Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium caliber artillery in Tsushima. Part 2

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Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium caliber artillery in Tsushima. Part 2
Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium caliber artillery in Tsushima. Part 2

Video: Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium caliber artillery in Tsushima. Part 2

Video: Reflections on the effectiveness of Japanese medium caliber artillery in Tsushima. Part 2
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In the previous article, we talked about the effectiveness of the impact of medium-caliber artillery on Russian warships in the Battle of Tsushima. For this, we, using the statistics of battles on January 27 and July 28, 1904, made an attempt to calculate the number of hits on the ships of the Russian squadron in Tsushima. Unfortunately, without a description of the damage inflicted by shells with a caliber of 152-203 mm in the cases known to us, the article was not complete.

But first, it is necessary to determine the criteria for the effectiveness of artillery impact: we say "serious damage", or "decisive damage", "drop in combat capability", and what is it? We will proceed from the fact that it seriously reduces the ship's combat effectiveness:

1. Destruction or incapacitation (obstruction of action) of guns with a caliber of 152 mm or more. It is well known that artillery with a caliber of 75 mm or less did not play any significant role in the naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War, unless we are talking about battles of very small ships, like 350-ton destroyers, but also there, in order to achieve a noticeable effect many hits were required;

2. Disabling the fire control system;

3. Damage leading to the ingress of water into the ship and causing severe heel or trim;

4. Damage that reduces the speed of the ship or disables its steering, or otherwise impedes the control of the ship.

As for fires, the fire itself still does not significantly reduce the combat capability of the ship, and we will take them into account only if it led to the consequences listed above - that is, disabled the artillery, reduced the speed, etc..d.

The total number of medium-caliber artillery shells hit by Russian battleships during the battle on January 27, 1904 is relatively small (only four hits, the rest went to the cruisers), which does not give us a representative sample. Another thing is the battle in the Yellow Sea, which took place on July 28, 1904. The statistics of hits on Russian ships here is good because it can be considered very reliable - as you know, not a single battleship of V. K. Vitgefta was not killed or taken prisoner in battle, so our sailors and engineers had enough time to study the damage to their ships upon returning to Port Arthur.

Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich"

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In total, "Tsesarevich" received 26 hits, of which 14 - heavy shells (11-305-mm, 2-254-305-mm and one - 254 mm) and 12 - medium and small-caliber artillery (1-203-mm, 6 -152-mm, and 5 - of unknown caliber, which we decided to consider as 152-mm). What damage did they do?

Neither artillery nor fire control devices received significant damage. One 305-mm and one 254-mm shell hit the nose turret of the 305-mm guns. The tower did not receive any noticeable damage and remained in service. The bow and stern 152-mm turrets on the starboard side received one round of an unknown caliber (152-mm?). There was no serious damage, except in the bow tower from the impact tore off the mount of the horizontal guide rheostat.

The fire control system was not disabled.

The battleship received 9 hits in the hull with shells of various calibers. The most significant was the impact of a 305-mm projectile into the armor belt in the bow of the battleship (starboard, in front of the bow turret of the main caliber). The shell did not pierce the armor, but slipped down along it and exploded in front of the unarmored plating. Holes were not formed, but the seams of the skin parted, as a result of which the ship received 153 tons of water, a roll of 3 degrees was formed, which later had to be corrected by counter-flooding. The rest of the hits did not cause significant damage.

The conning tower was hit by a 305-mm armor-piercing projectile, though not all of it. It fell undershot, ricocheted off the surface of the water, and then the fuse (bottom) went off, so that only the head part flew to the conning tower - but this was enough to destroy the machine telegraph, communication pipes, steering wheel, compass - as a result, the ship temporarily lost controllability. The hit of a 305-mm projectile in the navigator's cabin destroyed the command staff of the Russian squadron. Another projectile of the same caliber, hitting the foremast, led to the fact that it kept "on parole" and could collapse at any moment (one of the most important reasons that the battleship did not go to Vladivostok).

Three hits of 305-mm shells into the pipes of the ship, although they did not cause problems in battle, but seriously reduced the thrust, increasing the consumption of coal to such an extent that a breakthrough into Vladivostok without replenishing its reserves became impossible.

Thus, 7 out of 14 large-caliber shells inflicted serious damage. At the same time, a dozen medium-caliber hits (2 in medium-caliber turrets, one in the foremast, the rest in the hull and superstructures of the battleship) did not cause significant damage to the ship. The only serious damage that can be attributed to the result of the impact of medium-caliber shells is that the fire tank was damaged by shrapnel, which led to the leakage of water into the bow of the ship, which caused control difficulties, as the battleship became less responsive to the steering wheel. But the problem is that no source indicates the projectile, the fragments of which caused this damage.

Squadron battleship "Retvizan"

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Received 23 hits, including 6 large-caliber shells (5-305 mm, 1-254-305 mm), four medium-caliber shells (1-203 mm and 3-152 mm), as well as 13 shells of unknown caliber (hereinafter we refer them to medium-caliber artillery).

The hit of a 305-mm projectile in the bow turret caused a fire in it (thanks to the impeccable actions of the crew, it was immediately extinguished), but the electric aiming drives no longer worked, and the turret itself was jammed. Another shell of the same caliber hit the lower aft casemate of 152-mm guns - the guns were not damaged, but the control devices for its firing were out of order.

A large-caliber (305-mm, according to other sources - 254-305-mm) projectile hit 51 mm of armor plates in the bow, in the area of the infirmary. The armor was not pierced, but lost its integrity (cracks) and was pressed into the hull. As a result, water began to flow into the battleship (which was aggravated by the lack of drainage means in the damaged compartment), and the battleship got a trim on the nose.

Thus, of the six large-caliber shells that hit the ship, three inflicted significant damage. Seventeen medium and small-caliber shells, which fell mainly into the superstructures (but also into the pipes, masts, one 203-mm - into the hull) of the battleship, did not cause significant damage to the Retvizan.

Squadron battleship "Victory"

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Received 11 hits, including 4-305 mm, 4-152 mm and 3 unknown caliber.

The only hit that had any significant effect on the ship's combat capability occurred in the first phase of the battle, when a 305-mm projectile hit 229-mm armor plate under the nose casemates of 152-mm guns. The shell knocked out a plug in the armor measuring about 356 by 406 mm, but in general it did not pass inside (only the head part was found in the ship), nevertheless, as a result of this hit, the lower coal pit and three more compartments were flooded.

I must say that another 305-mm projectile, hitting the starboard side, destroyed the cabins of the conductors, and the hole was filled with water. However, the constant pumping of water by pumps led to the fact that the water in the hull "did not linger" and did not entail any consequences for the ship - accordingly, we have no reason to consider this damage serious.

Of the seven hits of small and medium-caliber artillery, five fell into the corps, one into the chimney, and one more - there is no description. Four 152-mm shells knocked out 3 75-mm guns, but we agreed not to consider such damage significant. From the statements of eyewitnesses, it can be assumed that there were other hits of shells of various calibers in the side armor of the "Victory" (that is, there were more than 11 shells hitting the ship), but they did not cause any damage to the ship.

Thus, one of the four 305-mm shells that hit the ship caused serious damage, and none of the seven small and medium-caliber shells.

Squadron battleship "Peresvet"

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The Japanese achieved 35 hits on the ship. The battleship was hit by 13 large-caliber shells, including 11-305-mm, 1-254-305-mm and 1-254-mm, as well as 22 smaller-caliber shells (1-203-mm, 10-152-mm, 1 -76 and 10 of an unknown caliber).

Two shells (305-mm and 254-305-mm) hit the nose turret of the main caliber, causing it heavy damage and jamming it. The tower retained limited combat effectiveness - the guns retained the ability to occasionally shoot, but the tower itself practically could not rotate. Another 305-mm projectile hit the 102-mm armor, it did not penetrate, but from the concussion the lifting mechanisms of the 152-mm gun in the 3rd casemate were out of order. One 305-mm projectile hit the middle casemate, causing the 152-mm gun to jam (two more 75-mm guns were disabled).

A 305-mm projectile hit the foremast above the navigator's cabin, among other (not too significant) damage, the Barr and Stroud rangefinder was disabled.

Two 305 mm shells hit the bow of the battleship on either side of the bow bulkhead. Fortunately, the bulkhead itself, by some miracle, remained intact, and kept the water flow from the hit closest to the stem (therefore, we will not consider it significant). However, the second round led to serious flooding of the living deck, as well as the ingress of water into the turret compartment, the compartment of bow mine vehicles and dynamos. The ship was saved from more serious consequences by intense damage control. Another 305-mm projectile (most likely armor-piercing), hitting the 229 mm armor plate, chipped off part of it, pressed inward by 6, 6 cm, while the shirt behind the armor was crumpled and destroyed, the edge of the armor plate was chipped off. Through this hole, Peresvet received 160 tons of water, which had to be “straightened out” by counterflooding. In addition, two shells of an unknown (152-254 mm) caliber hit the 178 mm section of the armor belt, the armor did not penetrate, but led to damage to the shirt and the skin behind the plate - however, this did not cause significant flooding, so we ignore these hits.

The pipes of the battleship were hit by 2 305-mm shells and three shells with a caliber of 120-152 mm. On the whole, the Peresvet pipes received serious damage, which caused an increased consumption of coal, and the reason for this was the damage caused by the 305-mm shells of the second and third pipes of the ship. However, modern researchers (V. Polomoshnov) suggest that these were still hits by 203-mm projectiles, since the nature of the damage (a badly destroyed outer casing with a much less damaged inner one) is characteristic of 203-mm projectiles. Such damage was inflicted by the 203-mm shells of the armored cruisers of Kamimura to the pipes of the cruisers of the Vladivostok detachment, but for the pipes of the Tsarevich, the opposite was characteristic - high-explosive 305-mm shells made huge holes of approximately equal area both in the outer and in the inner casing.

For all the weight of this reasoning, we still cannot accept it - nevertheless, Russian sailors, who had the opportunity after the battle to familiarize themselves in detail with the nature of the damage, came to the conclusion that it was precisely the 305-mm caliber. In addition, the author of this article can provide a logical explanation for such an incident. The fact is that the Japanese massively changed British fuses in their shells of large-caliber cannons for "instant" fuses of their own design (Yichiuying), which ensured the detonation of the projectile at the moment of contact with the armor, without any slowdown. This innovation also affected armor-piercing shells (probably not all, but still). That is, the pipes of "Peresvet" could theoretically get 305-mm armor-piercing shells with a low content of explosives (which, by the way, did not differ so much in the mass of explosives from high-explosive 203-mm shells), but with "instant" fuses, which caused known similarity of damage.

Medium caliber artillery, again, did not achieve success. One shell of an unknown caliber hit the aft turret, and another hit the casemate, but this did not damage the artillery. The bulk of the shells hit the hull (12 hits), but the only noticeable damage to the battleship was the massive failure of the unarmored 75-mm guns - and that was all. Three more medium-caliber shells hit the pipes (without causing serious damage), two into the masts and three (of unknown caliber) into the bridges.

Thus, out of 13 large-caliber shells, 7 did significant damage to the ship, and none of 22 small- and medium-caliber shells caused serious damage.

I would especially like to note that we are considering only hits during the daytime battle with the X. Togo squadron, therefore, damage to one 254-mm gun of the "Peresvet" by a direct hit from a 57-mm shell from a Japanese destroyer during a night attack is not taken into account - and, in any case case, it would refer to the effectiveness of small-caliber rather than medium-caliber artillery.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

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Twenty-one hits, including 10 - 305 mm, one 152 mm and 10 of an unknown caliber.

One 305-mm projectile hit the 127-mm armor belt and did not penetrate it, but the shock caused the electrical equipment of the right aft tower to fail, as a result of which the ammunition had to be fed into it manually. A round of unknown caliber knocked the rangefinder off the bridge.

One 305-mm projectile, hitting the 368-mm armor belt, pushed the slab inward, which caused two corridors to be flooded and opened to leak in a place previously damaged by the Peresvet ram. Another high-explosive projectile of unknown caliber, hitting the casing of the stern pipe, interrupted the steam pipes in the stern stoker, which caused the speed of the battleship to drop to 8 knots for some time.

Thus, out of 10 305-mm shells, 2 seriously damaged the ship, and 2 more out of 11 other hits. The remaining 7 shells of unknown caliber hit the ship's hull, one hit the mast and one 152-mm shell was found unexploded in the boat; they did not cause much damage to the ship's combat capability.

Squadron battleship "Poltava"

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The ship had 24 hits, including 16 large-caliber shells (15-305-mm and 1-254-mm), as well as 4-152-mm shells and 8 shells of unknown caliber.

Two 305-mm shells hit the unarmored side under the right nose turret of 152-mm guns and jammed it. The rangefinder was damaged by shrapnel, but, unfortunately, it is not indicated which shell fragments caused this damage, and judging by the description of the hits, both 305-mm and medium-caliber projectiles can claim this.

A 305-mm projectile hit the stern, in the unarmored side below the waterline. The premises of dry provisions were flooded, water also flowed into the steering compartment. The latter was drained by the crew's labor, but nevertheless it was necessary to use counter-flooding, taking water into one of the bow compartments. Two 305-mm shells hit the unarmored side just above the waterline, almost in the same place (the aft lower officers' compartment), as a result of which a huge hole of about 6.5 by 2 meters was formed in the side of the ship, and it began to overwhelm with water. The battleship got a trim aft.

A splinter from a projectile hit through the light hatch of the engine room directly into the bearing of the vehicle on the left side, which led to a drop in the speed of the battleship. However, it is not known where this splinter came from - the sources do not contain a description of the corresponding projectile hit. In other words, it is completely unknown where this splinter could have come from - it could have been from both large-caliber and medium-caliber shells.

Thus, 5 out of 16 large-caliber shells caused serious damage, in addition, perhaps one of them disabled the rangefinder. Twelve hits of medium- and small-caliber shells did not lead to anything, although perhaps the rangefinder nevertheless brought out fragments of one of them. Plus, one fragment of a shell that was not accounted for in these calculations damaged the bearing in the car.

Summing up, we can state the following. Of the 63 large-caliber shells that hit the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron, 25 shells inflicted significant, significant damage. Of the 81 shells that hit them with a caliber of 203 and below, only 2 inflicted similar damage. In addition, there are two serious damages (the breakdown of fragments of a fire tank on the "Tsesarevich" and the failure of the rangefinder on the "Poltava") caused by shell fragments, the caliber of which we do not know. And there is still from nowhere a splinter that has come from that damaged the car of "Poltava".

Thus, the true effectiveness of large-caliber and medium-caliber Japanese shells in daytime combat on June 28, 1904, depending on where to distribute the controversial and unknown damage, is in the interval:

1. Of 64 large-caliber shells, 28 of 81 small- and medium-caliber shells inflicted significant damage - 2;

2. Out of 63 large-caliber projectiles, 25 inflicted significant damage out of 82 small- and medium-caliber projectiles - 5.

Thus, we see that even with the most favorable assumptions in favor of medium caliber artillery, its effect on large warships in the battle in the Yellow Sea is extremely insignificant - out of 30 hits that caused serious damage, medium caliber accounts for only 5 or less 17%. The probability of causing serious damage by hitting a 254-305-mm projectile was 39.7-43.8%, and with a medium-caliber projectile it was only 2.5-6.1%.

“But what about the fires? After all, there was no mention of them”- the dear reader will ask. Unfortunately, we have nothing to answer him, because there is no description of at least one fire that would have serious consequences for the battleship of the squadron. At the same time, one should not think that the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron did not burn - for example, the presence of 7 fires was recorded on the battleship Sevastopol during the battle. Nevertheless, none of them produced any significant drop in combat effectiveness.

We now turn to the battleship Eagle.

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The most difficult thing, perhaps, is determining the number of hits on the ship. There are quite a few sources in which they are cited, but the reliability of any of them inspires certain doubts.

Let's start with Vladimir Polievktovich Kostenko, who reported 42-305-mm and 100 152-203-mm hits, not counting fragments and small-caliber artillery shells. The numbers are obviously very high. Official Japanese historiography reports that 12-305 mm shells, 7-203 mm and 20-152 mm were hit, but it obviously follows from the text that only a part of the hits is indicated, and not their total number. Of great interest are the data of N. J. Campbell, who, based on the information of the British and German attaches, as well as on the many photographs available to him, came to the conclusion that 5-305-mm, 2-254-mm, 9-203 mm, 39-152 mm shells. But still, his data are incomplete - in his work he could not rely on Russian sources, and this is also very valuable information.

In the opinion of the author of this article, A. Danilov did an excellent analytical work in his article "Damage to the battleship Eagle in the Battle of Tsushima."He brought together the data of known sources and came to the conclusion that 11 shells with a caliber of 254-305-mm, 3 203-305-mm, 10-203-m, 7 152-203-mm, 20-152-m fell into the Russian battleship and 12 - 76-152 mm. However, it should be understood that this is not the final result and other data may subsequently be obtained. At the same time, one cannot fail to note the peculiarities of Japanese historiography, which managed to fog up even in such a relatively simple question.

Well, now let's look at the most interesting thing - damage to the battleship Eagle. We will analyze them based on the descriptions of an eyewitness to the Battle of Tsushima, Captain 2nd Rank K. L. Shwede (Report to the Main Naval Headquarters of the senior officer of the battleship "Eagle", dated February 1, 1906, No. 195), comparing them with the data of N. J. Campbell "The battle of Tsu-Shima". Let's start with artillery.

Nose 305 mm turret - serious damage caused by a 203-305 mm projectile.

From the report of K. L. Swede: “12 inches. a projectile hitting the left bow muzzle 12 inches. guns, beat off a piece of the barrel 8 feet from the muzzle and threw it onto the upper nose bridge, where they killed three people below. ranks and jammed him upright there … … When hit, 12 inches. projectile in the muzzle of the left 12 inch. bow gun - right 12 inches. the bow gun remained intact, only the charger of the right gun was out of order. They began to supply charges to the surviving left charger. and the shells are hoists."

According to NJ Campbell, the projectile was 203 mm, not 305 mm.

Aft 305mm turret - Serious damage caused by a 203mm or larger projectile.

From the report of K. L. Shvede: “A large-caliber projectile hitting the stern of the armor above the embrasure of the left 12 inches. of the stern gun, distorted the embrasure frame and, pushing the armor over the gun, limited the gun's elevation angle, so that the gun could only act on 30 cables."

According to NJ Campbell: "Part of the roof of the aft 12" turret above the left gun port was pushed inward by the hit of an 8 "shell, limiting the gun elevation angle."

Left 152 mm bow turret - disabled by a 203-305 mm projectile.

From the report of K. L. Shvede: “In the left bow 6 inches. the tower had 3 hits 6 inches. shells; the tower continued to function properly ", but then:" 6 inches. the left bow turret was completely destroyed, the frame of the left gun burst in it. At the bottom, the toothed shoulder strap was dented and the gear was broken; in the projectile supply section, the turret rollers were pressed on one side, a connected ring burst on the left side, and a vertical table armor plate came off from the same side. Almost all of the bolts were stripped from the threads. The upper part of the plates was supported by two bolts, the roof of the tower was raised above the embrasures, the caps were torn from the bolts. Major destruction was caused by 12 inches. a projectile hitting the lower part of the armored rotating part of the turret. There were 4 or 5 hits in the tower in total. 12 in. shell that destroyed 6 inches. the forward left tower, destroyed the paramedic's cabin in the upper deck and pierced the upper armored deck with a thickness of 1 1/16 inches."

According to N. J. Campbell, the shell, the impact of which disabled the turret, was 203 mm, not 305 mm.

Left middle 152 mm turret - serious damage caused by a 203-305 mm shell.

From the report of K. L. Swede: “In the middle 6 inches. the left turret hit two 6 inches. projectile; the first hit the vertical armor, but did not pierce it, exploded without harm to the tower; the second exploded on the roof of the tower. The shrapnel that flew through the throat for throwing out the cartridges and through the gunnery cap severely wounded the tower foreman and 2 lower. chips - one is fatal. The shrapnel broke the mechanism for opening the tower door from the inside. Projectile 8 in. or a large caliber hitting the vertical armor of the table, ricocheted into the light side, when it exploded, turned it around, thereby limiting the angle of shelling of the turret aft from the traverse."

N. J. Campbell does not describe this damage (this does not mean that it did not exist, it is just that this author described only a few of the most important injuries that seemed to him).

Left aft 152 mm turret - serious damage caused by a projectile of unknown caliber, most likely 203-305 mm

From the report of K. L. Shvede: “guidance is correct, one gun is jammed by a segmental projectile due to a fragment that fell into the muzzle. The other gun was completely pitted with shrapnel, which made them afraid to shoot from it."

NJ Campbell does not describe this damage.

In principle, the projectile could be of any caliber, but there is a nuance - K. L. The Swede is talking about a segment projectile, and this is most likely a 305 mm. At the same time, a 203-mm projectile exploded near the left stern turret - perhaps it was its fragments that damaged the guns.

The right nose 152-mm turret could only be operated manually, the wires and windings of the motors burned out. Serious damage caused by fragments of a projectile of unknown caliber.

From the report of K. L. Shvede: “At this time, at the beginning of the fire with the starboard side, there was a fire in the right bow 6". the tower that Leith commanded. Gears. The fire occurred as a result of the ignition of cartridges in the fenders, which were ignited by a red-hot splinter that flew into the tower through an open mouth in the roof for throwing out casings. All the servants of the tower are out of order."

According to N. J. Campbell, the damage was caused by shrapnel, the caliber of the projectile is not specified.

Right middle 152 mm turret - serious damage caused by a 203-305 mm projectile.

From the report of K. L. Shvede: “manual vertical guidance was corrected in it, since the wires and windings of the motors burned out, the bucket elevators were corrected and cleaned, the broken chains were connected. The turret could not rotate, since a large-caliber shell jammed it along the traverse and did not have time to chop off the mamerin.

According to N. J. Campbell, the projectile was 203 mm.

Right stern 152-mm turret - the guns are operational, but the turret itself is jammed. Serious damage caused by a 305 mm projectile

From the report of K. L. To the Swede: “In the mamerin and in the vertical armor of the right stern 6 inches. towers, hit two 6 inches. projectile. With the second shell, the tower was jammed from the outside into the mamerine, but the tower commander, Warrant Officer Bubnov, with the servant of the tower, coming out of it, cleared the mamer, which was jammed by a stuck shell fragment."

At the same time, K. L. The Swede does not give a description of the hit that finally jammed the tower, only confirms the fact of its failure.

According to N. J. Campbell, the projectile was 305 mm.

Fire control system - disabled, serious damage caused by a 203 mm projectile.

From the report of K. L. Shvede: “There were three 6-inch hits in the conning tower. projectiles below the slot without causing harm. Shrapnel fell continuously from the shells bursting nearby. A lot of fragments flew into the slot, especially small ones that showered those standing in the wheelhouse. An 8-inch projectile, ricocheting off the water, at the end hit from the left side into the slot of the conning tower. The explosion of the shell and its fragments smashed the rangefinder of Barr and Stroud, spoiled the combat indicators and crumpled many communication pipes, damaged the compass and the steering wheel."

NJ Campbell does not describe this damage.

In terms of other damage received by the battleship "Eagle", one hit of a 305-mm projectile in the lower armored belt of the left side in the area of the aft 305-mm turret can be distinguished as serious. The armor plate 145 mm thick was not pierced, but shifted and water began to flow into the ship's hull. Shortly after this hit, the ship received a roll of 6 degrees, which had to be corrected by counter-flooding. There were other hits that displaced the armor plates or made a hole not too high from the waterline, but there is no information that neither led to serious flooding and roll, or trim, therefore, they are not counted as serious damage.

30 fires were recorded on the Orel, two of them in medium-caliber turrets were taken into account by us as serious damage. The rest: two - in a battery of 75-mm guns, one each in the bow and aft ends, the rest - in the superstructures and on the deck, did not cause a significant decrease in combat effectiveness.

On the whole, we see that the statistics for Orel are very confusing. We counted only 10 damage, which significantly affected the combat capability of the battleship squadron. But the caliber of the shells that caused them was more or less reliably determined only in three cases out of ten - two 305-mm (damage to the hull and the right aft 152-mm turret) and one 203-mm (the MSA was disabled). Of the remaining 7 damage, 6 were caused by 203-305-mm shells, and one (fire in the right bow turret) - by a shell, in general, of any caliber.

In the opinion of the author of this article, it is impossible to draw any reliable conclusions based on such vague data. And all the more, it makes no sense to analyze the hits in the dead ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron - we know even less about them than about the Eagle.

At the same time, some conclusions can still be drawn. It is noteworthy that in the battle in the Yellow Sea, absolutely all significant damage that caused, or could have caused medium-caliber artillery shells, relate exclusively to unarmored units. On the battleship "Sevastopol" the rangefinder was damaged and one splinter hit the car through the pipe. Another disabled rangefinder, a splinter hitting the car through the skylight on the battleship "Poltava") and shrapnel damage to the fresh water tank on the "Revizan" may be the result of hitting medium-caliber shells (but possibly large-caliber shells). At the same time, on the "Eagle" only in one case (fragments that caused a fire in the right forward 152-mm turret) a 152-mm projectile can claim serious damage (at least theoretically) - all other damage was caused by at least 203- mm artillery. Also noteworthy are the numerous hits of 152-m shells in the armored units of the "Eagle" (three direct hits in the left forward 152-mm tower and conning tower), which did not cause any damage at all, and the same was observed on the ships of the 1st Pacific squadron.

In accordance with the above, we can state that in battles of squadron battleships during the Russo-Japanese War, guns with a caliber of 152 mm or less were practically useless, and 203 mm guns may have had limited usefulness. But the final verdict in relation to them can be made only after the appearance of reliable descriptions of the damage to the battleship Eagle.

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