When I published here a story about the destroyer "Crushing", one of the commentators threw in the idea of the events on the Black Sea, which were not inferior in their tragedy.
Indeed, the so-called "raiding operations" of the Black Sea Fleet during the Great Patriotic War are the part of history about which, if they write, they write something that needs to be passed three times through the filter of the mind. And if you try to objectively look at the question … Frankly, the tragedy of "Crushing" - flowers.
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War on the Black Sea is described in many publications and is quite complete. Let me remind you that even on the first day of the war, the People's Commissar of the Navy assigned the Navy the task of conducting a raid operation with surface forces on the main base of the Romanian Navy and the largest port of Romania - Constanta. The essence of such an operation was outlined in NMO-40, there were also direct instructions on how to carry out such actions. I would like to note once again that the operation was prepared in conditions close to peacetime, all forces and means, command and control bodies were fully trained, and the materiel was also prepared in full.
Act 1. Raid operation to shell Constanta
The plan of the raid operation was developed by the headquarters of the fleet on the basis, it must be assumed, of the decision of the commander of the fleet. Here we will clarify that the Operational Plan is not a single document, but a set of documents, sometimes there are several dozen of them, but they all stem from the operational part performed on the map (at that time it was often called an operation scheme). In its most simplified form, the Plan of Operation was interpreted as the main document for managing forces in an operation, which is a graphical representation of the Commander's Decision on a map with a legend. Subsequently, the "legend" began to be called the "explanatory note".
In any case, the Plan is based on the Decision. However, in those days, the military leaders, judging by the documents stored in the Central Naval Archives, did not bother themselves with the adoption of this very Decision. In any case, not a single similar document signed, for example, by the commander of the fleet, has yet been found. It's a pity. The fact is that the Decision contains a personal plan for the operation. Such documents, executed on the map, often with the military leader's own hand, like no others characterize him as a naval commander, make it possible to assess the level of his knowledge of naval art, command of the situation, flexibility and, if you like, the cunning of his operational-tactical thinking. This is the rare case when the commander does not approve the document, but puts his signature under it, thereby fully confirming his personal authorship - and, therefore, takes full responsibility for the result. Then you can't say that the subordinate is stupid and that you can't attach your own head to everyone …
So, the decision of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet to fulfill the task assigned to him by the People's Commissar was not found. True, there is a tracing paper taken from the "Solution Scheme" and signed by the chief of staff of the fleet, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev and the head of the operational department of the headquarters, captain of the 2nd rank O. S. Zhukovsky. But it lacks the commander's signature, and most importantly, only the "naval part" of the operation is displayed, that is, the action plan of surface ships.
In accordance with the established procedure, the Plan of the upcoming operation was sent for approval to the one who set the combat mission, in this case the People's Commissar of the Navy. This document is also absent in the Archives, but it can be assumed that the commander's plan for the upcoming operation was reported in an oral textual form via the HF communication line. For efficiency, this method of reporting is quite acceptable, and was used repeatedly during the war, including by the army. In this regard, as well as for a number of indirect indications, there is reason to believe that there was no Operation Plan as such.
Apparently, on the basis of the commander's plan and the decision scheme for the naval unit at 15:00 on June 25, the commander of the Light Forces Detachment (OLS), Rear Admiral T. A. Novikov was given a battle order:
“A detachment of light forces consisting of: KR Voroshilov, two leaders, EM EM type C, under the command of Rear Admiral Comrade Novikov at 05:00 on 26.06.41 to attack the enemy base of Constanta with artillery fire.
The main object is oil tanks.
As part of the strike group to have the "Kharkov" ship, two destroyers of the type S. KR "Voroshilov" and the "Moscow" ship to have in support. In the event of a strike group meeting with enemy destroyers, aim Voroshilov at the CD and, with the support of it, destroy it with a decisive attack.
Simultaneously with the attack of the base by ships, our aircraft strike at Constanta (4:00, 4:30, 5:00).
Keep in mind the possibility of the presence of the enemy's DOZK and minefields."
Together with the order, the commander of the OLS received tracing paper from the "solution scheme" (in the documents it is called the "transition scheme"), a table of conditional signals, and an artillery fire plan. As we can see, the fleet commander assigned the execution of the naval part of the operation to the OLS commander. But at the same time, the commander was removed from her planning. Having received a combat order, the OLS commander must make his decision on its implementation, and then, having prepared an Action Plan, implement it. This is an axiom of combat control. In this situation, the commander becomes a hostage of other people's plans, which may be unknown to him to the end, and most importantly, possible other people's mistakes.
In fairness, it must be said that in fact, the squadron commander and the OLS commander knew about the planned operation and even, at least the first, tried to put their proposals into the plan. In particular, the squadron commander, Rear Admiral L. A. Vladimirsky suggested using the Voroshilov cruiser with its 180-mm artillery as a strike ship, especially since it was well prepared for firing along the coast.
The fact is that the Romanian press on July 7, 1940 and February 20, 1941 published official reports on the setting of minefields with an indication of the dangerous area. The fleet headquarters was skeptical about this warning and turned out to be wrong: on June 15-19, 1941, the Romanians placed five minefields on the approaches to Constanta, spending about 1000 mines and more than 1800 mine defenders on them.
However, on the “solution scheme”, instead of the officially declared boundaries of the mine-hazardous area, a contour of a conditional minefield was drawn, according to the outlines, as it turned out after the war, by chance (!!!) almost coincided with the location of the actual minefields set up a week before. It was from the configuration of this obstacle that the squadron commander proceeded, proposing the cruiser as a strike ship. In this case, his firing position could be located more seaward, that is, outside the area of the alleged minefield dangerous from mines.
Perhaps Vladimirsky did not know that the configuration of the mine-hazardous area was taken "from the ceiling" - but the Comflot knew about it. Apparently, the People's Commissar also knew about this, since in his telegram of June 22 regarding the operation, two tasks were set: the destruction of oil tanks, as well as reconnaissance during the day of the defense of the naval base - that is, including clarifying the boundaries of the minefield. N. G. Kuznetsov generally considered the raiding operation on June 26 as the first in a series of others, where the Voroshilov, as well as aviation and torpedo boats, were to participate. As for the leader and the destroyers of the strike group, they considered that their paravan guardians were quite enough to neutralize the mine threat.
Since in the further narration we will meet at least two minefields - S-9 and S-10, we will give a brief description of them. Both obstacles were 5, 5 miles long, mines were placed in two lines at a distance of 200 m from each other, the distance between mines (mine interval) 100 m, deepening 2.5 m, the depth of the location from 40 to 46 m. Barrage S-9, exhibited on June 17, 1941, included 200 mines, as well as 400 defenders. Obstacle S-10, posted on June 18, included 197 mines, as well as 395 defenders. By the way, another mine-hazardous area was indicated on the map 75–80 miles east of Constanta, the origin of which is not at all clear.
Let's go back to 15:00 on June 25th. According to the report on the raid operation on Constanta (albeit written already in August 1942), immediately upon receipt of the combat order, instructions were given to the commanders of the ships participating in the operation, as well as the controllers of the firing of the ships of the strike group. A plan of upcoming actions was analyzed with them, paying special attention to the organization of shooting along the coast, depending on the visibility conditions in the target area. The ships immediately began preparations for going to sea, as the shooting from the anchor of the strike group was scheduled for 16:00. This was completely unrealistic, and the shooting was postponed to 18:00 - that is, just three hours after receiving the combat order! If everything is exactly as it is written in the report, then one could immediately say: what was conceived most likely would not work.
On the basis of the Comflot's decision, to fulfill the assigned task, a strike group was formed consisting of the leader "Kharkov" and the destroyers "Savvy" and "Smyshlyany", headed by the commander of the 3rd destroyer battalion, Captain 2nd Rank M. F. Romanov, as well as a support group consisting of the cruiser "Voroshilov" and the leader "Moscow" under the command of the commander of the Light Forces Detachment, Rear Admiral T. A. Novikov, appointed commander of all surface forces involved in the operation. Three groups of bombers (two DB-3s and nine SBs) were allocated for a joint strike.
At 18:00 on June 25, the strike group began to withdraw from the mooring lines and leave the Sevastopol Bay. However, when approaching the boom at the observation and communications post, the signal "Exit is not allowed" was raised, the ships anchored. It turns out that at 17:33 the headquarters of the fleet received the results of the consideration of the action plan by the People's Commissar of the Navy.
There, the strike group was established as consisting of two leaders, and the support group was made up of a cruiser and two destroyers. So the leader of "Moscow" unexpectedly got into the strike group. Not only did he not prepare for joint shooting, but they did not even begin preparations for battle and campaign, since the shooting from the anchor of the covering detachment was originally planned at 21:30, and then, due to the delay in the exit of the strike group, the shooting was postponed to 22:30.
Anyone can easily imagine what happened next. The leader "Moskva" began to urgently prepare his main power plant, a set of combat documents from one of the destroyers was urgently delivered on a boat, the divisional commander arrived on board the leader to instruct the ship's commander. The situation was facilitated to some extent by the fact that both leaders were in the same division, that is, as they say, "floated", and during the operation "Moscow" the main thing was to stay in the wake of "Kharkov" and closely monitor the signals from the flagship.
Finally, at 20:10, a reorganized strike group consisting of the leaders "Kharkov" (the braid pennant of the battalion commander) and "Moscow" left Sevastopol and, passing along the fairway through our minefields, began to move towards Odessa to mislead enemy air reconnaissance … With the onset of darkness, the ships laid a course for Constanta and developed a course of 28 knots.
A support group consisting of the cruiser Voroshilov (flag of the commander of the Light Forces Detachment), destroyers Savvy and Smyshleny left Sevastopol at 22:40. With the passage of the booms, the destroyers stood in the wake of the cruiser, the terminal "Smyshlyany", the detachment with a course of 20 knots with paravans went to the exit from the defensive minefield along the FVK No. 4. The destroyer "Smyshlyany", while still at the Inkerman alignment, caught on something with its guard paravan and lagged behind the detachment. Soon the paravan got into place, and the destroyer rushed to catch up with the ships that had gone ahead. However, walking along FVK No. 4, he suddenly realized that … he got lost at the entrance to his own base! It turns out that the destroyer slipped through the narrow red sector of the Chersonesos lighthouse, which indicates the first knee of the passage between the minefields, and, moreover, lost its place. Only at 03:00 on June 26, "Smyshleny" was able to finally get out of its minefields. Looking ahead, we will say that only at 07:25 he managed to join the escort of the cruiser already returning to the base.
As for the "Voroshilov" and "Savvy", they, having successfully passed our minefield, made a move of 28 knots. Soon the destroyer began to lag behind, and at 02:30 the ships lost each other. Yet at dawn, the Smart was able to join the flagship.
At 01:47 on 26 June, when the leaders approached the area marked on the map farthest from Constanta from the mines, they set up paravan-guards and continued their movement at 24 knots. Here we note that according to the instructions for the combat use of K-1 paravans, which existed at that time, the speed of the ship after their setting should not exceed 22 knots.
At dawn, at 04:42, when the reckoning leaders were 23 miles from Constanta, and in fact about 2-3 miles closer, the outline of the coast opened directly on the course. The ships continued to follow the same course at the same speed to the starting point of opening fire. At 04:58, when the head leader "Kharkov" was about 13 miles east of the Konstanz lighthouse, he lost his right paravan and reduced the speed to small, the division commander ordered "Moscow" to take the lead, that the leader's commander Lieutenant Commander A. B. Tukhov did it - although he lost his right hand paravan 7 miles before that! Apparently, the division commander was not aware of the loss of the paravan by "Moscow"; otherwise, this rebuilding is difficult to explain: when maneuvering in battle in the formation of the wake, the flagship always strives to be the lead one, since in the extreme case, if it loses all controls, the last one will remain - “do as I do!”. Considering that "Moscow" was not originally planned for the strike group, the latter is especially important.
At 05:00, the ships turned to a combat course of 221 ° and began to develop a course of 26 knots. Approximately at this moment "Kharkiv" loses the left paravan. Perhaps this was due to speeding - but, as it turned out after the war, mine defenders could also be the cause of the loss of both paravans. The fact is that, presumably, from 04:58 to 05:00 the leaders crossed the S-9 minefield. The probability of each ship hitting a mine was about 20%, and taking into account one left trawling part of the Moskva paravan - about 35%, however, neither a mine detonation nor a paravan was hit by a mine. In this situation, they decided not to waste time on setting up the second set of paravans. (And how can this be called?)
At 05:02 "Kharkov" opened fire on oil tanks. The zeroing was carried out according to the measured deviations, the defeat - with five-gun volleys at a rate of 10 seconds. With the third salvo of "Kharkov" the second leader opened fire. At 05:04, two flashes of cannon fire were observed 3–5 miles south of Constanta. A little later, in the area of "Moscow" two shells fell with a flight of 10 kb, the second volley fell with a flight of 5 kb, the third - 1–1.5 kb undershot.
The Kharkiv got the impression that a large-caliber coastal battery had been targeting the lead leader, therefore, by order of the battalion commander at 5:12 am, the Moskva ceased firing, set up a smokescreen and laid down on a 123 ° withdrawal course. The "Kharkov" itself lagged behind a little and, having turned to the course of withdrawal, at 5:14 increased its speed to 30 knots, so that it would not jump out of the wake of the lead ship in the smoke screen. At the same time, he ceased fire, using up 154 high-explosive shells. Simultaneously, the flagship noticed three enemy destroyers at the stern, which, going north, seemed to open indiscriminate fire - in any case, their volleys fell far short of the Kharkov.
The fire on the "Moscow" stopped, but it continued to go in an anti-artillery zigzag. Seeing this, the divisional commander at 05:20 gave the command to the lead ship: "More speed, go straight ahead." However, this order was not executed: at 5:21 a powerful explosion was heard in the area of the third gun of the leader "Moscow", a column of water and smoke rose 30 meters, and the ship broke in half. The bow part turned out to be deployed with the stem towards the stern and lay on the left side. At the stern, the propellers rotated in the air and the smoke equipment worked, and on the stern superstructure, an anti-aircraft gun began firing at the approaching enemy aircraft. After 3-4 minutes, both parts of the leader sank.
After blowing up "Moscow" the leader "Kharkov" rounded it from the north (at the same time he safely crossed the minefield S-10) and, by order of the battalion commander, stopped the course 1-2 kb from the dying ship to save people. However, after listening to the arguments of the commander of the "Kharkov" Captain 2nd Rank P. A. Melnikova, M. F. Romanov changed his mind, and a minute later the leader gave a move. At 5:25 am, two 280-mm shells from the Tirpitz coastal battery fell near the Kharkov. The explosions caused a strong shaking of the hull, as a result of which the steam pressure in the boilers dropped, the ship's speed dropped to 6 knots.
At this time, the commander of the OLS on the cruiser Voroshilov, who was at the rendezvous point with the strike detachment, received a radio from the battalion commander using a table of conventional signals: "I fired at oil tanks, I need help, my place is square 55672." Immediately, the commander of the "Soobrazitelny" was ordered to go at full speed to the "Kharkov" with an indication of its place and course to the point. The cruiser remained at the rendezvous point, maneuvering with moves of 28-30 knots on the anti-submarine zigzag. At 05:50, another radio was received from "Kharkov": "The leader" Moscow "is bombing planes, if possible I need help." In fact, the divisional commander wanted to convey: “Moscow has exploded, I need help,” but the encryption was distorted somewhere during transmission.
At 06:17 the commander of the detachment asked the fleet commander for aviation support for the leaders, to which he received the order: "To retreat at full speed to the main naval base." Fulfilling this order, "Voroshilov" lay down on a course of 77 ° and began to withdraw. At 07:10 on the horizon appeared the destroyer "Smyshlyany", which was ordered to join the escort of the cruiser. At the same time, “Kharkov” was told: “We will move to the east, there will be no rendezvous”.
At 05:28, "Kharkov" developed its course to 28 knots, but almost immediately two large-caliber shells exploded next to the leader and again sat down in steam in the boilers. At 05:36, the main boiler No. 1 went out of order from close explosions of aerial bombs. Then, at 05:55 and 6:30, Kharkiv repelled attacks from small groups of enemy aircraft, while at 05:58, boiler No. 2 went out of order. by the end of the second raid, the coastal battery "Tirpitz" also ceased fire. Due to the failure of the turbofan of the only operating boiler, the ship's speed dropped to 5 knots. At 06:43, the leader noticed an air bubble and a trail of a torpedo, from which the "Kharkiv" dodged, firing at the alleged location of the submarine with diving shells.
Finally, at 07:00, the destroyer "Savvy" approached and began to take a place in front of the leader. At that moment, the destroyer noticed the trail of a torpedo at a heading angle of 50 ° on the starboard side. Turning to the right, "Smart" left the torpedo on the left and at the same time found the second one, going along the starboard side to the leader. The latter also carried out an evasive maneuver by turning on a torpedo, and the destroyer, reaching the point of the intended salvo, dropped four large and six small depth charges. After that, a large oil slick was observed and the stern of the submarine appeared for a moment and quickly plunged into the water. Over time, in the literature, these two torpedo attacks morphed into one, occurring at 06:53, and as a result of which there were signs of the sinking of the submarine. Whose torpedoes they were, whose stern part was seen from the ships - to this day remains a mystery.
At 11:40 am the destroyer Smyshleny, which had been sent to help them, joined the "Kharkov" and "Smart". After repelling three more attacks by enemy aircraft, the ships entered Sevastopol at 21:09 on June 26. The cruiser Voroshilov arrived there even earlier. According to intelligence, as a result of artillery shelling and a bombardment strike in Constanta at 6:40 am, a fire broke out in an oil storage facility, a trainload of ammunition was set on fire, railway tracks and the station building were destroyed.
By the way, about aviation. She was to deliver three strikes on Constanta: at 4:00 with two DB-3s, at 4:30 with two SBs, and finally, simultaneously with the ships at 5:00, with seven SBs. The logic behind the first two strikes is unclear - apparently, all they really could do was wake up the enemy in advance. But there were no actual blows. The first group of two DB-3s returned halfway due to a malfunction of the materiel. From the second group, which consisted of two SBs, one also returned due to a malfunction, and the second continued its flight, but did not return to its airfield and its fate remained unknown. Only the third group of seven SB carried out a bombing strike on Constanta, but only 1.5 hours after the shelling of the base by ships.
This is how the whole picture of the event looked. Now let's clarify the details using some of the trophy materials. First, about the coastal battery. According to Romanian data, of all the coastal batteries located in the Constanta area, only the German 280-mm Tirpitz battery took part in the battle. Moreover, despite the fact that there was constant monitoring of the sea and the silhouettes of Soviet ships approaching from the east were clearly visible against the light background of the horizon, the battery opened fire with a great delay, at about 05:19, that is, literally a few minutes before the explosion "Moscow". The first volley fell in flight and to the left of our ships. But even after the death of one leader, "Tirpitz" did not cease fire and conducted it approximately until 05:55, making about 35 volleys at the "Kharkov". Therefore, the question arises: who took aim at the leaders and made them fall on the course of withdrawal?
The fact is that it was on that night that almost the entire Romanian fleet was concentrated in the Constanta area, and not in the base, but in the sea! Thus, in distant patrol, behind the outer edge of the minefields, to the north of Constanta was the gunboat Giculescu, and to the south - the destroyer Sborul. Close patrol at Constanta was carried by two minelayers and a gunboat. From the north the passage between the minefields and the coast was covered by the destroyers Marabesti and R. Ferdinand ", and from the south - destroyers" Marasti "and" R. Mary ". It seems that our ships were waiting here. In any case, in such a composition and mode, the ships could not carry out patrols every night. Let's note this fact for ourselves!
So, just, two southern destroyers and our leaders discovered about 5 o'clock, lay down on a course of 10 ° and at 05:09 opened fire on the lead ship, covering it with the second or third salvo. However, in the transition to defeat, the Romanians incorrectly took into account the speed of the target, and all volleys began to go down the stern of the "Moscow". Since the Romanian destroyers were in the background of the coast, they were discovered only when the "Kharkov" began to withdraw, that is, at about 05:13. With the turn of the Soviet ships to the left on the course of withdrawal, they disappeared into a smoke screen, the Romanian ships stopped firing. Four minutes later, the leaders began to be seen through the smoke, the destroyers resumed fire at 05:17 and continued it until the explosion of the "Moscow".
The picture has more or less cleared up - but now it is not clear what kind of flashes were seen from the Kharkiv at 05:04 south of the port, if neither the Romanian ships, let alone the Tirpitz battery, opened fire at that moment. Here we recall the air strike. As we have already noted, from the second group, which consisted of two SBs, one returned due to a malfunction, and the second continued its flight, but did not return to its airfield and its fate remained unknown. So, according to Romanian data, at about 5 o'clock an air raid was announced in Constanta, and soon a single Soviet bomber flew over the city. It is quite possible that it was just that missing SB from the second group, and the flashes on the shore were the fire of an anti-aircraft battery.
Let's return now to the explosion of "Moscow". As you can see, by this moment two Romanian destroyers and a coastal battery were firing on it. This is enough for one of the shells to hit the ship and cause an explosion - for example, artillery ammunition or torpedoes. By the way, initially in the fleet there was an opinion that it was the hit of a shell of a large-caliber coastal battery in one of the spare torpedoes stored, as you know, on the upper deck, that led to the death of the ship. + although the version of a mine explosion cannot be ruled out.
After the death of the leader "Moskva" Romanian boats picked up 69 out of 243 people from the water of his crew, headed by the commander. Subsequently, Tukhov managed to escape from Romanian captivity and fought as part of one of the partisan detachments in the Odessa region. He died a few days before the detachment joined up with our advancing troops.
Let's summarize some operational and tactical result of the operation. The Black Sea Fleet planned to launch a joint strike with ships and aircraft against the main base of the Romanian fleet - Constanta. At the same time, the main target of the strike was not ships, but oil tanks, that is, the task was not solved in the interests of the fleet and not even in the interests of the ground forces. Why was she needed in this form at all? It would be very interesting to know whose initiative this is?
Judging by the information that we now have about the situation in the first hours and days of the war in the highest echelons of the country's leadership, the Red Army and the Navy, it is difficult to imagine that the People's Commissar of Defense could have turned to Kuznetsov with such a request - he was not up to it, yes, again, not his headache. It is even less likely that the task of striking the oil storage facilities in Constanta was set by the Headquarters of the High Command, and it did not appear until June 23rd. Apparently, the author of the idea of the raid on Constanta is the Main Headquarters of the Navy, and, judging by some documents, most likely the initial plan was as follows: “to disable the naval base, inflict losses on the enemy in ships and vessels, the work of the port of Constanta”.
There is nothing surprising in the very emergence of the idea of such an operation - Article 131 NMO-40 directly states that "Operations against enemy coastal targets are one of the methods of transferring the war to enemy territory." And this is exactly how we saw the future war. Article 133 of the same CMO-40, listing the features of operations against coastal objects, indicated that "each operation has a fixed object with constant properties, which facilitates and concretizes calculations and actions." That is, in the base itself, a certain stationary aiming point was required. With regard to Constanta, oil tanks could ideally fulfill its role. In the end, the second task of the operation was reconnaissance in force, and there the main thing was to force the enemy to put into action his entire defense system. The trouble is that this task also remained unsolved: the absence of reconnaissance aircraft during the strike devalued the results achieved at such a price. After all, all that we have precisely identified is the far border of the minefield. Even the location of the Tirpitz coastal battery remained unknown.
Through the fault of the Air Force of the Navy, no joint strike was made. Particularly surprising are the return of three aircraft for technical reasons. Recall that it was only the fourth day of the war, all the materiel went through all the necessary regulations, all the necessary supplies were available, all the technical personnel were trained, there were no enemy strikes on airfields - everything was according to the standard, everything was like in a peaceful life. The same can be said about the "Savvy", which could not hold out in the calm sea after the cruiser at the 28-knot speed. What was his 40-knot speed per measured mile worth during sea trials just a few months ago? Probably, these facts most objectively characterize the real combat capability of the naval forces before the war.
A curtain.
Continuation, all parts:
Part 1. Raid operation to shell Constanta
Part 2. Raiding operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942
Part 3. Raids on communications in the western part of the Black Sea
Part 4. The last raiding operation
