Again, on May 9, wreaths and flowers will be laid at the monuments erected in honor of the feat of the Soviet people. In many places, such monuments are the famous T-34 tanks, which have become symbols of the great Victory.
On the day of the national holiday in Moscow and a number of other Russian cities, restored T-34 tanks will march in parade formation, recalling how 70-odd years ago they instilled fear in the Nazi invaders, breaking through enemy defenses and destroying their fortified points.
But in June 1941, General Guderian, who proceeded from the decisive role of tank armies in the land war, believed that the successes of armored vehicles led by him in the fields of Poland, France, Holland, Belgium, Yugoslavia would be repeated on Soviet soil. However, talking in his memoirs about the October 1941 battles in the Moscow direction, the general was forced to admit:
“A large number of Russian T-34 tanks were thrown into battle, causing great losses to our tanks. The superiority of the material part of our tank forces, which had taken place until now, was lost and now passed to the enemy. Thus, the prospects for quick and continuous success disappeared."
Guderian decided to immediately draw conclusions from what was happening: “I wrote about this new situation for us in my report to the command of the army group, in which I described in detail the advantages of the T-34 tank compared to our T-IV tank, pointing out the need to change the design of our tanks in future. I ended my report with a proposal to send a commission to our front, which should include representatives from the Armaments Directorate, the Ministry of Armaments, tank designers and representatives of tank-building firms. I also demanded to speed up the production of larger anti-tank guns capable of penetrating the armor of a T-34 tank. The commission arrived at the 2nd Panzer Army on November 20."
However, the conclusions of the members of the commission were not encouraging for Guderian. He recalled: “The proposals of the front-line officers to produce exactly the same tanks as the T-34, to rectify an extremely unfavorable situation in the shortest possible time, did not meet with any support from the designers. The designers were embarrassed, by the way, not with aversion to imitation, but the impossibility of releasing the most important parts of the T-34, especially the aluminum diesel engine, with the required speed. In addition, our alloy steel, the quality of which was reduced by the lack of the necessary raw materials, was also inferior to the alloy steel of the Russians."
How the T-34 was created
For 14 years before the October battles of 1941, armored forces and military production in the USSR were in a deplorable state. Speaking in December 1927 at the 15th Party Congress, People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs K. E. Voroshilov reported that in terms of the number of tanks of the USSR (less than 200, together with armored cars) it lagged behind not only the advanced countries of the West, but also from Poland. There was also not enough metal for the production of armored vehicles. The People's Commissar reported: “70.5% of cast iron, 81% of steel, 76% of rolled products compared to the pre-war level - this, of course, is not enough for the needs of a widely developing economy and defense … We do not have aluminum, this necessary metal for military affairs. we produce.”Speaking about“archaic remnants of the times of Ivan Kalita”at defense enterprises, Voroshilov said that“when you see them, you are taken aback.”
In the late 1920s, alloy steel was not smelted in the USSR. To study the process of its production, Soviet metallurgists were sent abroad. Among them was my father, Vasily Emelyanov (pictured), a graduate of the Moscow Mining Academy. During long trips abroad in Germany, France, Italy, England, Norway, he managed to learn a lot about foreign steel production, especially about the smelting of ferroalloys. Soon after returning to his homeland, he was appointed chief engineer of the recently created ferroalloy plant in Chelyabinsk. This plant was one of three similar plants that allowed our country to solve the problem of the production of alloy steels as a whole.
Such steel was especially needed in the manufacture of weapons. Therefore, the experience and knowledge of his father were in demand in the military industry. In 1937, he was appointed deputy chief of the headquarters for the production of armor of the USSR defense industry. Meanwhile, the Spanish civil war, during which the Soviet Union supplied weapons to the Republicans, showed the weakness of Soviet tanks: the enemy's 37-mm guns easily hit them. Therefore, the Soviet military demanded the creation of tanks protected by durable armor.
These requirements began to be implemented. Under the guidance of the designer J. Ya. Kotin created heavy tanks from the KV and IS series. Even earlier, at the Leningrad Plant No. 185, work began on the design of a high-speed T-29 tank with anti-cannon armor protection. Soon a similar tank began to be created at the Kharkov plant No. 183. By order of the People's Commissar of Heavy Industry G. K. Ordzhonikidze On December 28, 1936, Mikhail Ilyich Koshkin, deputy chief designer of the Leningrad plant No. 185, was sent to the Kharkov plant, where he headed the design bureau. Together with a team of young designers, Koshkin managed to develop the design of the tank, which was later named the T-34.
On March 31, 1940, the Defense Committee ordered the start of serial production of T-34 tanks.
And on May 17, 1940, two such tanks, along with other Soviet armored vehicles, drove into the Ivanovskaya Square of the Kremlin, where Stalin and other members of the Politburo examined them. Stalin especially liked the T-34 tank, and he called it "the first swallow".
Soon, these tanks were tested on the Karelian Isthmus, where hostilities recently ended. Tanks successfully overcame escarpments, nadolby, anti-tank ditches and other fortifications of the "Mannerheim line".
Unfortunately, the chief designer of the T-34 M. I. Koshkin fell seriously ill with pneumonia during the ferrying of tanks from Kharkov to Moscow. Doctors removed one of his lungs, but this did not help the patient. The talented designer died on September 26, 1940.
Meanwhile, the transition to mass production of tanks revealed a number of unforeseen difficulties. In his memoirs, my father wrote: “It was still not entirely clear what technology to adopt for the mass production of armor protection, especially tank turrets. On light tanks, the towers were welded from individual parts cut out of sheet armor steel. Some of the parts had a convex shape, and they were stamped on presses. The same technology was adopted for the production of heavy tanks. But the thicker armor also required more powerful press equipment to manufacture turret parts. There were such presses at the plant, but in insufficient quantities. Well, if the program is increased, what should be done then? Pressing equipment will become a bottleneck. But things are clearly heading for war, and heavy tanks will not be needed for parades, thousands of them will be needed. How to be?"
My father got the idea: to cast tank turrets. He decided that in almost any metallurgical plant, in any steel workshop, it would be possible to cast towers. The difficulty was to convince other people of this.
According to his father, “a reasonable and courageous military representative, Dmitrusenko, turned out to be at the plant. He immediately agreed with the proposal to try to make cast tank turrets.
The towers were cast and then tested along with welded towers. Father wrote: "In most welded towers, after four or five shells hit them, cracks appeared in the welded seams, while cast ones did not show any defects." Similar results were achieved with repeated tests.
Soon my father was summoned to a Politburo meeting. After reviewing the draft resolution proposing to switch to the production of cast turrets, Stalin asked the head of the Armored Directorate, Ya. N. Fedorenko: "What are the tactical and technical advantages of the new towers?" Fedorenko explained that they can be made in foundries, whereas for the production of old-style towers, powerful presses are required for stamping individual parts. “I was not asking you about that,” Stalin interrupted him. - What are the tactical and technical advantages of the new tower, and you are telling me about the technological advantages. Who is engaged in military equipment? " Fedorenko named General I. A. Lebedev.
"Is he here?" Stalin asked. Lebedev rose from his seat. Stalin repeated his question to him. According to his father, “Lebedev hesitated and began, in essence, to repeat what Fedorenko said. Stalin frowned and asked angrily: “Where do you serve: in the army or in industry? This is the third time I ask a question about the tactical and technical advantages of the new tower, and you are telling me what opportunities are opening up for the industry. Maybe you'd better go to work in industry? " The general was silent.
I felt that the decision to switch to cast towers might not be made, and raised my hand and asked to speak. Addressing me, Stalin repeated once again: "I am asking about tactical and technical advantages."
The father replied: "I want to say about this, Joseph Vissarionovich," and handed Stalin cards with the results of the range shelling of armored towers. The father explained: “The old tower, welded from separate parts, has vulnerabilities - welded seams. The new tower is a monolith, it is of equal strength. Here are the results of tests of both types at the range by shelling."
Stalin carefully examined the cards, returned them to his father and said: "This is a serious consideration." He paused, walked around the room, and then asked a new question: “Tell me, how will the position of the center of gravity change when moving to a new tower? Is the car designer here?"
One of the tank's designers got up, whose name was not mentioned by his father in his memoirs. The designer said: "If it changes, Comrade Stalin, it will be insignificant."
“Slightly is not an engineering term. Did you count? " - Stalin responded sharply. “No, I didn't,” the designer answered quietly. "And why? After all, this is military equipment … And how will the load on the front axle of the tank change?"
Just as quietly, the designer said: "Not significant." “What are you saying all the time“insignificantly”and“insignificantly”. Tell me: did you do the calculations? " “No,” the designer answered even more quietly. "And why?". The question hung in the air.
Stalin put on the table the sheet with the draft decision which was in his hands and said: “I propose to reject the proposed draft resolution as unprepared. To instruct the comrades not to enter the Politburo with such projects. To prepare a new project, select a commission, which includes Fedorenko, he - he pointed to the People's Commissar of the automotive industry S. A. Akopov - and him. Stalin pointed his finger at his father.
The father and the designer left the conference room in a dejected state. On the way, they were overtaken by an employee of the Defense Committee apparatus, General Shcherbakov. He and another employee of the Committee, Savelyev, suggested that his father urgently prepare a new draft resolution, taking into account Stalin's remarks and with the attachment of the necessary certificates.
My father worked on this for the rest of the day and all night. By morning, all the necessary documents were ready. Akopov and Fedorenko signed them together with their father.
A few hours later, Stalin reviewed these materials and signed a decision to launch cast towers into production. And two years later, my father received the Stalin Prize of the second degree for his participation in the development of cast turrets for the T-34 tank.
After the start of the war
By June 22, 1941, 1,100 T-34 tanks had been produced in the country. They accounted for 40% of all tanks produced by the Soviet industry in six months. However, the retreat of Soviet troops jeopardized the country's tank production. Tank factories were hastily evacuated to the Urals. Father also went there, having with him a mandate signed by I. V. Stalin, who said that he, Emelyanov Vasily Semyonovich "is an authorized representative of the State Defense Committee at the plant for the production of tanks" and that he is "charged with the obligation to immediately ensure the overfulfillment of the program for the production of tank hulls."
At the Ural plant, to which my father was sent, the installation of equipment for tank production was just beginning. Under normal circumstances, this installation should have taken four to six months. The father went to the installers and explained to them: "The Germans are near Moscow. We need tanks. We need to know exactly when the workshop will be assembled." The installers asked for twenty minutes to think about it.
When their father returned to them, their foreman said: "Order that we have a few sunbeds set … We will not have to sleep, we will rest when we cannot hold our tools in our hands. Tell us to bring food from the dining room here too, otherwise a lot of time will be lost.. If you do what we ask, we will finish the installation in 17 days."
According to his father, people worked as a single human organism. The installation was completed in 14 days. The workers met the impossible according to technical standards deadline for assembling equipment at the cost of incredible exertion of their forces. However, as my father recalled, then such work in the rear was, rather, the rule than the exception.
In the meantime, the appearance and successful actions of the T-34 and other heavy Soviet tanks forced Hitler to decide on the production of an already developed model of the Tiger tank weighing 60 tons, and then a lighter tank, the Panther. However, according to Guderian, in January 1942, Hitler decided that the new cumulative grenade, "having a very high penetration of armor, in the future will reduce the importance of tanks." Tests of "tigers" in combat conditions took place only in the fall of 1942 in the Leningrad region. All the "tigers" moving in the column were destroyed by Soviet anti-tank artillery. This circumstance led to a new delay in the production of these tanks.
However, the Germans tried to exploit the vulnerabilities in the T-34 tank. They found that if projectiles were fired at the joint between the turret and the hull of the tank, the turret could jam and stop rotating. In the destroyed German tanks, our soldiers found sketches of T-34 tanks with an indication of where to aim.
The father recalled: “It was necessary to quickly eliminate this weak point. I don’t remember who first came up with the idea of how to eliminate this deficiency. The proposal was surprisingly simple. On the hull of the tank in front of the turret, armored parts of a special shape were fixed, which allowed the turret to rotate and at the same time eliminated the possibility of its jamming. Immediately, all hulls began to be produced with these additional parts, and we sent kits of parts to the front to install them on combat vehicles."
The Germans continued to hit with shells at the junction between the tower and the hull, exactly following the instructions. They probably wondered why their shots did not bring the desired result.
Meanwhile, the tank factories continued to improve the production process. In his memoirs, the father wrote: “In the armored hull of the tank there was one small but important detail with a long narrow slot, called the" sighting ". Through it, using a system of mirrors, the driver could view the area. The machining of this part was very difficult. First, it was necessary to drill out high-strength steel, and then carefully process the inner surface of the slot with a long special-shaped cutter, which was called "finger". Before the war, this cutter was manufactured by the Moscow plant "Fraser" and even then belonged to the category of a scarce tool. And then a new difficulty arose: "Fraser" was evacuated from Moscow, and at the new location they had not yet had time to assemble all the equipment and set up production. At our plant, there were only two finger cutters, and one of them was essentially unusable. Tank hulls cannot be manufactured without a part with a "sighting slit". It was obvious to everyone. How to be?".
My father recalled that after a long discussion, “someone spoke out in favor of trying to cast these details. If we make precise molds and try to improve the casting technique, then maybe it will be possible to keep within the given dimensions … There were excellent foundry workers at the plant”. After consulting with them, the decision was made: "Cast, only cast!"
The first cast parts were successful. But doubts arose: "Will the details withstand field tests?" The father wrote: “Immediately, several cast parts were sent to the landfill. The landfill was located near the plant. The details were shot in accordance with all the established rules. The results are great! This means that finger cutters are no longer needed. Everyone cheered up, as if everyone had a boring toothache at once”.
Father recalled that “from the front, there were continuous requests and information about which parts of the tank should be improved or changed.
Tanks for repairs also began to arrive. Once, carefully examining such a tank, which arrived from the front, we saw a soldier's medal "For Courage" on the bottom, near the driver's seat. There is a small stain of blood on the ribbon. Everyone standing near the tank, as if on command, took off their hats and silently looked at the medal.
The faces of all were solemnly stern."
Senior foreman for mechanical processing of parts Zverev said with some anguish: “Now, if they just shot me through and through, it would seem to be easier. Shame burns everything from the inside, you just think that you are not doing everything right."
The reaction of Zverev and other workers was understandable. Although they worked tirelessly to do everything "as it should" and tried to make tanks invulnerable to bullets and shells of the enemy, they knew that for many tankers their products turned into steel coffins.
The data that Lieutenant General V. V. Serebryannikov, testified that a tanker could survive no more than 1, 5 battles. And such battles did not stop throughout the war.
Victory of Soviet tanks at the Kursk Bulge
On January 22, 1943, Hitler published an appeal "To all workers in tank building" with an appeal to increase efforts to produce new armored vehicles, the appearance of which was to prove Germany's superiority in modern weapons technology and ensure a turning point in the war. Guderian wrote that "the new authority to expand tank production, granted to the Minister of Armaments A. Speer, testified to the growing concern over the declining combat power of the German armored forces in the face of the ever-increasing production of the old but beautiful Russian T-34 tank." In accordance with the plan "Citadel", developed by Hitler, the main power of the summer offensive in 1943 were to be the new tanks "tiger" and "panther".
Describing the first day of the battle on the Kursk Bulge on July 5, 1943, Lieutenant General N. K. Popel recalled: “Perhaps neither I nor any other of our commanders saw so many enemy tanks at once. Colonel-General Goth, who commanded the Hitlerites' 4th Tank Army, put everything on the line. Against each of our company of 10 tanks, 30 - 40 German ones acted."
A week after the start of the German offensive, on July 12, the largest tank battle of World War II unfolded near Prokhorovka. It was attended by up to 1200 tanks and self-propelled guns. A participant in the battle near Prokhorovka, Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Golovanov recalled: “I cannot find words or colors to describe the tank battle that took place near Prokhorovka.
Try to imagine how about 1000 tanks collided in a small space (about two kilometers along the front), bombarding each other with a hail of shells, burning bonfires of already knocked out tanks … There was a continuous roar of engines, clanking of metal, roar, explosion of shells, wild grinding of iron, tanks went to the tanks.
There was such a roar that it squeezed the membranes. The fierceness of the battle can be imagined in terms of losses: more than 400 German and no less than our tanks were left to burn out on this battlefield or lay in heaps of twisted metal after the explosion of ammunition inside the vehicle. And it all lasted the whole day."
The next day, Marshal G. K. Zhukov and Lieutenant General of Tank Forces P. A. Rotmistrov drove past the battlefield. Rotmistrov recalled: "A monstrous picture was presented to the eye. Everywhere twisted or burned tanks, crushed guns, armored personnel carriers and vehicles, piles of shell casings, pieces of caterpillars. Not a single green blade of grass on the blackened ground. In some places, fields, bushes, coppices still had time to smoke. to cool down after extensive fires … "This is what an end-to-end tank attack means," Zhukov said quietly, as if to himself, looking at the wrecked "panther" and our T-70 tank crashing into it.
Here, at a distance of two dozen meters, the "tiger" and the thirty-four rose up and seemed to grab hold of them tightly.
The Marshal shook his head, surprised by what he saw, even took off his cap, apparently paying tribute to our fallen heroes-tankers, who sacrificed their lives in order to stop and destroy the enemy."
According to Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, "the almost two-month Battle of Kursk ended with a convincing victory for the Soviet Armed Forces."
Guderian stated: “As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The Eastern Front, as well as the organization of defense in the West in case of the landing, which the Allies threatened to land next spring, were called into question. Needless to say, the Russians rushed to use their success. And there were no more calm days on the Eastern Front. The initiative completely passed over. to the enemy."
This was how Hitler's plans were buried - to achieve a turning point in the war, relying on the technical superiority of "civilized" Europe.
Having thwarted the German offensive, the heroic crews of the T-34 and other Soviet tanks proved the superiority of Soviet armor over German armor.
