The "rocket-space" euphoria that gripped our country in the 60s of the last century is now being used as an excuse to mock the Soviet leadership. In fact, the enthusiasm, backed by a strong engineering and industrial backbone, has yielded excellent results.
The Soviet Navy also underwent changes - artillery ships of the Stalin era were removed from the stocks. Instead, two projects of combat ships with guided missile weapons appeared at once - large anti-submarine ships of project 61 and missile cruisers of project 58. Today I propose to talk in more detail about the "project 58".
Development of a ship with missile weapons began in 1956. It is necessary to remind readers of the situation in which the Soviet Navy was in those years. The basis of the surface fleet was the five cruisers of the project 68-K and 15 cruisers of the project 68-bis, which were laid down back in 1939, which are their modernization. As the experience of the Second World War has shown, artillery ships have lost their importance. Old cruisers could be involved in solving a limited range of tasks, displaying a flag or providing fire support for an amphibious assault, but they were not able to withstand a squadron of a "potential enemy" that included aircraft carriers.
The state of the destroyer forces was no better: 70 destroyers of the project 30-bis were the development of the pre-war "project 30". Of course, nothing good could be expected from them - the ships did not at all meet the standards of that time and were involved only in the protection of territorial waters in the Baltic and the Black Sea. The only intelligible reason why these obsolete destroyers were built is the need to urgently saturate the post-war Soviet fleet with any, even so plain, equipment.
Each year, the Navy began to replenish with new destroyers of project 56, as time has shown - extremely successful ships. "Project 56", designed to please the ambitions of Comrade Stalin, turned out to be morally obsolete at the time of laying, but thanks to the efforts of engineers, it was possible to "repurpose" artillery destroyers into anti-submarine ships and carriers of missile weapons. Those. in their direct profile - artillery combat as part of a squadron - they were never used and could not be used in principle.
The only strong and numerous class, submarines, also required an early modernization. In 1954, the first nuclear submarine "Nautilus" entered the US Navy - at the beginning of the 60s, the USSR will reduce its lag by releasing 13 at once Project 627 "Kit" nuclear submarines and 1 experimental submarine K-27, a nuclear reactor which used liquid metal as a heat carrier. But in the late 1950s, the question remained open. Moreover, submarines a priori could not be the "masters of the ocean." Their main weapon is stealth, forcing them to act on the sly, giving up the initiative in advance to surface ships and carrier-based aircraft.
Based on the foregoing, a reasonable question arises: what could the USSR Navy oppose in the vastness of the World Ocean to the aircraft carrier groups of the United States and its allies? The USSR is not America, and the Warsaw Pact is not NATO. The organization of the Warsaw Pact countries rested solely on the economic, technical and military might of the Soviet Union, the contribution of the other satellite countries was symbolic. There was no one to expect serious help.
It was in such conditions that the missile cruisers of pr. 58 were created, the lead of which was named "Grozny". You will say a very unusual name for a class I ship. That's right, because initially "Grozny" was planned as a destroyer with missile weapons. Moreover, with a full displacement of 5500 tons, he was such. For comparison, its peer, the American Legy-class escort cruiser, had a total displacement of 8,000 tons. At the same time, much larger structures belonging to the "cruiser" class were created in the United States: the total displacement of the Albany and Long Beach reached 18,000 tons! Against their background, the Soviet boat looked very tiny.
The only thing that distinguished the Project 58 from the ordinary destroyer was its incredible striking power. Originally created to combat large enemy naval formations at an over-the-horizon range, "Grozny" received 2 four-charge launchers as its "main caliber" for launching P-35 anti-ship missiles. In total - 8 anti-ship missiles + 8 more in the below-deck cellar. The multi-mode winged anti-ship missiles of the P-35 complex ensured the defeat of sea and coastal targets at a distance of 100 … 300 km, at an altitude of 400 to 7000 meters. The flight speed varied depending on the flight mode, reaching 1.5M at high altitudes. Each anti-ship missile was equipped with 800 kg warhead, while one of the 4 missiles of the launcher was supposed to be equipped with a "special" warhead with a capacity of 20 kt.
The weak point of the entire system was target designation - the detection range of the ship's radar equipment was limited by the radio horizon. Striking surface ships at distances many times exceeding the direct radar visibility range required the creation of a reconnaissance and target designation system for anti-ship missiles based on Tu-16RTs, Tu-95RTs aircraft, equipped with equipment for broadcasting radar information to cruisers' combat posts. In 1965, for the first time, a real-time radar image of the ocean area was transmitted from a reconnaissance aircraft to an anti-ship missile carrier ship. Thus, in the USSR, for the first time in the world, a reconnaissance and strike system was created, including reconnaissance means, strike weapons and their carriers.
In fact, it was not a very good solution: in the event of a real conflict, the slow single T-95RTs could be easily eliminated by deck interceptors, and the time of its deployment in a given area of the World Ocean exceeded all conceivable limits.
Among other annoying miscalculations, the presence of 8 spare missiles is noted. As practice has shown, reloading in the open sea turned out to be an almost impracticable measure, moreover, in the event of a real naval battle, the cruiser could well not have survived the repeated volley. Multi-ton "blanks" were not useful and served as ballast.
Trying to squeeze super-powerful weapons into the limited dimensions of the "destroyer" hull, the designers saved on the most important thing, questioning the effectiveness of the entire system. There was only one control system for eight ready-to-launch anti-ship missiles. As a result, the ship could fire two four-missile salvo in a row (a decrease in the number of anti-ship missiles in a salvo reduced their chances of overcoming the air defense of ships) or immediately release the remaining 4 missiles on homing, which had a detrimental effect on their accuracy.
Despite all the shortcomings, it was a completely realistic threat to the enemy's naval groupings, which the overseas admirals had to reckon with.
By the way, at the same time, diesel submarines of the project 651, equipped with the P-6 missile system (modification of the P-35 for placement on submarines, the ammunition load - 6 anti-ship missiles) began to appear in the USSR Navy. Despite their significant number (more than 30 units), each of them was incomparable in capabilities with the cruiser pr. 58. This is partly due to the fact that at the time of launch, as well as throughout the entire flight of the anti-ship missile system to the target, the submarine was obliged to be on the surface, controlling the flight of its missiles. At the same time, unlike the cruiser, the submarines did not have anti-aircraft weapons at all.
"Grozny" became the first Soviet ship equipped with two missile systems at once - in addition to the P-35, the cruiser had an M-1 "Volna" anti-aircraft missile system with an effective firing range of 18 km. Now it seems naive to speculate about how a single-channel air defense system with ammunition load of 16 missiles can repel a massive air attack, but at that time the Volna air defense system was considered the guarantor of the combat stability of the cruiser.
The artillery was also preserved: 2 automatic AK-726 installations of 76 mm caliber were mounted on the ship to cover the rear hemisphere. The rate of fire of each is 90 rds / min. Again, the presence of a single fire control system turned "two installations into one": artillery could only synchronously fire on a common target. On the other hand, the density of fire in the chosen direction increased.
Believe it or not, there was enough space even for torpedo armament and "classic" RBUs to destroy submarines and fired torpedoes in the immediate vicinity of the cruiser. And in the aft part it was possible to place a helipad. And all this splendor - with a total displacement of only 5500 tons!
Cardboard sword or super cruiser?
The incredible firepower came at a heavy price. Despite the excellent driving characteristics (maximum speed - up to 34 knots), the economic cruising range was reduced to 3500 miles at 18 knots. (In the US Navy, the standard value for all frigates and destroyers was 4500 nautical miles at 20 knots).
Another consequence of the ship's excessive rebalancing in the direction of firepower was the complete (!) Lack of constructive protection. Even the ammunition cellars did not have splinter protection. The superstructures were made of aluminum-magnesium alloys, and in the interior decoration such "innovative" materials as plastic and synthetic coatings were used.
The Falklands War will begin only a quarter of a century later, but already at the design stage of "Grozny" many designers expressed concerns about the ship's fire-hazardous design and extremely low survivability.
The appearance of the cruisers "Project 58" was very unusual: the architecture of the superstructures was dominated by pyramid-shaped superstructure masts, saturated with a large number of antenna posts. This decision was dictated by the need to allocate large areas and volumes for the placement of radio electronic means, as well as by the requirements of the strength of the reinforcements of heavy antennas. At the same time, the ship retained a graceful and swift silhouette, combined with the quite justified name "Grozny".
During a visit to Severomorsk, N. S. Khrushchev was so impressed with the appearance and capabilities of Grozny that he planned to make a visit to London on it. On the ship, they urgently laid a vinyl deck and luxuriously decorated the wardroom. Alas, a "black streak" began in relations between the USSR and the West, then the Cuban missile crisis came and the London voyage of "Grozny" was canceled so as not to shock the inhabitants of Foggy Albion with the ferocious appearance of the Soviet cruiser.
In total, according to the 58 project, 4 cruisers were laid down: "Grozny", "Admiral Fokin", "Admiral Golovko" and "Varyag". The ships honestly served 30 years as part of the USSR Navy, becoming the basis for the creation of new cruisers, project 1134, more balanced in their capabilities.
During their combat service, the cruisers paid visits to Germany, France, Kenya, Mauritius, Poland, Yemen … they were noted in Havana (Cuba), Nairobi and Libya. Demonstrated their monumental power off the coast of Vietnam, Pakistan and Egypt. Foreign experts everywhere noted that a characteristic feature of Russian ships is their extremely high saturation with fire weapons in combination with excellent design.
