Comparing the incomparable is a lot of fun. The question from the title of the article, despite the slight shade of dibilism, has a deep foundation. This question was asked in connection with the unexpected appearance of figures characterizing the use of aircraft carrier strike groups in local wars.
Let's start our conversation with the famous "Desert Storm". To participate in the operation against Iraq, the international Coalition attracted 2,000 aircraft, the basis of which was the attack aircraft of the tactical aviation of the US Air Force, including:
- 249 F-16 air superiority fighters;
- 120 F-15C fighters;
- 24 fighter-bomber F-15E;
- 90 attack aircraft "Harrier";
- 118 bombers F-111;
- 72 aircraft of short-range fire support A-10
In addition, the American Air Force grouping included 26 B-52 strategic bombers, 44 F-117A Stealth attack aircraft, a large number of electronic warfare and AWACS aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, air command posts and tanker aircraft. The US Air Force was based at air bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
Naval aviation included 146 F / A-18 carrier-based fighter-bombers and 72 Marine Corps, as well as 68 F-14 Tomcat fighters. The naval aviation forces carried out combat missions in close cooperation and according to common plans with the Air Force.
83 aircraft were allocated by the British Air Force, 37 - by the French Air Force. Germany, Italy, Belgium, Qatar have allocated several planes each.
The Saudi Arabian Air Force included 89 legacy F-5 fighters and 71 F-15 fighters.
The aviation of the international coalition flew about 70,000 sorties, of which 12,000 were carrier-based aircraft. Here it is - an amazing figure! The contribution of naval deck aircraft to Operation Desert Storm was only 17% …
This does not at all fit with the image of the aircraft carrier strike groups as devastating "democratizers". No doubt, 17 percent is a lot, but nevertheless, it gives reason to believe that Operation Desert Storm could well have done without aircraft carriers. For comparison - 24 "land" F-15E "Strike Eagle" fighter-bomber flew 2,142 sorties over Iraqi territory in January 1991 - the command pinned great hopes on promising aircraft equipped with the LANTIRN IR sighting and navigation system, which enhances the light of the stars in 25,000 times.
Maybe the main striking force of the Coalition was tactical cruise missiles "Tomahawk"? Unfortunately no. For 2 months less than 1000 "Battle axes" were used, which looks simply ridiculous against the background of aviation successes. For example, during Operation Desert Storm, B-52G bombers performed 1,624 sorties and dropped 25,700 tons of bombs.
A similar picture developed in 1999 during the bombing of Yugoslavia. NATO command concentrated in Italy (airbases Aviano, Vicenza, Istrana, Gedi, Piacenza, Cervia, Ancona, Amendola, Brindisi, Sigonela, Trapani) a grouping of about 170 US Air Force combat aircraft (F-16, A-10A, EA-6B, F-15C and a squadron (12 cars) of F-117A aircraft), 20 aircraft of the British Air Force (Tornado IDS / ADV and Harrier Gr. 7); 25 French Air Force aircraft (Jaguar, Mirage-2000, Mirage F-1C); 36 aircraft of the Italian Air Force (F-104, "Tornado" IDS, "Tornado" ECR) and about 80 more combat aircraft from NATO member states.
Eight B-52Hs and five B-1Bs operated from airbases in Great Britain (Faaford and Mildenhall), and 6 B-2 "invisible" B-2s operated from Whiteman airbase (USA, Missouri).
For reconnaissance and target designation, 2 American E-8 JSTAR aircraft (Ramstein airbase, Germany) and 5 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft (Istres airbase, France), as well as 10 American and Dutch R-3S and EU-130 (Rota airbase, Spain). Subsequently, these figures increased, reaching 1000 units by the end of the operation.
In the Adriatic Sea, the US Navy's aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt was dangling, carrying 79 aircraft for a wide variety of missions, of which only 24 F / A-18s could be used for strikes. AUG was closest to the territory of Yugoslavia, therefore, the reaction time of its wing was minimal - 28 F-14 Tomcat carrier-based fighters flew to escort almost all strike groups coming from air bases in Italy. Also, the F-14 illuminated targets, providing combat missions of the A-10 attack aircraft. Five carrier-based AWACS E-2 Hawkeye aircraft worked no less intensely, constantly illuminating the air situation over Yugoslavia. But, alas, the results of their actions are lost against the background of the scale of the entire operation.
The general picture is as follows: NATO aircraft performed 35,278 sorties, of which 3,100 sorties were carried out by the carrier wing of the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt. Not much.
The company of the nuclear aircraft carrier was made up of the US Navy's universal landing ship "Nassau", on which there were 8 AV-8B VTOL aircraft, as well as "defective aircraft carriers" - the old French "Fosh" (air wing - 14 attack aircraft "Super Etandard", 4 reconnaissance aircraft "Etandard IVP"), Italian “Giuseppe Garbaldi” (air wing - 12 AV-8B attack aircraft) and English “Invincible” (air wing - 7 AV-8B). These carrier-based aircraft performed 430 sorties during the operation, i.e. took only symbolic participation, covering the territory of Italy from possible air attacks from Yugoslavia.
As a result, carrier-based aircraft completed only 10% of the tasks during the bombing of Yugoslavia. Again, the formidable AUG turned out to be of little use, and their intervention in the conflict was more of a PR campaign.
Continuing our theoretical research, we can come to the conclusion that a floating airfield, sooner or later, will have to approach the coast, where it will be happily greeted by aviation flying from land airfields. Deck aircraft, due to their specific basing conditions, as a rule, have "cut" performance characteristics and limited combat load. The number of carrier-based aircraft is strictly limited by the size of the ship, so the carrier-based F / A-18 is a compromise between a fighter, attack aircraft and bomber. "Land" aviation does not need such hybrids: specialized air superiority fighters F-15 or Su-27, "sharpened" for air combat, all other things being equal, will tear a small deck Hornet like a hot water bottle. At the same time, specialized shock F-15E or Su-34 have a much higher combat load.
A few words in defense of the F / A-18 "Hornet" - the designers all the same managed to create a lightweight fighter suitable for basing on the deck, while it can still carry a decent bomb load and purposefully pour it on the enemy's head. Electronics placed in an additional container makes it possible to use the weapon precisely (the MiG-29, for example, is deprived of such an opportunity). Therefore, taking into account the specifics of local wars, the F / A-18 is one of the best aircraft in terms of cost / efficiency.
Considering all of the above, the use of carrier-based aircraft for strikes against ground targets is ineffective. Then why is the United States building them in batches? Are these expensive and powerful "death machines" less useful than a garbage truck?
In our reasoning, we missed one small detail - an aircraft carrier is, first of all, a MARINE WEAPON.
Interesting Geography
This is the Pacific Ocean. Usually flat maps distort distances, so the size of the oceans does not seem so great (Mercator Gerard probably took offense at such words). The real size of the Pacific Ocean can be estimated only on the globe. And they are impressive. On the right, the coast of North America stretches out in a narrow strip. In the center, the attentive reader can see a speck of Hawaii. Above, in the very North, the Aleutian Islands and a piece of Alaska are visible. Japan and Australia are not visible from such a vantage point - they are still sailing and sailing before them. Russia is generally located on the other side of the Earth. Where is the ice cap of Antarctica? She, too, is not visible from here due to the monstrous size of the Pacific Ocean. The dimensions of the Atlantic or the Indian Ocean are no less enormous - any reader can be convinced of the truth of my words by turning the globe on their own. It would be more correct to call our planet "Ocean".
It is with this state of affairs that the navies of all countries of the world have to reckon with. Russia has no special problems with the sea border - the pack ice of the Arctic Ocean protects the Arctic coast of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East more reliably than any Coast Guard. "Marquis puddles" - the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland can be tightly covered by ground forces and air force aircraft. The situation in the Far East is much worse - too vast areas and too many aggressive neighbors who dream of getting this "tidbit". The underdevelopment of these areas and the crappy climate - on the entire coast of the Sea of Okhotsk, there is only one large settlement of Magadan (90 thousand lucky people live according to the All-Russian Population Census) - creates the danger of a quiet annexation of the Far East, but at the same time, a military attack on Kamchatka is meaningless - how many time will the enemy troops make their way to Moscow from there? 30 years old? The conclusion is that ensuring the security of the Far East, and, consequently, the integrity of the Russian Federation, lies outside the military plane. It is necessary to develop industries, transport networks, and correct the demography of the Far East.
As you can see, the Russian Navy does not have any interests in the World Ocean, the shores are reliably covered with Arctic ice. There are no overseas colonies, so 1/6 of the land is available. The land border causes much more problems, but this is no longer the prerogative of the Navy.
In the United States of America, the situation is reversed. In the North - the sluggish border with Canada, in the South - the border with Mexico, dangerous only for illegal migrants from Central America.
All the main industrial centers of the United States, the pillars of the American economy, are located on the coast. The richest states - California, Virginia, large metropolitan areas: Boston-New York-Washington and San Francisco-Los Angeles-San Diego - stretch out in a wide strip along both oceans. Readers have seen at what distance the 51st state of the United States (Hawaii) and Alaska are, everyone has heard about Fr. Guam and other overseas territories controlled by the Washington administration - all this raises the question of creating a powerful fleet for the American admirals to protect these territories and control transoceanic communications. The problem with Taiwan, the DPRK, a growing China, the defense of Singapore, the troubled Philippines - in Southeast Asia alone, the United States has a bunch of problems.
The fleet must confront any enemy in a non-nuclear conflict (it has already become an axiom that no modern power will dare to launch a nuclear strike, all conflicts will be resolved locally using conventional weapons, which, in fact, is confirmed by many years of practice). The fleet must be able to detect and drive away any intruder, be it a submarine or a ship of a measuring complex, i.e. control hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of the water surface of the World Ocean.
The fleet, which includes carrier-based aircraft, operates more efficiently. All other means and "asymmetric answers" have the same cost, but much less possibilities. As I have said more than once, to ensure the guidance of the excellent P-700 Granit missiles, a Space Reconnaissance and Targeting System is required, the operation of which costs $ 1 billion a year!
Yamato's last campaign
The battleship of the Imperial Navy "Yamato" ("Japan" in Japanese), the largest battleship in the history of mankind.
Full displacement - 73,000 tons (3 times more than that of the heavy nuclear missile cruiser "Peter the Great").
Reservation:
board - 410 mm;
main deck - 200 … 230 mm;
upper deck - 35 … 50 mm;
GK turrets - 650 mm (forehead), 270 mm (roof);
GK barbets - up to 560 mm;
wheelhouse - 500 mm (side), 200 mm (roof)
40 … 50 cm of metal! Logically, "Yamato" was resistant to any means of destruction of those years (after all, we are talking about the Second World War), impenetrable, invulnerable and unsinkable.
Armament: in addition to nine 406 mm main guns, the battleship's anti-aircraft armament included:
- 24 x 127 mm universal guns
- 152 x 25 mm anti-aircraft machine gun (One hundred fifty two!)
All this economy was controlled by five radar stations and hundreds of gunners.
In April 1945, the Yamato, with an escort of 1 cruiser and 8 destroyers, set off on her last voyage. Experienced Japanese admirals understood that an invincible battleship awaited, so they refueled it only half - a one-way ticket. But even they did not suspect that everything would happen so quickly.
On April 7, the entire Japanese unit was drowned in disgrace in 2 hours. The Americans lost 10 aircraft and 12 pilots. Japanese - 3665 people.
In the morning, 280 aircraft took off from the aircraft carriers of the 58th task force, which was at a distance of 300 miles (!) From the Japanese squadron. Only 227 reached the target, the remaining 53 lost their course (there was no GPS in those years). Despite the powerful air defense, the Yamato was hit by 10 aircraft torpedoes and 13 250-kilogram bombs. This was enough for the super-protected overgrown battleship, the ammunition of the main caliber turrets exploded and the Yamato set off to feed the fish.
A few months before these events, in October 1944, the Yamato sistership, the battleship Musashi, sank in the Sibuyan Sea under similar circumstances. In general, world history is replete with cases of the death of ships from the actions of carrier-based aircraft. Reverse cases are rare, under special circumstances.
What does this have to do with modern naval combat? The most powerful "Yamato" was attacked by flimsy torpedo bombers "Avenger": maximum speed - 380 km / h at the surface of the water and 430 km / h at altitude. The rate of climb is 9 m / s. No reservation.
These wretched planes had to approach the furiously firing ships at a distance of hundreds of meters, i.e. enter the air defense zone of the Japanese squadron. Modern supersonic Hornets will not even have to do this - any, even the most powerful shipborne air defense system (Aegis, S-300, S-400 or the hypothetical S-500) has one small drawback - the radio horizon.
Out of range
The trick is that, no matter how trite it may sound, the Earth is round, and VHF waves propagate in a straight line. At some distance from the radar, they become tangent to the surface of the earth. All that is above is clearly visible, the range is limited only by the energy characteristics of the radar. Anything below is out of sight of modern shipborne radars.
The radio horizon does not depend on the pulse power, or on the level of radiation losses, or on the RCS of the target. How is the radio horizon determined? Geometrically - according to the formula D = 4.124√H, where H is the antenna height in meters. Those. the height of the antenna suspension is decisive, the higher - the further you can see.
In reality, everything is much more complicated - the relief and the state of the atmosphere affect the detection range. For example, if the temperature and humidity of the air slowly decrease with height, then the dielectric constant of the air decreases and, consequently, the speed of propagation of radio waves increases. The trajectory of the radio beams is refracted in the direction of the earth's surface, and the radio horizon increases. A similar super-refraction is observed in tropical latitudes.
An airplane flying at an altitude of 50 meters is absolutely invisible from a ship at a distance of more than 40 … 50 kilometers. Having dropped to an extremely low altitude, it can fly even closer to the ship, while remaining unnoticed and, therefore, invincible.
What, then, do the indices of Soviet radars mean, for example, the MR-700 "Podberezovik"? 700 is the detection range in kilometers. At such a distance, the MP-700 is capable of examining objects in the upper atmosphere. When objects are detected above the radio horizon, the “boletus” vigilance is limited only by the energy characteristics of the antenna.
Are there any ways to look beyond the radio horizon? Of course! Over-the-horizon radars have long been built. Long waves are easily reflected from the ionosphere and bend around the Earth. For example, the over-the-horizon “Volna” radar, built on the hills near the town of Nakhodka, has a detection range of up to 3000 km. The only question is the size, price and power consumption of such "devices": the "Volna" phased array antenna has a length of 1.5 kilometers.
All other ways to "look beyond the horizon" - such as space satellites of the air defense system or the detection of aircraft from a ship's helicopter and the subsequent launch of anti-aircraft missiles on homing - smells of schizophrenia. On closer inspection, so many problems with their implementation are revealed that the idea disappears by itself.
And what about AUG, you ask. The carrier-based wing includes early warning aircraft, the most famous being the E-2 Hawkeye. Any radar, even the best shipborne radar, cannot be compared with the Hawkeye radar, raised above the surface to a height of 10 kilometers. In this case, the radio horizon when surface targets are detected exceeds 400 km, which gives the AUG exceptional capabilities for monitoring the air and sea space.
Moreover, the AWACS aircraft does not need to "hang" near the ship - "Hawkeye", as part of a combat air patrol, can be sent several hundred miles from the ship and conduct even deeper radar reconnaissance in the direction of interest. Such an approach is an order of magnitude cheaper and more reliable than the Naval Space Reconnaissance and Targeting System, created in the USSR. It is possible to shoot down the Hawkeye, but difficult - it is covered by a pair of fighters, and he himself sees so far that it is impossible to get close to him unnoticed - the Hawkeye will have time to either move away or call for help.
Iron fist
As for the shock capabilities of the AUG, it is even simpler. Imagine a small settlement with an area of 5x5, i.e. 25 square kilometers. And compare this with a destroyer, the dimensions of which are 150x30 meters, i.e. 0, 0045 sq. kilometers. It's almost a pinpoint target! Therefore, carrier-based aircraft, due to their relative small number, work ineffectively against ground targets, but in a naval battle their striking power is unmatched.
Although we were in a hurry, calling the AUG ineffective against ground targets. The fact that they, even with limited use, take on 10-20% of the tasks of the Air Force aviation speaks only of the versatility of this type of naval weapon. What help did cruisers and submarines provide during Desert Storm? They released 1000 "" Tomahawks ", which was about 1% of the actions of aviation. In Vietnam, carrier-based aviation operations were even more active - they accounted for 34% of all sorties. During the period from 1964 to 1973, the aviation of the 77th operational formation made 500,000 sorties.
Another very important point - the thorough preparation for Operation Desert Storm took more than six months. And the aircraft carrier is ready to engage in battle when it appears in the combat zone. It turns out an operational tool for intervention in any military conflict. Especially considering the fact that 70% of the world's population live in the 500 km zone from the coast …
In the end, this is the only type of ship capable of providing reliable air defense for a squadron on the high seas.
Does Russia need an aircraft carrier?
In existing realities - no. The only intelligible task that can be assigned to the Russian aircraft carrier is to cover the deployment areas of strategic missile-carrying submarines, but this task can also be performed from high latitudes without the participation of carrier-based aircraft.
Fight the enemy's AUG? Firstly, it is pointless, American AUGs cannot threaten the territory of the Russian Federation - NATO has enough ground bases. The threat lies in wait for our ships only in the open ocean, but we have no overseas interests. Secondly, it is useless - America has 11 aircraft carrier groups and has accumulated colossal experience in the use of carrier-based aircraft.
What to do? Pay due attention to the army, constantly saturating it with new tech. means. And there is no need to chase the ghostly phantoms of "aircraft carriers, like the Americans." This too powerful naval weapon is not in our interests. Truly, the whale will never come out on land, and the elephant has nothing to do in the sea.
