Over the past several months, the military and aviation media have reported on a lecture by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA Air Force) Air Force Test Pilot Li Zhonghua delivered in December 2019 at Northwestern Polytechnic University in Shaanxi. [2] … The lecture provided an extremely detailed look at the experience of the PLA Air Force during the Eagle Strike 2015 exercise in Thailand, with the participation of the Royal Thai Air Force, which acted as a competitor to the PLA Air Force. The PLA Air Force sent its Su-27SK to the exercises, while the Royal Thai Air Force sent its SAAB JAS93C Gripen (Gripen-C).
In some comments on the disclosed results of past exercises, there were extrapolations of the results to the capabilities of other aircraft of the Su-27 family or Chinese J-11 [3] or conclusions were drawn about the capabilities and training of the PLA Air Force pilots.
This article describes the capabilities of the aircraft participating in the exercises and suggests looking at the results of these exercises with these capabilities in mind.
Su-27SK and "Gripen-C"
It is difficult to assess the results of the exercises without access to a detailed comparison of the aircraft involved, as well as the missions and conditions of the battles fought. Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to establish the specifics of the tasks and individual exercises performed during these exercises, and while Lee's lecture provides information that various tasks were solved, there is no exact information about these tasks.
Nevertheless, the lecture makes a comparatively detailed comparison of the Gripena-S in its confrontation with the Su-27SK, from which the following follows.
Comparison of aircraft in combat at medium (out of visual visibility) distances [4]:
Missiles for the specified distance: AIM-120 with a range of 80 km - RVV AE with a range of 50 km.
Airborne radar: detection range 160 km, tracking 10 targets - 120 km and 10 targets.
RCS of aircraft: 1, 5-2 meters for "Gripen" - 10-12 meters for Su-27SK.
The number of simultaneously fired targets: 4 for the "Gripen" - 1 for the Su-27SK.
Electronic warfare stations: one built-in and up to two container stations - one container.
False target towed: The Gripen has, the Su-27SK does not.
Passive decoys: IR traps and dipole reflectors for both aircraft.
Functions of warning systems: "Gripen" - about radar exposure (SPO), about the launch of missiles by the enemy, about the approach of a missile; Su-27SK - SPO and missile approach warning.
Channels for automated information exchange: 2 for Gripen - 1 for Su-27SK.
A night vision system for the pilot: the Gripen has, the Su-27SK does not.
Comparison of aircraft in combat at close (within visual range) distance. Instead of numerical values, some parameters are characterized by the words "satisfactory", "good", "excellent" [5].
Maximum overload: "Gripen" + 9 / -2g - Su-27SK + 8 / -2g [6].
Engine (s) thrust: "good" - "excellent".
The perfection of avionics: "excellent" - "satisfactory".
Steady-State Turn Rate: Good - Excellent.
Unsteady turn rate: “excellent” - “satisfactory”.
Short-range missiles: AIM-9L - "good", R-73 - "excellent" [7]
Helmet target designation and indication system: "excellent" - "good".
Principal factors:
Combat radius: 900 km - 1500 km.
The possibility of refueling in the air: the Gripen has, the Su-27SK does not.
Combat load: 6 tons - 4 tons.
Tasks performed: air combat, strikes against ground targets, aerial reconnaissance - air combat only [8].
With all this information, you can begin to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of both aircraft.
"Gripen-S" has superiority in combat at long distances outside the visual zone due to the target detection range of its radar (160 km versus 120 for the Su-27SK), the maximum launch range of its missiles (80 km versus 50 km) and the possibility of simultaneous attack of four targets against one target of the Su-27SK.
In general, the Gripena avionics with all its capabilities are significantly superior to those of the Su-27SK. It also has superior transient reversal speed. The Su-27SK, in turn, has superiority in thrust, steady turn rate, has superior R-73 missiles, the potential of which can be fully realized by the primitive but effective Shchel-3M helmet-mounted target designation system.
Accordingly, the advantages and disadvantages of aircraft can be described as follows:
- in general, "Gripen" significantly surpasses the Su-27SK in combat at long distances, electronic warfare systems, communications, situational awareness of the pilot, radio channels for automated information exchange, has more advanced avionics and cockpit equipment;
- aircraft are superior to each other at "their" combat ranges;
- Su-27SK has superiority in engine thrust, in maneuverability, and has more effective missiles for close combat R-73, the superiority of which is realized when using a helmet-mounted aiming system.
The value of weapons and avionics
Before reviewing the results of Eagle Strike 2015, it may be helpful to examine the age and capabilities of the Su-27SK in Chinese service. The Su-27SK, which is also assembled in China as the J-11A, was the first fourth generation fighter in the PLA Air Force, imported from Russia in the early 90s.
However, over the decades of service that have passed since that moment, the Su-27SK has been modernized to the very minimum extent, for example, having received the opportunity to use RVV-AE missiles, which in its original form did not have, a warning system for the approach of enemy missiles and some minor updates to the cockpit instruments.
All other systems - airborne radar, avionics in general, electronic warfare systems, information exchange systems and weapons, lag significantly behind other modern fourth-generation fighters, not to mention the "4+" generation.
The "fourth generation" fighters can be classified into several sub-generations, reflecting the level of capabilities of their avionics, weapons, sensors and communications systems. The list below contains a small number of some examples:
- "early fourth generation" - can be cited as an example of the F-14A, F-15A, Su-27SK / J-11A;
- "modern fourth generation" - for example, F-15C, J-11B, J-10A and "Gripen-C" (JAS39C which is in service with the Royal Thai Air Force. - Approx. Translator);
- generation "4+", for example F-15EX, F-16V, J-16, J-10C and Gripen-E.
The J-11A / Su-27SK are therefore "early fourth generation" due to the lack of upgrades, and this aircraft can easily be identified as the oldest and least efficient 4th generation fighter in the PLA Air Force; it is likely that even a modernized 3rd generation fighter such as the J-8DF (equipped with modern 4th generation radar and long-range effective PL-12 missiles) can easily defeat the Su-27SK in battle on an equal footing for both aircraft conditions.
Results overview
Anyone could have foreseen that, being a modern 4th generation fighter, the Gripen would have a significantly superior combat score compared to the Su-27SK at long distances, beyond visual detection range, as well as in any group battles requiring better coordination and situational awareness. These results could be easily foreseen, based on the overwhelming superiority of the "Gripen" in enemy detection systems, long-range weapons, small EPR, electronic warfare and avionics in general. Pilot training would have minimal effect on such a huge technology gap.
From the Su-27SK one could expect superiority in close combat, where it could rely on the superiority of its R-73 missiles and superiority in maneuverability and flight performance, and where the enemy could not realize technological superiority as clearly as at long distances. Technological superiority means a lot less in such battles, which makes pilot training much more important to neutralize imbalances in technology.
The results of the Eagle Strike 2015 exercise fully correspond to the described logic, although the Su-27SK showed such superiority in victories in maneuverable combat, which no one could have expected [9] … This success can be attributed to both the R-73 missiles and the training of pilots in training battles with aircraft of the J-10 family from the PLA Air Force.
What are the conclusions?
The results of Eagle Strike 2015 are a serious confirmation that an aircraft with the best avionics, radar and other sensors, communications, electronic warfare and weapons will be able to arrange a loud rout in long-range and group battles that require a high level of group interaction and situational awareness. …
The superiority of the Gripen in such battles is not unexpected, but these results cannot characterize the Su-27 family as a whole as ineffective. In the end, the Su-27SK is one of the oldest aircraft of all the Su-27 variants in the world, with the most minimal capabilities, and many subsequent versions of the Flanker received significantly improved weapons, radar and detection, communication, electronic warfare and avionics systems generally.
The PLA Air Force is equipped with the Su-30MKK / MK2 multi-role fighters, the domestic J-11B / BS air superiority fighter. The newest J-16 fighter with AFAR and PL-15 missiles.
However, it would be wrong to say that the PLA Air Force did not learn any lessons from the past exercises. The article, written in Chinese based on insider information, as well as information from the original December slides, pointed to vulnerabilities such as lack of situational awareness in group battles and the inability to counter simulated long-range missiles, the latter of which, according to the known parameters used in the model, resembles AIM -120 AMRAAM.
Situational awareness vulnerabilities can also be attributed to inferior [enemy] detection systems, cockpit display devices and communications and information exchange of the Su-27SK, although the Chinese presentation suggests some expectations that Chinese pilots will be able to overcome this technical gap. [10].
In general, the view that was adopted in the PLA Air Force on the past exercises "Strike the Eagle 2015" focuses on the quality of the Chinese personnel who participated in the training battles. This does not necessarily have to be taken as something unexpected, as the PLA Air Force does not often participate in international aerial exercises, making each such meeting a valuable learning opportunity.
Also keep in mind that the PLA Air Force was in the midst of large-scale shifts in its combat training regimes that began in the 2010s and that the discussion peaked at the time when Eagle Strike 2015 took place.
The emphasis on linking Eagle Strike 2015 results to the training of Chinese pilots could have been made specifically to intensify combat training and improve curricula and methods.
PLA Air Force overseas exercise
Until 2010, the PLA Air Force conducted almost no exercises with foreign military personnel on a noteworthy scale. In the 2010s, the exercises in which the PLA Air Force participated were the Shahin exercises in Pakistan, the already mentioned regular Eagle Strike exercises and participation in some kind of Russian Aviadarts competition. There was also a one-time exercise with the Turkish Air Force "Anatolian Eagles".
It is worth mentioning that the PLA Air Force sent the same Su-27SKs that were opposed by the upgraded F-4Es to the Anatolian Eagles 2010, and although the formal results of the exercises were not published, according to rumors, the Su-27SK performed poorly. It is worth pointing out that the PLA Air Force used the same Su-27SK in the exercises, which were later used in the Eagle Strike 2015 exercise, while since 2010 no more exercises with the Turkish Air Force have been conducted.
It makes sense to consider what rational grounds are behind the use of the Su-27SK in exercises with the Air Force, with which the PLA Air Force has never interacted before. Since the Su-27SK is the weakest fourth-generation fighter in the Chinese arsenal (in 2010, 2015, and today), its dispatch to the exercises may reflect the reluctance of the PLA Air Force to disclose sensitive information about more modern fighters. As seen in the later Eagle Strike exercises, the Chinese sent more efficient and modern J-10A and J-10C fighters, possibly reflecting the growing mutual trust in the growing military relationship.
Of course, since the PLA Air Force is conducting exercises with a couple of air forces around the world, it is difficult to make an unequivocal conclusion that these guesses are correct. But it is worth mentioning that at the Shahin exercises with Pakistan, taking into account the very long military and geopolitical relations, the PLA Air Force is using various new systems from generation 4+ fighters to AWACS aircraft, and usually without many years of delays since adoption. …
A little about the future
The presentation of the 2015 Eagle Strike exercise provided very useful and rare details of the PLA Air Force's participation in the first exercise with the Royal Thai Air Force. While the details of the presentation provide grounds for discussing the shortcomings of the pilots who took part in the exercise, some English-language interpretations of what happened contain a clear overestimation of the scale of the consequences. In particular, it is difficult to ignore the estimates of long-range and group battles, which mainly depend on the technological level of the aircraft and, to a minimum, on the training of the pilots.
In subsequent exercises "Strike the Eagle" (2017, 2018 and 2019), the PLA Air Force used more advanced J-10A fighters than the Su-27SK, and finally, in 2019, the J-10C.
Rumors surrounding these exercises suggest that the Chinese have achieved much better results, in particular with the J-10C. Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that the PLA Air Force will make public such detailed analyzes of all subsequent exercises.
Rick Joe, The Diplomat (Japan), April 16, 2020
Afterword of the translator
Fighter SAAB JAS 39 "Gripen" in version "C" today can be considered as a kind of "conditionally average fighter of the West." In this regard, the results of the battles of the Su-27 against such a machine are of great interest to us. Although the Su-27 is already considered an obsolete aircraft today and is not mass-produced, dozens of such aircraft remain in the Aerospace Forces, and they are also in the naval aviation.
More than half of them did not undergo significant modernization of avionics and in battles with Western vehicles will show themselves in the same way as the Chinese fighters showed. And the latter lost 100% of long-range battles. The author of the article quite rightly pointed out that in such battles, the training of pilots is of minimal importance, and the tactical and technical characteristics of the aircraft and its weapons are of decisive importance.
In theory, there are several ways to solve the problem of obsolete aircraft. The first is a banal replacement for a new aircraft. This is the most reliable way, and this is what the Ministry of Defense has been doing in previous years, but still this process cannot be instantaneous. In addition, there are objective economic difficulties that our country is experiencing and which will not disappear so quickly.
The second way is modernization. But according to the available information, the Ministry of Defense believes that bringing the level of the Su-27 to modern requirements is unreasonably expensive.
Of interest is the partial modernization of the aircraft without costly replacing the radar and reworking the electrical system (the total cost of which led to the refusal to continue upgrading the Su-27), but with the update of information transmission systems and cockpit equipment, and giving the aircraft the ability to use weapons according to the radar data of another aircraft. Then one single Su-35 or MiG-31 will be able to make several Su-27s capable of launching missiles at targets that they themselves would not even be able to detect. This mode also "disguises" the fighter, since it basically does not turn on its radar, even when using missiles. The Americans are using this method with great success in a combination of F-35A and fourth generation fighters.
Another possibility is to integrate electronic warfare systems into the Su-27, allowing you to divert an ARLGSN missile going to an aircraft from its course. Then the enemy's advantage in launch range will not help, and he will be forced to converge in close combat, which, as the example of the Chinese shows, he will most likely lose miserably.
There are also non-technical ways - to achieve such a culture of staff work so that when planning combat operations it would not be possible to send aircraft into battle that obviously will not win it, but to use the Su-27 for feasible tasks - hunting for enemy anti-submarine aircraft, defeat of its strike fighters in case of joint actions with modern fighters of the Aerospace Forces, etc. This is the most unreliable method, due to the human factor, fraught with sending pilots to slaughter. Although that would be the way out. But not in our conditions.
One way or another, and the solution to the problem of the presence of obsolete fighters in the Aerospace Forces and unable to withstand even the middle peasants such as "Gripena" cannot be postponed. There are examples of neglect of the development of aviation in our history. The cost was terrible. Let's hope that this issue will be resolved as quickly as possible.
Translator's Notes
[1] "Flanker" (Flanker, attacking from the flank) - the codename for aircraft of the Su-27 family in the US Air Force, NATO and several other countries.
[2] This educational institution is a forge of personnel for the Chinese Air Force and the aviation industry. From time to time, his students are even involved in the design of real combat aircraft - for example, it was with the Q-5 attack aircraft.
[3] J-11 is a family of aircraft, the first version of which was the Chinese-built Su-27SK.
[4] All technical specifications are provided by the author of the article, and, in his words, are taken from the original Chinese slides. The performance characteristics, voiced in the article, differ significantly from those that were published in the Russian Federation.
[5] In the text “average”, “capable”, “strong”. When translated, these words have been replaced by the assessments familiar to the Russian reader, while the meaning has not changed.
[6] The difference in maximum overload is not critical, almost no combat pilot can handle 9g. The tabular advantage between 8g and 9g does little.
[7] Here we must take into account the fact that the "Sidewinder", even the newest, proved to be incapable of resisting even the old Russian IR traps. This is well illustrated by the shooting down of the Syrian Su-22 by the American F / A-18.
[8] The Su-27SK can use unguided weapons to strike ground targets.
[9] Data on the number and results of battles during the exercise are contradictory and vary greatly from one source to another. It is known that the Chinese lost the battles at the maximum distance, all without exception, but about short-range battles, some sources give them 86% of the victories. In any case, all experts and observers are confident in the overwhelming superiority of the Su-27SK of the PLA Air Force in close combat.
[10] Attempts to compensate for technical problems at the expense of the human factor are not unique to the PLA Air Force. The US Air Force has a special program for the development of tactical techniques, using which an F-16 pilot could conduct a maneuverable battle against the superior in maneuverability of the Su-27. One such battle between an F-16 and a Su-27 was photographed in Nevada by an accidental eyewitness, the photos hit the press. It is difficult to say what effect the Americans have achieved. Some of the techniques that were born in such battles and got into the press look like extremely dangerous stunts, although they increase the chances of winning.
