The Cuban government of the dictator Batista, in the mid-50s, bought a batch of military equipment from England in the mid-50s: 18 piston fighters Sea Fury, 12 communication aircraft Beaver, several Whirlwind helicopters, negotiations were underway on jet fighters Hawker Hunter - Concerned about competition, the US government agreed to sell a batch of jet planes to Cuba.
A group of Cuban pilots and technicians underwent training in the United States on T-33A and F-84G aircraft, and in 1955 the first 8 T-ZZA arrived in Cuba. The former US Air Force base in San Antonio de Los Baños was rebuilt especially for them. The rest of the ground aviation was stationed at the Columbia base near Havana, and the naval aviation at the Mariel base 70 miles from Havana; there was also a large air base and an air range at San Julian on the western tip of the island.
After the overthrow of the Batista regime at the end of 1959, all the remaining military equipment in the ranks became part of the revolutionary armed forces of the Republic of Cuba. The Air Force was called FAR, which stands for "Fuersa Aereas of the Revolutionary" - Revolutionary Air Force. Many specialists emigrated, but there was a sufficient number of pilots and technicians to operate the remaining equipment in service: only four T-33A, 12 Sea Furies, several B-26, transport, messengers and helicopters could fly. The aircraft fleet was extremely worn out, so the new government renewed its attempts to purchase 15 Hunter fighters in England. Negotiations were conducted on the supply of weapons and with some other countries. This became known to the United States, which put pressure on the arms supplying countries and actually achieved an embargo on the supply of military equipment to Cuba. A ship with a batch of Belgian ammunition was simply blown up by CIA agents in the port of Havana. Against this unfavorable background, in 1960, Cuba signed the first agreements on the supply of weapons and military equipment with the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Soon the first batches of armored vehicles (about 30 T-34 and SU-100), anti-aircraft artillery and small arms, produced in Czechoslovakia under Soviet licenses, were sent to Cuba through the Romanian and Bulgarian ports.
But no matter how much the Cubans were in a hurry, Soviet aviation equipment was late for the start of serious hostilities. This became apparent when opponents of the Castro regime began to conduct air raids to bomb cities and plantations of sugarcane, Cuba's only strategic raw material, and to deliver weapons to counter-revolutionary groups. These raids used several B-25s and converted civilian aircraft based at various airfields in the US state of Florida, in particular Pampana Beach, 35 km from Miami.
The Piper Comanche 250, which took part in one of the raids, crashed on February 18, 1960. Another plane of this type, trying to take the leader of one of the gangs out of Cuba, was shot down by an army patrol.
One C-46, delivering weapons to counter-revolutionaries, was captured at the landing site by security personnel, and a C-54 (DC-4), damaged by anti-aircraft fire, made an emergency landing in the Bahamas.
FAR could not prevent the raiders in any way - there were no full-fledged fighters, radar installations, communications equipment. The service life of the last remaining aircraft was saved to repel large-scale aggression, the preparation of which was reported by intelligence. Rumors that a small but experienced air force of the invasion forces was being trained at the CIA Truck base in Guatemala appeared in the press as early as the end of 1960.
Their flight personnel included several dozen Cuban emigrants, former military and civilian pilots, who had 16 B-26 bombers and 10 C-46 transport aircraft. But there were not enough people for the Air Force, and in January 1961, the CIA stepped up the recruitment of pilots with experience in flying the B-26.
By April 1961. the 2506 Brigade was finally formed, which included four infantry, one motorized and one parachute battalions, a tank company and a battalion of heavy weapons - about 1,500 men in total. On April 13, 1961, the 2506 brigade amphibious assault loaded onto 7 large Liberty-class transport ships and moved towards Cuba.
Liberty-class transport ship
On April 16, 45 miles from the island, they were joined by two tank landing ships and landing barges, which carried the brigade's military equipment. The purpose of the amphibious assault was to land on two (originally planned for three) bridgeheads in Cochinos Bay: two battalions on the coast of Playa Larga, the rest of the forces at Playa Giron (Bay of Pigs).
At the same time, the parachute landing was to land at the village of San Bale. The purpose of the operation was to seize a section of the coast and a small airstrip at Chiron for redeploying its air force there and delivering reinforcements. Air Force "brigade 2506" entered the battle two days before the landing of the main landing. After midnight on April 15, 1961, 9 B-26 bombers took off from the Puerto Cubesas airfield in Nicaragua. Eight of them struck the main FAR bases, and the ninth headed for Miami, where its pilot tried to assure reporters that a mutiny had begun in Cuban aviation.
The crews of the attack aircraft returned to base without loss, although somewhat battered by anti-aircraft fire, and reported a major success: 8-10 aircraft were disabled at the San Antonio airbase, 8 at Ciudad-Libertad (formerly Columbia), and Santiago de Cuba - 12, ammunition trucks were blown up, airfield buildings were destroyed. But where could such loss figures come from, which in total exceeded everything that FAR had at the time?
Probably, the point here is not the excessive boasting of the participants in the raid. Most likely, the blow fell on the decommissioned aircraft standing at the airfields, which from the air could not be distinguished from serviceable ones. In fact, as a result of the raid, 1-2 V-26, 2-3 Sea Furies and 1-2 transport and training aircraft were out of order. about half a dozen cars, some of which were later repaired.
Cuban Sea Fury
Repair work unfolded at a feverish pace immediately after the end of the raid. All aircraft capable of "flying and shooting" were immediately relocated closer to the area of the proposed landing of the invasion forces - to the San Antonio de Los Baños airbase. Only FAR planes could stop the counter-revolutionaries. The motors for most of them gave at least half the power, the lights did not close, and for some of them the chassis did not retract. The pilots themselves called them planes like "Motherland or Death" - and they really were ready to win or die! Such a fate befell the pilot Acosta, who took off on the night of April 14-15 in his T-33A on a reconnaissance flight over the sea. During the landing approach, the landing gear did not release, and then the plane caught fire and fell into the sea. The ten pilots available to FAR were mostly young guys, among whom the 39-year-old captain Enrique Carreras Rojas seemed like a "grandfather". Most of them had no combat experience, although some of them began flying in the guerrilla air force, and Lieutenant Alvaro Prendes Quintana was a career pilot of Batista's air force, who managed to undergo training in jet flying in the United States and was imprisoned in 1957 for refusal bomb the rebels. At dawn on April 17, FAR pilots were ordered to strike at the invasion ships. Of the eight aircraft in San Antonio, three were prepared for the first flight - a pair of Sea Furies and one B-26. At about noon, the shock troika went into the air. The group was led by Captain Rojas on a fighter, accompanied by Lieutenant Gustavo Bourzak on a second fighter and Captain Luis Silva on a bomber. Actually, on the first flight on the B-26, Captain Jakes Lagas Morrero was appointed, but Silva arbitrarily took a seat in the cockpit and went on a mission.
В-26В Invader / FAR 933. DL Marrero flew on this aircraft during the 8 battles at Playa Giron. The downed B-26 with tail number FAR 903 looked similar. The "Invaders" "Gusanos" looked the same, but their side numbers are unknown
"We were above the target in 20 minutes. From two thousand meters, 7-8 large ships standing off the coast of Playa Giron, a mass of landing barges and boats scurrying between them and the coast were clearly visible," Rojas recalled. Having dived to a height of 300 meters, he fired a missile salvo at the Houston vessel. The helmsman of the Houston later described it this way: “On the morning of April 17, we already unloaded the 2nd battalion and began to unload the 5th. Three planes appeared over the bay. We did not pay attention to them - many planes circled over the bay, but they We were generally told that Cuba had no aviation. And then one plane from this trio - a small single-engine fighter, descended and went to the ship. Anti-aircraft guns opened fire on it from the deck, but it did not turn away and fired 4 missiles at us Two of them hit the side near the stern. A fire broke out on the deck, water began to flow through the holes into the hold …"
The other two planes also attacked targets without missing, almost all of the missiles hit enemy ships. The troika returned to base, where by this time two more aircraft had been prepared. In the second flight, in addition to the previous crews, Lieutenant Ulsa on the Sea Fury and the crew of Captain Lagas Morrero on the B-26 took part. This time, Captain Rojas ordered eight missiles to be hung under the wing of his Sea Fury - and they all hit the middle section of the Rio Eskandio, loaded with fuel and ammunition. It also served as a command ship and, taking off into the air, took with it the main communications equipment of the 2506 Brigade. Other FAR pilots, breaking through the barrage of anti-aircraft fire, inflicted sensitive blows on the landing ships and boats.
Captain Morrero, in his B-26, attacked a tank landing ship: “I attacked one of the ships south of Playa Giron. Tanks and other equipment were unloaded onto barges from it. I fired a rocket, which hit the fuel tank on the upper deck … shattered to smithereens!"
By this time, fighting was going on below with might and main. Fierce battles unfolded in the air. The anti-Castro air pilots, confident in the defeat of the FAR, prepared only for relatively safe attacks on scattered units of government forces. But even with this task, they coped unsatisfactorily, often wasting ammunition on secondary targets and civilian objects. A meeting with the republican aviation in the air was not included in their calculations. At first, they mistook the FARs for their own. It cost them dearly. After completing one of the attacks on the ships, Rojas found a B-26 bomber in the air next to him. "At first I thought it was L. Silva's plane, but then I determined from the tail number that it was an enemy plane. I went into its tail and opened fire." Stitched with bursts from the Sea Fury, the B-26 caught fire and fell into the sea near one of the ships. This was the first aerial victory for the FAR. Following Rojas that day, Morrero, Silva and Ulsa shot down one B-26 each, and in just 17 April the Gusanos lost five aircraft.
FAR also suffered significant losses. Two B-26s clamped K. Ulsa's fighter in the air and fired at point-blank from machine guns, the pilot was killed. A "Invader" L. Silva with a crew of four exploded in the air from a direct hit of an anti-aircraft shell in the gas tank. There is information about serious damage to another Sea Fury. The tiny revolutionary Air Force lost a third of its aircraft and half of its flight personnel in one day.
But the main goal was achieved. Half of the invasion ships were sunk, and a large amount of heavy weapons and ammunition went to the bottom with them. The command of the invasion forces, stunned by unexpected losses, was forced to withdraw the remaining ships 30-40 miles into the open sea, under the cover of the American fleet. Thus, the landed subunits not only lost a significant part of their reinforcements, but were also left without fire support from naval artillery (transport ships had 1-2 127 mm guns for this purpose and 5-10 anti-aircraft machine guns each). From the second day on, the supply of the "2506 brigade" had to be carried out only from the air - by parachutes.
However, the invasion air force's operational summary on the morning of April 18 sounded cheerful: “On April 17, a B-26 FAR ('903') was shot down and one Sea Fury was damaged so much that it could not be used for a week. ' on the destruction of a truck with 20-30 people, 18 of whom were killed. Infantry units destroyed one "Sea Fury" and knocked out the second. Now the enemy has probably two jet T-33A, two "Sea Fury", 1 or 2 B -26. Today our Air Force is guarding the landing zone from 0330 to 0400 hours, and six aircraft will try to destroy the remnants of the Castro Air Force."
For its part, the FAR command assigned Lieutenants Quintana, Diaz and Mole the task of destroying the 2506 Brigade planes in the air over Cuban territory. Thus, April 18 was a decisive day in the struggle for air superiority.
Quintana and Diaz, who had driven their T-ZZA jet from Havana only last evening and had not yet had time to take part in the hostilities, flew forward, Mole in the Sea Fury lagged a little behind because of the lower speed. This is how Quintana himself described this flight: We are going in the ranks. On the right is the Del Pino car, at a distance the Douglas plane. The height is 7 thousand feet and we are in a hurry to intercept the mercenary bombers.
- The plane is on the right below! - the voice of Del Pino Diaz is heard in the headphones. I see two B-26s, which, dropping their bombs, go towards the sea.
I order my followers by radio to attack the enemy pair's wingman, and I myself will attack the leader.
Then I made my first mistake - I forgot about the B-26 bow machine-gun battery and attacked the enemy head-on. From a dive I went into the frontal on the B-26, which was below me. The enemy entrusted the car and we rush headlong to each other.
We open fire almost simultaneously, the B-26 pilot is shooting inaccurately - the tracks sweep over the canopy of my cockpit. I missed too. Turning to the right, B-26 flashes to the left under me. I lay down a sharp combat turn and, with the afterburner, attack him in the tail. There is a fight all around, excited voices screaming in the headphones. B-26 begins to maneuver vigorously. I press the trigger, the tracks go above the target. Again I attack - and again by. In despair, I no longer notice that the oxygen mask has slid to the side, I am preparing for a new attack. The B-26 is leaving over the sea towards Honduras, it is evident that I have run out of ammunition or fuel. Again I catch up with the target at an angle of 80 degrees, catching it in the scope of the sight. The track pierces the B-26 from nose to tail, but it does not fall.
I turn away sharply. I jump so close to him that I can see the rivets and the faces of the pilots.
New surprise: this B-26 has arrows - they shoot back! Fortunately, the trails pass by. I make a U-turn with a climb for a new attack. B-26 leaves. Eh, I would have his eight machine guns! Alas, our T-33A is only for training aircraft used as combat vehicles …
T-33A Snooting Star / FAR / 01 - one of two that fought at Playa Giron. The second T-33A at Playa Giron looked similar, but without a number and with yellow fuel tanks. A. Huintana flew on it. In addition to him, Del Pino Diaz, Afnandez and E. Guzrrero flew alternately on both T-33As.
On the radio I hear the voices of Del Pino and Douglas - they are vainly attacking the enemy. Their B-26 escapes, they failed to knock him out. I am catching up with my B-26. To shoot him down, I am now ready for anything … I catch the enemy in sight, shoot all the remaining ammunition from a minimum distance and turn it away, almost crashing into the tail of the B-26. On the bomber, from my hits, the left engine flares up and the gunner's cockpit lantern shatters into smithereens.
I have no cartridges, the fuel is at zero; I don’t know if I’ll make it to San Antonio. The B-26 is on fire, its left wing is on fire, and a long plume of smoke trails behind the plane. On the right side of the fuselage, the co-pilot of the B-26 falls out through the emergency hatch, a parachute opens above him …
The B-26 finally crashes into the waves of Cochinos Bay. In the headphones I hear Del Pino's joyful voice: You knocked him down, knocked him down!
He and Douglas continue to pursue the second B-26. I'm leaving for the base. The fight drained all my strength. I have enough fuel for a few minutes …"
On April 18, T-33A intercepted several more B-26 and C-46, and the Sea Fury and B-26 of the revolutionary air force bombed the positions of the 2506 brigade.
The anti-aircraft gunners also distinguished themselves: from the 12, 7-mm DShK quad machine-gun mounts delivered overnight, they shot down two V-26 invasion forces, reliably covering their ground forces. The superiority of the government troops by this time was so great that the "gusanos" defended themselves without any enthusiasm. The mercenary air force was no longer able to help its ground forces. By the evening of April 18, they had lost two-thirds of their aircraft and half of their personnel. Based on these disappointing results, the commander of the anti-Castro Air Force, Luis Cosme, said: “We have had enough casualties. There is information that on the evening of April 18, US Air Force and Navy aircraft attacked the positions of the Cuban troops, but this is unlikely - the decision to participate in the hostilities of American aviation was made only on the night of April 18-19.
President J. Kennedy authorized the use of fighters from the aircraft carrier "Essex" (but without identification marks) to cover the evacuation of the remnants of the "2506 Brigade" from the bridgehead on the morning of April 19.
F-8A Crusader carrier-based fighters from the USS Essex aircraft carrier were supposed to provide air cover.
They were supposed to establish airspace control and destroy FAR aircraft, and a special group of B-26 bombers with American crews was intended to attack ground targets, since only one Cuban pilot agreed to take the risk for an additional fee.
At about three o'clock in the morning on April 19, four B-26s took off from the Puerto Cabezas airfield in the "last parade". They were supposed to appear over the Gulf of Cochinos at 6.30 am, when the escort fighters had already arrived in the battle area. But when planning the operation, there was another overlap: the big bosses from the CIA and the headquarters of the Navy forgot about the difference in time zones. As a result, the last flight of the bombers took place two hours earlier than the fighters, and ended in a uniform defeat. The B-26s simply did not have time to provide any assistance to the 2506 Brigade - both T-33As of the revolutionary air force attacked them.
Two B-26s were shot down instantly, the third broke away from the pursuit and dropped bombs on the premises of the Australia sugar factory, where the brigade's headquarters was located, but was shot down by anti-aircraft gunners. The fourth bomber was damaged in an air battle, dropped bombs into the bay, but still fell short of the base and fell into the sea. During the battle, one of the American pilots shouted on the radio: "MIGs are attacking us! MIGs are attacking!" Subsequently, this information gave rise to a legend about the participation of Soviet aircraft in repelling aggression. Fidel Castro commented on these rumors: “On the day of the bombing of our territory by B-26 planes based in Nicaragua, the counter-revolutionaries announced that we were bombed by our own planes, claiming that our air force consisted of planes that the Americans supplied Batista. with the help of these old worn-out aircraft, they began to destroy their aviation, they declared that our air forces were armed with MIGs, but we did not have MIGs …
The adventure in Cochinos Bay ended in great disgrace for the United States and Cuban counter-revolutionaries. "Brigade 2506" only lost 458 prisoners (out of one and a half thousand destined for the landing!), Left half of its floating craft and all its weapons on the coast. The invading air force lost up to 12 B-26 aircraft and at least 4 C-46 transport aircraft.
FAR losses amounted to two aircraft. In addition, almost every Cuban pilot had sunken ships and landing boats to his account (large transports were sunk by Morrero, Rojas and Silva).
The command of the revolutionary armed forces drew the appropriate conclusions from the experience of the battles at Playa Giron, and the first of them was about the need to re-equip all branches of the armed forces with modern technology (of course, Soviet production), and above all aviation. Already in 1962, during the May Day parade, three squadrons of MiG-15 and MiG-19 marched over Havana.
And by the beginning of the "Caribbean crisis" in August 1962, FAR had several well-trained squadrons equipped with MiG-15, MiG-17F, MiG-19PF and MiG-19S. Fortunately, the "war of nerves" in the fall of 1962 did not develop into a real war, and these planes took off only for training and patrol flights.
Prepared based on materials:
