The reaction of the Poles to the proclamation of the Kingdom of Poland by Germany and Austria-Hungary was extremely ambiguous. Surprisingly, even after more than two years of war and a year of complete occupation, Russian supporters in the total population of three parts of the country were still in the majority. In addition, there was no hint of the loyal enthusiasm of the Polish deputies in the Prussian Landtag; the Polish colo of the Austrian Reichsrat also got off with formal displays of loyalty. In addition, there was no question of the person of the king; instead of him, the Regency Council was sitting. And, most likely, with the prospect of the coronation of some Habsburg and Hohenzollern.
Well, there is nothing to say about how Królestwo was received in Silesia and the Duchy of Poznan, which remained in the next, then still the Second German Reich. There, the Poles, by the way, still constituting the majority of the population, chose to simply ignore the act of the two emperors - after all, the "independence" of Poland did not affect them in any way. Perhaps, if there was even a hint of an impending reunion, the reaction turned out to be completely different.
However, the backlash on the other side of the front was also not as sharp as one might expect. So, the position of the Polish stake in the Russian parliament was utterly dryly voiced on November 1 (14), 1916 in the State Duma by the deputy Jan Garusevich:
The declaration by Germany and Austria-Hungary of the acts of independence of the Kingdom of Poland creates new international tasks.
In the midst of the war, the German powers had the courage to prejudge the fate of not only Poland, but the whole of Central Eastern Europe. An independent Polish state created by Germany from a part of Poland, made in many respects dependent on the German powers, would be an instrument of German imperialism.
The cradle of the Polish people and the Polish province of Prussia are doomed to further merciless Germanization. At the same time, Galicia remains in the possession of the Habsburg monarchy under the pretext of expanding its autonomy and is deprived of influence on the internal life of Austria. The latter is being done again, as before 1948, by a purely German state. Her Slavic roots will be subjected to heavy German oppression …
The Polish people will not agree to a German solution, which clearly contradicts their cherished aspirations, meeting the requirements of a great historical moment … It became clear that there could be no lasting peace in Europe, there was no limit to German encroachments.
We strongly protest against this German act, which confirms the partition of Poland and seeks to obstruct the historical necessity of the unification of Poland, unthinkable without Krakow, Poznan, Silesia and the Polish Sea.
The basic Polish political idea that the Polish question cannot be solved by Germany remains unshakable. Prominent representatives of all three parts of Poland in Paris on their own behalf and on behalf of their compatriots, as well as the most influential parties in Warsaw, have already stated that they consider the military projects of Germany and Austria a grave disaster for Poland, and the organization of the Polish army under these conditions is contrary to the feelings of the majority. Polish people.
… The Polish people have the right to expect that in this tragic situation they will not be left to their own forces, that the act of the German empires will not remain without a proper answer, that on the initiative of Russia, whose sword in defense of the rights of peoples was raised by the Sovereign Emperor; the allied powers will declare before the whole world that the Polish question will be resolved in full. Poland will be unified and will receive an independent state.
Representatives of the Polish people have repeatedly and persistently pointed out to the government the threat posed by Germany to Russia and Poland of snatching from the hands of Russia and the coalition the memorable initiative taken at the beginning of the war in resolving the Polish question. Meanwhile, the government did nothing to strengthen the belief that the decision of Russia, announced in a historic appeal to the Polish people, is unshakable, that there can be no return to the past. The silence of the government in the Polish question was used by our common enemy in order to create the impression that he, the enemy, Russia itself, was given entirely to the final resolution of the fate of the Polish people (1).
The reaction of the Polish emigration, which had already made a bet on the Entente, was quite expected. The Russian press, without hiding its sympathies, quoted the statement of representatives of the Polish society living abroad on October 23 (November 5) 1916:
The authorities of the occupied regions of the Kingdom of Poland proclaimed a decision taken by agreement of the German emperor with the Austrian one regarding the fate of Poland.
The Polish nation is inseparable. She strives for the creation of a Polish state from three parts of Poland, and her aspirations cannot be realized without the unification of these disparate territories. From a real war, the slogan of which is "freedom and independence of nations", Poland expects first of all its unification.
The projected creation of a Polish state exclusively from occupied territories, which constitute only one of the pieces of Poland, not only does not correspond to Polish aspirations, but on the contrary, emphasizes the division of their homeland. Maintaining the division of the national Polish forces, Germany and Austria-Hungary condemn the new state for impotence and turn it into an instrument of their policy.
Without making final decisions on the rights and prerogatives of the future kingdom, the central powers emphasize only its dependence on them. At the same time, they demand that the Poles create their own army for them. This army, subordinated as auxiliary troops to the German and Austrian forces, will serve to achieve the goals of the central powers and defend a cause alien to Poland, but for which it will fight …
We consider the military projects of Germany and Austria-Hungary a grave disaster for Poland, and their act is a new sanction for partitioning it (2).
Among those who signed the statement were Roman Dmowski, Casimir and Maria Derzhikrai-Moravsky, Baron Gustav de Taube, who once ostentatiously rejected the German noble "background", and other authoritative public figures. A day later, they were joined by Polish emigrants in Switzerland, as well as in Nice, led by Prince Leon Lubomirsky and Count Georgy Grabowski.
But at the same time, the Swiss "Berner Tagwacht", which printed both Bolsheviks and anarchists, sounded extremely harsh: "The Polish gentry betrayed the people to the central powers." Note - not for the first time. And the main reason for this conclusion was the undisguised delight of pro-German circles in Warsaw and Krakow.
However, the official flywheel was already launched, and a little later - on November 26, 1916, the order of the German Warsaw Governor-General Bezeler was published regarding the creation of a temporary state council in the Kingdom of Poland. It in itself so vividly characterizes the policy of the occupying authorities in the new kingdom that it also needs to be cited in full:
By the highest command of E. V. the German emperor and E. V. Emperor of Austria, Apostolic King of Hungary, is ordered as follows:
1) Until the state council is formed in the Polish kingdom on the basis of elections, which will be the subject of special agreements, a provisional council of state with headquarters in Warsaw will be formed.
This Council of State is composed of twenty-five members who are familiar with the desires and interests of the people and who, by virtue of their position, are capable of representing all regions and estates within both governorates-general. Fifteen members will come from the German government area and ten members from the Austro-Hungarian government area.
2) The members of this Council of State will be appointed by the highest command by means of a joint order of both Governor-Generals.
3) The Council of State will give its opinion on all legislative issues on which both departments, jointly or separately, will turn to it.
The Council of State is called upon to cooperate in the creation of further state institutions in the Polish kingdom … (3)
One of the ten Austrian representatives on the council was Yu. Pilsudski, who headed the military commission, which without any particular difficulties, under the guise of violent activity, actually sabotaged the call of volunteers. The activities of the State Council itself and other related institutions were just as "fruitful." To replace, although formally - to help the Polish state council, the occupation authorities created the so-called regency council. He was called to personify the already "supreme" power in the Polish kingdom before the election of the king. How short, in fact, the rights were granted to this regency council almost a year after the formation of the "Kingdom" is demonstrated at least by the corresponding patent of Governor-General Bezeler, which was published only in September 1917.
Patent of the German Governor-General of Warsaw Bezeler on the formation of a regency council in the Kingdom of Poland dated September 12, 1917.
Despite all the diplomatic contradictions, the German and Austrian bureaucracies continued to work in sync: on the same day, a patent of the same content was published in Lublin by the new Austro-Hungarian Governor-General Stanislav Sheptytsky, who had recently replaced Cook.
The recruits after Verdun and the hauling arranged for the Austrians by Brusilovs were needed by the central powers like air. A somewhat hasty "decision" on Poland, all the more surprising given almost six months of delays and mutual agreements, immediately revealed numerous contradictions between Germany and Austria-Hungary. The Viennese diplomats, having apparently given their consent to the creation of a "kingdom" as soon as this happened, once again were not averse to "attaching a new Poland" as the third link in their renewed semi-federal structure.
But the so-called "restoration of Poland" happened at a time when another aged Emperor Franz Joseph was about to leave for the world. The heir apparent, his grandson Karl, whose political views none of the authoritative politicians of the Central Powers had any idea about, could well have broken the combination planned by the diplomats. Those surrounded by Franz Joseph understood that after the thousand-year-old throne of the Habsburgs came to Karl, the Germans would not miss the opportunity to completely crush "New Poland".
It is no coincidence that the Polish project was only one of the "trialist" options, on a par with the "Romanian" or the same "Serbo-Croatian" one. However, it was also developed with numerous reservations - taking into account the special interests of Hungary. It was the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tissa, the strongest opponent of the Austrian Foreign Ministry, who adhered to the position: the annexation of Poland should in no way affect the political structure of the two-pronged monarchy. "Poland can be included (in the empire - AP) as an Austrian province, but not at all as a trialist factor of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy." From the point of view of the Hungarian royal government, the introduction of a new Polish element as a factor equal to Austria and Hungary "would immediately give our state organism a fragile character" (4).
It is quite indicative that in response to something similar (that is, the state of nationalities), many were ready to offer for Germany. The well-known publicist Georg Kleinov (5) (perhaps more correctly Kleinau - A. P.) turned out to be the exponent of this idea. In early November, he wrote in the Kölnische Zeitung:
If the German government, after thirty years of the closest relations with Austria-Hungary and two difficult years of war, which made it possible to deeply understand the internal state structure of the German ally, is now embarking on the path leading to the "state of nationalities", then it probably recognized the Hapsburg system as more responsive general tasks of the modern state (6).
Nevertheless, Berlin's course remains unchanged - towards the active Germanization of Polish territories. G. Kleinov, a very authoritative expert on the Polish question, was immediately answered sharply by the "Reinisch-Westfälische Zeitung", the organ of heavy industry, which pointed out that the "Austrian principle of the" state of nationalities "is completely incompatible with the development of the German national state, to which Germany owes that power that she showed in a real war. " Therefore, the newspaper strongly rebelled against the granting of greater national independence to the Prussian Poles. With quotations from the Austro-Hungarian press, she argued that the Poles still claimed Poznan, Silesia and Danzig. This argumentation found the most lively response in the next meeting of the Prussian Landtag.
Franz Joseph categorically dismissed all the projects regarding the "third", that is, the Polish throne for the suzerain of the dual monarchy, both in 1863 and already during the World War. True, then the Germans already felt themselves to be the real masters not only in Russian, but also in Austrian Poland. Even the rough division of the occupied lands into the Warsaw (German) and Lublin (Austro-Hungarian) governorships did not affect the situation at all - the Prussian and Pomeranian regiments will surprisingly quickly replace the Magyars and Czechs near Lublin, as, indeed, in Krakow.
Let us remind you that Bernhard von Bülow, who had been dismissed shortly before by Wilhelm II, was well aware of what such a policy would ultimately lead to. The ex-chancellor did not hide his fears about Poland - not as a potential ally of Russia (very few people in Germany believed in this at all), but as a newly-minted "mercenary of France" (7). The supreme Prussian government openly ignored the point of view of the retired chancellor, but this did not change the essence of the matter - the German Empire was unable to digest the puppet Kingdom of Poland, even together with the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
However, not only the retired chancellor was in opposition on the Polish topic. The negative assessment was reflected in the unexpectedly harsh press speeches. Thus, the agrarian Vorwärts, as well as Vossische Zeitung and Deutsche Tageszeitung, expressed their dissatisfaction with the haste with which the Kaiser's authorities "solved" the Polish question:
The Polish manifesto is formally the implementation of one of the most important goals of the war, but the opinion of the people was not reflected. Although the government has repeatedly stated that the people will have the opportunity to freely express themselves about the goals of the war in a timely manner, but on the very first and, moreover, such an important issue, it did not keep its promise. We must therefore strongly reiterate the demand for freedom of discussion about the goals of war (8).
Notes (edit)
1. State Duma. Fourth convocation. Session 5. Verbatim Report, Sessions 1-25. Pg, 1916-1917
2. "Russkiye vedomosti", St. Petersburg, October 24, 1916
3. Yu. Klyuchnikov and A. Sabanin, Contemporary International Policy in Treaties, Notes and Declarations, M. 1926, Part II, pp. 56-57.
4. O. Chernin, During the World War. Memoirs of the Former Austrian Foreign Minister. M-Pg, Giz, 1923, p. 219.
5. Former Petrograd correspondent for the Vossische Zeitung, author of a large work on the Poles, during the war years - a German censor in occupied Warsaw.
6. Kölnische Zeitung, 11 November 1916.
7. B. von Bülow, Memoirs, M., 1935, p. 488.
8. Vorwärts, November 8, 1916; Vossische Zeitung, November 8, 1916; Deutsche Tageszeitung, 9 November 1916.
