In this article, we continue the topic of the features of the Ulyanovsk ATACR project.
Air group project 1143.7
In the previous article, it was already mentioned about the fundamental difference in views on the role of carrier-based aircraft in the USA and the USSR. In America, it was believed that this aviation was the main force capable of solving most of the tasks of the surface fleet, and therefore they built their own surface fleet there as a means of supporting the activities of carrier-based aviation. In contrast to this point of view, it was believed in the USSR that the main tasks of the fleet would be solved by multipurpose and missile submarines, as well as missile and artillery surface ships, and that carrier-based aircraft should serve to ensure their combat stability. Accordingly, Soviet ATACRs were created not as multipurpose aircraft carriers, but rather as air defense ships, and this, of course, left a certain imprint on the planned composition of the Ulyanovsk air group. What was it supposed to be? The sources give very different data on this subject, some of them are shown in the table below:
According to the author, the most realistic option was No. 3 with a limitation of the number of aircraft to 61 units. with the abandonment of the light MiG-29K and bringing the number of Su-33 to 36 units. But, if the USSR had not collapsed, then the MiG-29K would have received their rightful place on the deck almost certainly. We must not forget that the MiG-29K was designed on the basis of the solutions of the MiG-29M, and the Su-33 was designed only on the basis of a conventional combatant Su-27. Thus, the avionics of the MiG-29K would have been much more modern, and it is unlikely that the fleet would abandon such aircraft.
In addition, 12 Granit anti-ship missiles can be safely assigned to the Ulyanovsk air group, in terms of their combat qualities, which were, rather, disposable unmanned aerial vehicles.
Let us compare the Ulyanovsk air group with the typical composition of the US aircraft carriers.
Fighters
The air defense of American aircraft carriers was built around 2 F-14A / D Tomcat squadrons, each numbering 10-12 aircraft. I must say that the "Tomcat" was originally created as an aircraft capable of providing complete air supremacy in the immediate vicinity of an aircraft carrier, but … The machine came out quite controversial. The fighter turned out to be very heavy, and with insufficient thrust-to-weight ratio, therefore, as an air fighter, it lost to the same F-15 "Eagle", despite some possibilities that were provided by the variable geometry of the wing. "Tomcat" was modified to use long-range missiles "Phoenix", but the latter, by and large, were an interceptor weapon, and were intended primarily for the destruction of Soviet Tu-16 and Tu-22 missile carriers, as well as missiles launched from them. But for the defeat of enemy fighters "Phoenixes" were not very good. At the same time, the Su-33 was a heavy air superiority fighter and surpassed the Tomcat in terms of its combat qualities.
The American naval pilots were also armed with F / A-18 Hornet aircraft, which were also capable of conducting aerial combat. However, the key word here is “were capable” - creating the Hornets, the American Navy still wanted to get, first of all, a strike aircraft that could also stand up for itself in air combat. This is evidenced by the very name of "Hornet", because F / A stands for fighter attack, that is, "fighter-attack aircraft." Comparing it with the equally versatile MiG-29K shows that the MiG is significantly inferior to the American aircraft in strike capabilities, but has a certain superiority in aerial combat.
Thus, the carrier-based fighters ATAKR "Ulyanovsk" in their capabilities individually surpassed similar American aircraft. At the same time, the superiority in numbers also remained with the domestic aircraft carrier - 36 Su-33 or a mixed air group of 45-48 Su-33 and MiG-29K obviously outnumbered 24 Tomkats or up to 40 Tomkats and Hornets.
Attack aircraft
Here the advantage of the American aircraft carrier is obvious. Deck air wings of the United States were necessarily equipped with specialized and very effective attack aircraft A-6 "Intruder", usually numbering 16-24 units, while the total number of strike aircraft, taking into account the Hornets, could well reach 40 units.
There was nothing of the kind on the Soviet ATACR. At Ulyanovsk, only 20-24 MiG-29Ks could play the role of strike aircraft, but, as mentioned above, in terms of these capabilities, they lost not only to Intruders, but also to Hornets.
As for the Granit anti-ship missiles, they, without a doubt, were a very formidable anti-ship weapon. However, it was not universal (in theory, it was possible to shoot on land, but the cost of the Granites was such that there would hardly be a goal justifying such means), and most importantly, the anti-ship missiles had too "short arm" in comparison with the American deck stormtroopers. Of course, the ATAKR "Ulyanovsk" had certain strike capabilities, but they, in fact, were limited to a distance of about 550 km ("Granites" in combination with a MiG-29K with a more or less acceptable combat load), while the American "Intruders" and The Hornets were able to act 1.5-2 times further.
I would like to note that today it has become very fashionable to scold domestic designers and admirals for adherence to anti-ship missiles: according to the firmly established opinion, it would be much better to abandon them, and use the freed up weight to strengthen the capabilities of the air group. That is, to increase its number, or to accept an additional amount of aviation kerosene, aircraft weapons, etc. This is very reasonable, but nevertheless it must be borne in mind that in at least one case, the presence of heavy anti-ship missiles perfectly complemented the capabilities of the Ulyanovsk ATACR.
It is no secret that the leadership of the USSR armed forces took the threat posed by the US 6th Fleet deployed in the Mediterranean very seriously. In order to counter this threat, the USSR Navy created the 5th OPESK, that is, a large formation of surface and submarine ships, permanently present in the same region. "Interaction" with the 6th Fleet was carried out on a regular basis, and combat services took place, including in the form of escorting US ships in immediate readiness to strike at them in the event of a war and receiving appropriate orders.
Given the limited water area of the Mediterranean Sea, long-range anti-ship missiles in it were an extremely formidable weapon. Firstly, the range of "Granites" was quite enough to strike from the tracking position - after all, the carrier ship of such anti-ship missiles, which found itself in the center of the Mediterranean Sea, could shoot it right through from the European to African shores. Secondly, which is very important at the beginning of the global conflict, "Granites" had a short reaction time when compared with carrier-based aircraft. And thirdly, the placement of "Granites" on ATAKR made it possible to significantly increase its strike potential "with little blood" - in order to provide the same striking power, for example, using MiG-29K fighters, it would be necessary to significantly increase the air group of our ship.
Thus, for the ATACR, which was planned to be used for BS as part of the 5th OPESK, the placement of the Granit anti-ship missile system should be recognized to some extent justified. Moreover, such anti-ship missiles could only be deployed on ships of very large displacement, from a missile cruiser and above, which even the USSR could not build in sufficient numbers. True, in this case, there is a surprise at the half-heartedness of the decision to equip anti-ship missiles. The fact is that, according to the calculations of our naval specialists, the attack on the AUG should have been inflicted by at least 20 missiles, but there were only 12 of them on the Ulyanovsk ATAKR. spent on sailors and officers serving this type of weapon, on its control systems, etc., which, in general, are the same for both 12 and 20 anti-ship missiles. And if, say, for the ATAKR, intended for service in the Pacific Fleet, all this is clearly not necessary (it is extremely difficult to imagine how the ATAKR would have approached American ships at a distance of the use of "Granites"), then for the ATAKR, which was to serve in the Northern Fleet and carry out regular combat services in the Mediterranean Sea, the ammunition load may have made sense to increase to 20 anti-ship missiles.
Support aircraft
Unfortunately, according to the project, the ATAKR had only one type of such machines - we are talking about the Yak-44 AWACS aircraft in the amount of 4-8 units. In this respect, "Ulyanovsk" was losing to the American aircraft carrier, which had at its disposal 4-5 AWACS aircraft, the same number of electronic warfare aircraft and 4 tanker aircraft based on the A-6 "Intruder".
Undoubtedly, the appearance of an AWACS aircraft in the Soviet carrier-based aviation, capable, as far as can be understood from its descriptions, also conduct radio-technical reconnaissance, was a giant step forward on the path of combat information support of the USSR Navy. However, the comparative weakness of our standard electronic warfare systems at the end of the last century, combined with the lack of specialized electronic warfare aircraft, remained a real "Achilles' heel" of our naval aviation. Of course, the presence of "air tankers" also increased the operational capabilities of American aircraft carriers. For the sake of fairness, we note that the Ulyanovsk air group should have included 2 specialized rescue helicopters, but for the Americans this function could be performed by PLO helicopters.
Anti-submarine defense
As you can see, the Americans paid great attention to the anti-submarine capabilities of their wing: it included 10 S-3A / B Viking aircraft and 8 SH-3H or SH-60F helicopters, and a total of 18 aircraft.
This is much worse for the Ulyanovsk ATACR, because there are simply no specialized PLO aircraft in its wing: at the same time, it should be understood that an PLO aircraft is more efficient and capable of operating at a greater distance from the aircraft carrier than an PLO helicopter. But the number of the Ulyanovsk air group was inferior to the American ship - 15-16 Ka-27PL helicopters.
Combat reserves
In this issue, the ATACR "Ulyanovsk" also obviously lost to the American aircraft carrier. The author does not have exact data on the combat stocks of "Ulyanovsk", but the literature mentions that the ATAKR should have more than doubled the previous projects 1143.5 and 1143.6 in this parameter. The aircraft carrier "Kuznetsov" carries about 2,500 tons of aviation fuel, but there is, again, no exact data on ammunition. Taking into account the information that these are twice the mass of aviation ammunition on the aircraft carrier of the previous types, we get a maximum of 400 tons. Accordingly, it would not be a mistake to assume that similar reserves of "Ulyanovsk" could be 5, 5-6 thousand tons, and ammunition stocks - up to 800-900, maybe 1,000 tons. At the same time, the analogous figure for the American "Nimitz" is about 8, 3-10 thousand tons of aviation fuel and up to 2,570 tons of aviation ammunition.
Service staff
Here the advantage, again, belongs to the American aircraft carrier. In addition to the crew of the Nimitz itself, the US aircraft carrier also has an air group of 2,500 people, while the ATAKR Ulyanovsk was supposed to have only 1,100 people. In other words, the American aircraft carrier was able to "offer" better service to its aircraft than the Soviet ATACR.
Takeoff and landing operations
It is extremely difficult to compare their capabilities on the American Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and on the Ulyanovsk ATACR. If only because it is not entirely clear what exactly the Soviet nuclear-powered heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser should have been equipped with.
That is, of course, there is generally known data that Ulyanovsk was supposed to receive 2 steam catapults and a springboard, but how this happened is not entirely clear. There is information that initially the project "Ulyanovsk" assumed the presence of three catapults, and it is unclear whether the ATACR should have also carried a springboard. It is also known that the number of catapults on this ship caused fierce disputes, as a result of which the composition of the "take-off means" was approved. In the end, we settled on 2 steam catapults, but, according to some reports, work in the USSR on electromagnetic catapults progressed so well that Ulyanovsk could get just them.
In addition, it is completely unclear how the rates of aircraft ascent using a catapult or from a springboard are related: some data for calculations can be obtained only by watching videos of flights of carrier-based aircraft. All this was analyzed in detail by the author in the series of articles "TAKR" Kuznetsov ". Comparison with NATO aircraft carriers”, so here we will only summarize what was said earlier.
According to the author's calculations, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is capable of lifting an air group of 45 aircraft in 30 minutes. Strictly speaking, the performance of American catapults is higher, they are able to send one plane in flight in 2, 2-2, 5 minutes, taking into account the time of arrival at the catapult, etc. But the fact is that, as a rule, the location of a large air group on the deck prevents the operation of 2 out of the available four catapults, so that the American aircraft carrier does not start operating at full capacity immediately: all 4 catapults can be used only after the start of some of the aircraft. At the same time, “Ulyanovsk”, judging by the location of its catapults and starting positions, is quite capable of immediately using two bow positions for launching from a springboard and both catapults, and subsequently a third (“long”) position can join them. At the same time, the lifting speed of fighters from the springboard may well reach 2 aircraft every three minutes from only two launch sites and 3 from three, but the aircraft carrier's catapults will work somewhat slower than the American ones, since they are located in such a way that they overlap the takeoff line. Nevertheless, it is quite possible to assume that the Ulyanovsk ATACR is capable of lifting at least 40-45 aircraft in half an hour, that is, its capabilities are quite close to the American nuclear aircraft carrier.
On the other hand, one should not forget that takeoff from a catapult is more difficult for a pilot, and besides, fighters cannot take off from “short” starting positions in the maximum takeoff weight. But, again, it should be understood that when defending a compound, aircraft will not need this maximum take-off weight: the fact is that large fuel reserves make the aircraft heavier, significantly reducing its maneuverability, and is often simply not required. If the ATACR "Ulyanovsk" will have to provide a flight to the maximum combat radius, then the speed of the air group's ascent will not be so critical and it will be possible to organize it from two catapults and one "long" starting position.
Yet, not having all the completeness of information, the author is inclined to believe that a purely ejection aircraft carrier will have an advantage over a purely springboard or a ship of a mixed scheme, where both a springboard and catapults are used. But in the latter case, the superiority of the catapult aircraft carrier may not be so great, and besides, in the case when the economy of displacement is required, the springboard seems to be almost an uncontested option.
The fact is that a steam catapult is a very complex complex of equipment, steam generators, communications, etc., the total weight of one catapult with all the units serving it reaches 2,000 tons. It is clear that two additional catapults will immediately "eat up" about 4,000 tons of payload, while the springboard is several times less, since its mass hardly exceeds several hundred tons.
As for preparing aircraft for flight, the Nimitz, again, has a preference. As you know, the area of the flight deck is one of the most important characteristics of an aircraft carrier, because aircraft ready to take off, fueled and with suspended weapons, are located on it - it is theoretically possible to lower such aircraft into hangars, but in practice it is extremely dangerous. Accordingly, the larger the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, the larger the air group can be placed on it. So, for "Nimitz" this figure reaches 18,200 sq.m., while for ATAKR "Ulyanovsk" - about 15,000 sq.m.
And what is the result?
As a result, we have two completely different aircraft carriers designed to solve, in general, different tasks. As already mentioned above, the Americans assigned the leading role to their carrier-based aircraft in literally everything. Accordingly, their standard wing (especially in the variant 20 Tomkats, 20 Hornets and 16 Intruders) was fully universal. It included both aircraft intended primarily for air combat - "Tomkats" and specialized strike "Intruders", and the "Hornets" were an excellent "cavalry reserve" capable of reinforcing, depending on the situation, fighters or attack aircraft. aircraft carrier. At the same time, the actions of fighter and strike aircraft were provided with the necessary means of reconnaissance, support and control - AWACS aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, as well as "flying tankers". In addition, the air wing was able to build a powerful anti-submarine defense, echeloning PLO aircraft and helicopters.
Accordingly, the American aircraft carrier was an almost ideal "floating airfield", the main and only task of which was to ensure the functioning of the air wing described above.
And, thanks to the versatility of their air group, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers have become truly multipurpose, capable of effectively destroying surface, ground, air and underwater targets.
At the same time, the Ulyanovsk ATACR was a much more specialized ship. As you know, specialization is always more effective than universalism, and besides, a number of the above-described shortcomings of "Ulyanovsk" in the light of the tasks it faces are not such at all. Let's take a closer look at this.
The ATACR "Ulyanovsk" turned out to be significantly smaller than the "Nimitz" - 65,800 tons versus 81,600 tons, while later the American aircraft carriers of this series "grew" by about 10,000 tons. Accordingly, the Soviet ship cost less, and this was in the manufacture of such leviathans, of course mattered.
At the same time, in solving its key task - to provide air defense of heterogeneous forces striking the US AUG, the Ulyanovsk ATACR had certain advantages over the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. Its air group, "sharpened" for air combat, was capable of opposing 24 "Tomkats" or up to 40 units. "Tomkats" and "Hornets" 36 Su-33 or 45-48 Su-33 and MiG-29K, respectively. At the same time, "Ulyanovsk" could deploy even more air patrols with the participation of AWACS aircraft than the American aircraft carrier, which, again, gave the Soviet ATACR certain advantages. The only thing the Americans won was in the availability of electronic warfare aircraft, but this would hardly be of decisive importance.
The American aircraft carrier had some advantage in the ability to quickly lift the air group, but it was leveled by the tactics of using ATACR. Of course, if you imagine some hypothetical duel between the ATACR and the US aircraft carrier, the latter, due to the larger number of catapults, a larger deck area, the presence of specialized Intruder attack aircraft and the superiority of its strike aircraft in the range of action, will have an undeniable superiority over the Soviet ship.
But the whole question is that no one was going to oppose the ATACR to the nuclear "Nimitz" in direct confrontation. ATACR was supposed to cover surface and submarine ships located hundreds of kilometers from the AUG, but itself was to be located even much further: thus, the "air battles" were to "boil" somewhere halfway between the aircraft carriers. Thus, the incomplete fuel loading of aircraft starting from two "short" positions to a certain extent ceased to be a problem, and when using these positions, the ascent rate of the Ulyanovsk air group approached the Nimitz. If it was a question of covering the regiments of missile-carrying aircraft striking the AUG, then its departure is known in advance, and ATAKR was able, using two catapults and a third, "long" launch position, to form air cover forces capable of operating over a full radius.
In order to minimize the number of ships involved in the direct protection of the ATACR, the latter was equipped with the most powerful, and, I'm not afraid of the word, robotic defense system. In fact, it was supposed to work like this: the radio-technical reconnaissance equipment automatically took direction finding certain radiation and automatically carried out countermeasures: setting jammers, traps, etc. In the event of a ship attack, the ATAKR, "Daggers" and "Daggers" fire means would have to reflect it in an automatic mode and under the control of a single CIUS. That is, the very impressive fire capabilities and electronic warfare means were supposed to act automatically and, at the same time, "in unison" with each other. The American aircraft carrier was much weaker defended. On the other hand, the reduced displacement of the ATAKR did not allow placing on it an equally powerful PTZ, which the Nimitz had.
ATAKR was very much behind the Nimitz in the amount of combat reserves - it carried 1, 5-1, 7 times less fuel and 2, 5-3 times less ammunition. But it should be understood that the American multipurpose aircraft carrier was created, among other things, for long-term impact on coastal targets. That is, one of the forms of combat employment of American aircraft carriers, and, as it were, not the main one, was supposed to maneuver at a certain distance from the enemy's coastline and deliver systematic strikes against targets on its territory. At the same time, ATACR should not have done anything like that. Operations to destroy the AUG in comparison with similar activities are fleeting, and then either the enemy aircraft carrier will be sunk / disabled, or our striking squad is defeated and defeated - in any case, it will no longer need air cover. In addition, ammunition for aerial combat, for obvious reasons, has a much lower weight than those used to destroy ships or ground targets.
conclusions
They are very simple. The Americans, by virtue of the concept of their Navy, required effective "floating airfields" - multipurpose aircraft carriers. It was them that they received, bringing the standard displacement of the "Nimitz" to more than 90 thousand tons, but at the same time sacrificing the powerful air defense of the ship. At the same time, the USSR was building a highly specialized ATACR, designed primarily for the destruction of air targets. As a result of this, a ship was to be obtained, although inferior in a number of parameters to the Nimitsu, but which was quite capable of fulfilling its key function, that is, crushing or tying up its air wing in battle, thereby ensuring the defeat of the AUG by missile-carrying surface or submarine ships, or coastal aircraft.
In other words, by deliberately weakening the strike capabilities and less significant - PLO, the Ulyanovsk ATACR, despite its smaller size, was able to solve airspace control issues, perhaps better than a single AUG led by a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier.
And today, while designing the first Russian aircraft carrier, we should, first of all, make a conceptual choice. If we are going to build a fleet in the image and likeness of the American one, then we will need a multipurpose aircraft carrier, similar to the American one. At the same time, you need to accurately imagine that we will not be able to design “the same“Nimitz”, only with a displacement of 60,000 tons”. That is, a multipurpose aircraft carrier in such a displacement is, of course, possible, but it will be much weaker than any American in all, I emphasize, in all respects.
At the same time, such an aircraft carrier, of course, will require a significant escort: as, in fact, the American one: there is practically no difference in whether to provide air defense / anti-aircraft missile defense for a ship of 100,000 tons or 60,000 tons. We can even say that the "sixty thousandth" aircraft carrier will require more escort than "Nimitz" or "Gerald R. Ford" - the latter's air wing is larger and will provide a better level of protection for the compound.
It's another matter if we adopt the Soviet concept, and we create not multi-purpose, but specialized aircraft carriers, "sharpened", for example, in air defense - here, indeed, it will be possible to get by with ships of moderate displacement, which, nevertheless, will be able to fulfill their key function … But you need to understand that in the Soviet concept, the main striking role was played not by carrier-based aircraft, but by Tu-16 and Tu-22 missile carriers, surface and submarine missile cruisers, while the task of the TAKR and ATAKR was only to ensure their actions. Thus, following the Soviet path, we can indeed afford a much smaller aircraft carrier than the Nimitz and save on this. But only on condition of the formation of sufficiently strong missile-carrying "kulaks", which our aircraft carrier will cover, and which, in fact, will solve the tasks of fighting the forces of the enemy fleet.
In other words, before embarking on the construction of an aircraft carrier, one should decide, no less, with the concept of the domestic fleet, and this must be done, in fact, long before its laying. In an amicable way, it was necessary to know long before the start of the GPV 2011-2020, in order to determine the number and performance characteristics of ships planned for construction within the framework of a single concept of naval construction.
It must be said that the defeat of our fleet in the Russo-Japanese War was extremely difficult, but many of the subsequent actions to revive the fleet (not all, alas) deserve the highest praise. The naval general staff seriously thought about what naval forces it would need and for what. The composition of the squadrons, of which the fleet was to consist, was determined, as well as the tasks assigned to each class of ships. And then, the Russian Empire began to build not individual ships, and not even their series, but to the creation of squadrons, that is, the main structural units of which the fleet was supposed to consist. Yes, of course, at the same time many mistakes were made in determining the performance characteristics of ships, but the fact is that in tsarist Russia they finally understood: in order to have a navy, it is necessary to build a navy, that is, to conduct naval construction within the framework of a single concept of its application, and not separate, even arbitrarily powerful ships. Alas, the only lesson of history is that people do not remember its lessons …
