Last raid operation
On October 5, 1943, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral L. A. Vladimirsky signed a combat order, according to which the 1st destroyer division, in cooperation with torpedo boats and fleet aviation, on the night of October 6, should raid enemy sea communications off the southern coast of Crimea and shell the ports of Feodosia and Yalta. The purpose of the operation is to destroy enemy floating assets and landing ships leaving Kerch. The general management of the actions of the ships was entrusted to the chief of staff of the squadron, Captain 1st Rank M. F. Romanov, who was at the command post in Gelendzhik.
Here we immediately note that if a day could be enough to prepare a detachment of ships for solving a typical task, then most likely they will not be enough to work out all issues of organization with other types of forces, for example, aviation. It is one thing if the commanders of the forces participating in the operation can be brought together for briefings and then clarify the details with each other. It is quite another matter if all participants make their Decisions separately from each other. It is even worse if these Decisions are heard and approved by different military leaders. In this case, it happened.
On October 5, from 4:30 to 17:40, nine aircraft of the 30th Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment conducted reconnaissance of enemy floating assets on sea communications in the northwestern and western parts of the Black Sea, on the Kerch Strait - Feodosia communications. Air reconnaissance found: at 6:10 in the Alushta area - 4 minesweepers, 12 high-speed landing barges and 7 barges, at 12:05 - the same convoy in the Balaklava area; in Feodosia at 6: 30-23 high-speed landing barges, 16 self-propelled pontoons and 10 patrol boats; at 12:00 on the outer roadstead - 13 high-speed landing barges, 7 self-propelled pontoons and 4 patrol boats; at 13:40 in the bay - 8 scattered high-speed landing barges; at 16:40 in the port - 7 fast landing barges, 2 self-propelled pontoons and in the roadstead - 9 fast landing barges, 4 self-propelled pontoons and 3 patrol boats; from 7:15 to 17:15 in Kerch - 20–35 high-speed landing barges and self-propelled pontoons; in the Kerch Strait (in the movement of Yenikale - the Ilyich cordon) - 21 high-speed landing barges and 7 self-propelled pontoons; between Yenikale and the Chushka spit - 5 high-speed landing barges and re-observation at 13:00 - a high-speed landing barge, 10 self-propelled pontoons and 7 patrol boats, and at 17: 05-18 high-speed landing barges and 4 self-propelled pontoons under the cover of four Me- 109; at 11:32 in the Yalta area - a high-speed landing barge; at 17:20 between Kerch, Kamysh-Burun and Tuzla spit (in motion) - up to 35 high-speed landing barges and 7 self-propelled pontoons.
Thus, on the communications along the Crimean coast between Kerch and Yalta, there were a large number of enemy watercraft, most of which could not leave the area until nightfall.
The leader "Kharkov", the destroyers "Merciless" and "Capable", eight torpedo boats, as well as aircraft of the Air Force of the fleet were allocated to fulfill the assigned combat mission.
The day before the departure, the leader and the destroyers were relocated to Tuapse, and four hours before the start of the operation, the ship commanders received combat orders; the briefing was carried out personally by the commander of the fleet. Bringing the combat mission to aviation looked completely different. For example, the commander of the 1st mine and torpedo aviation division, Colonel N. A. Tokarev made his Decision on the upcoming military operations on the basis of the verbal Decision of VRID of the Commander of the Fleet Air Force. Moreover, this decision was brought to the attention of the division commander at 23:00 (!) On October 5 by Major Bukreev, an officer of the operational department of the Air Force headquarters. What coordination of issues of interaction, if the ships were already at sea!
The very decision of the commander of the 1st mtad in relation to the division boiled down to the following:
a) carry out additional reconnaissance of the floating craft in the roadstead and in the port of Feodosia with one Il-4 aircraft at 5:30 on 6.10.43 in the interests of the destroyers' artillery fire, and then proceed from 5:30 to 6:00 to make adjustments;
b) to suppress the fire of enemy coastal artillery batteries located at Cape Kiik-Atlama, Koktebel, Feodosiya and Sarygol with four Il-4 aircraft during the period from 5:30 to 6:00;
c) from 6:00 from point 44 ° 5 ′ 35 ° 20 ′ by fighters P-39 "Airacobra" and P-40 "Kittyhawk" (from the operatively subordinate squadron of the 7th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the 4th Fighter Aviation Division) to cover the withdrawal and transfer of destroyers to point 44 ° 10 ′ 38 ° 00 ′;
d) at 7:00, nine Pe-2 of the 40th air regiment of dive bombers, under the cover of fighters, destroy the floating craft in the port of Feodosia and photograph the results of the artillery fire of the ships.
In addition, closer to the coast of the Caucasus, fighter cover was supposed to be carried out by twelve LaGG-3 and Yak-1 aircraft of the 4th Air Division.
According to the Decision adopted by the commander of the 1st Air Division, the shelling of the ports of Yalta and Feodosia was planned to be carried out at dawn on October 6 with the help of Il-4 spotter aircraft. It was envisaged to suppress enemy coastal batteries by an air group consisting of two Il-4 bombers and two DB-7B "Boston". In addition, nine Pe-2s of the 40th Aviation Regiment, under the cover of six "Airacobras" of the 11th Fighter Aviation Regiment, were to strike from a dive at the enemy's watercraft in the roadstead and in the port of Feodosia.
To cover the ships, four P-40s of the 7th Aviation Regiment were allocated from Feodosia to the point 44 ° 26 ′ 35 ° 24 ′ from 6:00 to 8:00; between the points 44 ° 26 ′ 35 ° 24 ′ and 44 ° 13 ′ 36 ° 32 ′ from 8:00 to 10:00 two P-40s of the same regiment; between the points 44 ° 13 ′ 36 ° 32 ′ and 44 ° 12 ′ 37 ° 08 ′ from 10:00 to 11:00 two P-39s of the 11th air regiment; between the points 44 ° 12 ′ 37 ° 08 ′ and 44 ° 11 ′ 38 ° 02 ′ from 11:00 to 12:30, two P-40s of the 7th Aviation Regiment.
According to the fleet's report on the operation, six P-40s were all that the Black Sea Fleet had at its disposal. But on October 15, the 7th regiment had 17 serviceable Kittyhawks, and the 30th Reconnaissance Regiment had five more. It is doubtful if all these vehicles appeared after October 5th. During October, the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet received eight P-40s, one was written off by an act, and as of November 1, the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet had 31 Kittyhawk.
With the onset of darkness at 20:30 on October 5, the ships under the command of the commander of the 1st division, captain of the 2nd rank G. P. Indignations (a braid pennant on the "Merciless") came out of Tuapse. At about one o'clock in the morning the leader of "Kharkov" (captain of the 2nd rank PI Shevchenko), with the permission of the detachment commander, began to move towards Yalta, and the destroyers continued on their way to Feodosia. But not by the shortest route, but so as to approach the port from the side of the dark part of the horizon.
After two o'clock in the morning, the ships discovered German reconnaissance aircraft. Thus, it was not possible to ensure the secrecy of the actions, although the detachment commander maintained radio silence and reported his discovery only at 5:30. However, the chief of staff of the squadron already guessed about the loss of secrecy, since the leader's commander reported about the reconnaissance aircraft at 2:30.
But M. F. Romanov did not know another … It turns out that the enemy's air reconnaissance discovered the destroyers in Tuapse, immediately upon their arrival, which gave the German Admiral of the Black Sea Vice Admiral Kizeritski to suggest a possible raid of Soviet ships to the coast of Crimea. At the same time, he did not cancel the previously planned departure of the convoy from Kerch to Feodosia in the afternoon of October 5, which was recorded by our aerial reconnaissance. At about 10 pm on October 5, the German direction-finding station in Evpatoria reported that at least one destroyer had left Tuapse. At 02:37 the head of the "Crimea" naval commandant's office, Rear Admiral Shultz, issued a military alert to the areas of the naval commandant's offices in the ports of Yalta and Feodosia. From that time on, the Soviet ships were already waiting.
Exactly at midnight on October 6, German torpedo boats S-28, S-42 and S-45 left their base in Dvuyakornaya Bay, taking a position south of the convoy going under the coast. At 02:10, the group commander, Lieutenant-Commander Sims, received an alert from the reconnaissance aircraft that it had spotted two destroyers heading west at high speed (note: reconnaissance aircraft - torpedo boat communications!). Realizing that it would not be possible to intercept the Soviet ships before dawn, Sims ordered the commanders of the torpedo boats to take a waiting position, gradually moving west, towards Feodosia. The plane constantly watched the destroyers and reported their position, course and speed to the commander of the German group.
This continued until four o'clock in the morning, when the Soviet ships turned north, towards Feodosia. Having received the report, the torpedo boats went to intercept the destroyers. At 05:04, Sims radioed a reconnaissance plane to show the location of the enemy ships with illuminating bombs - which the latter skillfully did, dropping several bombs further south along the course of the destroyers. Thus, they became perfectly visible from boats on the light path. Perhaps only then G. P. Negoda was finally convinced that his actions were not a secret for the enemy, and reported this to the squadron command post.
Having failed to find the German torpedo boats and knowing that a similar situation had taken place in the previous ships' exits to the Crimean shores, the battalion commander decided that nothing special had happened. No alarming information was received from the squadron command post, and G. P. Negoda proceeded with the task as planned. At 5:30, the Soviet destroyers found the German torpedo boats going into the attack and opened fire from a distance of about 1200 m, dodging four torpedoes (the sight on the S-42 jammed the sight, and he did not complete the attack). During the battle, one 45-mm shell hit the engine room of the S-45 torpedo boat, but the boat managed to maintain full speed for another 30 minutes. The latter turned out to be very important for the Germans, since the Soviet destroyers, after repelling the attack, began to pursue the German boats!
By order of Sims, the S-28 turned south, trying to divert the attention of the destroyers, and the S-45, accompanied by the S-42, covered with a smoke screen, began to retreat to its base in the Koktebel area. The Soviet ships also split up, but the S-28, after an unsuccessful torpedo attack, quickly broke away from its pursuer, and a pair of boats that went south were under unsuccessful fire until about six in the morning. By that time, having received an organized rebuff (after the attack of the boats, the coastal artillery also fired at the ships), G. P. Negoda decided to abandon the shelling of Feodosia, at 6:10 the destroyers laid down on the course of retreat to the point of meeting with the leader "Kharkov".
This morning, another meeting with the German torpedo boats was destined to take place, and completely unexpected for both sides. At about seven o'clock, "Merciless" and "Capable", 5-7 miles south of Cape Meganom, suddenly met with two torpedo boats that jumped out from the dark part of the horizon, clearly going into a torpedo attack. Having developed their maximum speed, both destroyers opened artillery fire and sharply turned away from the boats. A few minutes later, they also abandoned the attack and began to go north.
Circumstances developed so that two German boats - S-51 and S-52 - were returning to their base in the Koktebel region after repairs in Constanta, and their commanders did not know anything about the Soviet ships' raid on the ports of Crimea. Therefore, the meeting with them for the Germans happened completely unexpectedly and at such a distance when it was necessary either to attack or immediately leave. Attacking such well-armed warships in good visibility is a rather unpromising business, but an attempt to retreat could end in failure - despite the repair, the S-52 could not develop a course of more than 30 knots. If the destroyers organized a pursuit, then the S-52 would inevitably die. In this situation, the commander of the group of boats, Lieutenant-Commander Zevers, decided to launch a false attack in the hope that the Soviet ships would begin to evade and withdraw, without thinking of a counterattack. And so it happened, and the German boats came to the base.
As already mentioned, at 2:30 am, "Kharkov" reported its discovery by a reconnaissance aircraft. According to German data, he was spotted by a radio direction-finding station in Evpatoria. Beginning at 2:31 a.m., Rear Admiral Shultz, the head of the "Crimea" naval commandant's office, began to report on the hourly release of "Kharkov" for communication with the radio center in Gelendzhik. The same station, based on the bearings taken, determined the direction of the ship's movement in the direction of Yalta. At 5:50 a.m. a radar station located at Cape Ai-Todor detected the leader with a bearing of 110 ° at a distance of 15 km.
After making sure that the detected target was not its own ship, at 6:03 the German command allowed the coastal batteries to open fire on it. Almost at the same time, "Kharkov" began shelling Yalta. In 16 minutes, he fired at least one hundred and four 130-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectiles without adjustment. The leader's fire was answered by three 75-mm guns from the 1st battery of the 601st battalion, and then six 150-mm guns from the 1st battery of the 772nd battalion. According to German data, as a result of the shelling of the leader, several houses were damaged, and there were casualties among the civilian population. Following along the coast, the leader fired 32 shots at Alushta, but, according to the enemy, all the shells fell short. At 07:15, the Kharkov joined the destroyers heading 110 ° at a speed of 24 knots.
At 8:05, three Soviet P-40 fighters appeared over the formation. At 08:15, they spotted a German reconnaissance aircraft - a BV-138 flying boat belonging to 1st Squadron of the 125th Marine Reconnaissance Group (I./SAGr 125) - and shot it down. After that, at 08:20, the fighters flew to the airfield. Of the five members of the scout's crew, two splashed down on parachutes in sight of the ships, and the battalion commander ordered the commander of the "Capable" Captain 3rd Rank A. N. Gorshenin to take them aboard. The other two ships began to carry out anti-submarine protection of the destroyer that was drifting. The whole operation took about 20 minutes.
At 8:15, a new pair of R-40s arrived, the third car returned to the airfield due to an engine malfunction. They were the first to spot, first at 08:30 two Ju-88s at high altitude (apparently, scouts), and then at 08:37 a strike group - eight Ju-87 dive bombers from 7./StG3 under the cover of four fighters Me-109.
Naturally, two Soviet fighters could not thwart the attack, and the enemy dive bombers entering from the direction of the sun reached three hits of 250-kg bombs at the leader "Kharkov". One of them hit the upper deck in the area of frame 135 and, having pierced all decks, the second bottom and the bottom, exploded under the keel. Another bomb hit the first and second boiler rooms. Both boiler rooms, as well as the first engine room, were flooded, water slowly flowed through a damaged bulkhead on frame 141 into boiler room No. 3.
Thus, the turbo-toothed unit in engine room No. 2 and the third boiler remained in service from the main power plant, the pressure in which dropped to 5 kg / cm². Shock shocks damaged the motor pump in the second car, diesel generator No. 2, turbofan No. 6. The explosion tore off and threw overboard one 37-mm anti-aircraft machine gun, two anti-aircraft machine guns were out of order. The leader lost speed, received a roll of 9 ° to starboard and a trim to the bow of about 3 m. In this situation, the battalion commander ordered the commander of the "Capable" to tow the "Kharkov" stern forward.
Now the compound, located 90 miles from the Caucasian coast, was moving at a speed of only 6 knots. At 10:10, the three P-40s covering the ships flew away, but at 9:50 a couple of P-39s had already arrived. At 11:01, they finished sweeping, according to their report, shooting down one Ju-88 during this time - apparently, a scout. At 11:31 am, two A-20G bombers arrived to cover the ships from the air, and at 11:50 am, 14 Ju-87s from 8 and 9./StG3 appeared over the destroyers. Naturally, they did not receive a worthy rebuff and successfully bombed. Two Ju-87s attacked "Kharkov" and "Capable", which stopped its towing, and the rest began to dive on "Merciless". The latter, despite maneuvering and intense anti-aircraft artillery fire, received one bomb hit in the first engine room, and the second exploded directly at the side in the area of the second vehicle. As a result of the bomb explosions, the outer skin and deck on the starboard side in the area of 110-115 frames were destroyed, the side skin at the cheekbone in the area of the second vehicle was torn apart, the first engine and third boiler rooms were flooded, the rudder jammed. Filtration of water into the second engine and boiler rooms began.
The destroyer lost speed, but remained afloat with a roll of 5 ° -6 ° to the port side. By order of the commander, 2nd rank captain V. A. Parkhomenko began to fight for survivability and to facilitate the ship they shot all the torpedoes overboard, dropped depth charges. "Kharkov" received no new damage, but still had no move. According to some sources, the "Capable" has seams in the stern on the starboard side of the close breaks, and it received about 9 tons of water, but did not lose its speed.
After assessing the situation and sending a report to the command, the battalion commander ordered the commander of the "Capable" to start towing the leader and the "Merciless" in turn. This continued until the moment when, after 14 hours, the third boiler was put into operation on the "Kharkov" and the ship was able to move up to 10 knots under one machine. "Capable" took the "Merciless" in tow.
The question is natural: where were the fighters? Events developed as follows. At 5:40 am, the commander of the 1st Aviation Division received information from the Black Sea Fleet Air Force headquarters about the detection of our ships by enemy aircraft. In this regard, it was ordered to bring to immediate readiness all fighters allocated for cover. Given the situation, the division commander proposed not to strike the Pe-2 on Feodosia, but to re-target the six P-39s allocated to support the bombers to cover the ships.
But this decision was not approved, ordering to continue the operation as planned. At 6:15, the planes flew off to bomb Feodosia and returned from an unsuccessful raid only at 7:55. At 10:30 a pair of P-39s was supposed to arrive at the ships, but they did not find the ships and returned back. At 10:40, the second pair of P-39s takes off - the same result. Finally, only at 12:21 pm, the four P-40s appear over the ships - but, as we know, the second blow was delivered by the German aircraft at 11:50 am.
By the way, how far from our airfields did the German aircraft deliver the second blow? So, the A-20G ships who flew in to cover the ships found them at the point W = 44 ° 25 'L = 35 ° 54', that is, 170 km from the airfield in Gelendzhik. According to the report of the 1st Air Division, the flight time of the fighters was 35 minutes. Enemy aircraft operated from a distance of about 100 km.
A-20G flew to the airfield at 13:14, four P-40s - at 13:41. At 13:40 they were replaced by two P-39s. By this time, four Yak-1 and four Il-2 were also above the ships. At 14:40, the yaks and silts left, but three P-39s and two A-20Gs remained, and at 14:41, nine Ju-87s from 7./StG3, 12 Me-109s and two Ju-88. True, already in the course of the air battle, three Yak-1s from the 9th Aviation Regiment joined our aircraft.
Upon detection of enemy aircraft, the "Capable" moved away from the "Merciless". It was on him that the main blow fell. The ship was covered with a continuous stream of water; shuddering from direct hits, falling to the left side with an increasing trim to the stern, he soon quickly sank. The personnel who tried to leave the dying destroyer, for the most part, were sucked into a crater and died.
"Capable" avoided direct hits, but was damaged by explosions of aerial bombs 5-6 m from the starboard side in the area of the bow superstructure, 9-10 m on the left side of the second torpedo tube and in the stern. A number of breakdowns of mechanisms in boiler rooms and engine rooms occurred from the shaking of the hull, which led to a loss of progress for 20-25 minutes. By that time, Kharkiv had also been hit. He received two direct hits in the forecastle, several bombs exploded near the ship. All the bow rooms up to the 75th frame were flooded, the auxiliary mechanisms of the only boiler remaining under the steam were out of order from a strong shake of the hull, the leader began to plunge nose-down with a roll to the starboard side. They did not have time to carry out any significant measures to combat damage, and at 15:37, firing from a 130-mm stern gun and one anti-aircraft machine gun, "Kharkov" disappeared under water.
Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy planes flew away, "Capable" approached the place of the leader's death and began to rescue the personnel. It took him over two hours. Then the destroyer returned to the place of death of the "Merciless", but managed to lift only two people, when another raid followed at 17:38. Up to 24 Ju-87 bombers began to dive onto the ship from several directions. With a short interval in time, three bombs, weighing up to 200 kg each, hit the "Capable": in the area of the 18th and 41st frames and in the first engine room. In addition, several small-caliber bombs exploded in the cockpits No. 3 and 4.
The ship almost immediately sank with its bow to the forecastle deck, and almost all those rescued from the Kharkov were killed. In the inactive first boiler room, fuel oil from the damaged main caught fire, and a flame burst out of the first chimney. This outbreak was observed from the German submarine U-9. On the "Capable" command staff made an attempt to organize a fight for survivability, but after 10-15 minutes the destroyer lost her buoyancy and sank at 18:35. During the last raid, a pair of P-39, P-40 and Pe-2 were over the destroyer, but the P-40 did not take part in repelling the strike due to the remaining fuel.
Torpedo and patrol boats, as well as seaplanes, picked up 123 people from the water. 780 sailors were killed, including the commander of the leader "Kharkov" 2nd rank captain P. I. Shevchenko. The death of people was facilitated by the onset of night, worsening weather, a completely insufficient number and imperfection of the rescue equipment that the ships had.
Let's summarize some of the results. On October 6, 1943, three modern destroyers were killed, which at that time were in a state of high combat and technical readiness, were fully equipped with everything necessary, the number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns on them was brought to 5-7, their commanders and personnel had more than two years of experience in the war, including the fight for survivability with severe damage (both destroyers lost their bows). Against these three ships, German Ju-87 dive bombers operated in the first raids in groups of 8-14 aircraft, and everything took place in the zone of action of Soviet fighters. This was the fourth similar raid operation, the previous three ended in vain.
The operation was planned by the headquarters of the fleet. The set of documents developed is unknown, but all reports include only the combat order of the fleet commander No. op-001392 dated 5 October. Certainly there was some kind of graphic part as well. Since the ships left Batumi for the Tuapse forward base at 7:00 on October 4, it is obvious that the commander made his decision no later than October 3. The operation was planned by the headquarters of the fleet, and it was to be approved by the commander of the North Caucasus Front, to whom the Black Sea Fleet was operatively subordinate. If you believe the subsequent "debriefing", it turns out that the front did not even suspect about the raiding operation. Let us note this fact.
How the commanders of the air force formations made the decisions on the operation is clearly seen in the example of the 1st air division. However, from the point of view of organizing interaction, this did not affect anything. Firstly, the ships refused to shell Feodosia, and therefore did not work with the spotter aircraft. From previous experience, it can be said that this is one of the most difficult tasks in terms of mutual understanding of the forces involved. Secondly, in fact, no interaction between ships and fighter planes was envisaged, that is, each acted according to his own plans, which were theoretically coordinated in place and time, but did not provide for joint actions.
In the events of October 6, these flaws in the planning of the operation are poorly visible - and primarily because of the scantiness of the assigned order of fighter aircraft. Indeed, what joint actions could have been organized during the first attack of the enemy, when two Soviet fighters had four German ones? In the second strike, fourteen Ju-87s were opposed by two A-20Gs. Six fighters took part in the third strike from our side, but twelve German fighters also flew in! During the fourth strike, there were no German fighters, but two P-39s and two Pe-2s had to withstand twenty-four Ju-87s.
We can say that no matter what the Soviet pilots were aces, they could not physically disrupt any of the strikes. The tragedy could have been prevented if, after the first raid at 8:37 am, the fighter cover was strengthened many times over. Was there such an opportunity?
Yes, it was. We do not know the exact number of Black Sea Fleet fighters on October 6, but on October 15, the Fleet Air Force had serviceable vehicles with sufficient range: P-40 - 17 (7th IAP), P-39 - 16 (11th IAP), Yak- 1 - 14 + 6 (9th iap + 25th iap). At least five more P-40s were in the 30th reconnaissance aviation regiment, but even without scouts, the fleet had about fifty fighters capable of covering ships at a distance of up to 170 km, which could make several sorties. By the way, in total, fighters made 50 sorties to cover the ships.
The question is natural: how many fighters were needed? Based on the existing standards and military experience, a fighter squadron was required to reliably cover three ships with an expected enemy grouping of 10-12 bombers without escort fighters, that is, an average of one fighter per bomber. At a distance of 150 km from the airfield, with a time reserve for a 15-minute air battle, the R-39 with suspended tanks could loit at an altitude of 500-1000 m for three hours, and without tanks it was half as much. Under the same conditions, the P-40 could patrol for 6, 5 and 3, 5 hours, respectively, and the Yak-1 for an hour and 30 minutes. These figures are taken from the standards developed from the experience of the Great Patriotic War; in real conditions, they could be less.
But even if all the aircraft flew without outboard tanks (and some fighters certainly had them), if we reduce the standards by 20 percent, it is still clear that the Navy's Air Force could well cover ships with squadrons for about eight hours. Well, let it be six o'clock! During this time, the destroyers would have reached the base anyway.
However, this did not happen. First of all, because the Air Force commander did not receive a specific and unequivocal order to organize this most complete fighter cover for ships. This was not done, although the signal from the "Kharkov" "I endure a distress" was recorded in the combat log of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force headquarters at 9:10. Only at 11:10 was the order given to constantly cover the ships with at least eight aircraft - but this was not actually done.
Now we need to see how correctly the commander of the squadron of ships acted. But first, about the ships themselves in terms of their combat resistance against air strikes. In this respect, Soviet destroyers as of mid-1943 were among the weakest in their class among all the belligerent states. We will not even consider our allies: a universal main caliber, anti-aircraft fire control devices, radar … German destroyers did not have a universal main caliber, but carried a radar for detecting air targets and more than a dozen anti-aircraft guns. Of the Soviet ships, only the "Capable" was equipped with fire control devices for 76-mm anti-aircraft guns. Unfortunately, these guns themselves were ineffective for firing at air targets, and at dive bombers they were simply useless. In addition, the "Capable" had seven 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. "Merciless" had five, and "Kharkov" had six. True, all the ships still had 12, 7-mm machine guns, but by that time no one seriously counted on them.
In general, we did not make any revelations: already since 1942, all kinds of reports, notes, reports were circulating in the General Staff, in the relevant directorates of the Navy and fleets, the meaning of which boiled down to the fact that the anti-aircraft weapons of ships did not correspond to the air threat. Everyone knew everything, but they could not do anything drastic: the only available means of self-defense - anti-aircraft guns - were not enough. In addition, many ships, the same destroyers, were so cluttered and overloaded that there was nowhere to put submachine guns.
Similar problems have occurred in the fleets of other belligerent states. There, for the sake of strengthening anti-aircraft weapons, torpedo tubes and non-aircraft main caliber guns were often dismantled from destroyers. For various reasons, none of our fleets took such drastic measures. The few radar stations that we began to receive from the allies were installed primarily on the ships of the Northern Fleet, the Black Sea residents did not receive a single one until the end of hostilities. As a result, Soviet destroyers, in the face of the threat of air strikes, could not operate without fighter cover. And even then it was obvious to everyone.
Much has been written about the tragedy of October 6, 1943, both in closed and open editions. At the same time, documents related to the analysis of the operation were not printed anywhere. Only the conclusions set out in the Supreme Command Headquarters Directive of October 11, 1943 are known. However, starting with the first reports, the divisional commander, 2nd rank captain G. P. Negoda. First of all, they immediately recall the delay associated with the capture of the German reconnaissance crew. Most likely, there was no deep sense in the rise of the pilots. But, firstly, not every day there is an opportunity to take such prisoners. Secondly, they have already gone to the Crimean shores a dozen times - and never once have the ships been subjected to effective massive air strikes. By the way, most likely this fact influenced the chiefs of G. P. Indignations, after each raid, hoping that it would be the last. Even if we recall the "Tashkent", then the Germans could not sink it into the sea either …
Finally, thirdly, it must be borne in mind that during these 20 minutes the ships, going at a speed of 24 knots, could approach their coast by eight miles, with a 28-knot move - by 9.3 miles, and if they developed 30 knots you would travel 10 miles. In all cases, the first blow was inevitable, and its result would most likely remain the same.
The second raid took place at 11:50, that is, more than three hours later. All this time the "Capable" was towing the "Kharkov". What valuable and invaluable recommendations were not given to the division commander … after the war. Some even believed that G. P. Negoda had to abandon the "Kharkov" as bait and retreat with two destroyers to the base. I would like to see at least one Soviet commander who could order to abandon a destroyer afloat 45 miles from the enemy's coast. And if the enemy had not sunk him, but took and brought him in tow to Feodosia? Incredible? As much as one would expect from a Soviet commander that he would abandon his ship in the middle of the sea.
There was also a second option: to remove the crew and flood the Kharkov. It would take about 20-30 minutes. But who knew when the next raid would be - and whether there would be any at all. They would drown a valuable ship that could be brought to the base, and take enemy aircraft and never appear again. Who would be responsible for this? G. P. Negoda was clearly not ready to take on such responsibility. However, having received a report on damage to the "Kharkov", the fleet commander gave an encrypted message with just such an order. But, first of all, this telegram was not found in the Archives of the Navy, but there is a very important point here: did the commander order to flood the "Kharkov" - or did he just recommend? Agree, this is not the same thing. Secondly, according to some sources, this encryption before the second raid to G. P. I didn't get into indignation.
Well, and thirdly: knowing the time of the third raid, it is safe to say that with any actions of the detachment commander, the ships would not have escaped it. We have already sorted out the situation with the fighter cover, so the result of the strike most likely did not change either, but the events would have happened twice as close to our shore.
Concluding the conversation about the place and role of the battalion commander in the events described, we note that the only solution that would really prevent the tragedy could be the termination of the operation after the loss of secrecy of the forces' actions became obvious. But, again, this is from the position of today - how would you react to such a decision then?
The example of this tragedy clearly shows how the Soviet military leader found himself hostage to a situation that was created not by him, but by the existing system. Regardless of the outcome of the operation (whether the divisional commander interrupted it even after losing stealth, or he abandoned the leader as bait and returned with two destroyers, or he sank another damaged destroyer and returned with one ship), G. P. Negoda, in any case, was doomed to be guilty of something. Moreover, no one could predict the assessment of his guilt in any case. He could have been put under a firing squad for the loss of one ship - and forgiven for the loss of all three. In this particular case, they did not cut from the shoulder, after all, it was October 1943. On the whole, we figured it out objectively: G. P. After recuperation, he was appointed chief officer of the battleship in the Baltic, and he completed his service with the rank of rear admiral.
The change in the conditions of the situation during the operation on October 6 did not cause a response in the headquarters in command of the forces - everyone tried to adhere to the previously approved plan. Although after the second strike it became obvious that the ships must be rescued in the full sense of the word, since they were taken seriously and they could not stand up for themselves. At the same time, the inability of the fleet command to direct the operation in a dynamically changing situation (although what the fuck, dynamics, the ships sank for more than 10 hours!), To adequately respond to it, to maintain the continuity of control of forces, was revealed.
Probably, this is the main cause of the disaster, and the rest is the consequences and particulars. Here we again stumble over the quality of the operational-tactical training of staff officers, their inability to analyze the current situation, foresee the development of events, and control forces under active enemy influence. If the experience gained has already allowed the command and control bodies to basically cope with their functional responsibilities for planning combat operations, then with the implementation of these plans, everything was worse. With a sharp change in the situation, in conditions of time pressure, decisions must be made quickly, often without being able to discuss them with colleagues, approve them with the bosses, and make comprehensive calculations. And all this is possible only if the manager, of whatever scale he is, has not only personal experience, but also absorbed the experience of previous generations, that is, he possessed real knowledge.
As for the additional forces, if the fleet commander, as required, reported his intention to conduct a raiding operation to the commander of the North Caucasian Front and approved her plan from him, one could count on the support of the front air force. In any case, realizing their part of the responsibility for the result, the front command did not take the position of an outside observer.
In conclusion, I must say about the price that the enemy paid for the death of three destroyers. According to the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, the Germans lost a reconnaissance aircraft, Ju-88, Ju-87 - 7, Me-109 - 2. According to German data, it is not possible to establish the exact number of losses. Throughout October 1943, participating in the III / StG 3 raids lost four Ju-87D-3 and nine Ju-87D-5 from combat reasons - more than in any other month in the fall of 1943.
After the death of the last of the Black Sea leaders and two destroyers, only three modern ships of this class remained in service - "Boyky", "Bodry" and "Smart", as well as two old ones - "Zheleznyakov" and "Nezamozhnik". Since that time, the ships of the Black Sea Fleet squadron no longer participated in hostilities until their very end in the theater.
We have already drawn some intermediate conclusions, analyzed unsuccessful or not entirely successful actions of the Black Sea Fleet forces. To summarize, we can say that the main reason for failure was the human factor. This matter is subtle, multifaceted. But with allowable simplifications, we can say that the human factor could negatively affect the outcome of hostilities in three main cases.
The first is betrayal. In this regard, it should be noted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War was primarily brought about by the selfless love of the Soviet people for their homeland. He stood up to defend his Fatherland, his loved ones and relatives from possible enslavement. This was the root cause of the mass heroism of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear. True, they say that the heroism of some is the idiocy of others, usually their bosses, who, by their actions, drove people into a desperate situation. However, such hopeless situations, excuse the pun, usually had at least two options. And the absolute majority chose feat, not betrayal. Naturally, this does not in any way mean Soviet soldiers who were captured due to circumstances beyond their control.
If we accept this point of view, then it is necessary to immediately exclude any malicious intent when planning and conducting operations. An analysis of all the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet Navy during the war years does not give a single, even the slightest, reason for such suspicions.
The second is cowardice. Here, let's start with the fact that all Soviet people with weapons in their hands, and sometimes even without them, who defended our Motherland from the German invasion, who gave us this life, are heroes by definition. Moreover, completely regardless of what deeds each of them performed personally, what awards he has. Any person who conscientiously fulfilled his duty, even far from the front, is also a participant in that war, he also contributed to the Victory.
Of course, the family is not without its black sheep, but it is easy to argue for someone over whose head the bullets did not whistle. In the course of hostilities, including in the Black Sea theater, there were isolated cases of cowardice in the face of the enemy, and even more often - confusion, paralysis of will. However, an analysis of the activities of the Chernomors shows that such isolated cases have never influenced the course, let alone the outcome of hostilities. As a rule, for every coward there was his boss, and sometimes a subordinate, who, with his actions, parried the negative consequences of the coward's activities. Another thing is that often people were more than enemies afraid of their own bosses and “competent authorities”. The cowardice shown in front of them really influenced several times, if not the outcome of operations, then at least the number of losses. Suffice it to recall the amphibious assault operations carried out in the absence of the necessary conditions, including weather conditions. They knew what the weather was expected, knew what it threatened, even reported on command - but as soon as the commanding roar was heard from above, everyone was allowed to go to the Russian at random. And how many times in the war, and even in peacetime, one could hear from the chief: "I will not relocate to the top!"
The third is banal human stupidity. True, here you must immediately make a reservation that if, as a result of any research, you are led to the idea that certain decisions or actions turned out to be wrong due to the fact that the boss is a fool, immediately be on your guard. Surely this happened not because the boss or the executor is stupid, but because the researcher has reached the limit of his knowledge of this issue. After all, declaring what happened as the result of someone's stupidity is the simplest and most universal way to explain the negative outcome of certain events. And the less competent the researcher, the more often he resorts to just such an explanation of what happened.
The reason for the failure of all the described operations lies primarily in the low operational-tactical training of the command personnel of the fleet. The negative development of events on the land front, as well as the problems and shortcomings of the material and technical plan, only exacerbated the miscalculations and mistakes in decision-making and their implementation. As a result, in pursuit of victorious reports, decisions were made to conduct operations, which resulted in the loss of warships (cruiser, 2 destroyer leaders, 2 destroyers) and hundreds of our sailors. This should never be forgotten.
Continuation, all parts:
Part 1. Raid operation to shell Constanta
Part 2. Raiding operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942
Part 3. Raids on communications in the western part of the Black Sea
Part 4. The last raiding operation
