In a previous article, the author described the measures taken by the German military and industrial leadership to stop the threats posed by the T-34, a tank with anti-cannon armor and a powerful 76.2mm cannon. It can be said with good reason that at the beginning of 1942 the Germans did not have a single widespread weapon system that would ensure reliable defeat of the T-34, with the exception of an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. But by 1943, the Wehrmacht and the SS were mostly re-equipped with anti-tank guns and tanks, quite capable of fighting the T-34. A decisive role here was played by the Pak 40 75-mm cannon, various modifications of which were used as a towed artillery system, as well as guns for tanks and various self-propelled guns.
Thus, at the beginning of 1943, the T-34 lost its status as a cannon-proof tank. What did our designers do?
T-34-76 sample 1943
In principle, the design of the T-34 had certain reserves in terms of mass and made it possible to increase the thickness of the reservation, however, this was not done. The main changes in the "thirty-four" in the first half of 1943 consisted in increasing the engine resource, improving ergonomics and increasing the situational awareness of the tank.
The T-34 "fiery heart", the V-2 diesel engine, after getting rid of "childhood diseases", was a high-quality and quite reliable tank engine.
However, it often failed before the deadline due to the disgusting performance of the air cleaners. The head of the 2nd Directorate of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, Major General of Tank Forces Khlopov, who oversaw the tests of the T-34 at the Aberdeen test site, noted: “The shortcomings of our diesel engine are a criminally bad air cleaner on the T-34 tank. The Americans believe that only a saboteur could design such a device."
During 1942 the situation improved somewhat, but nevertheless, our tanks received really high-quality air cleaners "Cyclone" only in January 1943. And this significantly increased the resource of their engines. The latter now often even exceeded the tabular values.
The second major innovation was the switch to a new five-speed gearbox. As far as the author could figure it out, it was first used on the T-34 in March 1943, and in June it was already used everywhere in all tank factories that produced T-34s. In addition, the design of the main clutch was slightly modernized, and all this together led to a significant relief of the work of the driver. Until that time, driving a tank required a lot of physical strength, in certain circumstances the effort on the lever had to reach 32 kg. In addition, it was very difficult to "stick" a new gear while the main clutch was in operation, but burning it out was very easy, which is why many tankers acted easier before the attack. They included starting 2nd gear, but at the same time removed the rev limiter from the engine. This brought the diesel engine up to a rotational speed of 2,300 rpm, and the speed of the tank in this gear up to 20-25 km / h, which, of course, greatly reduced the engine resource.
The new gearbox and improved friction clutch did not require any "miracle heroes" behind the levers of the tank, nor fighting in one gear. The management of the T-34 after these innovations became quite satisfactory. Although the T-34 transmission did not become exemplary and still contained a number of obviously archaic solutions, after these innovations, the thirty-four really became reliable and unpretentious in operation and easy to operate.
Tank observation devices made a huge step forward. Unfortunately, the narrow shoulder strap of the turret did not allow the introduction of a fifth crew member and thus separate the duties of the gunner and tank commander. Nevertheless, in terms of situational awareness, the crew of the T-34 produced in the summer of 1943 was an order of magnitude superior to the T-34s of the earlier models.
On the T-34 arr. 1941, the tank commander had a PT-K panoramic device and two periscopic devices located on the sides of the tank. Alas, the PT-K turned out to be not quite good in design, and most importantly, it was installed extremely poorly. Although theoretically he could provide a 360 degree view, in fact the T-34 commander could only see ahead and the 120 degree sector. to the right of the direction of movement of the tank. The side periscopes were extremely uncomfortable. As a result, the review of the commander of the T-34 mod. 1941 was very limited and had many "dead" zones inaccessible to observation.
Another thing is the commander of the T-34 mod. 1943 Since the summer of this year, the "thirty-four" has finally appeared a commander's cupola, equipped with 5 sighting slots, and an observation periscope device MK-4, which had a 360-degree view, was located on it. Now the commander could quickly look around the battlefield, using the sighting slots, or thoughtfully study it through the MK-4, much more advanced than the PT-K.
According to one of the domestic "gurus" in the history of tanks M. Baryatinsky, the MK-4 was not a Soviet invention, but a copy of the British Mk IV device, which was installed on British tanks that entered the USSR under Lend-Lease. Of course, our military and designers carefully studied the "Lend-Lease" equipment, and made a list of successful solutions of foreign tanks, recommended for implementation on domestic armored vehicles. So, the Mk IV device usually occupied the very first line in this list, and one can only regret that the MK-4 did not go into production earlier. This is all the more offensive because, according to the same M. Baryatinsky, the Mk IV was produced under license in England itself, and its inventor was the Polish engineer Gundlach. In the USSR, the design of this device has been known at least since 1939, when the Polish 7TP tanks fell into the hands of our military!
Be that as it may, the T-34 mod. 1943 received one of the most advanced observation devices in the world, and its location on the commander's cupola hatch provided excellent view sectors. Nevertheless, many tankers in their memoirs noted that in battle they practically did not use the capabilities of the commander's turrets, and sometimes the hatch was kept open at all. Naturally, it was impossible to use the commander's MK-4 in this position. Why is that?
Let's go back to the T-34 mod. 1941 The tank was equipped with a TOD-6 telescopic sight, with the help of which the commander, playing the role of a gunner, aimed the tank gun at the target. This sight was very perfect in design, its only significant drawback was that its sight changed position along with the gun: thus, the commander had to bend down the more, the higher the gun elevation angle. But still, TOD-6 was completely unsuitable for observing the terrain.
But on the T-34 mod. In 1943, the commander, performing the duties of a gunner, had at his disposal not one, but two sights. The first, TMFD-7, performed the same functionality as the TOD-6, but was more perfect and of high quality. Nevertheless, he, of course, was not suitable for observation: in order to inspect the battlefield from TOD-6 or TMDF-7, it was required to rotate the entire tower. However, the commander of the modernized "thirty-four" also had a second, PT4-7 periscope sight, which, having the same viewing angle of 26 degrees, could rotate 360 degrees. without turning the tower. In addition, the PT4-7 was located in the immediate vicinity of the TMDF-7.
Thus, in battle, the commander, wishing to inspect the terrain, had the opportunity, without changing his body position, to "switch" from the TMDF-7 to the PT4-7 - and this was enough for many, so that many commanders did not really feel the need to use the commander's cupola in battle and MK-4. But this did not make the latter useless - after all, even when participating in a battle, a tank does not always engage in firefight, and, being, for example, in an ambush, the commander had the opportunity to use the sighting slots of the commander's cupola and MK-4.
In other words, the supply of the commander in both his guises - both the commander and the gunner of the tank gun - has improved qualitatively. But that was not all. The fact is that in the T-34 mod. 1941, the loader had almost no view, except for the ability to use the side periscopes of the tank commander. There was practically no sense, however, from this - due to the extremely unfortunate location of the latter.
But on the T-34 mod. In 1943, the loader had his own MK-4 device, which was located on the roof of the tower and had a full, although apparently not 360-degree view - it was probably limited by the commander's cupola. In addition, the loader had 2 sighting slits at his disposal.
The driver mechanic received more convenient observation equipment, which consisted of two periscopic devices. As for the radio operator, he also received a "new thing", a dioptric sight instead of an optical one, but this almost did not affect anything: this crew member remained almost "blind".
At the end of the story about the observation devices on the T-34 arr. 1943, mention should be made of the quality of optics. Let's face it, the quality of German instruments remained unsurpassed, but our pre-war optics, although somewhat worse, still met their tasks. However, the Izium Optical Glass Factory, which was engaged in its manufacture, was evacuated in 1942, which, alas, greatly affected the quality of its products. However, the situation was gradually improving, and by the middle of 1943 the manufacturers managed to ensure the quality, which is quite comparable to the world one.
In other words, by about the middle of 1943, the Red Army tankers finally received the tank they dreamed of in 1941 and 1942. - the development of the T-34-76 has reached its peak. In this form, the "thirty-four" was produced until September 1944, when the last 2 machines of this type rolled off the assembly line of plant # 174 (Omsk).
Let's try to compare what happened with the Soviet and German gunsmiths, using the example of comparing the T-34 mod. 1943 and the best German medium tank T-IVH, the production of which began in April 1943.
Why was the T-IVH chosen for comparison, and not the later T-IVJ, or the famous "Panther"? The answer is very simple: according to the author, the T-IVH should be considered as the pinnacle of the development of the T-IV tank, but the T-IVJ had some simplifications in its design designed to facilitate its production, and it was produced only from June 1944., it was the T-IVH that became the most massive tank of the series - all the Krupp-Gruzon in Magdeburg, VOMAG in Plauen and the Nibelungenwerk in S. Valentin produced 3,960 such tanks, that is, almost half (46, 13%) of all "fours" ".
As for the "Panther", then, in fact, it was not a medium, but a heavy tank, whose weight was quite consistent with that of the heavy tank IS-2 and surpassed the American heavy tank M26 "Pershing" (the latter, however, was subsequently re-qualified as a medium, but this happened after the war). Nevertheless, subsequently, the author will certainly compare the T-34-76 and the "Panther", since this will be absolutely necessary for understanding the evolution of the Soviet and German tank forces.
T-34 vs. T-IVH
Alas, a large number of fans of military history reason about this: the T-IVH had armor thickness of up to 80 mm, while the T-34 had only 45 mm, the T-IVH had a long-barreled and much more powerful 75-mm cannon than the Soviet one. F-34 - so what else is there to talk about? And if you also remember the quality of shells and armor, it is quite obvious that the T-34 lost in all respects to the brainchild of the "gloomy Teutonic genius."
However, the devil is known to be in the details.
Artillery
The excellent 75mm KwK.40 L / 48 was installed on the T-IVH, which is an analogue of the towed Pak-40 and had slightly better characteristics than the 75mm KwK.40 L / 43 gun mounted on the T-IVF2 and part of the T-IVG. … The latter had a design similar to the KwK.40 L / 48, but the barrel was shortened to 43 calibers.
KwK.40 L / 48 fired a caliber armor-piercing (BB) projectile weighing 6, 8 kg with an initial speed of 790 m / s. At the same time, the domestic F-34 fired 6, 3/6, 5 kg shells with an initial speed of only 662/655 m / s. Taking into account the clear superiority of the German shell in quality, it is obvious that in terms of armor penetration the KwK.40 L / 48 left the F-34 far behind.
True, the Russian projectile had one advantage - a higher content of explosive, of which in 6, 3 kg of BR-350A and 6.5 kg of BR-350B, there were 155 and 119 (according to other sources - 65) g, respectively. The German caliber BB shell PzGr. 39 contained only 18, possibly 20 g of explosives. In other words, if the Soviet armor-piercing caliber projectile penetrated the armor, then its armor-piercing effect was significantly higher. But it is unclear to the author whether this gave any advantages in battle.
In terms of sub-caliber ammunition, the KwK.40 L / 48 was also superior to the F-34. The German gun fired 4.1 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 930 m / s, the Soviet one - 3.02 kg with an initial speed of 950 m / s. As you know, the striking element of a sub-caliber ammunition is a relatively thin (about 2 cm) pointed pin made of very strong metal, enclosed in a relatively soft shell, not intended for armor breakdown. In modern ammunition, the shell is separated after a shot, and in shells of those times, it was destroyed when it hit enemy armor. Since the German projectile was heavier, it can be assumed that, with an almost equal initial velocity, it retained energy better and had better armor penetration with increasing distance than the lighter domestic one.
High-explosive fragmentation ammunition KwK.40 L / 48 and F-34 were at approximately the same level. The German projectile at an initial speed of 590 m / s had 680 g of explosive, the indicators of the Soviet OF-350 - 680 m / s and 710 g of explosive. For the F-34, O-350A cast iron grenades with a reduced explosive content were also used in 540, as well as older ammunition, which should have been fired at a reduced muzzle velocity, but which were equipped with up to 815 g of explosives.
In addition, the F-34 could use buckshot and shrapnel ammunition, which were not in the range of the German gun: in turn, cumulative ammunition was produced for the KwK.40 L / 48. However, it is likely that in 1943, neither one nor the other was widely used.
Thus, the German artillery system was obviously superior to the domestic F-34 in terms of impact on armored targets, which is not surprising - after all, the KwK.40 L / 48, unlike the F-34, was a specialized anti-tank gun. But in "work" on unarmored targets, the KwK.40 L / 48 did not have a particular advantage over the F-34. Both guns were quite convenient for their calculations, but the Soviet one was much simpler technologically. The scopes had quite comparable capabilities.
Reservation
T-34 arr. 1943 increased insignificantly in comparison with its previous modifications. A brief description of it can be given as follows: "all 45 mm." T-34 mod. 1940 had 40 mm armor of the hull sides where the armor plates were tilted, as well as in the stern. The gun mask also had only 40 mm.
The T-34 mod. 1943, in all cases, the armor thickness reached 45 mm. In those cases when cast towers were used on the T-34, their thickness increased to 52 mm, but this did not give an increase in protection: the fact is that cast armor steel has less durability than rolled armor, so in this case the thickening of the armor only compensated her weakness. At the same time, the armor of the T-34 had rational angles of inclination, which in a number of combat situations made it possible to hope for an enemy shell ricochet of at least 50-mm, and in some cases even 75-mm caliber.
As for the T-IVH, everything turned out to be much more interesting with him. Yes, the thickness of his armor really reached 80 mm, but you should never forget that exactly 3 armor parts had such a thickness in the entire tank. Two of them were located in the frontal projection of the tank, another one defended the commander's cupola.
In other words, the T-IVH was very well protected in the frontal projection, only 25 or even 20 mm armor plate, located between the lower and upper 80 mm armor plates, raises doubts. Of course, its slope is 72 degrees. should have guaranteed a rebound, but theory and practice are two different things. As we know, the creators of the T-34 were faced with situations where small-caliber projectiles seemed to have to ricochet from "rationally inclined" armor, but for some reason they did not.
The forehead of the T-IVH turret had, in general, protection similar to the T-34 - 50 mm. But everything else was protected much worse - the sides and stern of the "four" had only 30 mm protection without rational angles of inclination. On the T-IVH, the sides of the hull and (less often) the turret were shielded, but the thickness of the screens was only 5 mm. They were intended solely for protection against cumulative ammunition, and practically did not give an increase in armor resistance against other types of projectiles.
Attack and Defense
And now the most interesting part. In general, the following can be said about the protection of the T-IVH - in the frontal projection it was slightly superior to the T-34, and from the sides and stern it was very much inferior to it. I foresee angry remarks from supporters of German armored vehicles, they say, how can you compare the 80 mm "forehead" of the T-IVH and the sloping 45-mm armor plates of the T-34? But allow me a few facts. M. Baryatinsky pointed out that
“Repeated shelling tests of tank hulls at the NIBT Polygon showed that the upper frontal plate, which had a thickness of 45 mm and an angle of inclination of 60 degrees, was equivalent to a vertically located armor plate 75–80 mm thick in terms of projectile resistance”.
And yet - the Pak 40 tabular armor penetration was, according to German data, about 80 mm per 1000 m. The frontal armor of the T-34 turret was pierced at a distance of 1000 m, but the nose armor plate was only at a distance of up to 500 m, as evidenced by, including this memo to the calculation of Pak 40
Of course, the T-IVH had a more powerful cannon, but what advantages did this give it? If we consider the head-to-head confrontation, then at a distance of 500 to 1000 m, the German tank pierced only the frontal parts of the T-34 turret. But the tabular values of the armor penetration of the F-34 guaranteed the same result for the 50 mm armor plates of the nose of the T-IVH turret, and in practice it was approximately the same - at least with the use of solid metal shells that did not contain explosives. A different matter - distances up to 500 m, at which the frontal projection of the T-34 made its way in any place, but the frontal armor parts of the T-IVH - only with subcaliber projectiles. The author, unfortunately, did not find the results of shelling a 20 or 25 mm T-IVH armor plate connecting two 80 mm armor parts. Did this armor withstand the strikes of domestic 76, 2-mm armor-piercing caliber shells?
However, it is worth noting other points of view. For example, the same M. Baryatinsky cites an excerpt from a report made on the basis of the experience of the 23rd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht that "the T-34 can be struck at any angle in any projection if the fire is fired from a distance of no more than 1, 2 km.", and, oddly enough, it is not even about KwK.40 L / 48, but about KwK.40 L / 43. But this could be the result of erroneous observation, yet the experience of one division may not be entirely indicative. The observations of our military indicated that the forehead of the T-34 corps could be pierced by a KwK.40 L / 48 projectile at a distance of up to 800 m - and this is not a guaranteed defeat, but that there were no cases when the forehead of the T corps -34 made his way from a greater distance. Thus, it is possible that at angles of impact close to optimal, the forehead of the T-34 hull could be pierced from a distance slightly greater than 500 m, but, most likely, a reliable defeat was achieved precisely from 500 m.
As for the sides and stern, everything is simple - both the T-34 and T-IVH confidently hit each other in these projections at any conceivable distance of artillery combat.
And now we come to a rather strange, at first glance, conclusion. Yes, the T-IVH had 80mm armor (in some places!) And a very powerful 75mm cannon, but, in fact, this did not give it an overwhelming advantage over the T-34 mod. 1943 The German tank's armor scheme gave it superiority, and not absolute, only at a distance of up to 500 m or a little more when firing "head-on". But in all other respects, the protection of the T-IVH was completely inferior to the T-34.
It should never be forgotten that tanks are not fighting against each other in a spherical vacuum, but on the battlefield with the entire range of enemy firepower. And for medium tanks of the WWII era, the fight against enemy tanks, oddly enough, was not at all the main combat task, although, of course, they had to always be ready for this.
The T-34, with its anti-cannon armor, forced the Germans to evolve towards increasing the caliber of anti-tank equipment to 75 mm. Such cannons fought successfully against the T-34, but at the same time “successfully” limited the capabilities of the Wehrmacht. The author came across information that the batteries of the towed Pak 40 could not carry out an all-round defense - after a few shots the openers were buried so deeply into the ground that pulling them out to deploy the gun became a completely non-trivial task, which, as a rule, could not be solved in battle. That is, after entering the battle, it was almost impossible to turn the guns in the other direction! And in the same way, the Pak 40 did not allow the crew to move across the battlefield.
But the T-IVH, which had comparable armor with the T-34 only in the frontal projection, could never have caused such a reaction - its 30 mm sides were confidently amazed not only by the 57-mm ZiS-2, but also by the good old "forty-fives" … In fact, tanks of this type were very dangerous to use against a properly organized defense with overlapping sectors of flank anti-tank fire, even if it is conducted by mobile and mobile small-caliber guns. All of the above will be illustrated by the example of damage to the T-34 according to the analysis of the Central Research Institute No. 48, carried out in 1942 on the basis of a study of the damaged T-34s. So, according to this analysis, hits were distributed as follows:
1. Hull sides - 50, 5% of all hits;
2. The forehead of the body - 22, 65%;
3. Tower -19, 14%;
4. Feed and so on - 7, 71%
It is possible that for the T-IVH, the crew of which had a significantly better view than the crew of the T-34 of the 1942 model, this ratio was better, because the Germans probably allowed them to enter the sides less often. But even if for the T-IVH such hits on the nose and sides of the hull were distributed approximately equally, then even then at least 36.5% of all shells that hit it should have hit its sides! In general, the protection of the lateral projection was not at all a whim of the creators of the tanks, and the sides of the T-IVH were "cardboard" and could not take a blow at all.
It can be stated that the T-IVH had certain dueling advantages over the T-34, but at the same time it was much more vulnerable on the battlefield. At the same time, the more powerful gun T-IVH did not give him any advantages in the fight against field fortifications, machine-gun nests, artillery and unarmored equipment compared to the T-34.
Observation tools
Here, oddly enough, it is difficult to determine the winner. The indisputable advantage of the T-IVH was the fifth crew member, as a result of which the duties of the tank commander and gunner were separated. But the T-34-76 crew was much better equipped with technical means of observation.
At the disposal of the commander of the T-IVH was a commander's cupola with its 5 sighting slots, but that, in fact, was all. She, of course, gave a good overview of the battlefield, but on the T-34 arr. In 1943, the commander received the same, and the MK-4 and PT4-7, which had a magnification, allowed him to see the threatened direction much better, to identify the target. For this, the German commander had to get out of the hatch, get out the binoculars …
In the T-IVH crew, only one tank commander had a 360 degree view. But in the T-34, the MK-4 devices had both a commander and a loader. That is, in case of extreme need (for example, a tank was opened fire), the T-34 crew had, perhaps, more chances to quickly figure out where and who, in fact, was firing.
I must say that on previous modifications of the T-IV the crew visibility was better - the same loader in the T-IVH was completely "blind", but in the T-IVG, for example, he had 4 sighting slots at his disposal, into which he could not look only he, but also the gunner. But screens were installed on the T-IVH, and these sighting slots had to be abandoned. Thus, the gunner's only device was a tank sight, and for all its merits, it was not suitable for viewing the terrain.
The driver mechanics of the T-34 and T-IVH were approximately equal in capabilities - the German tanker had a good periscope device and a sighting slit, ours had 2 periscopes and the driver's hatch, which was, on the whole, perhaps more convenient than the slit. Only the gunner-radio operator remained the losing member of the Soviet crew - although he had a diopter sight, his angle of view was too small, and the 2 sighting slits of his German “colleague” provided a slightly better view.
In general, perhaps, it can be argued that the T-34 crew in terms of awareness came close to the T-IVH, if there was a difference, it was not too significant. And, by the way, it is no longer a fact that in favor of the German tank.
Ergonomics
On the one hand, the German crew had certain advantages - a wider turret ring (but it housed not 2 people, but 3), better conditions for the loader. But on the other hand, the Germans were already forced to save on the T-IVH. In their memoirs, a number of Soviet tankers expressed complaints about the operation of the electric motor, which turned the tank turret. Well, on some T-IVHs, mechanical means of rotation were generally considered an unnecessary excess, so that the tower rotated exclusively by hand. Someone complained about the optics of the T-34 mechanic drive (by the way, the complaints related mainly to the "thirty-four" models of 1941-42)? So some T-IVH did not have a periscope observation device at all, and the driver had only a sighting slit. In general, on the T-IVH part, the only optical devices were only the gunner's sight and the tank commander's binoculars. Undoubtedly, the T-IVH was more convenient to control, but on the T-34 the situation in this respect has improved dramatically. On average, perhaps, the German tank was still superior to the T-34 in terms of convenience, but, apparently, it was no longer possible to say that the ergonomics significantly reduced the potential of the thirty-four.
Undercarriage
Of course, the German transmission was more advanced and of higher quality. But the T-IVH, with a mass of 25.7 tons, was driven by a 300 hp gasoline engine, that is, the specific power of the tank was 11.7 hp. per ton. A T-34-76 mod. 1943 with a mass of 30, 9 tons had a 500-horsepower diesel engine, respectively, its specific power was 16, 2 hp / t, that is, in this indicator more than 38% superior to its German "opponent". The specific ground pressure of the German tank reached 0, 89 kg / cm 2, and that of the T-34 - 0, 79 kg / cm 2. In other words, the mobility and maneuverability of the T-34 left the T-IVH far behind.
The power reserve on the highway at the T-IVH was 210 km, at the T-34 - 300 km and, unlike the thirty-fours of previous years, the T-34 mod. 1943 really could have covered such a distance.
As for the fire hazard, then the question is very difficult. On the one hand, gasoline, of course, is more flammable, but the T-IVH tanks with fuel were located very low, under the fighting compartment, where they were threatened only by explosions on mines. At the same time, the T-34 had fuel on the sides of the fighting compartment. As you know, diesel fuel does not really burn, but its vapors could well cause detonation. True, judging by the available data, such a detonation could have been caused by at least a 75-mm projectile that exploded inside the tank, if the latter had little fuel. The consequences of such a detonation were, of course, terrible, but … Would it be much worse if the T-34 tanks were located elsewhere? The detonation of a 75 mm projectile in the fighting compartment almost guaranteed the death of the crew.
Probably, we can say this: the use of a diesel engine was an advantage of the Soviet tank, but the location of its fuel tanks was a disadvantage. In general, there is no reason to doubt that each tank had its own advantages and disadvantages in terms of the engine and transmission, and it is difficult to choose the undisputed leader, but the T-34 may well claim to be in first place.
Combat potential
In general, it can be stated that the T-IVH and T-34 mod. 1943 were vehicles of approximately equal combat qualities. The T-IVH was somewhat better in tank combat, the T-34 in the fight against infantry, artillery and other unarmored targets. Interestingly, both tanks met the requirements of the moment. For the Germans, the time of the blitzkrieg was irrevocably gone, for them the tasks of confronting Soviet tank wedges that broke into the defenses and broke into the operational space came to the fore, and the T-IVH coped with this task better than the T-34. At the same time, an era of deep operations was approaching for the Red Army, in which they needed an unpretentious and reliable tank capable of long-range raids and focused on the quick defeat and suppression of rear structures, troops on the march, field artillery in positions and other similar purposes in the depth of enemy defenses. … This is T-34-76 arr. 1943 "knew how" to do better than the T-IVH.
Manufacturability
According to this parameter, the T-IVH was losing out to the T-34 with a bang. While the T-34 hulls were formed using welding machines, the operators of which were not required high skill, and the towers were made either the same way, or were cast, the hulls of German tanks were a real work of art. The armored plates had special fasteners, they seemed to be inserted into each other (on dowels), and then they were welded by hand, which required a lot of time and highly qualified workers. But what was the point in all this, if all these efforts in the end did not lead to any noticeable superiority of the T-IVH in defense over the T-34? And the same could be said about any other unit.
As a result, the Germans spent a lot of time and effort on the creation of a combat vehicle … which had no apparent superiority over the much simpler and easier-to-manufacture T-34-76 arr. 1943 g.
