The Soviet-Chinese military conflict, which ended on Damansky Island fifty years ago, by early April 1969, almost escalated into a world war. But the situation on the Far Eastern border with the PRC was resolved through territorial concessions from the Soviet side: de facto Damansky and a number of other islands on the border rivers with the PRC were transferred to China at the turn of 1969 and 1970. And in 1991 it was finally legalized.
Few now remember that in the days when Damansky was on fire, not only very many foreign communist parties, but also the Warsaw Pact countries actually stood up to defend China's interests. The support from a number of capitalist countries, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement, is hardly surprising, but the comrades-in-arms in the struggle clearly wanted to demonstrate their independence from the USSR. And this despite the fact that the split in the communist movement after the resignation of Khrushchev seems to have been overcome.
However, the crack remained. The PRC, which by that time already possessed atomic (since 1964) and hydrogen (since 1967) bombs, and not without the help of the USSR, clearly decided to demonstrate its "great power" to the USSR and, although of course, indirectly, to the United States. It seems that then in Beijing they managed to look half a century ahead. In general, the calculation of Mao and his comrades-in-arms turned out to be quite correct: Washington ultimately preferred to use the discord in the socialist camp to accelerate rapprochement with the PRC.
The Americans acted according to the principle "The enemy of my enemy is my friend." Already in the second half of 1969, Sino-American trade began to grow by leaps and bounds, although at first it was carried out mainly through re-export through Thailand, Pakistan, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau on the South China coast … And both sides, without much publicity, began to lift all kinds of restrictions on mutual trade.
This strategic trend was also "spurred on" by the sharply negative reaction of the PRC to the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968, which the Chinese Ministry of Defense called "the transition of Soviet revisionism to direct armed aggression." The materials of the department noted that this "was to be expected in connection with the betrayal of the Khrushchevites and their last remnants of Marxism-Leninism - the all-conquering teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin."
The openly provocative actions of the PRC were caused both by Beijing's territorial claims both to the border islands and to the much more extensive border regions of the USSR (read more in the Military Review).
It is characteristic that these claims were voiced personally by Mao Zedong back in March 1964. At the same time, the leadership of the PRC, it seems, understood quite well in the spring of 1969 that these wishes were feasible for the time being only in propaganda and on geographical maps, and therefore Beijing's top task was, we repeat, a deliberate demonstration of the PRC's "great power".
Put pressure on allies
Moscow, for its part, tried to use in this conflict a variant of the collective military-political pressure of the Warsaw Pact countries on the PRC. This was proposed to the VD allies at a specially convened meeting of the organization's governing structures in Budapest on March 17-18, 1969. Within the framework of the Soviet draft of the Final Communiqué, it was not only about the unanimous support of the USSR in this situation, but also about the sending of contingents of the Air Force countries, albeit only symbolic ones, to the Soviet-Chinese border.
It was necessary to demonstrate to Beijing the political unity of the Warsaw bloc. But, as it turned out, in vain … Here are just some excerpts from the speeches on this forum:
L. I. Brezhnev, KPSS: “Events on the Soviet-Chinese border require the adoption of adequate collective measures to strengthen the security of the border and the defense capability of the USSR. Mao Zedong's group - apparently counting on support from the United States - switched to a policy of military provocations against the USSR, which is fraught with dire consequences for peace and security. We expect that other countries participating in the VD have a similar or similar position, therefore, an appropriate collective statement could be agreed upon and adopted. Providing, among other things, the possible dispatch of some military units of a limited composition of the countries of the military or their observers to the Soviet-Chinese border."
Janos Kadar, Hungarian Labor Party: “The efforts of all socialist countries are required to resolve the situation on the Soviet-Chinese border and in general in Soviet-Chinese relations. Moreover, the United States and its allies, incl. to increase aggression in Indochina. But sending our contingents can provoke an anti-Soviet alliance between the PRC and the United States."
Virtually not a word about the speech of the Soviet leader.
Nicolae Ceausescu, Romanian Communist Party: “Difficulties in the Soviet-Chinese relations stem from the unsettledness of a number of border issues and the refusal of the PRC-CPC to support the political and ideological line outlined by the XX and XXII CPSU Congresses. The latter politically complicates border issues. All socialist countries should not whip up the already high tension between the USSR and the PRC, but promote the Soviet-Chinese dialogue. In our opinion, a joint statement by the socialist countries to facilitate such a dialogue is more expedient, even without mentioning border clashes. In Bucharest, it is quite possible to organize negotiations between representatives of the USSR and the PRC on a wide range of issues."
Vladislav Gomulka, Polish United Workers' Party: “China is pursuing an increasingly provocative policy towards the USSR and other socialist countries. Including the encouragement of a split in their Communist parties and the creation of pro-Chinese factions in them. But we still need a dialogue with Beijing, because I think that if we form our common statement, it should be aimed specifically at dialogue and expression of concern about the situation on the border of the USSR and the PRC."
And also, as in Ceausescu's speech - not a word about Brezhnev's proposal. As we can see, contrary to Moscow's expectations, the reaction of the Warsaw Pact “allies” to the events at the meeting was, in fact, pro-Chinese. It immediately became clear that, in fact, it was a "under-agreement". By the way, the largest pro-Chinese (that is, Stalinist-Maoist) faction in pro-Soviet Eastern Europe from 1966 to 1994 was the semi-legal “Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Poland” headed by the former (in the early to mid-50s) Deputy Prime Minister Kazimierz Miyal (1910-2010).
Not a word about China
As a result, the Final Statement covered the issues of political detente in Europe, while the PRC was not mentioned at all. In a word, the "fraternal allies" made it clear to Moscow that military mutual assistance within the framework of the VD does not extend to the Soviet-Chinese contradictions. Accordingly, comments appeared in the PRC that they are trying to resist the anti-Chinese plans of Soviet revisionists in Eastern Europe.
It was in 1969-1971. All the USSR's allies in military affairs concluded new, more voluminous trade agreements with China, and at the same time with Albania, which openly supported it. It was, of course, a deliberate demonstration of the Chinese policy of "little brothers" independent of the USSR. At that time, the largest and longest was the Sino-Romanian trade agreement, signed during the negotiations of N. Ceausescu in Beijing with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in June 1971.
An even greater opposition to the Soviet assessment of relations with the PRC and Chinese policy took place at the last international meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties in June 1969 in Moscow. Expecting Soviet pressure on the Communist Party in connection with China, they did not attend the forum or sent only their observers to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam and North Korea. Naturally, there were no representatives of China, Albania, Yugoslavia at the meeting, as were the 35 Stalinist-Maoist Communist Parties created at the turn of the 50s and 60s in the wake of the XX Congress of the CPSU.
But even with such a composition of 82 Communist Parties - participants in the meeting, over 50 spoke in favor of dialogue with Beijing and Tirana; The delegations of the Central Committee of the pro-Soviet Communist Parties of Eastern Europe spoke from the same positions as at the aforementioned Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in March 1969. Again, nothing anti-Chinese in the Final Statement …
Thus, the allies of the USSR were in "veiled" opposition to the introduction of troops into Czechoslovakia and, probably, to Khrushchev's anti-Stalinism. Not without reason they considered it capable only of deepening the split in the world communist movement, as well as shaking the foundations of socialism and, accordingly, the leading function of the communist parties in the pro-Soviet socialist countries.
