The built-in large-caliber four-barreled machine gun YakB-12, 7, mounted on the Mi-24V, was well suited to combat manpower and unarmored equipment. There is a known case when in Afghanistan a bus with rebels was literally sawn in half by a dense line of YakB-12, 7. But among the crews of helicopters, and especially among the gunsmiths, the YakB-12, 7 was not particularly popular. In the course of hostilities, serious shortcomings of the machine gun were revealed. The complexity of the design and the high thermal and vibration loads led to frequent failures due to contamination and overheating. There were also problems with the supply of the cartridge tape. With a burst length of about 250 shots, the machine gun began to "spit" and wedge. On average, one failure occurred for every 500 shots, and this is at a rate of fire of 4000-4500 rds / min.
This is not to say that no measures were taken to improve the reliability of the built-in machine gun mount. So, the YakBYu-12, 7 was presented for testing with improved reliability and rate of fire, increased to 5000 rds / min. But at the same time, the weight of the modernized machine gun reached 60 kg, which was 15 kg heavier than the YakB-12, 7. By that time, the military was largely disappointed with the machine-gun armament mounted on the fire support helicopter. The effective fire range of 12, 7-mm machine guns left much to be desired, in addition, the command of the army aviation wanted to have built-in weapons, with which it was possible to hit armored vehicles and field-type fortifications. In this regard, in 1981, the production of the "artillery" modification of the Mi-24P began. In just 10 years of serial production, 620 vehicles were built.
In terms of its flight characteristics, the composition of avionics and outboard weapons, the helicopter is generally similar to the Mi-24V, and was distinguished by the presence of a fixed 30-mm GSh-2-30 (GSh-30K) cannon installed on the starboard side. GSh-30K with barrels extended to 2400 mm, equipped with an evaporative cooling system and has a variable rate of fire (300-2600 rds / min). The cannon barrels were lengthened by 900 mm not only to improve ballistic characteristics, but also for layout reasons - to divert muzzle gases forward, away from the side of the vehicle. For the same reason, the barrels of the GSh-Z0K helicopter were equipped with flame arresters that reduce the impact of the shock load on the Mi-24P board.
The BR-30 armor-piercing explosive projectile with an initial projectile speed of 940 m / s, at a distance of up to 1000 m, easily hits armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. With a certain amount of luck from the GSh-30K, you can pierce the upper relatively thin armor of the tank, "gnaw through" the side or stern with a long burst. However, the 30-mm air cannon turned out to be too powerful and heavy for installation on a combat helicopter. The crushing recoil adversely affected the reliability of the avionics, and worthy targets for such a powerful weapon were not always found. When operating against an enemy with a strong ground air defense, ATGMs and powerful NAR S-8 and S-13 are much preferable, since when firing at ground targets from a cannon, the helicopter is more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire.
Too powerful and heavy, the GSh-30K was also fixed motionless, and only the pilot who controlled the helicopter and dropped bombs and launched the NAR could fire from it. Thus, the navigator-operator, at whose disposal was the ATGM guidance station, in local conflicts of low intensity and various kinds of "anti-terrorist" operations, was often left without work.
For a relatively low-speed helicopter, a very valuable quality was the ability to use mobile small arms and cannon weapons and target firing regardless of the direction of flight. Evaluations of various options for built-in weapons have shown that a mobile unit with a 23-mm cannon will be much more effective.
The helicopter with a new gun mount received the designation Mi-24VP. Compared to the YakB-12, 7, on the new NPPU-24 cannon turret with the GSh-23L double-barreled cannon, with a constant firing sector in the horizontal plane, the vertical deflection of the gun became possible in the range from + 10 ° to -40 °.
Another innovation introduced on this modification of the "twenty-four" was the ATGM "Attack-V", created on the basis of "Shturm-V". The difference from the "Shturm" was the use of a new sighting and sighting system with a laser rangefinder and an optical, television channel. During the use of an anti-tank missile system, the helicopter can maneuver with a yaw angle of up to 110 ° and a roll of up to 30 °.
The new 9M120 ATGM with a tandem cumulative warhead, created on the basis of the 9M114 missile of the Shturm-V complex, thanks to the use of a more powerful engine, has a firing range increased to 6000 m, as well as a more powerful warhead with armor penetration of more than 800 mm behind ERA. In addition to missiles with a tandem cumulative warhead, variants have been developed with a cumulative fragmentation and high-explosive fragmentation warhead. The highest efficiency of the ATGM "Ataka-V" application is achieved at a range of up to 4000m. At the same time, it is possible to launch missiles at zero flight altitude, which reduces the helicopter's vulnerability to air defense systems. The probability of hitting a tank with a single missile in a combat situation at a range of up to 4000 m is 0.65-0.9. Later, the 9M120M ATGM with a launch range of up to 8000 m and armor penetration of 950 mm was developed for use as part of the Ataka-VM ATGM. The modernized Mi-24VN, which was a further development of the Mi-24VP, was equipped with a Tor observation and sighting system with a laser rangefinder and optical, television and thermal imaging channels. The "Tor" system, in addition to searching and tracking targets, is also used to target ATGMs.
The Mi-24VP became the most advanced combat helicopter put into production in the Soviet Union. The production of the Mi-24VP began in 1989 and lasted until 1992. Due to the reduction in military costs and the collapse of the USSR, relatively few helicopters of this modification were built. By deep modernization of the Mi-24VP, the Mi-24VM (Mi-35M) was created in 1995. Serial construction of the helicopter has been launched at the Rosvertol enterprise in Rostov-on-Don.
Initially, the Mi-35M was designed exclusively for export purposes. But the challenges faced by our country in the 21st century, and the "natural decline" of earlier modifications of the "twenty-fours" required the equipping of helicopter units with new attack vehicles. According to data published in open sources, since 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense has ordered 49 Mi-35M.
The most noticeable difference between the Mi-35M and the Mi-24 family was the fixed landing gear, which made it possible to simplify the design and reduce the takeoff weight. At the same time, thanks to the use of more powerful VK-2500-02 engines with increased altitude and increased resource, the maximum speed, due to the increase in drag, did not decrease much and is 300 km / h. Another notable feature was the use of shortened wings with DBZ-UV beam holders, which allow the helicopter to mount the APU-8/4-U multi-seat launchers used to accommodate guided missiles. In addition to strike weapons, missiles were introduced into the helicopter's arsenal to combat air targets: Igla, R-60M and R-73. The shortened wing with new holders made it possible to accelerate the Mi-35M equipment with various types of aircraft weapons using a lifting mechanism.
To improve the flight performance of the Mi-35M and maneuver at a speed close to zero, a new carrier system is used. Among the innovations introduced is a main rotor with increased survivability, the blades of which are made of composite materials. The propeller blades have a lower weight and increased technical resource. They remain operational even when fired by 30-mm projectiles. Together with the main rotor, a new titanium alloy hub with elastomeric joints that do not require lubrication is used. The four-bladed tail rotor with a two-tier X-shaped arrangement of blades and torsion bar suspension is also made from composite materials.
The improvements made to the avionics are not so striking, but they are no less important for increasing the combat potential. The helicopter is equipped with an upgraded OPS-24N surveillance and sighting system, which is compatible with night vision equipment. The Mi-35M helicopter is equipped with a thermal imaging system for observing and tracking targets, as well as night vision devices. This enables the crew to detect and recognize a target at a distance of several kilometers at any time of the day. The satellite navigation system, connected with the helicopter's on-board computer, determines the coordinates of the helicopter with high accuracy during the mission and significantly reduces the time for plotting the route. All this makes it possible to effectively use the helicopter in daily combat and can significantly reduce the workload on the crew.
At the moment, the Mi-35M is the pinnacle of the evolutionary development of the Mi-24 family. In a number of countries, efforts are being made to modernize Soviet-made combat helicopters.
The most famous are the modernization options offered by the South African company Advanced Technologies and Engineering (ATE). The main changes in the process of improving the combat characteristics of the Mi-24 are being made to the front of the helicopter. The cockpit and bow has a new configuration and modern avionics. The cockpit layout provides better visibility than on the Mi-24D / V. According to statements made by ATE representatives, the helicopter's maneuverability has been increased, which in turn makes it easier to fly at extremely low altitudes. Thanks to the use of Kevlar armor, the weight of the helicopter has been reduced by 1.5 tons.
The cockpits are equipped with color multifunctional displays, a satellite navigation system, night vision equipment and a compact gyro-stabilized sight Argos-410. The weapon control equipment of the Mi-24V modernized in South Africa consists of a FLIR multichannel sighting system with an automatic target tracking and a built-in laser rangefinder, a helmet-mounted sighting system and an information display system. At the moment, 4 modifications of the helicopter are known, designated as the Mi-24 Super Hind. The first modification of the Super Hind Mk II, commissioned by Algeria, appeared in 1999. Currently, Super Hind Mk II, Mk III and Mk IV helicopters have been delivered to the armed forces of Algeria, Azerbaijan and Nigeria. Re-equipment, modernization and refurbishment of the Mi-24V in the past were carried out jointly by JSC Rostvertol, the South African company ATE and the Ukrainian state-owned enterprise Konotop Aircraft Repair Plant Aviakon.
The main flight data of helicopters being modernized in South Africa remained at the level of the Mi-24V. But the main armament of the helicopter has been completely redesigned. The main "anti-tank caliber" was eight laser-guided Ingwe ATGMs, with an armor penetration of about 1000 mm and a launch range of 5000 m. In the near future, it is planned to introduce a Mokopane ATGM with a launch range of 10 km into the Super Hind armament. The helicopters delivered to Azerbaijan are equipped with the Ukrainian Barrier-V anti-tank missile system with a launch range of up to 5000 m and armor penetration of 800 mm behind ERA. The Super Hind helicopter has the ability to use both Soviet-made weapons and NATO standards. In the nose of the helicopter, a remote-controlled turret with a 20-mm automatic cannon GI-2 with high speeds and angles of horizontal and vertical guidance is installed. With a mass of weapons comparable to the 23-mm GSh-23L, the South African 20-mm cannon with dual feed fires 125 g projectiles with an initial speed of 1040 m / s and a rate of fire of 750 rounds / min. According to a statement from the manufacturer Denel Land Systems, a 20-mm shell with an armor-piercing core at a distance of 100 m is capable of penetrating 50 mm of armor.
Soviet combat "twenty-fours" have a rich combat biography. But historically, in more than 90% of combat sorties, helicopters were used not to fight tanks, but to provide fire support to ground units, destroy fortifications, strike at positions and camps of all sorts of bandit formations and insurgents. At the same time, the share of guided weapons used in air strikes in relation to unguided weapons was negligible, and mainly NAR, bombs and built-in small arms and cannon weapons were used to destroy ground and surface targets. This is partly due to the high cost of modern guided missiles and the complexity of their use, but most often it was due to the areal nature of the targets.
As a rule, the Mi-24 acted as a kind of flying armored MLRS, unleashing a hail of unguided missiles on the enemy in a few seconds. A salvo of 128 57-mm NAR S-5, 80 80-mm NAR S-8 or 20 heavy 122-mm S-13 is capable not only of sweeping light field fortifications and destroying enemy manpower over a large area, but also provides the strongest moral psychological effect. Those lucky enough to survive the crocodile air attack will never forget it.
In most cases, the use of large-caliber aerial bombs, cluster bombs, incendiary tanks and submunitions equipped at the KMGU proved to be very effective. The low drop height and the relatively low speed of the helicopter made it possible to lay bombs with high accuracy. But the lack of free-fall bombs can be considered the need to fly over the target, which makes the helicopter vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire. In addition, when dropping bombs from a low altitude, there is a danger of shrapnel hitting the helicopter, in connection with which it is necessary to use deceleration fuses.
Although the Mi-24 helicopters fought a lot, there are not so many reliable combat episodes where they were used to combat armored vehicles. Within the framework of this publication, the most interesting is the experience of the combat use of the Mi-25 (export version of the Mi-24D) by Iraq and Syria.
During the Iranian-Iraqi war, the Mi-25V was able to perform the entire possible range of tasks: to fight tanks, destroy field fortifications and provide air support to the offensive of ground forces, destroy enemy personnel on the battlefield, escort transport helicopters, and lay minefields, conduct reconnaissance and adjustment of artillery fire, spray chemical warfare agents and conduct aerial combat. Against the Iranian armored vehicles were used ATGM "Phalanx", NAR S-5K / KO and containers KMGU-2, equipped with mines and PTAB. Most often, combat helicopters attacked the Iranian M47, M60 and Chieftain Mk5 in places of concentration and on the march. In Iraq, the most trained Mi-25 crews used the "free hunt" tactics. Information about the location of enemy tanks was transmitted by ground units or recorded by aerial reconnaissance. Also, the Iraqis actively listened to the talks of the Persians in the VHF range. Based on the data received, combat missions were planned, carried out as part of a pair. The leader searched for enemy armored vehicles and launched the ATGM. The wingman, in turn, covered the tank destroyer and suppressed anti-aircraft artillery with the help of the NAR.
Destroyed Iranian tank M60
Iraqi helicopters have sometimes successfully interacted with their own armored units. Mi-25, operating in conjunction with light anti-tank helicopters Aerospatiale SA-342 Gazelle, in July 1982 played a significant role in repelling the Iranian offensive near Basra. Parts of the 16th, 88th and 92nd armored divisions of Iran suffered heavy losses from the actions of air hunters. However, the anti-tank helicopters themselves had to operate in difficult conditions. The often desolate nature of the terrain with a view to the horizon and the absence of hills behind which it was possible to secretly approach the target made a surprise attack by helicopters difficult to implement. This in turn increased the vulnerability of combat helicopters. In addition, the Mi-25s were among the priority targets for Iranian fighters. In 1982, the Iranians managed to capture the Mi-25, which made an emergency landing. This car was exhibited in Tehran among other trophies.
During the Iranian-Iraqi war, the Mi-25 for the first time clashed in air battles with other combat helicopters and enemy fighters. The data on the losses and victories of the parties are quite contradictory. Foreign researchers agree that the Iranian AH-1J Cobra destroyed 6 Mi-25s in air battles, while losing 10 of their vehicles. For 8 years of the armed conflict, 56 air battles with the participation of the Mi-25 took place.
The crews of the Iranian Phantoms and Tomkats claim several downed combat helicopters. However, the Mi-25 was not an easy target. So, on October 27, 1982, an Iraqi Mi-24 in an air battle in the vicinity of the village of Ein Khosh destroyed an Iranian F-4 fighter. A number of domestic sources indicate that the Phantom was hit by the Falanga-M ATGM, which of course is impossible. The maximum flight speed of the 9M17M anti-tank missile is 230 m / s, which is significantly less than the cruising speed of a jet fighter. And most importantly, the Raduga-F radio command guidance system is physically incapable of directing missiles to objects moving at a speed of more than 60 km / h. Effective means of dealing with air targets that were in the Mi-25 arsenal are 57-mm unguided rockets and a four-barreled 12, 7-mm machine gun YakB-12, 7.
It is reliably known about the use of Syrian Mi-25s in 1982 against Israeli armored vehicles in Lebanon. The advancing Israeli units literally cluttered the few narrow roads of Lebanon with armored vehicles. This was used by the crews of the Syrian "crocodiles". According to Syrian data, in 93 sorties, combat helicopters, without suffering losses, destroyed more than 40 Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers. However, these data are likely to be overstated. Even if the Syrians managed to achieve so many hits, this does not mean that all Israeli tanks were destroyed or destroyed. The American M48 and M60 modernized in Israel, as well as the Merkava Mk.1 of their own design, were equipped with Blazer "reactive armor", which protected against cumulative ammunition with a fairly high degree of reliability.
In the early 80s, Angolan Mi-25s attacked South African army columns that had invaded the country from Namibia. Among the priority targets were the Olifant Mk.1A tanks (a modification of the British Centurion tank) and Ratel fire support armored vehicles. Helicopters were flown by Cuban crews. There is no reliable data on how many units of armored vehicles they managed to destroy, but a kind of reaction to the actions of combat helicopters can be considered the active use by the enemy of captured ZU-23, Strela-2M MANPADS, and Strela-1 mobile short-range air defense systems.
To reduce combat losses, helicopter pilots had to operate at extremely low altitudes. In the course of fierce clashes by December 1985, all Angolan Mi-24s were lost or disabled.
In 1986, three dozen Mi-35s and spare parts for the surviving helicopters were delivered from the USSR to Angola. With the help of Soviet specialists, several Mi-25s were returned to service. Combat helicopters Mi-25 and Mi-35 successfully operated against South African troops in the southeast of the country. However, it was mainly the same Cubans who fought on them, the Angolan pilots frankly avoided dangerous missions.
In addition to fire support for their troops, strikes on UNITA camps, attacks by South African armored vehicles and transport convoys, helicopters in a number of cases solved transport tasks to deliver food and ammunition to forward positions.
Fighting "crocodiles" fought in other parts of Africa. In 1988, in addition to the existing Mi-24A, the Mi-35 arrived in Ethiopia. They were actively used in battles with Eritrean separatists. In the winter of 1989, two groups of Mi-35 attacked a convoy moving along a road in a mountain gorge, which included an armored personnel carrier. After the use of the NAR C-8 and the suspended cannon containers UPK-23-250, several burning cars remained on the road. Mi-35s effectively hunted for high-speed armed boats of the Eritreans. Mi-35s were successfully used not only against ground targets, but also against surface targets. Combat helicopters managed to destroy in the Red Sea about a dozen armed speedboats of the separatists who attacked transports awaiting their turn for unloading or heading to Ethiopian ports.
In 1998, Ethiopia, in addition to the existing combat helicopters, received from Russia a batch of overhauled and modernized Mi-24Vs. During the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, which lasted from 1998 to 2000, Ethiopian "crocodiles" destroyed at least 15 Eritrean T-54/55 tanks. At least one helicopter was shot down by air defense forces and several more were damaged. In February 1999, one damaged Mi-35 made an emergency landing behind the front line and was captured. Subsequently, with the participation of Ukrainian specialists, the helicopter was restored, and it was included in the Eritrean Air Force.
After the end of hostilities, another Mi-24V was hijacked to Eritrea. Both helicopters are currently at Asmara airbase. Their operation continued until early 2016. Now helicopters, due to the unsatisfactory technical condition, do not rise into the air.
Approximately 30 Libyan Mi-24A and Mi-25 took part in the civil war in Chad. "Crocodiles" were used mainly against manpower and all-wheel drive pickups, on which recoilless guns, large-caliber machine guns and anti-aircraft guns were mounted. It is not known what successes the Libyan combat helicopters achieved, but 7 Mi-24A and Mi-25 were lost. A couple of "twenty-fours" were shot down by air defense systems at the disposal of the Chadian dictator Hissen Habré, two more helicopters were destroyed by saboteurs at the Maaten Es Saray airbase, and three in good condition were captured at the Wadi Dum airbase in March 1987. The captured helicopters were subsequently transferred to the United States and France in gratitude for military assistance in the fight against the troops of Muammar Gaddafi. And this help was very significant: from France, airborne units and two squadrons of Jaguar fighter-bombers participated in the hostilities, and from the United States there were massive supplies of modern weapons, including such complex systems as ATGM Tou and SAM Hawk.
In the 90-2000s, on the African continent, twenty-fours of various modifications fought in Zaire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire. They were piloted by mercenaries from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the CIS and South Africa. Often, one appearance in the sky of "crocodiles" was enough for the soldiers of the opposing side to scatter in horror. As in other local conflicts, the Mi-24 in central Africa was used mainly by NAR on ground targets. At the same time, the losses of the twenty-four were insignificant, the helicopters mainly fought due to errors in control and due to unsatisfactory maintenance. In November 2004, five Mi-24Vs were destroyed by French forces on the ground in response to an air strike on a French Foreign Legion base.
Mi-24V of the Ivory Coast Air Force, which participated in the internal conflict, were acquired from Belarus and Bulgaria. The nationality of the pilots who flew combat missions on them was not disclosed. On some of the helicopters, movable four-barreled large-caliber machine guns were dismantled. Instead of them, containers with 23-mm cannons were suspended for actions against manpower and weakly protected equipment. It is reported that in early 2017, a new batch of twenty-fours arrived at the air base in Abidjan.
Soviet Mi-24s were first used in combat in Afghanistan. But the Mujahideen did not have armored vehicles, helicopters provided fire support to ground troops, hunted for caravans with weapons, and struck at the bases and fortified areas of the rebels. Mi-24V and Mi-24P actively fought during two Chechen campaigns. The first reliably known case of using "twenty-fours" against armored vehicles of the separatists was recorded on November 23, 1994. During a joint attack by Su-25 attack aircraft and Mi-24 helicopters on the location of a tank regiment in Shali, 21 tanks and 14 armored personnel carriers were destroyed.
In the initial period of the operation "to restore constitutional order", when the enemy still had a significant number of armored vehicles, the crews of combat helicopters often used Shturm-V missiles. For 40 C-8 unguided rockets fired, there was approximately one ATGM. In a number of cases, Mi-24s were involved in repelling attacks from enemy tanks. On March 22, 1995, while repelling the offensive of militants from Shali and Gudermes, who, with the support of armored vehicles, tried to unblock Argun, the Mi-24V unit destroyed 4 tanks and up to 170 militants. After that, the Chechens began to avoid frontal attacks using tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, using them as nomadic firing points. To identify them, air spotters-aircraft controllers were involved, in the role of which were usually Mi-8MT helicopters. On March 26, 1995, the Mi-8MT directed a group of 6 Mi-24s at a large detachment of Dudayevites, moving in cars and armored vehicles. As a result, 2 armored vehicles, 17 vehicles and more than 100 bandits were destroyed. In addition to armored vehicles and vehicles, ATGMs were intensively used for the targeted destruction of firing points, command posts and ammunition depots. Soon, this led to the fact that in the helicopter regiments participating in the hostilities, a shortage of guided missiles began to be felt. According to the official data released in 1994-1995, the actions of army aviation in Chechnya destroyed 16 tanks, 28 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 41 Grad MLRS, 53 guns and mortars, and many other equipment.
During the first campaign, the main air defense assets of the Chechen militants were machine gun mounts of 12, 7-14, 5 mm caliber and MZA of 23-37 mm caliber. There were also 85-100 anti-aircraft guns used during the Soviet era in avalanche service. But the combat value of large-caliber anti-aircraft guns when firing at air targets without a PUZO is questionable. In addition to specialized anti-aircraft weapons, the helicopters were fired from small arms and anti-tank grenade launchers.
Irrecoverable losses of the Mi-24 in the First Chechen were 4 vehicles. Several "twenty-fours", having received serious combat damage, managed to return to airfields or make an emergency landing at the location of their troops. This was facilitated by the good security of the helicopter. Steel armor 4-5 mm thick covered the cockpit, gearbox, engine oil tanks, gearbox and hydraulic tank, which made it possible to delay two-thirds of the bullets. The armored glass of the cabins showed a fairly high durability, although the greatest number of hits on the Mi-24 occurred in the front, during the attack, and most of all hit the cockpit of the navigator-operator.
Engines are very vulnerable to combat damage, but if one engine fails, the second automatically switches to emergency mode. Even with a shot through the gearbox and complete "oil starvation", it was possible to stay in the air for another 15-20 minutes. Most often, the helicopters suffered due to the lumbago of the hydraulic system, power grid and control, stretched throughout the helicopter, although their duplication in many cases made it possible to save the car. As in Afghanistan, the Mi-24's vulnerability from rear fire was confirmed; at the exit from the attack, the helicopter had a vulnerable "dead zone".
During the second campaign, helicopters were used with no less intensity. But the combat losses of the Mi-24 during the "counter-terrorist operation" from August 9, 1999 to June 19, 2000 increased significantly and amounted to 9 Mi-24s. This was due to the fact that the enemy made the appropriate conclusions and prepared, paying great attention to improving the air defense. If in 1994-1995 launches of MANPADS could be counted on one hand, then in four years the militants managed to accumulate a hefty arsenal of these weapons. The use of guided anti-tank missiles in the second campaign was much rarer. This was due to both the shortage of ATGMs and the small number of targets for them.
It is rather difficult to assess the effectiveness of the Mi-24 as a tank destroyer. This undoubtedly outstanding machine has been successfully used in many conflicts, but mainly in the role of assault rather than anti-tank helicopters. It should be admitted that the idea of a "flying infantry fighting vehicle" was untenable. As a transport and landing vehicle, the Mi-24 was significantly inferior to the Mi-8 helicopter. "Twenty-fours" were carried out extremely rarely and, basically, they carried about 1000 kilograms of useless load in the form of an amphibious compartment. While the altitude and rate of climb of the Mi-24 were generally sufficient for the conduct of hostilities in Europe, the combat operations in hot climates and high mountains sharply raised the question of raising the static ceiling. This could only be achieved quickly by increasing the power of the engines. In the second half of the 80s, new electronic speed controllers were installed on TV3-117 engines. For a short-term increase in engine power during takeoff and landing, a water injection system was introduced in front of the turbine. As a result, the static ceiling of the Mi-24D and Mi-24V helicopters was brought up to 2100 m. But this was not enough to dramatically increase the combat characteristics.
The armored Mi-24, designed to achieve high speed due to the presence of a "dead weight" in the form of a troop compartment, was frankly overweight. This circumstance is aggravated by the fact that from the very beginning a "high-speed" main rotor with a low efficiency in hovering mode was installed on the helicopter. As a result, on "twenty-four" it is very difficult to use ATGMs in hover mode, maneuver at low speeds and implement such an effective method of fighting armored vehicles as a short-term vertical jump due to natural heights, hovering in place and simultaneously launching guided anti-tank missiles. Moreover, at full combat load, pilots prefer to take off along the "airplane", with a takeoff run along the runway of 100-120 meters. Thus, when operating from small field unpaved airfields, restrictions are imposed on the takeoff weight of combat helicopters, which naturally affects the strike capabilities.
The disadvantages of the Mi-24 became clear after the start of operation in combat units, and the concept of using a combat helicopter was revised. When designing promising combat helicopters, the designers took into account the experience of creating and using the Mi-24. On the new machines, the useless amphibious cockpit was abandoned, due to which it was possible to reduce the size, reduce weight and increase the thrust-to-weight ratio.
During the Soviet era, about 2,300 Mi-24 helicopters of various modifications were transferred to the helicopter regiments. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, a little more than 1400 Mi-24s were in service. Some of these machines went to the "fraternal republics" of the former USSR. The legacy of the Soviet army was used in the armed conflicts that erupted in the post-Soviet space, and was actively sold at dumping prices on the international arms market. On the one hand, this led to the fact that the Mi-24 received the widest distribution, becoming the most belligerent combat helicopter in the world, on the other hand, the number of capable "twenty-fours" in the CIS countries has sharply decreased. This fully applies to our army aviation. Over the years of "reforms", due to the lack of timely repair and proper care at Russian military airfields and storage bases, many "twenty-fours" have rotted away. Currently, according to figures published by World Air Forces 2017 and Military Balance 2017, there are 540 combat helicopters in the Russian armed forces. Of these, about 290 are Mi-24V, Mi-24P, Mi-24VP of Soviet construction. Relatively recently, army aviation was replenished with six dozen Mi-24VN and Mi-24VM (Mi-35M).
However, the information regarding the number of our combat helicopters given in Western sources should be treated with caution. As you know, it is very common for our potential partners to overestimate the number of Russian military equipment available in the troops, thus justifying the growth of their own military spending. In addition, the main part of the "twenty-four" built in the USSR, in view of the development of a resource, is at the end of its life cycle or needs major repairs and modernization.
