As you know, after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, Great Britain immediately made it clear that it would be an ally of the USSR. Not without pressure from Britain and the United States, which had not yet joined the anti-Hitler coalition, promptly extended the practice of military supplies to the USSR as well. The very limited possibilities of transit via Arctic convoys and through the Soviet Far East forced the Allies to turn their attention to the Persian corridor.
However, by that time in Iran, the influence of the Germans was so strong that the Soviet elite considered the prospect of Iran entering the war with the USSR on the side of Hitler quite real. According to the data of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Soviet Trade Mission in Iran on May 12, 1941, sent by I. V. Stalin, German and Italian weapons were then literally "stuffed" with the Iranian army, especially the ground forces. German military advisers (about 20 officers) since the fall of 1940 actually led the Iranian General Staff, and they increasingly traveled to the long Iranian-Soviet border (about 2200 km).
In the same period, the provocative activities of emigrants - former Basmachs and Azerbaijani Musavatists - intensified, and not only propaganda: since the fall of 1940, they began to more often violate the border with the USSR. The situation was aggravated by the permission of Moscow (in mid-March 1940) for the transit of military and dual-use cargoes from Germany and Italy to Iran. This decision was in keeping with the then Soviet policy of "appeasing" Germany towards the USSR.
Just as part of that transit, German military seaplanes began to arrive in Iran from the end of April 1941 - obviously, for operations in the Caspian Sea, including to seize the Soviet ports there. In September 1941, these seaplanes were interned by Iran and soon transferred to the USSR and Great Britain.
Moreover, on March 30, 1940, there was a major Iranian provocation initiated by Germany as a pretext for the Iranian-Soviet war. As noted in the note of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, “On March 30, 1940, two three-engined monoplane planes of green color violated the state border, having flown from Iran to our territory between the heights of Shishnavir and Karaul-tash (in the extreme southeast of the Azerbaijan SSR - near the port city of Lankaran). Having deepened 8 km into Soviet territory, these planes flew over the villages of Perembel and Yardimly, and turned back to Iranian territory."
It is significant that Iranian Foreign Minister Mozaffar Aalam denied the fact of this incident, and this also increased the Soviet-Iranian tension. Most likely, the calculation was that the USSR would shoot down these planes, and this would provoke a war. However, the Soviet side seems to have figured out such a scenario.
In the future, Moscow more than once demanded that Tehran officially acknowledge the aforementioned fact and apologize, but in vain. The head of the government of the USSR V. M. Molotov, in his report at the 7th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on August 1, 1940, mentioned this situation, recalling that "uninvited and non-accidental" guests "flew from Iran to Soviet territory - to the regions of Baku and Batumi." In the Batumi area, those "guests" (2 similar aircraft) were recorded in November 1940, but the Iranians also denied this and did not comment on what Molotov said.
But, perhaps, the first violin in the escalation of Soviet-Iranian tension was played, we repeat, by Moscow's permission for military-technical transit from Germany and Italy to Iran. In a little more detail, then, according to the report of the Soviet ambassador to Iran M. Filimonov to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade of the USSR (June 24, 1940), "June 23, 1940 M. Aalam conveyed the gratitude of the Iranian government to the Soviet government for allowing the transit of weapons to Iran. Aalam asked to strengthen the transit of goods of any destination from Germany. " And Molotov, at a meeting with the German ambassador to the USSR A. Schulenburg on July 17, 1940, confirmed that the aforementioned transit would continue.
On December 14, 1940, Berlin and Tehran sign an agreement on the contingent of goods for the next financial year. According to Nazi radio, "oil will play the main role in Iranian supplies to Germany. German supplies to Iran are envisaged in the form of various industrial products." Moreover, the Iranian-German trade turnover will be expressed in 50 million German marks a year on each side.
This, we note, has already doubled the level of Soviet trade with Iran in 1940. But about oil - generally "nota bene". The Soviet ambassador was soon instructed to find out:
"On the basis of the concession agreement on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AINC), concluded in 1933, the British retained the monopoly right to dispose of the oil produced, except for a certain amount necessary to satisfy domestic Iranian needs. Iran itself has not yet exported oil. and therefore it is not clear how Iran is now acting as an oil exporter to Germany."
Nevertheless, these deliveries, although in symbolic volumes (maximum 9 thousand tons per month) began in February 1941, in fact, they were supplied by the same AINK under the Iranian marking. Moreover, up to 80% of these supplies were sent through the USSR (by rail); all these deliveries / shipments ceased from the beginning of July 1941. At the same time, military-technical transit from Germany and Italy to Iran through the USSR ceased.
Compulsion to neutrality
In short, the Soviet policy of "appeasement" of Germany was, shall we say, more than concrete. But the British oil double-dealing in relation to Germany, with which the British Commonwealth fought, recall, from September 3, 1939, is very characteristic …
According to the Russian historian Nikita Smagin, "By 1941, Germany accounted for more than 40% of Iran's total trade turnover, and the USSR - no more than 10%. Reza Shah's dependence on the Germans in his ambitious plans to transform the Iranian economy and army gave rise to fears that Germany would be able to convince or even force Iran to enter the war on the side of the pro-Hitler coalition. After all, the country was an excellent springboard for an attack on British possessions in India, and could also serve as the basis for an attack on the southern borders of the Soviet Union. " Moreover, "as of the summer of 1941, the positions of Hitlerite Germany in Iran were much stronger than those of the British Empire and the defeated USSR."
It is also noted that on June 25, 1941, "Berlin really tried to involve Iran in the war and sent a note to Tehran with an almost ultimatum demanding to join the war on the side of Germany. Although Reza Shah responded in mid-July with a refusal." In fact, Reza Shah was playing for time to be convinced of the inevitable defeat, first of all, of the USSR, and not Great Britain. The shah was not convinced of this. In addition, in Tehran, Turkey was expected to enter the war against the USSR in connection with the German-Turkish treaty of friendship and non-aggression of June 18, 1941. But Turkey also expected decisive victories of Germany in the war with the USSR, which never happened.
According to the memoirs of the head of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia (1937-1943) Aram Puruzyan, at a meeting in Moscow on July 2, 1941 with the leaders of the Transcaucasian republics and the Turkmen SSR I. V. Stalin declared:
"… the invasion of the USSR is not ruled out not only from Turkey, but also from Iran. Berlin is increasingly influencing Tehran's foreign policy, the Iranian press actively reprints anti-Soviet materials in newspapers from Germany, Italy, Turkey, and anti-Soviet emigration. Restless on our border with Iran, as well as with Turkey. The regions of Iran adjacent to the USSR are filled with German scouts. All this is in spite of our 1921 treaties on friendship and borders with Turkey and Iran. Apparently, their authorities are provoking us to break these treaties and, under the pretext of some kind of "Soviet military threat" in connection with such a decision, - entering the war against the USSR."
In the context of these factors, Stalin noted that “we will have to seriously strengthen our entire border with Iran as soon as possible. Soviet and British troops to Iran at the end of August - the first ten days of September 1941 - Ed. note).
On June 24, 1941, Iran officially declared its neutrality (in support of its statement on September 4, 1939). But in January-August 1941, Iran imported over 13 thousand tons of weapons and ammunition from Germany and Italy, including thousands of machine guns, dozens of artillery pieces. Already from the beginning of July 1941, German reconnaissance operations with the participation of local anti-Soviet emigration from Iranian territory intensified even more.
Data of the NKGB of the USSR (July 1941):
Iran became the main base for German agents in the Middle East. On the territory of the country, especially in the northern regions of Iran bordering the USSR, reconnaissance and sabotage groups were created, weapons depots were set up, provocations on the Iranian-Soviet border became more frequent.
The government of the USSR in its notes - June 26, July 19, "and also August 16, 1941 -" warned the Iranian leadership about the activation of German agents in the country and offered to expel all German subjects from the country, among them were many hundreds of military specialists. Because they are carrying out activities incompatible with Iranian neutrality. Iran rejected this demand."
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill adhered to an extremely tough position with respect to the then leadership of Iran, headed by Reza Shah, and in fact, with his submission, it was decided to deal with Tehran radically. The bet was immediately placed on the heir to the throne - Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, known for his progressive pro-Western views.
Victory bridge
The already mentioned unclassified operation "Consent", as a result of which Soviet and British troops entered Iran, and almost an ally of Hitler became a companion of the USSR and Britain, has already been written on "Military Review", and more than once. Mohammed Reza succeeded his father on the Persian Shah's throne.
As a result, already in the fall of 1941, the so-called "Victory Bridge" - "Pol-e-Piruzi" (in Farsi) began to operate through Iran, along which supplies of allied cargoes, military-technical, civilian, as well as humanitarian, went to the USSR. The share of this transport (both rail and road at the same time) corridor in the total volume of those supplies reached almost 30%.
And in one of the most difficult periods for Lend-Lease, in 1943, when, due to the defeat of the PQ-17 convoy, the allies temporarily, until the fall of 1943, stopped escorting Arctic convoys, it even exceeded 40%. But back in May-August 1941, the likelihood of Iran's participation in "Barbarossa" was very high.
Corridors through Armenia with access to the Caspian Sea and Georgia were proposed during the Great Patriotic War as part of the Trans-Iranian railway route. It delivered almost 40% of the volume of all lend-lease and humanitarian cargo. They first entered the borderline Julfa (Nakhichevan ASSR "within the" Armenian SSR), and then followed the railways and highways of Armenia, Georgia and the main part of the Azerbaijan SSR to the front line and to the rear regions outside the Caucasus.
But the seizure of almost the entire North Caucasus by the aggressors (from August 1942 to February 1943) forced the relocation of up to 80% of the volume of these traffic exclusively to the South Azerbaijan steel mainline. More than three quarters of this highway runs along the border with Iran (Julfa-Ordubad-Mindjevan - Horadiz - Imishli - Alat-Baku). And this route passed through the 55-kilometer South Armenian section (Meghri region) - that is, between the Nakhichevan region and "main" Azerbaijan.
At the end of 1942, the Armenian leadership proposed to the USSR State Defense Committee to build the Merend (Iran) - Meghri-Kafan-Lachin-Stepanakert - Yevlakh railway, that is, to the steel arteries in the direction of Baku, Dagestan, Georgia and to the temporary ferry Baku-Krasnovodsk - almost the only trans-Caspian route at that time. In order to avoid the strategically flawed concentration of allied cargo flows at one border crossing point and on one Iranian-Azerbaijani highway.
However, the leadership of Azerbaijan, which has been very influential in the highest ruling echelon of the USSR since the early 1920s, strongly objected in view of the passage of a new artery through Nagorno-Karabakh (where in those years the share of Armenians in the local population exceeded 30%), and the unwillingness to concede the most important role Soviet Azerbaijan in the organization and implementation of transportation of allied cargo. As a result, the highway proposed by Yerevan was never built.
