Raiding operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942
The first to fire on Feodosia on July 31 were two minesweepers T-407 and T-411. The fact that for such purposes in general they used highly-scarce minesweepers of special construction, we will leave without comment. But we note that these ships are not adapted for firing at invisible coastal targets, they could only fire at a visible target or in an area. The port of Feodosia, of course, has a certain area, but it is possible to hit any ship in it with 100-mm shells only by accident. The radius of their sphere of destruction by an explosion is 5–7 m, fragmentation damage - 20–30 m. And the port water area is about 500 × 600 m. This does not take into account the adjacent territory. If you wish, you can calculate how many shells you need to fire to get into a landing barge measuring 47 × 6.5 m. But it seems that such a task was not set. In general, little is known about this raid - there are no reports, it does not even appear in the summary table of the report of the Black Sea Fleet for the Great Patriotic War. The "Chronicle …" says that two minesweepers and two patrol boats from a distance of 52-56 kb fired at the port of Feodosia 100-mm shells - 150, 45-mm - 291 and 37-mm - 80 shells. As a result, a fire broke out in the port. But the fact is that the maximum firing range of the 45-mm 21-K gun is only 51 kb, and the 37-mm assault rifle is even less. Although a fire could have occurred from one successful hit of a 100-mm projectile. Apparently, the purpose of the minesweepers' raid to Feodosia should be considered reconnaissance in force, that is, their task was to provoke a coastal defense system. It is difficult to say how accurately they were able to identify fire weapons in the Feodosia region, but the ships came under fire.
The next night, the only relatively large torpedo boats SM-3 and D-3 in the fleet made a raid on Dvuyakornaya Bay. They found landing barges in the bay, fired three torpedoes and ten rockets at them. Five more NURS fired a volley at the coastal battery at Cape Kiik-Atlama. As a result of being hit by a torpedo at the landing barge F-334 tore off the stern part, which sank.
Lack of patrol, weak artillery fire from the shore led the fleet commander to the conclusion that the enemy was not capable of seriously countering the attack by large ships. Despite the objections of the squadron commander, the Military Council ordered the commander of the cruiser brigade, Rear Admiral N. E. Bassisty on the night of August 3 to fire at the port of Feodosia and the moorings of Dvuyakornaya Bay in order to destroy the floating equipment concentrated in them. To ensure reliable observation of ships in the Feodosia region, the submarine M-62 was sent there. The preliminary attack on the port was to be carried out by the bomber aviation of the fleet.
At 17:38 on August 2, the cruiser Molotov (the flag of the brigade commander of Rear Admiral N. Ye. Basistoy) and the leader of the Kharkov left Tuapse for Feodosia. Soon after leaving the sea, the ships heading to the west were discovered by enemy aerial reconnaissance. 28 minutes after being discovered by an air reconnaissance officer, the detachment at 18:05 lay on a false course to Novorossiysk. But already at 18:22, when the reconnaissance plane disappeared, the ships again turned to Feodosia.
At 18:50, a reconnaissance aircraft reappeared, and until 21:00 from a distance of 15–20 km, it continuously monitored the movement of the detachment. The ships again lay down on a false course, showing movement to Novorossiysk, but only at 19:20, that is, half an hour after the re-discovery. From 19:30 the ships were heading 320 °, leaving Novorossiysk on the right abeam. Naturally, such a "rough" false maneuvering of the Germans was not misled. Based on the data of the Ju-88D reconnaissance aircraft, they began to prepare for the departure the last torpedo-carrying unit remaining in the Black Sea - squadron 6./KG 26, which by that time had ten serviceable He-111s. Before the approach of the detachment to Feodosia, the city was twice hit by our bombers. In total, five Il-4s, seven SBs and sixteen MBR-2s worked on it.
At 00:20 on August 3, the ships, approaching the border of the submarine's fire visibility sector, had no confidence in their place, and with its detection this uncertainty increased even more, since the fire was not at all in the expected bearing. Continuing to clarify the location, the brigade commander gave the order to the leader to fire at Dvuyakornaya Bay. At 00:59 "Kharkov" opened fire on the berths and conducted it for 5 minutes, using up 59 130-mm shells. In the meantime, enemy coastal batteries opened fire on the cruiser, which until one o'clock in the morning continued to specify its place to open fire on Feodosia. At the same time, ships, illuminated by missiles from an aircraft, attacked the Italian torpedo boats MAS-568 and MAS-573.
Having met opposition and making sure that, firstly, the cruiser knows his place with an accuracy of 3-5 kb, and secondly, he will not be allowed to lie on a constant course for ten minutes anyway, the brigade commander refused to shell Feodosia and at 01: 12 gave the signal to retreat south at a speed of 28 knots. Apparently, the decision was perfectly correct. The accuracy with which the cruiser knew its place is indirectly indicated by the fact that the report never indicates the distance to the coast, and only once was it noted in the combat log: “0:58. The enemy opened artillery fire on the cruiser. Orient. P = 280 gr., D = 120 cab. ". Under these conditions, the ship could only fire on the shore "according to navigational data." And for this, in addition to knowing your place with an accuracy of several tens of meters, you need to lie on a constant course during the shooting, otherwise, not only in the port, but in the city you can not get. In other words, shooting in such conditions was nothing more than the unloading of artillery cellars through the barrels. The only one who would be affected by such a shelling is the civilian population.
It was a lunar night, the visibility along the lunar track was 30–40 kb. Literally a few minutes after the start of the withdrawal, at 1:20, the first attack by torpedo bombers began. At the same time, Italian torpedo boats were attacking. At 1:27, the Molotov, unexpectedly for those in the conning tower, lost control, a strong vibration began, the ship's speed began to drop, a cloud of steam escaped from the bow tube with a deafening roar - the safety valve of the bow echelon of the main power plant was activated. First of all, they tried to switch to emergency steering from the tiller compartment, but it did not respond to all requests. The sent messenger stunned everyone by the fact that … there was no stern of 262 frames along with the tiller compartment. Due to the firing of their own anti-aircraft artillery in the conning tower, no one heard or felt the hit of an aviation torpedo in the stern from the starboard side.
Driving by machines, the Molotov continued to move towards the Caucasian coast in a 14-knot speed. At 02:30, 03:30 and 07:20 the torpedo bombers repeated their attacks, but to no avail, and they lost two vehicles. Our fighters appeared over the ships at 05:10. At 05:40, ten fighters were already in the area of the ships, however, when a Ju-88 passes over the cruiser nine minutes later, they all appear somewhere on the horizon. During the last raid of torpedo bombers, Molotov again had to rely only on his own forces. Finally, the wounded cruiser at 21:42 on 3 August anchored in Poti.
In general, all the fears of the squadron commander were justified: the secrecy of the operation could not be maintained, there were no targets worthy of the cruiser in Feodosia, the lack of reliable hydrographic support made it impossible even to shell the port territory in order to disable the mooring front, fighter cover, as it happened before, turned out to be formal: when it was needed, fighters were absent or they were completely insufficient. Instead of a short artillery strike, the cruiser "pushed" near Feodosia for 50 minutes. "Molotov" three times dodged the discovered boats and three times tried to lie on a combat course to shell the coast. Apparently, this is the case when such persistence could hardly be justified.
As a result, Molotov suffered severe damage even by the standards of peacetime ship repair capabilities. In the conditions of the Black Sea in the summer of 1942, the cruiser could have remained incapacitated until the end of hostilities - the Black Sea people were just lucky that they had such a high-quality personnel of ship repairmen. But all the same, "Molotov" re-entered service only on July 31, 1943 and did not participate in hostilities any more.
After an unsuccessful march to Feodosia, the command of the fleet, occupied with the defense of bases and the provision of sea transport, until the second half of September 1942, stopped using surface ships, including torpedo boats, on enemy sea routes.
Only in the midst of battles in the Novorossiysk and Tuapse axes, active operations of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet resumed on enemy communications. True, not without a corresponding push from above. On September 24, a directive was issued by the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front, and on September 26 - by the People's Commissar of the Navy. In these documents, the task of actions on enemy sea communications was defined for the fleet as one of the main ones, for which it was prescribed to purposefully aim the activity of not only submarines, but also aviation, as well as surface ships. The directive of the People's Commissar of the Navy demanded an increase in the activity of the surface fleet by deploying hostilities on enemy communications off the western coast of the Black Sea, and especially on the routes of communication with the Crimea and the North Caucasus.
At the same time, it was planned to increase the influence of surface forces on the enemy's basing points in the Crimea (Yalta, Feodosia), without refusing to take action during daylight hours, in accordance, however, with the situation. It was required to approach all ship exits thoughtfully, providing their actions with full-fledged reconnaissance data and reliable air cover. The directive also demanded an increase in the activity of submarines, a wider use of mine weapons from surface ships and aircraft, and a more decisive use of torpedo aircraft.
The first to enter the raiding operation was the patrol ship "Storm", accompanied by the patrol boats SKA-031 and SKA-035. The target of the raid is Anapa. According to the operation plan, the port was supposed to be illuminated with illuminating bombs (SAB) by aviation, but it did not arrive due to weather conditions. The ships also got it: the wind was 6 points, the sea - 4 points, the list of the patrol boat reached 8 ° and it buried its nose into the wave. Range guidance was carried out along a barely distinguishable coastline, in the direction towards the port. At 00:14 "Storm" opened fire and in seven minutes fired 41 shells somewhere, while having 17 passes due to three cases of cartridge case swelling. The enemy woke up and began to illuminate the water area with searchlights, and then the coastal battery opened fire. However, the Germans did not see the Soviet ships, and therefore also fired at random. The fact is that the patrolman used flameless rounds, and therefore did not reveal its location. It seemed that a weak fire was observed from the ship on the shore, but the shooting was immediately assessed as completely ineffective. In order not to spoil the statistics, this raid, like the actions of two minesweepers in Feodosia on July 31, was not included in the reports of the Black Sea Fleet.
On October 3, the destroyers "Boyky" and "Soobrazitelny" came out to shell Yalta. The task of the exit is the destruction of ships and port facilities. According to intelligence, Italian midget submarines and torpedo boats were based on Yalta. No target illumination was supposed. The shooting was carried out as a joint in the area, without adjustment. In fact, it was about the simultaneous shooting according to the approved single initial data. The fire was opened at 23:22 at a speed of 12 knots in a bearing of 280 ° at a distance of 116.5 kb. Within 13 minutes, "Smart" used up 203 shells, and "Boyky" - 97.
In the latter, after the first salvo from a concussion in one of the devices of the stern group, the lock nut came off, as a result of which a short circuit occurred, and then firing was carried out only by the bow group. According to the report, the wind in the region is 2 points, the sea is 1 point, and the visibility is 3 miles. Comparing the range of visibility (3 miles) and firing (11.5 miles), the question arises as to how to perform the shooting. Despite the fact that the report says “using a DAC on an assault rifle using an auxiliary sighting point”, it can be assumed that the shooting was carried out in a classical way “according to navigator's data”, which was fully provided by the Mina fire control system. The accuracy of shooting in this way is predetermined by the accuracy of the ship's knowledge of its place.
The Yalta port is a small water area 250-300 meters wide, fenced off by a breakwater. At a distance of 110 kb, the average range deviation for caliber 130/50 is about 80 m. Without going into mathematical sophistication, we can say that in order to enter the water area of the Yalta port, ships had to know the distance to it with an error of no more than one cable (185 m). It is doubtful that such accuracy took place in those conditions. A fire was traditionally observed on the shore.
Since we will continue to face shelling of ports in the future, we note that after the liberation of the temporarily occupied ports, not only counterintelligence officers worked there, but also representatives of various departments of the fleet. Their task was to find out the effectiveness of various, including raiding, operations. As follows from the few reporting documents, the artillery shelling of the ships did not cause any serious damage. There was occasional damage to ports - but these were usually disputed by pilots; there were casualties among the local population, but no one wanted to take responsibility for them. As for the fires as a result of shelling, they could well have been - the only question is what was burning? Moreover, there are known cases of the creation of false fires by the Germans away from important objects.
On October 13 at 7:00 the destroyer Nezamozhnik and the patrol ship Shkval left Poti. The purpose of the exit was the shelling of the Feodosia port. At about zero o'clock on October 14, the ships identified at Cape Chauda, then at 0:27 - at Cape Ilya. At 01:38 the plane dropped the SAB over Cape Ilya, which made it possible to once again clarify its position. Until 01:54, two more lighting bombs were dropped - and all over the cape, not over the port. There was no communication with the aircraft, and therefore it was impossible to use it to adjust the fire.
At 01:45, the ships lay down on a combat course and opened fire. Both ships had a primitive Geisler launcher, and therefore firing was carried out as if at an observed target. "Nezamozhnik" was pointing along the water's edge in distance, and in the direction - along the right slope of Cape Ilya. Distance 53, 5 kb, four-gun volleys. On the third salvo, we noticed undershoots, as well as sweeps to the left. From the fifth salvo, adjustments were made, flares of ruptures began to be observed in the port area. On the ninth volley, the lock on gun no. 3 jammed, then it did not take part in the shooting. At 01:54 the shooting was stopped, having spent 42 shells.
"Shkval" went with a ledge to the left 1, 5-2 kb. He opened fire simultaneously with the destroyer at a distance of 59 kb, but, having no aiming point, at first he simply fired at the heading angle. Naturally, the first shells flew away who knows where. With the outbreak of a fire on the shore, he transferred the fire to the hearth. He stopped firing at 01:56, using up 59 rounds. Despite the fact that the shooting was carried out by flameless shots, the flame arresters did not work. As we calculated, because of this, the enemy discovered the ships and at 01:56 opened fire on them with two coastal batteries. The shells landed 100-150 meters behind the stern of the patrol boat. At the same time, the ships laid down on the course of withdrawal and entered Tuapse at 19:00. The illuminator reported three fires in the port. According to the plan, the ships were supposed to use up 240 shots, but due to the cessation of the illumination of the aiming point, the shooting was finished earlier.
In fact, the Soviet ships were discovered by the coastal radar eight minutes before they opened fire (at 00:37 German time). The coastal battery (captured 76-mm cannons) fired defensive fire, firing 20 shots at a distance of 11,100-15,000 meters. Our ships made one hit on the territory of the military part of the port, as a result of which there was one lightly wounded.
Then there was a pause in the raiding operations - the daily routine got stuck. However, on November 19, the People's Commissar of the Navy confirmed the need to fulfill the previous directive in terms of organizing combat operations of surface ships off the western shores of the Black Sea. We will dwell on this in detail a little later, but, looking ahead, we note that following the results of the first operation in 1942 off the coast of Romania, it was decided not to send the squadron ships there anymore, but to use them against the Crimean ports. The task remained the same - the destruction of the floating craft.
Despite the fact that intelligence on December 17-18, 1942 could not give out anything specific about Yalta or Feodosia, it was known that the base of Italian midget submarines was functioning in the former, and Feodosia remained an important communications hub and port-shelter for convoys supplying German troops on the Taman Peninsula. For the shelling of Yalta, the most modern and high-speed leader "Kharkov" and the destroyer "Boyky" were allocated, and for Feodosia - the old destroyer "Nezamozhnik" and the patrol ship "Shkval". The operation, which was planned for the night of 19-20 December, provided for the provision of illumination of targets to ships with the help of illuminating bombs and adjustment of fire by aircraft.
The prepared combat order can be considered typical for such military operations, and therefore we will consider it in full.
Combat order number 06 / OP
Squadron headquarters
Raid Poti, LC "Paris Commune"
10:00, 19.12.42
Cards No. 1523, 2229, 2232
Directive of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet No. 00465 / OG set the task: with the aim of destroying watercraft and disrupting enemy communications, destroyers and patrol ships from 01:30 to 02:00 20: 12.42 to fire artillery shelling of Yalta and Feodosia when illuminated by SABs and adjusting the firing of aircraft …
I order:
1 dmm as part of LD "Kharkiv", M "Boyky" leaving Poti at 09:00 19: 12.42 from 01:30 to 02:00 20: 12.42 shell the port of Yalta, and then return to Batumi. Consumption of 120 rounds for each ship. Detachment commander 2nd-Class Captain Melnikov.
2 dmm as part of M "Nezamozhnik", TFR "Shkval", leaving Poti at 08:00 19: 12.42, following to Cape Idokopas near our shores from 01:30 to 02:00 20: 12.42 to shell the port of Feodosia. Ammunition consumption: M "NZ" - 100, TFR "ShK" - 50. After shelling, return to Poti. The squadron commander 2nd-Class Captain Bobrovnikov.
The planes attached to start lighting Yalta and Feodosia at 01:30 20: 12.42, the main task is to adjust the fire, when coastal batteries open fire on Kiik-Atlami, Cape Ilya and Atodor, drop several bombs on them to demoralize them. Cover ships with fighter aircraft in daylight.
Squadron Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vice Admiral Vladimirsky
Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet squadron Captain 1st Rank V. Andreev
Pay attention to how the combat mission is formulated - "to shell the port". Agree that for its implementation it is enough to simply fire the assigned number of shots towards the port. Could the task be formulated more specifically? Of course, if the intelligence indicated that, for example, there is a transport in the port or ships are moored in such and such a part of its water area. Yalta and Feodosia at that time were transit ports for convoys going to Taman and back.
These are not some of today's sophistication - these are the requirements of the main combat documents that existed at that time, such as, for example, the combat regulations of the Navy BUMS-37. And what do we have in this case? The operation was carried out simply on the appointed day, at the readiness of the forces, without any reference to intelligence. If we go back to the combat order itself, then it as a whole did not meet the requirements of article 42 BUMS-37.
The ships put out to sea at nightfall on 19 December. The leader and the destroyer began shelling the port of Yalta at 1:31 am on a bearing of 250 ° from a distance of 112 kb, with a stroke of 9 knots. The MBR-2 spotter plane did not arrive, but the MBR-2 illuminator plane and the Il-4 reserve spotter plane were over Yalta. However, the ships had no communication with the latter (!!!). The shooting was finished at 1:40, while the "Kharkov" fired 154 shots, and the "Boyky" - 168. The destroyer fired using the main PUS scheme, on a conditional area measuring 4 × 4 kb. Despite the fact that flameless charges were used, 10-15% of them gave a flash, and the coastal battery opened fire on the ships; no hits noted. As for the results of the shooting, the planes seem to have observed shell explosions in the port area.
The Germans determined the composition of the group at 3-5 units with 76-105 mm guns, which fired 40 volleys. The 1st battery of the 601st marine coastal artillery battalion fired back. No hits were observed. Nothing was reported about the damage. More worrisome was the raid of 3-4 planes, which dropped something behind the pier - the Germans feared that these were mines.
The destroyer Nezamozhnik opened fire on the port of Feodosia at 01:31 from a distance of 69 kb at a bearing of 286 °. The illuminator plane did not arrive, but the spotter plane was there. However, he did not observe the fall of the first salvo, and he had to repeat it. On the second salvo, they received a proofreading, entered it, transferred the initial data to the Shkval, and the ships went over to defeat together. During the execution of the firing, the aircraft provided proofreading twice. However, the shooting manager doubted their reliability and did not introduce them. Apparently, he turned out to be right, since in the future the plane gave a "target". At 01:48 the shooting was stopped. The destroyer used 124 shots, and the patrol ship 64. As in the case of the first group, some of the flameless charges fired a flash, which, as we believed, allowed the enemy to detect the ships and open fire on them. The results are traditional: the plane saw the fall of shells in the port, fires on the Shirokoye mole.
The Germans detected our ships at 23:27 with the help of the coastal radar at a distance of 10,350 meters and raised the alarm. They believed that they were fired at from 45-105 mm guns, and about 50 volleys were fired in total. The 2nd Battery of the 601st Battalion fired back. A fall of shells was observed in the water area of the harbor, as a result of which tug D (obviously a harbor tug from among the captured) burned down. The rest of the damage is insignificant, there are no losses in personnel. From German batteries at a distance of 15,200 meters, two or three enemy two-pipe destroyer-class ships were observed.
Continuation, all parts:
Part 1. Raid operation to shell Constanta
Part 2. Raiding operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942
Part 3. Raids on communications in the western part of the Black Sea
Part 4. The last raiding operation
