General Vlasov. The path to betrayal

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General Vlasov. The path to betrayal
General Vlasov. The path to betrayal

Video: General Vlasov. The path to betrayal

Video: General Vlasov. The path to betrayal
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In the previous material, the pages of the successful military career of General Vlasov were shown not in order to whitewash this traitor, but to show that he confidently moved up the career ladder and that there was not the slightest reason that could push the general on the path of treason. What then pushed him on this path?

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Commander of the 2nd Shock Army

Lieutenant General Vlasov showed himself at the beginning of the war as a capable military leader who successfully commanded armies. For the successes achieved on March 8, 1942, he was appointed deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, where tragic events with the unsuccessful offensive of the 2nd Shock Army began to unfold in January.

On the Volkhov front, on January 7, the Lyuban offensive operation began, the 2nd Shock Army under the command of General Klykov, having successfully broken through the enemy's defenses in the Myasny Bor area, deeply wedged into its location, but having limited forces and resources could not consolidate the success, the enemy repeatedly cut it communications and created a threat to encircle the army.

To clarify the situation, the front commander, Meretskov, on March 20 sent Vlasov to head the commission to the 2nd Shock Army. The commission found out that the army on its own is not able to break out of the encirclement and is experiencing difficulties with ammunition and food. In addition, the commander Klykov fell seriously ill, he was released from the command of the army and on April 16 was evacuated to the rear. Vlasov proposed to Meretskov to appoint the chief of staff of the army Vinogradov as the commander of the dying army, but on April 20 Meretskov appointed Vlasov as the commander of the 2nd shock army, leaving concurrently as deputy commander of the front.

So Vlasov became the commander of the doomed army and, together with the front command, during May-June, with the assistance of the 52nd and 59th armies of the Volkhov front, made desperate attempts to unblock the 2nd army, but had no success. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the commander of the Volkhov operational group, Lieutenant General Khozin, did not fulfill the directive of the Headquarters of May 21 on the withdrawal of army troops, and its situation became catastrophic.

More than 40 thousand Soviet soldiers were in the "cauldron". The people exhausted by hunger, under the continuous blows of German aviation and artillery, continued to fight, breaking out of the encirclement. However, it was all to no avail. The combat strength was melting every day, as well as the stocks of food and ammunition, but the army did not surrender and continued to fight.

On June 22, Vlasov sent a report to the front headquarters: “For three weeks the army troops receive fifty grams of crackers. The last days there was no food at all. We finish eating the last horses. People are extremely emaciated. Group mortality from hunger is observed. There is no ammunition. The territory controlled by the army was shrinking every day under enemy attacks, and soon the agony of the 2nd Shock Army set in. The front command sent a special plane to evacuate the army headquarters, but the headquarters staff refused to abandon their soldiers, and Vlasov joined them.

The command of the Volkhov Front managed to break through a small corridor through which scattered groups of exhausted soldiers and commanders emerged. On the evening of June 23, the soldiers of the 2nd Shock Army went for a new breakthrough through a corridor about 800 meters wide, called the "Valley of Death", but few managed to break through. On June 24, the last breakout attempt was made and ended in failure. In this situation, it was decided to go out in small groups, and Vlasov gave the order to break up into groups of 3-5 people and secretly leave the encirclement.

Contrary to the opinion prevailing in Soviet times that the 2nd Shock Army surrendered together with Vlasov, this is not so. She fought to the last and died heroically. Even German sources recorded that there were no facts of mass surrender, the Russians in Myasnoy Bor preferred to die in arms and did not surrender.

Captivity

The few witnesses who managed to escape from the cauldron claimed that after unsuccessful attempts to withdraw the army from the Vlasov encirclement, he was discouraged, there was no emotion on his face, he did not even try to hide during the shelling in shelters.

In the group with Vlasov remained chief of staff Vinogradov, a staff officer and another mistress of Vlasov - the chef Voronov. In search of food, they split up, Vlasov stayed with Voronova, and the rest went to another village. Vinogradov was wounded and shivered, Vlasov gave him his greatcoat, then Vinogradov was killed in a shootout, the Germans took him for Vlasov.

Together with his companion, Vlasov entered the village of the Old Believers and ended up in the headman's house. He called the local police, who arrested them and locked them in a barn. The next day, 12 July, a German patrol arrived. Vlasov told them in German: “Don't shoot, I'm General Vlasov,” the soldiers identified the famous general from the portraits often published in newspapers and arrested him.

During interrogations, Vlasov said that the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were incapable of any offensive operations in the direction of Leningrad and warned the Germans about the possibility of Zhukov's offensive in the central direction. After interrogation, Vlasov was sent to a special officer prisoner of war camp in Vinnitsa, which was subordinate to the high command of the Wehrmacht's ground forces.

A former Russian officer from the Baltic Germans, Shtrik-Shtrikfeld, worked with Vlasov in the camp. As a result of conversations with him, Vlasov agreed that it was necessary to fight communism and Stalin and agreed to cooperate.

What pushed Vlasov onto the path of betrayal? Before surrender, there was not even a hint that Vlasov was dissatisfied with something. He was an active supporter of the current regime in the country, during the years of repression, being a member of the tribunal, he fought against the "enemies of the people" and made a successful career for himself, was treated kindly by Stalin personally (and not always according to his merits) and he had no problems and reasons for betrayal. It was. At the beginning of the war, he had opportunities for treason, but he did not go for it. Until the last moment, he did not even think about surrender.

Apparently, he simply did not have any convictions, he was driven by ambition and ambition, most of all in his life he loved fame and career growth and made his way to the top in any way. A life-lover and a woman-lover, he wanted to live in grand style under all circumstances.

He believed that it would always be so and was mistaken, under his command, the 2nd Shock Army was surrounded. The alternative to captivity was death, and he did not want to die. Having lost the army and being taken prisoner, he realized that his military career was over, and when he returned home, he would face shame and humiliation. When he went over to the side of the Germans and the victory of Germany, which at that time seemed to him indisputable, he could count on a high military post in the new Russia under German patronage. And Vlasov decided to take the side of the Germans.

The writer Ehrenburg, who communicated with him after the victory near Moscow, left his memoirs about Vlasov's personality. He noted that Vlasov stood out for his posturing and acting, the manner of speaking figuratively and cordially, while there was a sense of pretense in his behavior, turns of speech, intonations and gestures. Also, Vlasov's associates in the ROA noted his desire to capture the attention of all those present, show his importance and emphasize at the same time his qualities and merits.

Vlasov was not tortured or starved; he himself deliberately chose the path of betrayal, unlike other generals who found themselves in the same situation. It is known that the commander of the 12th Army, General Ponedelin, who was captured and sentenced to death in absentia (in 1950 he was still shot) and who knew about this, spat in Vlasov's face in response to an offer to cooperate, and the commander of the 19th Army Lukin, who was captured wounded and without a leg, contemptuously rejected Vlasov's proposal. Vlasov's subordinate division commander in the 2nd Shock Army, General Antyufeev, who was also captured wounded, sent them to a fabricated interview presented to him about their readiness to work for the Germans and remained faithful to the oath.

Work for the Nazis

In captivity, representatives of the high command of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht worked with Vlasov, they invited him to present a memorandum with his proposals. Vlasov wrote a note about the need to create a Russian army that would fight the communist regime on the side of the Germans. Vlasov hoped that the Germans might consider his candidacy as one of the leaders of the future non-Soviet Russia. However, the German command rejected this memorandum, at that time they did not consider any options for state formations in the occupied territory.

Vlasov continued to offer his services to the Germans, and in September 1942 he was transferred to Berlin in the Wehrmacht propaganda department. Vlasov was assigned a purely propaganda role, the Germans decided to create a semi-virtual Russian committee headed by Vlasov, which would publish appeals calling for an end to resistance and go over to the side of the Germans.

General Vlasov. The path to betrayal
General Vlasov. The path to betrayal

In December 1942, the Smolensk Appeal was published, in which Vlasov urged to go over to his side in order to build a new Russia. The appeal was written in the newspapers, leaflets were printed in Russian for scattering on Soviet territory. The main lobbyists of Vlasov were the German military, on their initiative Vlasov made several trips to the location of Army Group North and Center in the winter and spring of 1943, where he met with prominent German military leaders, spoke to local residents in the occupied territories and gave several interviews collaborationist newspapers.

The German party leadership did not like the activity of the military, the Nazis saw in Vlasov only a propaganda role, the Russian Committee was disbanded, Vlasov was temporarily banned from speaking publicly.

Stalin was furious at the "gift" presented by Vlasov; the Soviet press began to label him as a Trotskyist, a Japanese and a German spy. The road back for Vlasov was closed, and the party leadership and Hitler did not want to hear anything about the creation of some kind of Russian army.

Vlasov was out of work, his patrons organized meetings with prominent figures in Germany, in a year and a half he made acquaintances in various fields, he was even organized a marriage with the widow of an SS man. But the role of Vlasov remained purely propaganda; only a "school of propagandists" was created for him.

As the situation deteriorated on the fronts, the SS leadership began to look closely at Vlasov. Himmler summoned Vlasov in September 1944, he assured him that he had great authority among Soviet generals, and Himmler gave permission to create the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (KNOR), a kind of government in exile.

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Vlasov and Himmler

In November 1944, the first meeting of the KONR took place, at which the Manifesto of the Liberation Movement was announced and the formation of the Russian Liberation Army, which had previously existed in the virtual space, began.

There is a widespread version that the ROA units operated in the occupied territory. This is not the case, since at the time of its formation, Soviet troops were already at war in Europe. This is due to the fact that other collaborationist formations not related to the ROA fought on the side of the Germans in the occupied territory.

From March to December 1942, the Russian National Liberation Army (RNNA) existed with a deployment in the village of Osintorf in Belarus, created on the initiative of the Russian émigré Sergei Ivanov. Since September 1942, the RNNA was headed by the former commander of the 41st Infantry Division of the Red Army, Colonel Boyarsky and former brigade commissar Zhilenkov. The number of the formation reached 8 thousand people, some battalions were consolidated into regiments, and the RNNA was transformed into a brigade. In December 1942, the RNNA was disbanded, Boyarsky, Zhilenkov and part of the personnel subsequently joined the ROA.

Also, from October 1941 to September 1943, the Russian People's Liberation Army (RONA), numbering about 12 thousand people and consisted of 15 battalions, including a tank battalion and an artillery division, operated in the Lokotsky district in the occupied Bryansk and Oryol regions.

These armed formations had nothing to do with the ROA and were used by the Germans in punitive operations against partisans. Some units fought under the Russian tricolor and used tricolor cockades. Later, some units of the RNNA and RONA joined the ROA during its formation.

The Germans also created eastern battalions and companies, rarely regiments, as part of the SS troops, a significant part of them were involved in anti-partisan operations. These units were commanded, as usual, by German officers.

Also, up to 40 thousand Cossacks fought on the side of the Germans. Under the leadership of the Don Ataman Krasnov, units of the Cossack emigrants and the Cossacks of the Don and Kuban, who went over to the side of the Germans, were formed in the SS troops. In 1942 they expanded to the SS Cossack Cavalry Corps. They also had nothing to do with Vlasov's army, in April 1945 the Cossack formations concentrated in Italy and Austria in the area of the city of Lienz were formally subordinate to Vlasov.

Formation of ROA

The ROA was formed in September 1944 and was staffed with the personnel of units of the disbanded RNNA and RONA and members of the eastern battalions that had managed to prove themselves earlier in the occupied territory. Soviet prisoners of war were in the minority, white emigrants were also few, since they considered the Vlasovites "the same Bolsheviks."

In total, three divisions of the ROA were formed. One of them had no weapons at all, the other did not have heavy weapons, having only small arms. And only the 1st ROA division, numbering about 20 thousand people, was combat-ready and fully equipped. A number of independent formations and units were also formed, subordinate to the main headquarters of the ROA. Formally, the ROA was not part of the Wehrmacht, it was financed from the German treasury in the form of loans that were to be returned in the future.

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The Andreev flag was used as a symbolism, the Germans banned attempts to use the Russian tricolor, the cap had a blue-red cockade, on the sleeve there was a chevron with the Andreev flag and the inscription "ROA". The soldiers and officers were dressed in German uniforms.

Vlasov never wore the ROA uniform and the German uniform, he wore a specially sewn jacket without insignia and shoulder straps.

The ROA formed in battles with Soviet troops never participated, in February 1945 three platoons of the ROA took part in battles against 230 Soviet rifle divisions and the 1st division in early April 1945 participated in battles together with the Germans in the Fürstenberg area against the 33rd Soviet army, after that all parts of the ROA were withdrawn to the rear. The Nazi leadership did not trust the Vlasov army and was afraid to keep it at the front. ROA remained a purely propaganda organization, and not a real military formation.

At the end of April, the leadership of the ROA decided to withdraw from the subordination of the German command and break through to the west with the aim of surrendering to the Anglo-American troops. The 1st ROA division under the command of Bunyachenko was in the area of Prague, where the Czech uprising broke out on May 5.

To prove to the Americans that the Vlasovites also fought against the Germans, Bunyachenko decided to support the rebellious Czechs and opposed the Germans, especially since the Germans did not let them through Prague. On the morning of May 7, the Vlasovites occupied several districts of Prague and disarmed part of the German garrison. Stubborn battles began with the Germans, which by the end of the day ended in an armistice, and together with the Germans, the 1st ROA Division left Prague and headed west to surrender to the Americans.

Vlasov and his staff hoped to surrender to the Americans and go into service with them, since they counted on a new war between the USSR and the USA. The ROA headquarters established contact with the Americans and tried to negotiate the terms of surrender. Almost all formations and units of the ROA reached the American zone of occupation. But here a cold welcome awaited them. In accordance with the agreement with the Soviet command, all of them were to be returned to the Soviet zone of occupation.

The headquarters of the 1st division of the ROA, in which Vlasov was located, and individual units of the division were at the junction of the American and Soviet zones of occupation and advanced into the American zone. The command of the 25th Panzer Corps gave the command to the scouts to find the headquarters and take Vlasov prisoner. The scouts intercepted the column of the Vlasovites, in which Vlasov and Bunyachenko were, they were taken prisoner.

Vlasov was asked to write an order for the surrender of his troops. He wrote such an order and in two days, units of the 1st division surrendered in the amount of 9 thousand people. Vlasov was immediately sent to Moscow.

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In May, almost all of the ROA command was arrested in the Soviet zone of occupation or handed over by the Americans. They were sent to Moscow, where they were interrogated, tried and executed. The personnel of the ROA was also transferred by the Americans to the Soviet command. At the end of the war, the ROA and the Cossack formations and units reassigned to it numbered 120-130 thousand personnel, including the command of the army and formations, three divisions, two understaffed separate corps, a training reserve brigade, the command of the Cossack troops, two Cossack cavalry corps, auxiliary troops and two intelligence schools. Basically, it was a bunch of traitors and traitors, who for one reason or another went over to the side of the Nazis.

So the military career of the general and the failed ruler of non-communist Russia under the protectorate of the Nazis ended in a pitiable end. The expressions "Vlasov" and "Vlasovites" will forever remain in the memory of our people a symbol of betrayal and treason, no matter what merits the prototype of these symbols may have.

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