“The two largest and most protracted local conflicts of the twentieth century”, “Afghanistan turned into Vietnam for the Soviet Union”, “The USSR and the United States switched roles” - such statements have become canonical for modern historiography. From my point of view, it is unacceptable to draw a direct analogy between the events in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and the US aggression in Vietnam (1965-1973). The hellish disco in the jungle has nothing to do with the feat of Soviet soldiers-internationalists.
In theory, everything looks like the truth, the two wars have some similarities:
For example, the phrases are often found in print media: "War between the United States and Vietnam" or "Soviet-Afghan war." The Soviet Union and the United States of America did not fight, respectively, with either Afghanistan or Vietnam. Both superpowers were drawn into an internal armed conflict between the warring parties, although initially the armed forces of the USSR and the United States were planned to be used only to protect vital facilities and intimidate the opposition. In reality, it turned out to be almost impossible to rely on the government's military forces: units of the US Army and the Soviet Army were forced to take over the conduct of full-scale hostilities. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Soviet and American units were extremely limited in operational-tactical and strategic freedom of action by political circumstances. Conflicts were widely covered by the world media, any miscalculation or mistake instantly became known around the world (in this case, Vietnam generally became the "first television war"). The Afghan war, despite its excessive closeness to Soviet society, was widely known abroad, and its events were often covered in the most negative light for the USSR.
A very important point - in Vietnam and Afghanistan, the armed forces of the USSR and the United States did not suffer a single military defeat. The ratio of losses of the sides, both in Afghanistan and Vietnam, was within 1:10, which, from a military point of view, testifies to the complete defeat of enemy units during each operation. And if we take into account the losses among civilians (although in both cases it was impossible to determine who the “civilians” were partisans), then this ratio would become equal to 1: 100 in favor of the regular army. The Americans thwarted all the Viet Cong offensives, and the Afghan spooks were unable to capture a single large settlement until the Soviet units began to leave the territory of Afghanistan. According to General Gromov, "we did whatever we wanted, and the spirits did only what they could."
What then caused the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and Afghanistan? Why did the USSR and the United States stop supporting the allied regimes and announced the cessation of hostilities? In both cases, the truth is simple: further warfare was pointless. The army was quite successful in dealing with the armed opposition, but during this time a new generation of Afghans (Vietnamese) grew up, took Kalashnikov into their hands, died under a hail of unguided rockets and aircraft cannons, the next generation grew up, took Kalashnikov into its hands, died … and etc. etc. The war dragged on indefinitely. The conflict could be resolved only by political means, but this turned out to be impossible - the leaderships of the USSR and the USA, disillusioned with their allies, stopped all attempts to tilt the situation to their side.
This is how these events sound in theory. Two identical wars: "The USSR repeated the mistake of the United States."Sounds like the truth, right? But if we leave demagoguery and turn only to tough statistics, exact numbers and facts, then the two wars will appear in completely unexpected colors. They are so different from each other that it is absolutely impossible to make any comparison between them.
The scale of the fighting
Just a few facts that put everything in its place:
At the end of 1965, the number of the US military contingent in Vietnam was 185 thousand people. Subsequently, it increased significantly, reaching by 1968 an incredible figure of 540 thousand people. Half a million American soldiers! This is a real WAR.
Let's compare this with the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Even in the midst of hostilities, the number of the Limited Contingent did not exceed 100,000 soldiers and officers. The difference is, of course, impressive. But this is also a relative figure, since the area of Afghanistan is twice that of Vietnam (647,500 sq. km versus 331,200 sq. km), which indicates less tension in hostilities. Unlike the American bloody massacre, the Soviet Army needed 5 times less forces to control the territory twice as large!
By the way, there is still such a tricky moment: long before the official start of hostilities, there was a huge number of American troops on the territory of South Vietnam. Not "military specialists" or "instructors", but US Army soldiers. So, 2 years before the invasion, there were 11 thousand American troops in this country. By 1964, there were already 23 thousand of them - an entire army.
Further, there are dry figures of statistics: the aviation of the 40th Army completed about 300 thousand sorties in 9 years of the Afghan war … At the same time, the Americans had to complete 36 million helicopter sorties to achieve (or rather, fail) their nefarious goals. With regard to fixed-wing aviation (aircraft of all types), only carrier-based aviation, which was assigned a supporting role, flew more than half a million sorties. It looks like the Yankees are seriously bogged down in the war.
The basis of the strike aviation of the 40th Army was made up of Su-17 fighter-bombers of various modifications. Su-17 is a single-engine aircraft with variable geometry wing. The combat load is two 30 mm cannons and up to four tons of outboard weapons (in reality, in the thin mountain air, the Su-17 usually did not lift more than one and a half to two tons of bombs and NURS blocks). Reliable and cheap weapon for regional wars. Great choice.
The invulnerable Su-25 attack aircraft became the hero of the "hot sky of Afghanistan". "Rook" was originally created as an anti-tank aircraft, but in the absence of armored vehicles from the enemy, it turned into a real "vigilante" of spooks and their meager property. The low flight speed contributed to the greater accuracy of the bomb strikes, and the Su-25 airborne weapon system made it possible to mix bloody fragments of the enemy with stone chips in any conditions.
The attack aircraft possessed high protection (titanium armor "held" a 30 mm projectile) and excellent survivability (a destroyed engine or a broken control thrust - normal flight).
Due to the absence of an air enemy, MiG-21 fighters were involved in bombing, and later MiG-23MLD. Sometimes Su-24 tactical bombers appeared, and at the end of the war, new Su-27 attack aircraft appeared in Afghanistan. Frankly speaking, only front-line aviation “worked” in Afghanistan, strikes were made on point targets. The occasional use of Tu-16 and Tu-22 heavy bombers was more of an embarrassment.
Compare that to tens of thousands of B-52 Stratofortress sorties and carpet bombing of Vietnam. During the 7 years of the war, American aviation dropped 6, 7 million tons of bombs on Vietnam. (By the way, the well-known comparison with Germany is incorrect. According to statistics, during the Second World War, American pilots dropped 2, 7 million tons of bombs on it. But! This is data for the period: summer 1943 - spring 1945 Unlike the Third Reich, Vietnam bombed for 7 years.) And yet, 6, 7 million tons of death - this is the reason for the Hague Tribunal.
In addition to strategic bombers, the US Air Force actively used an exotic vehicle of total destruction - the AC-130 Specter fire support aircraft. According to the concept of the "flying artillery battery", a 105 mm gun, a 40 mm automatic cannon and several six-barreled "Volcanoes" were installed across the side of the C-130 "Hercules" heavy transport aircraft, the trajectories of their shells converging at a certain distance at one point. A huge pot-bellied plane, similar to a cannon ship of the eighteenth century, flew in a circle over the target, and an avalanche of hot metal fell from its sides on the heads of enemies. It seems that the creators of the "Spectrum" revised Hollywood action movies, but the concept turned out to be successful, despite serious losses from ground fire, the AC-130 fire support aircraft did a lot of bad things around the world.
The next sin of the American army: the open use of chemical agents during hostilities. US Air Force pilots generously watered Agent Orange to Vietnam and destroyed the jungle with reagent to make it impossible for Viet Cong guerrillas to hide in dense vegetation. Changing the relief is, of course, an ancient tactic, in Russia the phrase “changing the relief during the night” is generally an army joke. But not in the same barbaric way! "Agent Orange" is not a chemical warfare agent, but it is still toxic muck that accumulates in the soil and can harm human health.
It is impossible to imagine anything like this during the Afghan war. Rumors about spraying smallpox and cholera bacteria over the positions of dushmans are just urban legends that do not have any confirmation of facts.
The main criterion. Losses
"Whites send blacks to kill yellows" - Stokely Carmichael's funny phrase became one of the slogans of pacifism. Although, this is not entirely true: official statistics say that 86% of those killed in Vietnam were white, 12.5% were black, the remaining 1.5% were representatives of other races.
58 thousand dead Americans. Losses of personnel of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops were 4 times less - 15 thousand soldiers and officers. This single fact alone casts doubt on the thesis “the USSR repeated the mistake of the USA”.
Further, again dry statistics:
The Air Force of the 40th Army lost 118 aircraft and 333 helicopters in the Afghan war. Can you imagine three hundred helicopters lined up in one row? An incredible sight. And here is another anomalous figure: the US Air Force, US Navy and Marine Corps lost 8,612 aircraft and helicopters in Southeast Asia, of which 4,125 were directly over Vietnam. Well, what else is there to talk about? Everything is clear.
The high losses of US aviation are explained, first of all, by the large number of aircraft involved in the war and the high intensity of sorties. In the late 1960s, more helicopters were deployed in Vietnam with American troops than elsewhere in the world combined. 36 million sorties. There is a known case when a battery of 105 mm guns changed position with the help of helicopters 30 times in one day. It only remains to add that the Americans, in the conditions of a powerful enemy air defense system, managed to achieve a phenomenal result: one helicopter lost for 18,000 sorties. Let me remind you that most often we are talking about the UH-1 "Iroquois" - a multi-purpose "turntable" with one engine and without any constructive protection (frying pans under the butt of American pilots do not count).
Support
“On the day the Soviet Union officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter:“Now we have a chance to give the Soviet Union our Vietnam War”(the famous communist Zbigniew Brzezinski).
With the support of the US leadership, the CIA launched a large-scale Operation Cyclone. In 1980, $ 20 million was allocated to support the Afghan mujahideen. The amounts grew steadily, reaching $ 630 million by 1987. Weapons, equipment, instructors, financial support for recruiting new gang members. Afghanistan was surrounded by a ring of training camps for future "warriors of Allah", weekly in the port of Karachi (the capital of Pakistan) a ship with weapons, ammunition and food for Afghan spirits was unloaded. The story with the famous "Stinger" deserves a separate paragraph.
So, about portable anti-aircraft missile systems. FIM-92 "Stinger" began to be supplied to dushmans in 1985. There is an opinion that it was these "tricks" that forced the USSR to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Well, what can I argue here, here are the numbers:
1. With the help of MANPADS of all types, 72 aircraft and helicopters were shot down, i.e. only 16% of the losses of the 40th Army Air Force.
2. Paradoxically, with the appearance of the Stinger MANPADS among the dushmans, the aviation losses of the 40th Army steadily decreased. So, in 1986, 33 Mi-8 helicopters were lost; In 1987 they lost 24 Mi-8s; in 1988 - only 7 cars. The same goes for the IBA: in 1986, ten Su-17s were shot down; in 1987 - four "dryers".
The paradox can be easily explained: death is the best teacher. Measures were taken and they yielded results. Lipa missile disorientation system, heat traps and special piloting techniques. The pilots of the fighter-bomber aviation were forbidden to descend below 5000 meters - there they were in complete safety. The helicopters, on the other hand, pressed themselves to the ground, because the minimum target flight altitude for the Stinger is 180 meters.
In general, the spooks used many portable anti-aircraft systems: Javelin, Blopipe, Redai, Strela-2 made in China and Egypt … Most of these MANPADS had limited capabilities, for example, the British Blupipe could not shoot in pursuit, had the height of the defeat is only 1800 meters and 2, 2 kg of cumulative warhead. In addition, he had complex manual guidance, and most dushmans could only control a donkey. "Stinger", of course, looked attractive against the background of this mess: easy to use, firing at any air targets within a radius of 4.5 km, warhead - 5 kilograms. About 2 thousand of them got to Afghanistan, part of them was spent on training future "missilemen", the Americans bought another 500 unused "Stingers" back after the war. And nevertheless, there was little sense from this venture - the spooks shot down more aircraft from rusty DShK caliber 12, 7 mm. By the way, "Stinger" was very dangerous in operation - for a missile fired into "milk" they could cut off their hands.
In short, Operation Cyclone is just a cheap anecdote compared to how the Soviet Union supported its allies. According to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kosygin, every day we spent 1.5 million rubles to support North Vietnam (exchange rate for 1968: 90 kopecks for 1 dollar). Plus, China provided significant military assistance in creating an air defense system for North Vietnam. The Americans just got hit. I have no other words.
Tanks, fighters, trucks, tech. support, artillery systems of all calibers, air defense systems, radars, small arms, ammunition, fuel … During the war, 95 S-75 Dvina anti-aircraft missile systems and 7658 missiles were delivered to North Vietnam. At medium and high altitudes, there was no escape from air defense missile systems - the S-75 hit 20-30 kilometers in height and the same in range, the mass of a high-explosive fragmentation warhead was 200 kilograms. For comparison: the length of the Stinger missile is 1.5 meters. The length of the two-stage SAM complex S-75 is 10.6 meters!
American pilots tried to go to low altitudes, but came under deadly fire from the ground: the air defense of North Vietnam was extremely saturated with anti-aircraft artillery systems of all calibers - from 23 mm rapid-fire ZU-23-2, to 57 mm SPGs ZSU-57-2 and 100 mm anti-aircraft guns KS-19. At the very end of the war, Soviet-made Strela-2 MANPADS began to be used.
Vietnam's presence of fighter aircraft sharply worsened the position of the Americans. In total, the USSR provided the Vietnamese army with 316 MiG-21 combat aircraft, 687 tanks, more than 70 combat and transport ships, as well as a large number of other military-technical products. Thousands of Vietnamese military personnel completed a full course of training in Soviet military academies (compare this with martyr), 16 Vietnamese were awarded the title of ace pilot.
China, in turn, provided North Vietnam with 44 MiG-19 fighters, as well as tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military equipment.
Timur and his team
It is known about the existence of at least 136 large objects of the national economy, built by Soviet specialists during the War in Afghanistan. Here's this awesome list, friends:
1. HPP Puli-Khumri-II with a capacity of 9 thousand kW on the river. Kungduz 1962
2. TPP at a nitrogen fertilizer plant with a capacity of 48 thousand kW (4x12) Stage 1 - 1972 Stage II - 1974 (36 MW) Expansion - 1982 (up to 48 MW)
3. Dam and HPP "Naglu" on the river. Kabul with a capacity of 100 thousand kW 1966 expansion - 1974
4. Power transmission lines with substations from the Puli-Khumri-II HPP to Baglan and Kunduz (110 km) 1967
5. Power transmission line with a 35/6 kV substation from TPP at the nitrogen fertilizer plant to Mazar-i-Sherif (17.6 km) 1972
6-8. An electrical substation in the northwestern part of Kabul and a 110 kV power transmission line from the Vostochnaya electrical substation (25 km) 1974
9-16. 8 tank farms with a total capacity of 8300 cubic meters. m 1952 - 1958
17. Gas pipeline from the gas production site to the nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sheriff with a length of 88 km and a throughput capacity of 0.5 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year 1968 1968
18-19. Gas pipeline from the gas production facility to the USSR border, 98 km long, 820 mm in diameter, with a throughput capacity of 4 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year, including an air crossing over the Amu Darya river with a length of 660 m 1967, an air crossing of the gas pipeline -1974.
20. Looping on the main gas pipeline 53 km long 1980
21. Power transmission line - 220 kV from the Soviet border in the area of Shirkhan to Kunduz (first stage) 1986
22. Expansion of the oil depot in the port of Hairaton by 5 thousand cubic meters. m 1981
23. Oil depot in Mazar-i-Sheriff with a capacity of 12 thousand cubic meters. m 1982
24. Oil depot in Logar with a capacity of 27 thousand cubic meters. m 1983
25. Oil depot in Puli - Khumri with a capacity of 6 thousand cubic meters. m
26-28. Three road transport enterprises in Kabul for 300 Kamaz trucks each 1985
29. Motor transport company for servicing fuel trucks in Kabul
30. Service station for Kamaz vehicles in Hairaton 1984
31. Arrangement of a gas production facility in the area of Shibergan with a capacity of 2.6 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year 1968
32. Arrangement of a gas production facility at the Dzharkuduk field with a complex of facilities for desulfurization and preparation of gas for transportation in the amount of up to 1.5 billion cubic meters. m of gas per year 1980
33. Booster compressor station at the Khoja-Gugerdag gas field, 1981
34-36. A nitrogen fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-Sherif with a capacity of 105 thousand tons of carbamide per year with a residential village and a construction base 1974
37. Auto repair plant in Kabul with a capacity of 1373 overhaul of cars and 750 tons of metal products per year 1960.
38. Airport "Bagram" with a runway of 3000 m 1961
39. International airfield in Kabul with a runway 2800x47 m 1962
40. Airfield "Shindand" with a runway 2800 m 1977
41. Multi-channel communication line from Mazar-i-Sheriff to Hairaton point 1982
42. Stationary satellite communication station "Intersputnik" of the "Lotus" type.
43. House-building plant in Kabul with a capacity of 35 thousand square meters of living space per year 1965
44. Expansion of the house-building plant in Kabul to 37 thousand square meters. m of living space per year 1982
45. Asphalt-concrete plant in Kabul, asphalting of streets and delivery of road vehicles (equipment and technical assistance were supplied through MVT) 1955
46. The river port of Shirkhan, designed to process 155 thousand tons of cargo per year, including 20 thousand tons of oil products 1959 expansion 1961
47. Road bridge across the river. Khanabad near the village of Alchin with a length of 120 m 1959
48. The "Salang" road through the Hindu Kush mountain range (107.3 km with a tunnel 2, 7 km at an altitude of 3300 m) 1964
49. Reconstruction of technical systems of the Salang tunnel, 1986
50. Road Kushka - Herat - Kandahar (679 km) with cement-concrete pavement 1965
51. Road Doshi - Shirkhan (216 km) with black surface 1966
52-54. Three road bridges in the Nangarhar province across the river. Kunar in the districts of Bisuda, Kame, Asmar with a length of 360 m, 230 m and 35 m, respectively, 1964
55. Highway Kabul - Jabel - us-Seraj (68, 2 km) 1965
56-57. Two road bridges across the Salang and Gurband rivers, 30 m each 1961
58. Central repair shops for the repair of road construction equipment in Herat 1966
59. The Puli-Khumri-Mazar-i-Sheriff-Shibergan highway with a length of 329 km with a black surface 1972
60. Automobile road from the Puli-Khumri-Shibergan highway to the Hairaton point on the bank of the river. Amu Darya with a length of 56 km
61. Automobile-railway bridge across the river. Amu Darya 1982
62. Complex of facilities for the transshipment base on the left bank of the river. Amu Darya in the area of Hairaton
63. Kindergarten for 220 places and kindergarten for 50 places in Kabul 1970
64. Urban electrical networks in Jalalabad 1969
65-66. City electrical networks in the years. Mazar-i-Sheriff and Balkh 1979
67-68. Two microdistricts in Kabul with a total area of 90 thousand square meters. m 1978
69-74. 6 weather stations and 25 posts 1974
75-78. 4 weather stations.
79. Center for mother and child for 110 visits per day in the city of Kabul, 1971.
80. Geological, geophysical, seismic and drilling operations for oil and gas in Northern Afghanistan 1968 - 1977.
81. Integrated prospecting and survey work for solid minerals
82. Polytechnic Institute in Kabul for 1200 students 1968
83. A technical school for 500 students for the training of oil specialists and miners-geologists in Mazar-i-Sheriff 1973
84. Automotive technical school for 700 students in Kabul
85-92. 8 vocational schools for the training of skilled workers 1982 - 1986
93. Boarding school based on an orphanage in Kabul 1984
94. Bakery in Kabul (an elevator with a capacity of 50 thousand tons of grain, two mills - 375 tons of grinding per day, a bakery 70 tons of bakery products per day) 1957
95. Elevator in Puli-Khumri with a capacity of 20 thousand tons of grain.
96. Bakery in Kabul with a capacity of 65 tons of bakery products per day 1981
97. Mill in Puli-Khumri with a capacity of 60 tons per day 1982
98. A bakery in Mazar-i-Sheriff with a capacity of 20 tons of bakery products per day.
99. Mill in Mazar-i-Sheriff with a capacity of 60 tons of flour per day
100. Jalalabad irrigation canal with a node of head water intake structures on the river. Kabul with a length of 70 km with a hydroelectric power station with a capacity of 11.5 thousand kW 1965
101-102. Dam "Sarde" with a reservoir with a capacity of 164 million cubic meters. m and irrigation networks at the dam for irrigation 17, 7 thousand hectares of land 1968 - 1977.
103-105. Two agricultural diversified farms "Gazibad" with an area of 2, 9 thousand hectares, "Khalda" with an area of 2, 8 thousand hectares and irrigation and reclamation preparation of land in the zone of the Jalalabad canal on an area of 24 thousand hectares. 1969-1970.
106-108. Three veterinary laboratories for the fight against infectious animal diseases in the years. Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sheriff and Herat 1972 109. Citrus and olive processing plant in Jalalabad 1984
110. Control and seed laboratory for cereals in Kabul
111-113. 3 soil-agrochemical laboratories in the years. Kabul, Mazar-i-Sheriff and Jalalabad
114-115. 2 cable cranes in the area of Khorog and Kalayi-Khumb 1985 - 1986
116. Power transmission line-220 kV "State border of the USSR-Mazar-i-Sheriff" 1986
117. Integrated laboratory for the analysis of solid minerals in Kabul 1985
118. Elevator with a capacity of 20 thousand tons of grain in Mazar-i-Sheriff
119. Truck maintenance station for 4 posts in Puli-Khumrm
120-121. 2 cotton seed laboratories in the years. Kabul and Balkh 122. Clinic of the insurance society of civil servants for 600 visits per day in Kabul
123-125. Artificial insemination stations in the years. Kabul (Binigisar), Mazar-i-Sheriff (Balkh), Jalalabad.
126. Institute of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the PDPA 1986
127. Development of a feasibility study for the feasibility of creating two state farms on the basis of the Sardé irrigation system.
128. Power transmission line-10 kV from the state border in the area of Kushka to st. Turgundi with a substation.
129. Gas filling station in Kabul with a capacity of 2 thousand tons per year 130. Base of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Hairaton for unloading and storage of special cargo (on contract terms).
131. Reconstruction of the railway station Turgundi 1987.
132. Restoration of the bridge over the river. Samangan
133. Gas filling station in Hairaton with a capacity of 2 thousand tons of liquefied gas.
134. Looping 50 km of the USSR-Afghanistan gas pipeline.
135. Secondary general education school for 1,300 students in Kabul, teaching a number of subjects in Russian.
135. Installation for processing gas condensate into diesel fuel with a processing capacity of 4 thousand tons per year at the Dzharkuduk gas field.
136. Enterprise for the progressive assembly of bicycles with a capacity of 15 thousand units per year in Kabul, 1988.
Of course, building something in a country torn apart by civil war was madness, most of these wonderful undertakings turned to dust, but that was the essence of the Soviet Union - we really did bring good to the people of the whole world. At least in dreams.
And all the cheap talk about how "the USSR repeated the mistake of the USA" is simply incorrect. America got involved in a real war, the USSR limited itself to a counter-terrorist operation and the restoration of the national economy of Afghanistan. Q. E. D.
