly and without delay, but one did not reach the addressee at all. What do you think? The very first one about the reconnaissance plane. She was handed over to the brigade commander at 14:45, received at the fleet's communications center, but did not rehearse for the flagship destroyer. And on "Smart", despite keeping a radio watch for communication with a group of minesweepers, the said radiogram was not accepted. V. A. Yanchurin was informed that no receipt had been received for the radio message sent at 14:45, but he did not give the order to transmit it a second time. Thus, V. G. Fadeev remained unaware that secrecy had already been lost and that the continuation of the operation was most likely pointless: the enemy would, at least temporarily, hide all his convoys in ports.
The minesweepers took a full supply of fuel, which made it possible to make a rather lengthy search. According to the plan, at 17:15 on December 27, they were supposed to determine their place along the same Snake Island and then, from 18:00 on December 27 to 14:00 on December 28, a search on enemy communications in the Sulina-Bugaz region. But due to the delay in going out to sea, and then due to the almost two-hour loss of time caused by the malfunction of the machines on the T-407, the shock-search group, having received observation in the Kerempe lighthouse on the morning of December 27, approached the area of Zmeinyi Island with a great delay., in the dark and in poor visibility.
To approach the coast, they chose the route tested on December 13, along which the first group of minesweepers departed into the sea after the battle in Zhebriyanskaya Bay. But in reality, the minesweepers had a residual of more than 10 miles and were much closer to the coast. This is partly due to the navigational armament of the ships, which was no different from that of the Russo-Japanese War. The visibility in the area did not exceed 1 kb, so at 0:00 on December 28, considering himself 20 miles southeast of the Burnas sign, the battalion commander decided to reduce the speed to 8 knots and maneuver at a sufficient distance from the minefields set in the coastal strip by our ships in 1941
V. A. Yanchurin hoped that with dawn the visibility would improve; this would make it possible to approach the shore to clarify the location and then proceed to the search. But in fact, the search began earlier than expected. At 4 o'clock, when the minesweepers, heading 232 °, were in dead reckoning 14 miles from the coast, on the right, abeam at a distance of 15–20 kb, they unexpectedly discovered a strip of high coast. It became clear that the minesweepers are somewhere between the sign of Burnas and the village of Budaki, that is, in the area of their minefield No. 1/54, but where exactly is unknown. Therefore, we decided to move 10-11 miles out to sea to wait for improved visibility.
If up to that moment there was still hope for an accidental meeting with the enemy's convoy, then it soon vanished: at 5:45 V. G. Fadeev ordered V. A. Yanchurin to show his place. There was no doubt that the enemy, having received a report from a reconnaissance aircraft on the westward movement of four of our ships in the afternoon of December 26, not only suspended the movement of convoys, but also increased surveillance at communications posts, in particular at radio direction-finding stations. Thus, radiotelegraphic communications, carried out on the morning of December 28 in enemy-controlled waters, not only confirmed the location of the Soviet ships, but also indicated their location with sufficient accuracy. However, the brigade commander, not having communication with the minesweepers for two days, could not stand it and broke the radio silence.
At 7 o'clock, the battalion commander ordered the minesweepers to stop the machines to check the dead reckoning by measuring the depths of the place. Soon after, they entered a zone of dense fog. At 8:45 V. A. Yanchurin, without any reason, in turn violated the rules of secrecy, sending a radiogram to the "Smart" with a report that the voyage was taking place in the fog by reckoning, and therefore he intends to approach the shore by calculation, fire artillery and then begin to withdraw, about which and asks for directions. This radiogram was answered: "Good."
The minesweepers, again risking to hit one of our defensive minefields, went to the coast, which later opened and then hid in the fog, and at about 10 o'clock, when the visibility improved for a short time, they fired from a distance of 36 kb at the cannery and buildings in the area of the Burnas sign, having a point of aiming the chimney of the plant. As a result of shelling, fires traditionally broke out on the shore, and several buildings were destroyed. A total of 113 100-mm rounds were used up. Given the accuracy of the ships' navigation, it is difficult to say exactly which pipe they fired through. And to wonder what objects were destroyed on the shore is generally useless. In the documents of the Control Commission in Romania, the shelling of Burnas was not found - either the Romanians did not notice it, or only civilians were injured.
Having stopped the shelling, the minesweepers at 10:20 lay on the course of withdrawal. The re-routing carried out then showed that the path of the minesweepers at night and in the morning of December 28, by chance, was successfully positioned in the passages between their minefields. So, the search for the enemy's communications was stopped much earlier than planned. However, even earlier, on the afternoon of December 26, it became clear that this search would hardly bring success.
By the way, we had the only case since the beginning of the war that allowed minesweepers to carry out mine reconnaissance directly in the combat zone of their submarines. They could well go on the withdrawal path within the shallow waters with snake trawls delivered, since our submarines serving positions No. 42 and 43 used approximately the same route. the hands of the trawling forces! But the initiative of most of the officers had already been stifled by the existing realities of that life. The entire return passage passed without any incident, and on the morning of December 30 the ships returned to Poti.
The last raid on communications in the western part of the Black Sea was successful, if only in the sense that everyone returned safely to the base. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of the operation were not considered the mistakes of the commanders of the brigade and the division, but above all the winter weather conditions, and therefore for some time they decided not to carry out operations near the Romanian coast. Moreover, a lot of tasks arose for attack surface ships in the area of the Taman Peninsula.
Continuation, all parts:
Part 1. Raid operation to shell Constanta
Part 2. Raiding operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942
Part 3. Raids on communications in the western part of the Black Sea
Part 4. The last raiding operation
