In 1992, the command of the Russian Air Force, while analyzing the experience of hostilities and statistics of losses of past wars (not only Soviet ones) and realizing that serious budgetary problems lay ahead, decided to withdraw from the Air Force's armament single-engine combat aircraft: MiG-23, MiG-27 and Su-17M of various modifications. This decision meant de facto the elimination of fighter-bomber aviation and the erosion of its tasks between assault and front-line bomber.
It was not immediately possible to implement this decision: some of the Su-17Ms available in the ranks served until the mid-nineties, and some squadrons - until 1997.
The last air unit on single-engine fighter-bombers was the 43rd separate naval assault squadron of the Black Sea Fleet aviation. Its Su-17M4, due to the position of Ukraine, which did not want to allow the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet forces, flew until 1998.
Since the 90s, the main tactical attack aircraft in the Russian Air Force have been the Su-25 and Su-24. Later, relatively recently, the Su-34 was added to them. Also, the Russian Aerospace Forces received the Su-30 of various modifications, which could be used to solve strike missions, but in some cases, their crews were preparing to conduct hostilities against enemy aircraft. The Su-35, which began to enter service with the Russian Aerospace Forces relatively recently, can be characterized in a similar way - even though these machines have wide striking capabilities, do their pilots specialize in fighting an air enemy? To which these aircraft are even better adapted than to strike missions.
We will not analyze whether it was worthwhile to do this with fighter-bomber aviation - we must understand that the country then found itself in an extremely difficult situation, and had to choose.
But the question - was it not worth it later for the Aerospace Forces and the military industry to return to single-engine aircraft again, it is not at all idle and very relevant.
It is worth looking back at past experiences.
The military glory of the post-war Soviet Air Force and aviation industry was created by single-engine fighters. The first of them, the legendary MiG-15, became famous during the Korean War. The equally legendary MiG-17 proved to be an extremely dangerous rival even for the US Air Force in Vietnam. Especially, acting in conjunction with the more modern and also single-engine MiG-21. It was the latter who became the main "heroes" of the war in the sky.
It is worth remembering that although formally the MiG-21 belonged to the third post-war generation of fighters, in air battles it turned out to be more effective than the American Phantoms. The MiG pilots were also more effective. The best Vietnamese ace, Nguyen Van Cock, had nine American aircraft shot down, of which at least three were Phantoms and one F-102 interceptor. For comparison, the best American ace, Captain Charles de Bellevue, had six shot down, moreover, flying a two-seater Phantom as a weapon operator, with different pilots, with the support of AWACS aircraft and almost absolute air supremacy. The rest of the Americans shot down fewer, and the Vietnamese have "six or more" this is the indicator of the first fifteen pilots in the list of aces.
Colonel Fayez Mansour, a Syrian, had 14 shot down planes in his account - both on the MiG-17 and on the MiG-21. Mohamed Mansour - 12, Adib el-Ghar and Bassam Khamshu 7 each. This indicates at least the full suitability of MiGs for air battles with Western machines.
In the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the MiGs also chalked up a number of Pakistani fighters …
And what about strike aircraft? The "star" of Soviet fighter aviation in the 50s and 60s was the Su-7B. Originally designed as an interceptor armed with 30mm cannons, this aircraft became world famous as a strike aircraft. Despite the absence of an airborne radar, despite a very high landing speed, and not a very good view from the cockpit, the Su-7B turned out to be a truly "lethal" aircraft. Strange as it may seem, he performed especially well in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.
These aircraft, with all their disadvantages, which theoretically prevented them from being used for tasks of direct support of ground forces (poor visibility, high speed), had one important advantage - excellent stability and accuracy of the use of airborne weapons from a dive. As a result, these machines became real "snipers" of the Indian Air Force. For Pakistani tanks, they have become simply the "Scourge of God." Massive strikes on Pakistani railways had a similar effect. Powerful NAR S-24 literally swept the trains off the tracks, and cannon shells pierced through the locomotive boilers, depriving the train of progress.
And even against point targets in the jungle, these aircraft, as they say, worked - by diving at the target and maintaining an accurate sight, the Su-7B could hit even individual bunkers with cannon fire, provided they were visible from above.
Despite the configuration with one engine, they were distinguished by their unique survivability. The Indian Air Force Museum houses the tail section of the Su-7B of Lieutenant S. Malhotra. After being intercepted by two Pakistani F-6s (an export version of the Chinese copy of our MiG-19 with American AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles), and “receiving” the missile directly into the nozzle, Malhotra entered an air battle on an airplane destroyed by an explosion with a couple of Pakistanis and shot down one of them with cannon fire, and put the other to flight.
Surprisingly, for a strike aircraft with a primitive avionics, the Su-7B had statistics of victories in the air, and not only in the war between India and Pakistan, but even in the six-day Arab-Israeli war of 1967. When, it would seem, all Arab aviation was destroyed. The aircraft could attack targets from ultra-low altitudes, including at transonic speeds. OKB im. Sukhoi can rightfully be proud of this aircraft - for all its known shortcomings.
The latest generation of Soviet single-engine fighters was already lagging behind what the West had fielded. Since 1974, the United States began to produce the fourth generation F-16 fighter. Initially, it was planned as an air "fighter", but later the fight for air supremacy fell on the F-15, and the F-16 began to evolve as a multifunctional vehicle capable of also performing a wide range of strike missions.
MiG-23s of various modifications, which formed the basis of the front-line fighter aviation of the USSR in the 80s, could not fight this rival on equal terms. And the USSR followed the path of a spasmodic increase in the complexity of combat aircraft, creating the "F-16 killer" - a small, but expensive and difficult to maintain MiG-29 fighter, whose flight characteristics were inaccessible to any single-engine aircraft.
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that with timely modernization, the MiG-23 would still be very dangerous aircraft for any air force in the world and for quite a long time. Work on the experimental project MiG-23-98 showed that, in theory, the aircraft's ability to conduct air combat at long distances can be brought to that of the MiG-29. If the evolution of the MiG-23 would have continued with more modern modernizations of combat vehicles, then the possibilities for conducting air combat would have grown, although, of course, after a certain moment, this machine would have had the potential only as a shock one. All this was not done, by that time the Russian Air Force had already abandoned twenty-thirds, but it was possible.
Specialized attack aircraft of this family also performed well. The MiG-23BN left a good memory of itself among the pilots who fought on it in Afghanistan. The aircraft, created on the basis of 23BN - MiG-27, had an even greater strike potential. The only drawback of which was the extremely unfortunate choice of the gun. The aircraft were maneuverable, had good visibility, sufficient in the case of the MiG-23 and, frankly, a good sighting system for the MiG-27, could carry numerous and varied weapons, including high-precision ones.
Why is there a MiG. Let's remember how the already formally outdated Su-17 proved to be useful in Afghanistan.
Usually, when they mention the Afghan war, people think of the Su-25. Indeed, the Su-25 covered itself with unfading glory in that war. However, one must understand that the main "workhorse" of the USSR Air Force in Afghanistan was a completely different aircraft - the Su-17 in the M3 and M4 variants. It was these machines that inflicted most of the bombing strikes on the Mujahideen, and they fought "from ring to bell", carrying out a phenomenally high number of sorties per day.
By the end of the Soviet era, these were still very formidable machines. The use of the latest computer at that time on the M4 modification significantly simplified the work of the pilot, since many processes were automated. The plane could go to supersonic at the ground with full load. It could carry TV homing bombs, and both TV and laser guided missiles. He could use almost all anti-radar missiles available at the end of the 80s, and all types of unguided missiles and bombs, caliber up to 500 kg, cannon containers and containers for small cargo (mines).
The scouts used containers of complex reconnaissance, first equipped with cameras, then thermal imaging container stations "Zima", with the help of which it was possible to detect the trail of a car that passed an hour ago.
The aircraft themselves were modified - additional IR traps were installed on them, moreover, of different types, and overhead armor plates designed to reduce the risks of fire from the ground. Overall, it was a very good strike aircraft.
He still remains.
It was the Su-17s that performed most of the combat missions in Afghanistan. At the same time, the statistics of their vulnerability to MANPADS of various types, supplied to the rebels by the Americans and their allies, looks extremely curious.
So, for 47 launches of MANPADS on Su-25 aircraft, as of 1987-25-12, 7 aircraft defeats were recorded. Or 6, 71 missiles per 1 attacked attack aircraft. And for the Su-17M3 and M3R, the same figure looks like 37 missiles for 3 aircraft - that is, 12, 33 missiles for one aircraft. Thus, the single-engine Su-17M3 with a small number of overhead armor plates, with the tactics of use that took place in Afghanistan, was almost half as vulnerable to MANPADS fire.
Of course, taking into account the DShK and MZA that the "spirits" had, the statistics on all types of weapons would look differently in aggregate, but on the other hand, after the massive appearance of the Stinger MANPADS, against which IR traps were ineffective, the attack aircraft also went to safe heights. In general, it must be admitted that the survivability of single-engine and almost unarmored Su-17Ms against missiles turned out to be much higher than that of armored twin-engine Su-25s.
But the Su-17Ms were too fast and carried too few weapons to carry out the tasks of direct support of the troops in full. But the MiGi-23BN and 27 could well perform such tasks. What was the statistics on the MiG-23 of different types in Afghanistan (the "twenty-seventh" were not used there)? And here's how - 45 launches of missiles and…. 1 shot down plane! Not indicative?
Thus, Soviet single-engine fighters and fighter-bombers had high combat effectiveness, and their survivability was much higher than the "average for the planet" - despite only just one engine.
In the nineties it all ended, and in 2015 our military aircraft appeared in Syria. With front-line bombers Su-24M and Su-34, as well as Su-25SM attack aircraft as the main strike force.
At the same time, due to the threat from the US and NATO fighters, after the Turkish Air Force shot down the Su-24M bomber, the Su-24M and Su-25 aircraft had to be escorted by the Su-30SM and Su-35 fighters, as well as the Syrian MiG-29s.
The second important factor was the typical bomb loads of our Su-24 aircraft, as a rule, they carried 4-6 bombs of different calibers, mostly FAB-250 M54 ("blunt noses"). At first, the Su-25 used a similar load, only because of uneconomical engines they also had to take a couple of outboard fuel tanks. The number of sorties per day that the Su-25 could do was limited by factors that had nothing to do with the aircraft itself. We know that the record for such a number was set by the Iraqi Air Force during the Iran-Iraq war, and with the location of the airfield close to the front line, it could make up to 15 sorties per day.
But the Su-24M in Syria could do no more than two.
Now let's imagine what would happen if, instead of the Su-25 and Su-24M (and the Su-34, by the way, too), the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria would use some abstract single-engine aircraft, superior in combat qualities to the MiG-23, 27 and Su-17M.
We know that in Afghanistan the number of sorties for the Su-17 easily reached 9 per day. We also know that the MiGs had enough hardpoints to carry four bombs, a pair of air-to-air missiles, and one PTB. In the Syrian climate, both Su and MiGs have been tested in the past, and there is no reason to believe that the new hypothetical aircraft will not be able to be used in it.
A simple conclusion follows from this - if Russia today had a single-engine fighter, similar to those with which the military glory of the USSR Air Force and its allies was “forged”, then it could fulfill most of the tasks that arose in the Syrian war.
Moreover, if our hypothetical fighter had the same inter-flight service indicators as the Su-24M, then it would be possible to make them more sorties.
What advantages would Russia get if there were such machines in the Syrian group? First, saving money. A single-engine aircraft with a highly efficient engine a priori requires less fuel than the twin-engine Su used in Syria, especially since neither the Su-25 nor the Su-24M are highly economical aircraft.
Secondly, they would not need an escort. Any modern multifunctional fighter, for example the same F-16 (just an excellent example of an effective single-engine aircraft) is quite capable of conducting aerial combat. Sometimes very well capable.
And if our group consisted mainly of such aircraft, then they would not need the Su-35 and Su-30 for escorting. And this is again saving money.
In addition, at some moments, when the number of sorties per day from Khmeimim approached a hundred, it was clearly seen that the airbase's capabilities in terms of the number of sorties per day were not rubber, and could not grow forever. If, instead of flights of escort heavy fighters, light multipurpose fighters were launched in the same time "windows", then the number of targets hit per day would be significantly greater.
Finally, in the case of a hypothetical attack on Khmeimim by some third country, fighters are much more useful in the air defense system of the base than bombers and slow subsonic attack aircraft without radar. And this would have to be taken into account by all of our, if I may say "partners".
And in general, when the Air Force has a lot of aircraft capable of conducting air combat, it is better than when there are few of them. At least with a hypothetical defense of the country from a non-nuclear attack by the enemy, or the struggle for air supremacy anywhere.
Foreign experience is also indicative. All countries that had front-line bombers long ago abandoned them in favor of multifunctional fighters - and precisely because such aircraft can also perform almost all the tasks of a front-line bomber, but the opposite is absolutely wrong. Both the Americans and Australians left the F-111. Many years before that, Canberra and their American modifications had gone down in history.
Attack aircraft are also slowly "going out of business" - today there is no A-7 Corsar 2 or A-6 Intruder in any Air Force or Navy. But multifunctional fighters are flourishing and fully justified. And most often these are single-engine F-16s.
And in theory, at least they are being replaced by single-engine F-35s.
Let's draw some short conclusions.
1. The USSR Air Force and the allies of the Soviet Union have repeatedly used Soviet single-engine fighters and fighter-bombers in battles. As a rule, the enemy was the developed air force, which had a large number of American aircraft, or - twice - the Americans themselves. In all cases, the aircraft showed themselves to be rated from "good" to "excellent". The performance characteristics of some types made it possible to win in the skies of the US Air Force with the latter's superiority in strength.
2. Single-engine aircraft, contrary to popular belief, have quite satisfactory survivability. In the hostilities in Afghanistan, they inflicted greater losses on the enemy than the Su-25 attack aircraft, which in fact were a "niche" aircraft (and this was actually created).
3. The presence of single-engine multifunctional fighters would significantly reduce Russia's spending on the war in Syria, would allow an increase in the number of sorties from the Khmeimim airbase, and would also increase the defensive capabilities of the Russian Aerospace Forces group in Syria.
4. For the combat power of the Air Force as a whole, a large number of multi-functional fighters are better than frontline bombers. At the same time, single-engine light aircraft, for economic reasons, can be built in larger numbers than heavy aircraft.
5. All of the above is confirmed by foreign experience.
This, of course, does not mean that we must immediately take and write off both attack aircraft and front-line bombers, but it is worth thinking about the balance between the number of combat aircraft of different classes. A single-engine aircraft is a priori cheaper than a twin-engine aircraft both in construction and in operation, and very significantly. The myth that such aircraft cannot fight on equal terms with heavier twin-engine machines is refuted by history in an extremely graphic form.
Finally, a light and not very expensive single-engine aircraft, possibly with a simplified avionics, and not the latest, but efficient engine, will have a huge export potential, incomparable with that of the MiG-29, 35, heavy Su aircraft and or anything from what Russia is now offering to the world market.
With all of the above in mind, the question is "should Russia develop and start producing its own lightweight multi-purpose single-engine fighter?" not even worth it - you need it. And how long. This question is not ripe, it is overripe.
What developments does the Russian aircraft industry have on this subject? Not to say that they are very good, but not zero either.
When the I-90 program was launched in the USSR ("Fighter of the 90s", later it led to the appearance of the MiG 1.44), then in parallel the Mikoyanites began work on a light fighter with one engine. The example of the Americans with their "pair" of F-16 and F-15 turned out to be very successful, and the designer wanted to work out such an option for the USSR Air Force.
At the same time, the OKB im. Yakovleva also worked on a fighter with one engine and horizontal take-off and landing, however, with an eye on the ship-based. This machine was supposed to contain a significant part of the systems developed for the Yak-41 VTOL aircraft (later Yak-141) and is today known as the Yak-43 (in fact, such an aircraft was not accepted for service, such a "nickname" was given to the project by modern enthusiasts) … Then the OKB them. Yakovleva was working on a promising VTOL aircraft, which today is known to researchers as the Yak-201 - this machine was not designed to the end, that is, its appearance was not even "frozen", and we simply cannot imagine what would come of the project, for except that a lot of ideas from it were later implemented in the American F-35B. Yes, and most likely the correct designation is not Yak-201, but as in the prototype "201".
One way or another, but the calculations, research results, the results of the creative search of our engineers, their theoretical developments and errors today, at least partially, exist in different archives, and although the engineering solutions of those years are largely outdated, old research and development may well save time …
OKB im. Sukhoi also noted in the subject of a light fighter with the C-54 project (and its naval version of the C-56). This is perhaps the most elaborate of all the projects of the domestic light single-engine fighter. There were models of both single and double versions of this car.
Most importantly, Sukhoi also worked on a ship version. As you know, our only aircraft carrier, TAVKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" hangar disproportionately small for such a large ship. This is due to the requirement to allocate large volumes inside the hull for the launchers of anti-ship cruise missiles, which are useless for such a ship. This problem is unavoidable, and the only way to increase the number of the Kuznetsov air group is to reduce the size of the aircraft it consists of. This can be effectively solved with the help of a new single-engine fighter, if its performance characteristics will meet the requirements of naval aviation and its tasks.
And the last and, apparently, the most important thing. According to numerous statements by Russian officials, the development of a combat aircraft with a short take-off and vertical landing, in fact an analogue of the American F-35B, is slowly and quietly going on in the Russian Federation. The format of the article does not allow weighing all the pros and cons of such a program for our country - let's say, this decision is ambiguous, with a lot of pluses and minuses and requires a separate analysis. (For news, see, for example: RIA Novosti: Russia began to develop a vertical takeoff aircraft)
But one of the side effects of such a program, if it reaches the "metal", will be the mass of completed R&D projects, based on which you can then very quickly and easily create on the basis of the "vertical" a conventional aircraft with horizontal takeoff and landing and, apparently, with a high weight return (which will be vital for a single-engine aircraft).
Thus, it should be noted that Russia has certain developments, mostly, however, theoretical, on the subject of a light fighter with one engine.
The rest is a matter of technology. We have aircraft engines. Taking into account the claim of the aircraft for a relatively low cost and mass production, you should use something already mastered by the industry. The same AL-41F (for sure it will be cheaper than the "product 30" being prepared now). We have a radar station. We will somehow make a glider and avionics, and the electrics and hydraulics can be taken from existing machines. There remains a "feature" of the fifth generation aircraft - sets of sensors and programmable electronic control units. But here, too, there is a backlog - the systems created for the Su-57.
Ultimately, we will end up with something similar to the American Air Force structure - a heavy air supremacy aircraft with two engines and a light single-engine "station wagon" with a bias towards strike missions. Plus niche aircraft - attack aircraft, interceptors, etc. Such air forces have a lot of advantages and a lot of disadvantages, but they are cheaper than any others, and this covers all their disadvantages.
There is no reason why we could and should continue to ignore such opportunities.
The position of the Aerospace Forces on single-engine vehicles, which has not changed since 1992, should be revised.
Russia should get such aircraft into service as soon as possible.
