Several readers immediately asked to comment on the rather unexpected and incomprehensible statement of the Commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Vladimir Shamanov. Let me remind you that the commander promised to introduce 6 tank companies equipped with T-72B3M tanks into the Airborne Forces by the end of this year. And in the future, in two years to expand these companies to full-fledged battalions.
I confess, the first to surprise me were American and European experts. It was their reaction that showed complete ignorance of the situation in today's armies. Authoritative publications tried to determine what the heavy by NATO standards T-72 in the Airborne Forces would do.
The fact is that heavy tanks cannot be dropped in the usual way. And there are not so many planes in the world capable of doing this. Literally by the piece, you can count. And it is impossible to upgrade tanks for landing.
So why does General Shamanov make such statements? And makes them not for the future, sometime later, but by the end of this year? Why does the commander demand to strengthen the already sufficiently increased fire and armor power of the formations and units of the Airborne Forces?
The days when the paratroopers went out on the enemy practically with bare hands and regular small arms are long gone. Today, airborne units and units have not only BMD, but also their own artillery. And the new BMD-4M "Sadovnitsa" are not inferior at all, and in many respects are superior to the "land" BMPs and armored personnel carriers.
Let me remind you of what kind of weapons this vehicle possesses. Two guns! 100 mm and 30 mm automatic, 30 mm AGS-30. Anti-tank missile system "Konkurs". Machine guns … And at the same time, the BMD allows you to drop the crew right in the car. This means that the "Gardener" enters the battle almost seconds after it touches the ground.
Shamanov promises to deliver almost one and a half hundred units of these machines to the Airborne Forces by the end of 2016. And by 2025 there will be up to 1,500 in the Airborne Forces. Western experts generally consider the new BMD to be comparable in firepower to tanks.
But back to Shamanov's statement. After all, the general did not talk about machines "comparable in …". The general talked about real-life tanks. And even with an indication of the brand. So why are they Airborne Forces?
In order to get a clear answer, it is necessary to make a short excursion into the history of the Airborne Forces.
In addition to auxiliary units, the USSR Airborne Forces consisted of several divisions. 7th Guards (Kaunas), 76th Guards (Pskov), 98th Guards (Bolgrad), 103rd Guards (Vitebsk), 104th Guards (Kirovabad, then Ganzha), 105th Guards Mountain Desert (Fergana), 106th Guards (Tula), 242 Airborne Training Center (44th training airborne division) (Gayzhunai settlement).
If you look closely, you will find some inconsistencies. In fact, there are no absurdities in the text. There were no airborne assault brigades in the USSR Airborne Forces. But the brigades themselves were. And even the uniform of the Airborne Forces was worn.
In each military district, such brigades and regiments (sometimes battalions) were subordinate to the district commander. 11 Airborne Assault Brigade (Mogocha and Amazar), 13 Airborne Assault Brigade (Magdagachi and Zavitinsk), 21 Airborne Assault Brigade (Kutaisi), 23 Airborne Assault Brigade (Kremenchug), 35 Airborne Assault Brigade (GDR, Cottbus), 36 Airborne Assault Brigade (town Garbolovo), 37 ODShBr (Chernyakhovsk), 38 Guards ODShBr (Brest), 39 ODShBr (Khyrov), 40 ODShBr (Nikolaev), 56 Guards ODShBr (Chirchik, introduced to Afghanistan), 57 ODShBr (town of Aktogay), 58 ODShBr (Kremenchug), 83 ODShBr (Poland, g. Bialogard), 1318 ODSP (Polotsk), 1319 ODSP (Kyakhta).
As you can see, the composition of the airborne assault brigades in the USSR Armed Forces was impressive. But the main thing was that the Airborne Forces and the DShB performed albeit similar, but different tasks. The Airborne Forces operated at a great distance from the front line (up to 200 km and more), but the tasks of the DShB were more modest (30-40 km or more).
Support units were formed accordingly. The Airborne Forces were parachuted from aircraft, DShB from helicopters. The power of these units and formations was felt by the spooks of Afghanistan. From the Airborne Forces, the 103rd Airborne Forces took part in the Afghan war. From the composition of the airborne brigade - 56 airborne brigades. In total, the paratroopers were represented by 18 "line" battalions (13 Airborne Forces and 5 DShB), which accounted for a fifth of the total number of battalions in the DRA.
Today the airborne assault units have become part of the Airborne Forces. This determined the conventional division of parts and compounds. The tasks of capturing and holding objects have been preserved. And the range of the Airborne Forces has expanded significantly.
Parachute units and airborne units capture objects. But to hold these objects, it is precisely the airborne assault units and subunits that are used. It is to help these units that tanks are needed.
It is no secret that the enemy after the first strike by the PDP or VDD is stunned. But the power of the ground forces, with all due respect to the courage and training of the paratroopers, significantly exceeds the capabilities of the paratroopers. And the enemy will try to destroy the landing precisely with the help of heavy equipment, heavy artillery, and aviation. This is where the durability of the DShBr is needed, backed up by heavy equipment, anti-tank weapons and unmanned aircraft.
In addition, in modern military conflicts, landing is rarely used. There are land delivery vehicles. Therefore, many airborne units and subunits are used as airborne. And in this case, the commander of the division, and in the future the regiment (brigade), needs his own tank units. As artillerymen or sappers have already become accustomed to the Airborne Forces. How reconnaissance drones and combat robots, unprecedented in our army, have become commonplace.
Well, and the traditional "fly in the ointment" from me. The commander's idea is well thought out and timely. Moreover, this idea has been in the minds of officers for a long time. After all, this has already happened! Yes it was. There were tanks in the airborne division. True, not the T-72, but the T-62D. Back in 1984, a tank battalion was formed as part of the 103 Airborne Division instead of the artillery battalion. The division commander, future Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Pavel Grachev, then very successfully used this "truncated by the standards of the Airborne Forces" battalion. 22 paratrooper tanks (as part of tank battalion 31) fought successfully in the Afghan mountains.
And they abandoned this idea because, alas, the issue with transport aviation has not yet been resolved. The transport aircraft used by our army were designed during the Soviet era. And BMD, respectively, were designed specifically for these aircraft. One plane - one platoon of paratroopers. These are both "Ana" and "Ily".
But with the increase in firepower, armor protection and other upgrades, the weight of combat vehicles increased. The same "Sadovnitsa" is twice as heavy as the BMD-1. And the planes remained the same. The weight of the T-72 tank is 44 tons (against 13, 5 Sadovnitsa). And today only Il-76 or An-124 Ruslan can lift such a tank. There are simply no others in the army.
A tank platoon can "transport" An-124. Three tanks! This means that 4 (!) Departures are required to transport a company. But the 76th will include only one tank. That means ten planes per company. This is a serious enough risk. Modern air defense is quite capable of destroying such large and slow targets. Even at the departmental level. Remember the huge Mi-26 helicopter shot down in Chechnya?
And the number of BTA aircraft today is clearly not enough. According to some experts, today we have from 7 to 14 operating Ruslans and something about a hundred Il-76s. And given the active use of these machines during the operation in Syria and during the exercises of units and formations of the Airborne Forces, the service life of these machines is on the verge.
But in general, the reform of the Airborne Forces is ripe. The concept of modern warfare is constantly changing. Therefore, highly mobile, well-mechanized and armed Russian paratroopers are an urgent need today. But this reform must be accompanied by reforms in other branches of the defense complex. And first of all, in the creation of new aircraft and helicopters of the BTA, corresponding to the new tasks.
