In 1941-1942, the "Persian Corridor", uniting the sea, air and land routes of lend-lease supplies to the USSR, played an important role in establishing military-economic cooperation between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition. It became one of the most important Lend-Lease supply routes from the United States and Great Britain to the Soviet Union. If in 1941 its share was only 3.7%, then in 1942 it rose to 28.8%, and in 1943 to 33.5%. In total, during the war years, 23.8% of the cargo was transported this way. Only deliveries through the Pacific Ocean (47.1%) were larger.
After Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, at conferences of representatives of the governments of the USSR, Great Britain and the United States, questions of mutual military-economic assistance were repeatedly considered. A significant role in the establishment of allied trade relations was played by the conference of representatives of the USSR, England and the United States in Moscow, held from September 29 to October 1, 1941, at which the issue of providing assistance to the Soviet Union with military equipment, weapons and various military materials was positively resolved. In return, the Soviet Union pledged to supply the United States and Great Britain with strategic raw materials and supplies. In this regard, the question immediately arose of organizing the reception of goods traveling to the Soviet ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk through the northern seas, to Vladivostok through the Pacific Ocean, as well as arriving through Alaska and the Persian Gulf.
Since the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade (People's Commissar A. I. Mikoyan) had an apparatus of military specialists who already had some experience of such work with foreign states, it was entrusted with the main task of receiving and delivering military cargo - military equipment, weapons and supplies. as well as materials for the defense industry. In November 1941, preparations began for receiving military supplies from the United States and Great Britain through the southern ports of Iran and Iraq, and transporting them through these countries to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. This route later became known as the Persian Corridor.
As you know, the United States did not fulfill its obligations on a regular basis. So, in November and December 1941, only $ 545 thousand worth of goods were delivered instead of the planned $ 111 million. Approximately the same thing was on the part of Great Britain. So, from October 1941 to June 1942, the United States fulfilled the plan for the supply of cars by only 19.4%, and for aircraft and tanks by 30.2% and 34.8%, respectively. Moreover, in the near future, the Allies did not envisage a sharp increase in supplies. In a conversation with the plenipotentiary of the USSR in England I. M. Maisky W. Churchill frankly and cynically declared that "until winter we will not be able to provide you with serious assistance either by setting up a second front, or by ensuring a wide supply of all types of weapons."
Before the war, a number of Soviet organizations functioned in Iran, in particular, the Trade Representation of the USSR in Iran (trade representative V. P. Migunov), as well as the transport organization "Iransovtrans", headed by L. Ye. Krasnov. The latter hired transport from Iranian organizations and individuals. After agreeing on the basic principles of military supplies to the USSR through the Persian Gulf, by order of the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. I. Mikoyan, a special organization is being created to receive and transport these goods - the Office of the authorized People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade for the transit of military equipment and materials for the front through Iran. It was headed by a 1st rank military engineer I. S. Kormilitsyn, and military engineer of the 3rd rank L. I. Zorin. The apparatus of the authorized Narkomvneshtorg for the transit of military equipment and materials consisted of officers of the Red Army: military engineer of the 3rd rank M. A. Sergeichik, military engineer 2nd rank N. S. Karlashev, military technicians of the 1st rank V. I. Rudenko, V. E. Sheingauz, I. T. Rostovtsev, military technicians of the 2nd rank V. I. Tikhonyuk, V. I. Samsonov, as well as employees: translators E. N. Kuznetsova, O. V. Zilberberg, I. S. Koroleva, V. M. Gluskin, signalmen, typists and secretaries. By agreement with Moscow, the group was divided into two parts. The first, headed by I. S. Kormilitsyn left for Baghdad for a conference, and then for Basra. It included aviation specialists, whose task was to organize the assembly and transfer of aircraft, L. I. Zorin, together with representatives of "Iransovtrans" in Tehran, I. P. Kononov and I. P. Shapov, go to the port of Bushehr and establish work there on assembly, acceptance, loading with military materials and sending military trucks to the Soviet border through Tehran. This is how the hard work of the officers of the staff of the authorized Narkomvneshtorg abroad began.
At that time, Iransovtrans did not have so many forces and means, therefore, in the future, for a more efficient transportation both on army trucks assembled in the southern zone of Iran and Iraq, and on the Trans-Iranian railway, an institution was additionally involved in this operation. People's Commissariat of Defense - Soviet Transport Administration (STU) in Iran, subordinate to the head of the rear of the Soviet Army. The STU arrived in Iran at the end of 1942. It was first headed by Major General A. N. Korolev, and then Major General I. V. Kargin.
To centralize the leadership, the head of Iransoztrans, who was subordinate to the People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, was simultaneously appointed by an order for the rear of the Red Army as Deputy Head of the Soviet Transport Directorate. Subordinate to the STU were automobile regiments, motor transport battalions, road construction and road maintenance units of the Soviet troops in Iran, as well as military operational departments (VEO-17 and VEO-50) of the People's Commissariat of Railways. The task of the STU included the transportation of goods in the northern zone of Iran, where the Soviet troops were located, both by rail and by road. Transportation of goods from the south of Iran continued exclusively through the military apparatus of the authorized People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, and then through Iransovtrans and STU.
The goods and equipment that came from the allies by sea to the southern ports of Iran and Iraq were first transported by road convoys organized by the authorized NKVT in Iran for the transit of goods. The columns were manned by military drivers as well as Iraqi nationals. Iranian drivers drove the cars with a certain eastern sluggishness, did not rush, set off late, and stopped early for the night. Therefore, the flight from the south of Iran (Khorramshahr) to the borders of the USSR (Julfa), with a total length of about 2000 km, often lasted more than 30 days. Some of the drivers tried to steal the cargo and the cars themselves. The march discipline was very low, which led to a large number of accidents, and, consequently, damage and loss of cargo.
By this time, the Americans had deployed three car assembly plants in southern Iran and Iraq - in Andimeshk, Khorramshahr and Shuaiba. At these factories, acceptance points for assembled vehicles from the Americans and the British and camps for the formation of convoys were created. As the participants in those events recalled, the quality of the assembled cars was not always high. So, in Andimeshka at the end of May 1942, the Americans presented 50 cars for acceptance. Our specialists did not accept a single car, as they had 25-45 defects each. The Americans were offended, but the Soviet inspectors did not give up and demanded the delivery of serviceable cars. Then the Americans went to the other extreme - they stopped fiddling with faulty cars, even if the defect was insignificant. They just threw them in a landfill. A cemetery of such cars was formed near Andimeshk. Seeing such waste, Soviet specialists undertook to restore even those machines that seemed absolutely hopeless. This made it possible to minimize truck losses. The next problem was the fact that the cars, which were badly needed at the front, stood idle at the factory sites in anticipation of the ferrymen. It was necessary to urgently speed up the pace of transporting cars and delivering goods to them to the borders of the Soviet Union, as well as to achieve a reduction in accidents and theft of transported goods. After a detailed discussion of the current situation, the leaders of Iransovtrans turned to the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. I. Mikoyan with a request to give them at least partially regular transport. A. I. Mikoyan proposed the GKO to create a special automobile detachment for Iran. This proposal was accepted. By order No. 52 of August 15, 1943, the 1st separate special automobile detachment was formed in the rear of the Red Army and sent to the order of the head of Iransovtrans. The direct selection of officers for him was carried out by the head of the Main Automobile Directorate of the Red Army, Lieutenant General I. P. Tyagunov.
The detachment was an unusual military unit - it consisted only of motorist officers (150 people) and sergeants (300 people). The officers were allocated by the Personnel Department of the Main Automobile Directorate of the Soviet Army, and the sergeants, by order of the GAVTU, were assembled in Yerevan from the automobile regiments of the Transcaucasian Front. It was envisaged that Iranian citizens would be employed as ferry drivers.
According to the state, the detachment consisted of 60 automobile convoys, each of which was manned by two officers (the leader of the convoy and his deputy in technical affairs) and five sergeants - squad commanders. Later, on the territory of Iran, each column was replenished with Iraqi citizens - an interpreter and 50-70 drivers. Engineer Lieutenant Colonel M. V. Arguzov. At the beginning of September 1943, officers and sergeants of the 1st Special Automobile Detachment arrived in Tehran, and on September 19 they began to directly fulfill their difficult and responsible task of ferrying imported vehicles with cargo through Iran.
The measures taken have dramatically reduced the time spent on one flight on the Tehran-Khorramshahr-Tehran-Julfa-Tehran route. If earlier, before the arrival of the 1st special automobile detachment, Iranian drivers spent 28-30 days on such a flight, now the detachment's columns, led by Soviet officers, spent an average of 12-14 days on this, that is, two times less … The leaders of many convoys completed their voyage in 11-12 days. The record for the fastest and most trouble-free car race was set by the convoy, where the chief was Senior Lieutenant N. A. Syedyshev, - one of the flights organized under the leadership of the head of the NKVT engineering department, Major General I. F. Semichastnova, she completed it in 8 days.
By the beginning of the mass transportation of goods to the Soviet Union in 1943, separate road construction and road maintenance battalions were responsible for the maintenance of the highways along which the transportation went. There were only 4 such battalions subordinate to the STU. Of course, they could cope with the regulation of the mass flow of cars only on certain, most dangerous mountain sections of the road. There was simply not enough strength to repair the quickly wearing gravel bed over such a long distance.
At the end of 1943, the Soviet government decided to send two highways to Iran - VAD-32 and VAD-33. VAD-33 (Chief Lieutenant Colonel V. F. Oprits) was responsible for the highway from Tehran through Qazvin, Zanjan, Miane, Tabriz to Iranian Julfa, stretching for more than 800 km. The headquarters of VAD-33 was located in the city of Tabriz. VAD-32 (Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Obyedkov) was entrusted with the provision of two highways, the most intense, passing through dangerous mountain passes: the roads from Qazvin through Menjil, Rasht, Pahlavi to Astara with an Iranian length of over 500 km, and the road from Keredzh to the port of Noushehr in the south of the Caspian Sea, over 200 km long.
Along with the main tasks - maintaining highways in normal condition, traffic regulation, territorial petrol stations (BZP) were subordinated to military highways, and the chiefs of VAD began to be responsible for providing transport with fuel on their routes. South of Tehran, i.e. in the Anglo-American zone, the service of fuels and lubricants was organized by the forces and means of the Americans.
VAD-32 and VAD-33 arrived in Iran in early 1944 and became part of the Soviet Transport Administration in Iran. Their practical activities were supervised by the road department of the STU, staffed by road service officers with extensive experience at the front.
The VAD was entrusted with great tasks. They carried a support service along the entire length of the road, were responsible for the maintenance and repair of sections of roads and artificial structures (bridges, tunnels, passes), as well as the protection of facilities. They also had the responsibility of organizing a strict and accurate regulation service in certain areas in order to ensure order and rules for the movement of convoys and individual groups of vehicles and traffic safety along the entire length of the road, especially in narrow, difficult sections and on mountain passes. They also created and equipped points for pulling up columns and preventive inspection of cars, as well as points for rest and eating for drivers and personnel. Such points, as a rule, were combined with field points of refueling with fuels and lubricants and water.
The chiefs of the roads set up food points in the cities through which the convoys passed. For example, on the western outskirts of Tehran, a feeding point was set up for civilian drivers who ferried cars with cargo from car assembly plants in southern Iran to Julfa. The military guard of the columns also ate here. The carrying capacity of the point is 500 people per day. In the northern section, such points were deployed in the town of Menjil in the most intense traffic section, as well as in Astara Iranian. Their carrying capacity is up to 700 people per day each. In the city of Qazvin, the feeding point was the largest, it worked around the clock, passing up to 1000 people. In the westerly direction, there were food stations for 500 people in both Mian and Julfa. Drivers, as a rule, received a three-course meal on special coupons issued by the automobile department.
The uninterrupted operation of the feeding points was a special concern of the quartermasters of the military highways. It should be borne in mind that the supply bases were very far from the supply points. The movement and maintenance of roads in the eastern direction - Shahrud-Ashgabat and Bender-Shah-Gorgan-Kizyl-Atrek - were provided by separate road construction and road maintenance battalions. Both of them were not part of the VAD organization, but acted independently under the leadership of the road department of the STU in Iran.
The organizational structure of VAD-32 and VAD-33 was as follows: road administration and political department, road maintenance department, technical department, line apparatus, support services. The entire route of the highway, transferred to the jurisdiction of the VAD, was divided into 4-5 road commandant sections, depending on the general condition of the road and the importance of one or another of its sections. The road maintenance department supervised the activities of the road commandant sections, drew up a plan for the repair of road sections on its own and by civilian Iranian workers, and provided material support for the work. The technical department was in charge of the standard equipment of the VAD, its use at work, and was responsible for its serviceability.
Support services were staffed with quartermaster, financial and medical workers serving personnel. The linear apparatus consisted of 4-5 road commandant sections (DKU), a motor transport service (20 onboard vehicles, 5 motor-grader trailers, 3 motor-skating rinks) and five platoons (about 150 people), two of which served food and rest points, and three carried a regulatory service (checkpoints, control posts, mobile control posts).
In each road commandant section, in addition to the military commandant of the section, the deputy for political affairs, and the chief of staff for traffic regulation, there was a production and technical department, whose duties included taking care of the repair and maintenance of the road section. The road and commandant sections of the military highways were staffed with servicemen recognized as unfit for formation - mainly former front-line soldiers who had wounds and contusions. The rest of the composition was represented by 18-20-year-old Komsomol girls. In the recent past, all of them stormed the military registration and enlistment offices and insistently demanded that they be immediately assigned to military units and sent to the front.
The intense pace of movement of convoys in both directions demanded, especially on difficult sections of roads, utmost attention, exact implementation of rules and instructions. The workers of the road commandant's offices also took care of the cultural rest of the drivers. Komsomol organizer Masha Akimova organized a group of amateur artists. Once a month, the participants of the amateur performances gathered at the DKU, where they finally worked out their numbers and the entire program. After that, they performed at feeding points during the drivers' brief respite after refueling their cars and eating. Military drivers always watched such twenty-minute concerts with interest.
The highways of Iran could not withstand such an unprecedented movement of heavy trucks. On the crushed stone-gravel surface, the canvases quickly formed, especially after rains or in wet weather, "comb", potholes or splashes. Gravel and crushed stone not bonded with binders were thrown by the slopes of cars over the side of the road. The roadbed fell into disrepair, the speed of traffic dropped. In addition, the cars raised a cloud of the smallest corrosive dust. In calmness, it did not settle for a long time, limited visibility, and the column was forced to stretch. To combat shaking, it was necessary to cut the "combs" with graders and fill in a new layer of gravel or crushed stone. The road commandant's offices had 3-5 trailed graders, i.e. one for 40-50 km. Imported motor graders appeared in small numbers only at the end of 1944. For the repair of highways and the procurement of material, the military road commandant's offices hired Iranians, paying for their work in local currency. Crushed stone and gravel were delivered from the mining site on a returning empty road. But this, undoubtedly, caused delays and idle time of vehicles, since it took a lot of time to manually load gravel or crushed stone. As a result, this negatively affected the plans for the transportation of basic, military, cargo.
In 1944, the Qazvin-Astara road and further to Beku, by the decision of the Soviet government, was reconstructed - covered with asphalt. The work was carried out by Soviet road-building organizations from their own materials. The remaining sections of the highway, especially from Qazvin to Julfa, were kept in working order by road construction organizations.
The second problem - a dusty cloud - made it necessary to water some sections of the road with water. For this, road workers created primitive irrigation devices. But the water on the Iranian plateau was worth its weight in gold, as it had to be transported for hundreds of kilometers. In addition, in the summer heat, it immediately evaporated, and everything quickly returned to its original state.
Cargoes arriving from the south of Iran to our land transshipment bases in the northern part of the country were then delivered to delivery points on the border of the Soviet Union by military road transport units. Subordinate to the STU were two automobile regiments, which had 1,017 transport vehicles each, and five separate motor transport battalions of 600 vehicles each.
The 6th Automobile Regiment was stationed in Tabriz. Its main task was to transport goods from the terminal railway station Miane to Tabriz, to the place of their loading into the railway wagons of the Soviet Union. Some of the drivers transported cars and goods from the south of Iran to Julfa. The 18th Automobile Regiment was stationed in Pahlavi and provided the transportation of goods from the Casein railway station through Rasht, Pahlavi to Astara Iranian.
The 287th and 520th auto battalions transported goods from the transshipment base in Qazvin to Astara Iranian. The 528th autobahn transported goods destined for the republics of Central Asia from the Shahrud railway station through Kuchan, Badjgiran to Ashgabat and from the terminal railway station of the Trans-Iranian railway on the southeastern coast of the Caspian Sea - Bender-Shah to Kizyl-Arvat through the Kizyl border point. Atrek. To Ashgabat, he also transported goods delivered by chartered vehicles from India (from the areas that later became part of Pakistan), from Zahedan station to Mashhad, where they were loaded onto autobahn vehicles. The 572nd and 586th autobaths transported goods from the Tehran and Keredzh railway stations to the port of Noushehr in the south of the Caspian Sea. To ensure the repair of cars of automobile parts, the 321st and 322nd repair and restoration battalions were subordinate to the STU.
The experience of transporting goods over long distances made it necessary to additionally create preventive maintenance points for imported cars, moving under their own power with full load from car assembly plants in the south of Iran to the borders of the Soviet Union. One of them was set up in the southwestern part of Tehran. The convoy of cars that arrived here underwent a full technical inspection, and, if the need arose, individual cars were repaired. Then the convoy was refueled with fuel and lubricants and followed further through Keredzh, Qazvin, Miane, Tabriz to Iranian Julfa, where it also underwent a preventive examination. Similar points were organized in Andimeshk, Khorramabad, Qazvin, Tabriz and Badjgiran. In addition, it was also necessary to create a non-standard company for the supply of fuels and lubricants, consisting of 100 Studebaker vehicles.
Thus, at the disposal of the STU for the delivery of goods to the borders of the Soviet Union, there were up to 5200 transport vehicles operating in extremely difficult natural conditions. To ensure the organized and well-coordinated work of such a kind of conveyor, clear leadership was required from the apparatus of the Soviet Transport Administration in Iran and Iransovtrans. This task was very successfully solved by the small staff of the STU auto department and the Tekhnoexport department of Iransovtrans. They included experienced, proactive workers who performed their duties with full knowledge of the matter. Their care, efforts and perseverance ensured high technical readiness indicators of the entire STU vehicle fleet - up to 95% (instead of 80% according to the plan). Moreover, the indicators for the use of cars were not lower than 85-90% for each car part.
Until the middle of 1943, there was a shortage of domestically produced cars in the automotive parts - ZIS-5 and GAZ-AA. There was an acute shortage of spare parts. The situation with the provision of tires was also bad. At that time, the country was repelling the offensive of the German troops that had reached Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and then near Kursk. It is clear that the industry, first of all, provided the active army, and the supply of the Iranian units was not a priority. Therefore, the automotive parts of the STU tried to get out of the most difficult situations on their own. To this it should be added that even before the start of the transportation of imported goods, some automobile battalions were involved in servicing the military units of the Red Army, as well as in the construction of new highways. For example, the 528th Automobile Battalion delivered materials for the construction of the Gorgan-Kizyl-Atrek road. At the same time, the vehicles of the battalion were greatly worn out.
Much, a lot has been done to ensure the proper technical condition of the vehicle fleet by craftsmen - soldiers and commanders in auto repair battalions and in the auto battalions themselves. For example, they made some parts on their own. Car damage control has become a law for drivers and repairmen. And they gave all their strength to this business. So, the personnel of the repair platoon 528 oATb, in difficult conditions of using vehicles, increased the technical readiness of the vehicles from 75% to 92%. At the same time, even the seemingly impossible was done. Locksmiths Barabash and Putintsev designed a machine for winding wires of generators, made all kinds of stamps and other small, extremely scarce parts.
Soldiers of the repair and restoration battalions worked at the machines practically around the clock. But as the wear and tear of domestic cars grew, it became more and more difficult to cope with repairs. Even the transfer, at the suggestion of the Main Automobile and Tractor Directorate of the Red Army, to the subordination of the STU of the Baku Automobile Repair Plant, could not fix things. The rate of delivery of imported goods to the USSR was alarmingly declining.
In mid-1943, the deputy chief of the rear of the Red Army, Lieutenant General V. E. Belokoskov was personally convinced of the state of the STU vehicles. Soon, a member of the State Defense Committee A. I. Mikoyan allowed to replace all transport vehicles of auto parts with imported ones in Iran. By September 1943, this process was completed. As the cars were replaced with new ones, the volume of traffic started to grow. But new concerns soon arose due to the poor condition of the highways. In addition, new, imported cars could not withstand the condition of these roads. The Studebakers, for example, often had their front and rear axles broken. The Soviet soldiers had to urgently master the repair of new equipment.
At the border crossing points of the USSR, cars and cargo were subjected to a full customs examination, verification of documents and verification of the compliance of cargo with documents. The same procedure existed for returning vehicles after the delivery of goods to the Iransovtrans bases on the territory of the Soviet Union. Such a procedure is, of course, inevitable. But the existing procedure for inspecting a column of 60-70 vehicles took a lot of time. If we add to this the time spent on unloading vehicles at the acceptance base, sometimes with recalculating places and weighing them, then the turnover of the convoy to the loading point on the territory of Iran took 48-60 hours.
The commander of 528 OATB, Major S. A. Mirzoyan, having taken the initiative, began to send convoys of 30-35 vehicles. As a result, the time of loading and unloading operations was sharply reduced, the processing of documents was accelerated and customs inspection was carried out faster. The personal responsibility of platoon and squad commanders has increased. And most importantly, the number of flights increased sharply, which contributed to the implementation of plans for the transportation of imported goods to the eastern republics of the USSR by 125-130%. Major S. A. Mirzoyan and the officers of the battalion was quickly distributed in all automobile units of the STU.
In the same battalion, the leading drivers initiated the movement “Carry more and faster”. V. V. Stulnev, N. S. Devyatkin and E. I. Alekseev and their followers Golubenko, Gorbatenko, Medvedev, Novikov, Yuldashchev and others began to carry cargo to the ZIS-5, not weighing three tons, as it should be in terms of the carrying capacity of machines, but much more: five, six and even seven tons. In the 1st and 3rd companies of the battalion, the drivers of GAZ-AA vehicles began to constantly transport 2.5-3 tons of cargo. Of course, the springs of the cars were significantly strengthened. In the same battalion, a movement was launched under the slogan "Do 500 km of mileage per day." We worked like this: today, a drive from Shahrud to Ashgabat, unloading, and tomorrow a trip from Ashgabat to Shahrud and loading. So day after day, month after month, without rest. Other automotive parts worked in the same rhythm. It should be remembered in what difficult road conditions military drivers acted and what difficult mountain passes, slopes and serpentines of roads they had to overcome under constantly changing temperature and climatic conditions. So, on the mountain passes, the engines of the cars worked at their limit. Descending from passes, frequent serpentines with minimal turning radii required constant use of brakes, which led to their premature wear. In addition, the smallest, corrosive dust made it very difficult to operate the machines. It was necessary to arrange car washes at all points of dislocation of automobile parts, especially in points of unloading, but there was no money for this.
The STU automotive parts did a lot, especially in 1943-1944, a lot of work on the transportation of military cargo through Iran. So, according to operational records, in 1943 they transported a total of 503 thousand tons of imported cargo to delivery points on the border of the USSR and made 129.5 million ton-kilometers. In 1944, 1,056 thousand tons of cargo (or more than 200% of the 1943 plan) were delivered from land transshipment bases to receiving points. Auto parts vehicles made 235 million ton-kilometers, or 2, 2 times more than in 1943.
Motor transport parts were also used for the transportation of goods in the opposite direction. But their volume was insignificant. These were mainly cargoes from the Soviet Union to the military units stationed in the northern provinces of Iran (military transport), or cargo arriving at the USSR Trade Mission in Iran (commercial transport). Military transportations amounted to 53 thousand tons in 1943, and in 1944 - 214, 7 thousand tons. A noticeable increase in traffic is due to the fact that in 1943-1944. In order to help the population of Iran, who suffered from a poor harvest, wheat was delivered from the Soviet Union: to the northern provinces - 100 thousand tons, to Tehran - 25 thousand tons and to the southern provinces - 4.5 thousand tons.
For the successful work of providing the front with imported military materials and vehicles traveling through Iran, a large group of Soviet military personnel and specialists, including the personnel of automobile units, as well as employees of Iransovtrans, were awarded orders (193 people) and medals (204 people). Among those awarded the medal "For Labor Distinction" were Iranian citizens - mainly railroad workers and drivers who actively helped us transport imported cargo for the front through Iranian territory.
Thus, Soviet specialists, our automotive parts, despite enormous difficulties, did everything possible to deliver the goods received under Lend-Lease without interruption. At the same time, it should be noted that, according to the memoirs of L. Zorin and I. Kargin, a significant part of the equipment supplied by the allies turned out to be outdated and had defects. The car delivery plan was not carried out regularly, the quality of the assembled cars was not always high. The American side has repeatedly drawn the attention to this.
