Georgia
Until the end of the 80s, units of the 19th separate Tbilisi Air Defense Army, which were part of the 14th Air Defense Corps, were located on the territory of Georgia. On February 1, 1988, in connection with organizational and staff activities, the 14th Air Defense Corps was reorganized into the 96th Air Defense Division. It consisted of three anti-aircraft missile brigades: in Tbilisi, Poti and Echmiadzin, armed with the S-75M2 / M3 and S-125M / M air defense systems, a separate anti-aircraft missile regiment armed with the C-75M3 air defense system (located in Gudauta), a separate anti-aircraft missile regiment in the Rustavi area, equipped with a long-range air defense system S-200V, as well as two radio engineering brigades, where there were radars: P-18, P-19, P-37, P-14, 5N87, 19Zh6 and radio altimeters: PRV-9, -11, -13. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, two fighter regiments were based on the territory of Georgia: the 529th IAP in Abkhazia at the Gudauta airfield on the Su-27 and the 166th Guards IAP in Marneuli on the Su-15TM interceptors.
The layout of the air defense system on the territory of Georgia as of 1991
After the collapse of the USSR, parts of the former Soviet armed forces, including the forces of the 96th Air Defense Division, did not come under the jurisdiction of Georgia, which had proclaimed independence, but remained under Russian control. In the early 90s, most of the equipment was exported to Russia, but the new authorities of "independent" Georgia, against the background of ethnic conflicts flaring up in the republic, tried by all means to gain access to modern weapons, including air defense systems. The Russian military presence remained in Georgia until November 2007. The 12th military base (Batumi) was created on the basis of the 145th motorized rifle division, and the 62nd military base (Akhalkalaki) on the basis of the 147th motorized rifle division. Until 2005, anti-aircraft cover of Russian military bases in Georgia was carried out by the 1053rd anti-aircraft missile regiment (Batumi) and the 1007th anti-aircraft missile regiment (Kellachauri), which were armed with mobile air defense systems "Kub" and "Krug" on tracked chassis.
In 1992, Georgian armed formations forcibly captured one C-75M3 and two C-125M missiles, as well as several P-18 meter-range radars. These systems were put into operation, forming the basis of the air defense of the Georgian armed forces in the 90s. The Georgians used the S-75M3 air defense system during the armed conflict in Abkhazia, shooting down a Russian Su-27 on March 19, 1993 in the Gudauta region. However, they could not maintain the S-75 air defense system in Georgia for a long time, two years later, two low-altitude C-125M air defense systems with solid-propellant anti-aircraft missiles, which did not require time-consuming maintenance and refueling with liquid fuel and an oxidizer, remained in service. These complexes were located in the vicinity of Tbilisi and Poti. However, by the beginning of the 2000s, the "hundred and twenty fives" available in Georgia had exhausted their resource and needed refurbishment. Due to the lack of air-conditioned missiles, only two of the four launchers were equipped with missiles. By that time, control of the air situation had practically ceased in Georgia, since due to the lack of routine maintenance and current repairs, the radars seized from the Russian military were out of order.
In the nineties, a certain amount of weapons from the arsenals of units of the former Soviet army got into the air defense of the Georgian ground forces. Including 100-mm anti-aircraft guns KS-19, 57-mm anti-aircraft automatic guns S-60, 23-mm twin anti-aircraft guns ZU-23, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", SAM "Strela-10 ", MANPADS" Strela-2M "," Strela-3 "and" Igla-1 ". Some of the ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns were installed on lightly armored MT-LB tractors. However, most of these weapons were lost in the unsuccessful war for Georgia with Abkhazia, or out of order due to improper operation and improper storage.
After Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in 2003, a course was taken for the forced strengthening of the armed forces in order to create the preconditions for the return of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by military means. To cover Georgian ground units and important facilities in the event of a possible limited military intervention by Russia in Georgian operations against the breakaway republics, Georgia began active purchases of modern air defense systems and the modernization of existing ones.
In 2005, two Georgian S-125M air defense systems underwent refurbishment and modernization in Ukraine. In 2007, four P-18 radars were upgraded by the Ukrainian company "Aerotekhnika" to the level of P-18OU. Thanks to the modernization, the Georgian air defense forces received new two-coordinate radars for detecting air targets on a modern element base, capable of operating in conditions of passive and active interference. At the time of the attack on South Ossetia, the Georgian Air Force had four P-18OU radars deployed in Alekseevka, Marneuli, Poti and Batumi. In addition to the modernized P-18OU, two modern mobile three-coordinate 36D6-M radars were purchased in Ukraine. As already mentioned in the second part of the review, dedicated to Ukraine, the 36D6-M1 radar is currently one of the best in its class and is used in modern automated air defense systems, anti-aircraft missile systems for detecting low-flying air targets covered with active and passive interference, for air traffic control of military and civil aviation. This radar is a further development of the ST-68U (19Zh6) radar, which was put into service in 1980 and used as part of the S-300P air defense system. If necessary, the 36D6-M operates in the mode of an autonomous control center, the detection range is up to 360 km. Radar 36D6-M was created in Zaporozhye NPK Iskra. In 2008, these stations were located in the vicinity of Tbilisi and Gori.
According to information leaked to the Ukrainian media, Ukraine has supplied Georgia with up to four Kolchuga-M passive radar stations, capable of passively detecting modern warplanes, including those using Stealth technology, by detecting emissions from aircraft radio systems. The maximum detection range of "Kolchuga-M", depending on the operating mode and target radiation parameters, ranges from 200 to 600 kilometers. In addition, Georgia received one "Mandat" electronic warfare station. The Kolchuga-M and Mandat stations were produced in Donetsk by the SKB RTU and the Topaz company.
In 2006, the Ukrainian company "Aerotechnika" linked all the Georgian military and four civilian air traffic control system radars into a single National Air Control System (ASOC) (Air Sovereignty Operations Centers). The central command post of ASOC was located in Tbilisi. In the first half of 2008, the Georgian ASOC segment was connected to NATO's ASDE (Air Situation Data Exchange) system through Turkey, which allowed the Georgian air defense system to receive data on the air situation directly from the NATO joint air defense system in Europe.
The coverage of the air situation in 2008 over the territory of Georgia and the control of the combat actions of the air defense forces and means were carried out by combat command and control bodies and stationary radar posts according to information from the P-37, 36D6-M, P-18OM radars, as well as several French-made stationary radars in the regions Poti, Kopitnari, Gori, Tbilisi, Marneuli.
Stationary radar station in the vicinity of Tbilisi
In addition to modernizing the existing S-125M air defense systems, Georgia purchased modern anti-aircraft systems. In 2007, Georgian representatives submitted information to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, according to which one battalion of the Buk-M1 air defense missile system, consisting of three batteries, had been received from Ukraine. Complete with the air defense system, 48 9M38M1 missiles were supplied. The piquancy of this deal was that the 1985 anti-aircraft systems were taken from the anti-aircraft units of the Ukrainian armed forces. At the same time, Ukraine was negotiating with Russia on the modernization and repair of the existing Buk-M1 air defense systems.
The 9A39M1 launcher and the 9A310M1 self-propelled gun in the transport position during delivery to the exercise area in 2007.
The first air defense systems "Buk-M1" from Ukraine were delivered by sea to Georgia on June 7, 2007. In June 2008, photographs of Georgian Buk-M1s during a tactical exercise in Western Georgia, dated August 2007, appeared on the Internet. On June 12, 2008, another battery of the Buk-M1 air defense missile system was delivered to the port of Poti. But she did not have time to take part in hostilities due to not being mastered by the calculations, and was captured by Russian troops.
Towing of a captured Georgian missile launcher Buk-M1 air defense missile system by a Russian T-72 tank.
In addition to mobile Buk-M1 medium-range air defense systems, Ukraine has supplied Georgia with eight self-propelled near-zone air defense missile systems 9K33M2 Osa-AK and six 9K33M3 Osa-AKM air defense systems. Self-propelled complexes "Buk-M1" and "Osa-AK / AKM", as well as stationary C-125M, were part of the Georgian Air Force and were deployed in Kutaisi, Gori and Senaki. A number of sources published information about the purchase in Israel of one battery of a modern short-range air defense system Spyder-SR. This mobile anti-aircraft complex uses Python-5 and Derby air-to-air missiles as missiles. This information has not been officially confirmed, but the magazine ‘Jane's Missiles & Rockets’ in July 2008, citing a statement from a Rafael spokesman, said that “the Spyder-SR complex was ordered by two foreign customers, and one of them put the air defense system on alert”. Fragments of one of the missiles found in the combat zone are evidence of the presence in Georgia of the Israeli Spyder-SR air defense complex with Python missiles.
In addition to Ukraine and Israel, other states also participated in strengthening Georgia's air defense. Thus, according to the RF Ministry of Defense, Bulgaria supplied 12 ZU-23-2M anti-aircraft guns and more than 200 9M313 SAM systems for Igla-1 MANPADS. According to a Georgian report to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, in 2007 Poland received 30 Grom MANPADS (a modernized version of the Russian Igla-1 MANPADS) and 100 anti-aircraft missiles for them. There is information about the acquisition of Soviet-style MANPADS by Georgia in other countries of the former Warsaw Pact.
As for fighter aircraft, the Georgian Air Force has never had combat aircraft capable of acting as air defense interceptors. The existing Su-25 attack aircraft and L-39 training aircraft, equipped with R-60M melee missiles with a thermal homing head, can effectively deal only with helicopters and military transport aircraft at low and medium altitudes. In August 2008, Georgian attack aircraft and combat helicopters were used only at the initial stage of the conflict. In the conditions of air supremacy of the Russian Air Force, the Georgian Air Force combat aircraft had no chances of successfully completing combat missions, and all Georgian Su-25s were dispersed over several airfields and camouflaged in shelters to avoid destruction.
In 2008, the military air defense of the Georgian army had the following anti-aircraft weapons: a battery of 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns, a dozen ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", about 20 ZU-23 installations on various self-propelled chassis, about 30 MANPADS "Thunder ", As well as several dozen MANPADS" Igla-1 "," Strela-2M "and" Strela-3 ". Georgian "know-how" was equipping MANPADS crews with cross-country ATVs, which significantly increased their mobility and made it possible to quickly change firing positions.
In August 2008, despite the surprise of the attack, the Georgian army failed to solve the assigned tasks by military means. Moreover, the treacherous attack on South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeping contingent stationed there ultimately resulted in a crushing defeat and indiscriminate retreat of the Georgian armed forces. Against this background, the actions of the Georgian air defense system can be considered relatively successful. In terms of its potential, the Georgian air defense system in 2008 was approximately equivalent to the reinforced air defense system of the Soviet first line division in the late eighties - early nineties.
The strengths of the Georgian air defense system were:
- the presence of a centralized system for lighting the air situation and controlling the combat actions of air defense forces and means, which included various types of military and civilian radars;
- high mobility of air defense systems and its separation (the presence of short-range and short-range air defense systems, MANPADS, ZA);
- discrepancy between the frequency range of the radio-electronic means of the Georgian air defense missile system of the Soviet production with the operating range of the GOS UR "air-radar" of the Russian aviation (the existing letters of the GOS are mainly designed to work on the frequencies of the NATO air defense systems, and not according to their own means);
- the absence of standard electronic warfare equipment for individual and group protection in the operating frequency range of the Georgian air defense systems "Buk-M1" and "Osa AK / AKM";
The collision with the Georgian air defense system in 2008 became a serious test for the Russian Air Force, especially since, apparently, initially, our military leadership underestimated the enemy's air defense capabilities. The effectiveness of the use of air defense systems in many respects turned out to be very high due to the presence of highly qualified Ukrainian instructors in the crews. According to the official Ukrainian-Georgian version, all of them were not in active military service in the armed forces of Ukraine, but were “civilian specialists”. To detect air targets and issue target designation to anti-aircraft systems in the Georgian air defense system, in order to avoid losses, they tried to make the most of the data received from the Kolchuga-M radio-technical reconnaissance stations, minimizing the operating time of active radars. Georgian air defense systems used ambush tactics, trying to avoid long-term activation of their own radars. This seriously hampered the fight against Georgian air defense systems.
According to unofficial information, unconfirmed by the Russian Defense Ministry, Georgian air defense systems were able to shoot down five Russian aircraft on the first day of the war on August 8 - three Su-25 attack aircraft, one Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber. In addition, during the conflict, the Russian Air Force lost three more aircraft - two Su-25 attack aircraft (August 9), one Su-24M front-line bomber (August 10). At least one more Russian Su-25 was hit by a MANPADS missile, but was able to safely reach its airfield. In total, according to the general director of the 121st aircraft repair plant (Kubinka) Yakov Kazhdan, three Su-25s received serious combat damage.
It is believed that some of the Russian combat aircraft could have been shot down by "friendly" MANPADS fire, which were launched by Russian paratroopers, motorized riflemen and Ossetian militias. Presumably, the Su-24M bomber and the Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft were hit by the Osa-AK / AKM air defense missile system, and one Su-25 attack aircraft fell victim to “friendly fire”. Two of the crew members of the downed Russian planes (pilots of the Su-24MR and Tu-22M3) were taken prisoner, from where they were released on an exchange on 19 August. Five Russian pilots (the pilot of the Su-25 shot down by friendly fire, the navigator of the Su-24MR crew and three crew members of the Tu-22M3) were killed.
In the Russian media and representatives of the RF Ministry of Defense, in order to justify the losses, statements were made about the alleged presence in Georgia of long-range S-200V air defense systems and modern mobile Tor air defense systems delivered from Ukraine, but no confirmation of this was subsequently provided and these statements should be considered disinformation. It is doubtful that the Georgian military would be able to operate the stationary S-200V air defense missile system with a 5V28 liquid missile defense system weighing more than 7 tons. Maintaining this anti-aircraft complex in working order requires numerous well-trained technical personnel and is very costly. As for the Tor air defense system, in Ukraine, which is the main supplier of air defense systems for the Georgian armed forces, there were no serviceable complexes of this type, and Georgia could not get them anywhere except from Russia. That, taking into account the tense Russian-Georgian relations, was, of course, not realistic.
Never before August 2008 had the Russian Air Force suffered such heavy losses. The reasons that led to such serious consequences were:
- flaws in planning, neglect of intelligence data and underestimation of the enemy's capabilities;
- the habit of acting according to templates, lack of understanding of the importance of protecting aircraft and helicopters, the lives of crews, the place and role of electronic warfare in the overall system of combat support;
- lack of detailed analysis of information about the Georgian air defense system;
- insufficiently fast reaction of headquarters to a rapidly changing situation and poor interaction of the Air Force with ground units;
- non-use of jammers to provide cover for strike aircraft due to their absence at the nearest airfields;
During combat missions on the territory of South Ossetia and Georgia, it turned out that the Russian pilots were not ready to conduct hostilities against the enemy, which had modern air defense and air situation control systems. This war actually became the first conflict in the world in which aviation was opposed by new generation air defense systems, such as the Buk-M1, which entered service in the eighties. In all previous military campaigns at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century, the air defense system was represented mainly by air defense systems developed in the fifties and sixties of the last century. In addition, the fact that the Russian Air Force, like the Soviet Air Force, always prepared for war with an enemy equipped with Western-made air defense systems, played a role. This led to the fact that the existing Russian radar homing heads for air-to-radar missiles in frequency ranges did not coincide with radars and air defense systems of Soviet production, there was no necessary control and target designation equipment.
The following factors also played a negative role:
- in the first two days after the start of hostilities, the flights of strike aircraft were carried out strictly along the planned routes with the optimal distribution of echelons for the purpose of flight safety, at speeds not exceeding 900 km / h, and at altitudes within the engagement zone of unsuppressed Georgian air defense systems;
- lack of means of electronic warfare for group protection of battle formations at the first stage;
- insufficient number of jammers, short time spent in the jamming zone;
- insufficient number of reconnaissance aircraft and imperfection of their equipment;
- insufficient height of the maximum flight ceiling of helicopters - jammers, as a result of which it was impossible to use them in mountainous terrain;
- the conduct of electronic reconnaissance was carried out irregularly and not by all forces, without the setting of passive and active interference to clarify the electronic situation, the state of communication and control systems, the deployment of enemy radar and air defense systems;
- operational control of the areas of combat operations, identification of command and control units, launchers, positions of radar and air defense systems of the armed forces of Georgia with the help of space reconnaissance equipment was practically not carried out;
- the share of using high-precision ammunition in air strikes was less than 1%.
As is often the case in Russia - "Until the thunder breaks out, the man does not cross himself." Unacceptably high losses and insufficient effectiveness of the actions of the Russian military aviation at the initial stage of the operation required urgent measures. To correct the situation, it was necessary to intervene by representatives of the Air Force High Command and develop, together with the command of the 4th Army of the Air Force and Air Defense, appropriate recommendations to the crews of aircraft and helicopters.
In order to avoid losses of our aviation, organizational measures began to be widely used:
- participation in aircraft strikes without personal protective equipment was excluded;
- the use of strike aircraft only under the cover of group means of protection from the zones by EW aircraft and helicopters (An-12PP, Mi-8PPA, Mi-8SMV-PG) and in combat formations by Su-34 aircraft with a new generation of electronic warfare systems;
- the use of combat aviation was carried out at maximum speed and at altitudes excluding the use of MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery of Georgia;
- Su-25 aircraft exited the attack by massive shooting of heat traps and minimized the operating time at maximum modes;
- aviation flights began to be carried out along routes bypassing areas covered by air defense means (Buk-M1, Osa-AK / AKM), as well as at altitudes over 3,500 meters and speeds that provide optimal conditions for overcoming countermeasures air defense equipment;
- the use of exits to targets from directions not covered by air defense means, and the implementation of repeated attacks from different directions using the terrain and smoke screens;
- target attacks "on the move" at the minimum time using the natural thermal background when moving away from the target (towards the mountains, clouds, illuminated by the sun);
- flight along different routes to the target and back using demonstrative and distracting groups of planes and helicopters;
- exclusion of repeated approach from the same course and flights along the same route to the target and back.
After the losses incurred on August 8 and 9, the Russian Air Force, using the entire available arsenal, suppressed the Georgian air defense systems and radars. Very good results when covering strike groups were demonstrated by the onboard jamming station of the promising front-line bomber Su-34, which at that time were not in the combat units. The fight against enemy radar and air defense systems was mainly conducted by front-line bombers Su-24M with the help of X-58 anti-radar missiles with the use of Phantasmagoria equipment.
The Georgian radar 36D6-M in the vicinity of Gori, destroyed by Russian aviation in August 2008.
The identified positions of the Georgian air defense systems, their places of permanent deployment and storage bases for equipment were subjected to massive air strikes. Both Georgian divisions of the S-125M air defense missile systems and most of the military and civilian radars were destroyed, as well as all the Buk-M1 and Osa-AK / AKM air defense systems were suppressed. Unlike the Serbian S-125 air defense systems, which were quite successfully used in 1999 against NATO aircraft, Georgian complexes of this type were constantly at stationary positions, which ultimately led to their complete destruction. In the following days of hostilities, only Georgian MANPADS constituted a real threat to Russian aircraft and helicopters.
After the Russian military aviation began a targeted hunt for Georgian air defense systems and radars, the enemy within a short time lost more than half of the anti-aircraft systems and radars, and Russian radio intelligence systems no longer recorded their radiation over the territory of Georgia. One can only regret that the Georgian air defense system was not suppressed at the very beginning of the military operation, and our command made major miscalculations that led to unjustified losses. It is worth thinking about what the outcome of the military campaign would be if our Air Force faced a more prepared and powerful enemy.
During the offensive of the Russian ground units, in addition to the Buk-M1 air defense system (four self-propelled firing units and two missile launchers with missiles), five combat vehicles of the Osa-AKM air defense missile system, several ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns and several self-propelled ZSU-23-4 "Shilka", which are in varying degrees of preservation. In addition, Russian troops managed to seize a number of samples of special American-made equipment. Its composition is not disclosed, but apparently, we can talk about radio intelligence stations, satellite and "closed" communication systems. US officials have repeatedly demanded the return of "illegally seized" US military equipment, but they were refused. A number of sources reported that the mobile launcher of the Israeli air defense system "Spider" became a trophy of the Russian army in Georgia. However, there is no confirmation of this in official Russian sources, perhaps, the fact of the capture of the "Spyder" was not made public for political reasons, because of the unwillingness to spoil Russian-Israeli relations. A few days after the end of the "hot" phase of the Russian-Georgian conflict, Russian radio-technical reconnaissance means began again to record the radiation of Georgian radar and air defense missile systems. This indicated that it was not possible to completely destroy the Georgian air defense system.
I would like to believe that the leadership of the RF Ministry of Defense made the appropriate conclusions based on the results of the 2008 military campaign. Over the past years, the Russian attack combat aviation has been qualitatively improved. The Air Force began extensive deliveries of new front-line bombers Su-34, part of the Su-24M, Su-25 and Tu-22M3 were modernized. At the same time, the Georgian air defense system did not significantly improve. In order to restore the radar field over the territory of the country, several stationary radars were put into operation, intended mainly for air traffic control.
SAM Crotale Mk3
At the end of October 2015, Georgian and French representatives signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the supply of new anti-missile and air defense systems. On June 15, 2016, Georgian Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli signed an agreement with ThalesRaytheonSystems in Paris on the purchase of "advanced" air defense systems. The details of the deal were not officially disclosed, but information was leaked to the media that at the first stage we are talking about the supply of a towed version of the Crotale Mk3 short-range air defense system, which is a modification of the Crotale NG air defense system and the Ground Master 200 (GM200) three-coordinate radar.
The launch range of the Crotale NG missiles reaches 11,000 m, the ceiling is 6,000 m. The complex, in addition to an anti-jamming radar, is equipped with a set of optoelectronic sensors, which makes it possible to covertly operate at night and in difficult weather conditions.
Radar GM200
The GM200 mobile radar is housed on a four-axle cargo chassis. The time for transferring from transport to working position is 15 minutes. The detection range of high-altitude air targets is 250 km. Thanks to its high automation, it can be serviced by two operators.
SPU SAMP-T
After the completion of the first stage of the transaction, it is planned to supply SAMP-T long-range air defense systems using the Aster 30 long-range missile and the Arabel multifunctional radar. The launch range of the latest 30 Aster missiles exceeds 100 km. According to the manufacturer, the SAMP-T complex is capable of successfully fighting not only combat aircraft, but also hitting operational-tactical ballistic missiles.
In addition to acquiring modern radars and anti-aircraft systems, Georgian representatives showed interest in the French Mirage 2000-5 fighters. All this testifies to the desire of the Georgian leadership in the future to significantly increase the capabilities of its own air defense system, which, if all plans are implemented, will significantly change the balance of forces in the region. At the same time, it can be noted that the traditional role of Ukraine as the main supplier of air defense systems has disappeared, and the Georgian armed forces are gradually abandoning Soviet-style equipment and weapons.
