The other day Warsaw, having essentially kept silent about Kerch, once again voiced threats against the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Something similar happened in the late 1930s, especially at the end of that decade. Then a lot in Poland changed with the death of the long-term leader of the country and nation, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, who preferred not to even hold the official post of president.
An ardent Russophobe who was once a companion of the Russian revolutionaries, "Pan Józef" in his old age was not at all opposed to one way or another to agree on many issues with the Soviets. Most likely, by the end of his reign, the marshal understood that the "alliance" with Berlin or with London and Paris against Moscow and the constant Polish-Soviet confrontation could well return to the reconstituted Poland like a boomerang. And even lead it to a repetition of a tragic fate at the end of the 18th century.
However, Mark Aldanov, even during the lifetime of the head of the Polish state, wrote that "in Marshal Pilsudski there are simultaneously the most different, seemingly incompatible moods." But his much less authoritative comrades-in-arms, having buried the dictator, seemed to have broken off the chain and openly competed in anti-Soviet rhetoric. The actual epilogue of that campaign was the statement of Marshal E. Rydz-Smigla (1886-1941), commander-in-chief of the Polish army since 1936, made literally on the eve of the war with Germany. Then, in response to the proposal of the Soviet People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov on the supply of military materials to Poland, made on August 26, 1939, the Polish marshal said: "If we lose our freedom with the Germans, then with the Russians we lose our soul." Is it worth reminding how it ended for the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth?
But did the indefinite strategic interests of Poland and the USSR-Russia, the issues of ensuring their security, diverge and diverge now? It is not out of place, in this regard, to recall that at the end of the 1920s - the first half of the 1930s, trade, cultural, scientific ties between Poland and the USSR quickly began to grow. The traditional Polish business-like attitude has taken its toll - you have won back, and you can trade. During that period, a non-aggression pact was signed; Soviet-Polish trade almost doubled. Moreover, the intelligence services of the USSR and Poland conducted about 10 successful joint operations against Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) in the southern and southeastern sections of the mutual border (on both sides of the border in the Kamenets-Podolsk region). It is clear that the highest ranks of modern Poland, with their obligatory support from the Independent, do not remember this, even when it is required to slightly besiege the presumptuous Maidan politicians.
Documents show that the same OUN since the beginning of the 1930s "oversaw" not only Berlin: its representatives of various levels have long been in contact with British, French, and Italian intelligence services. In addition, the OUN members, from about 1934-35, were also supported by neighboring Czechoslovakia and pro-German Hungary. Clement Gottwald wrote about this in great detail in his work "Two-faced Beneš", published in 1951 in Prague, including in Russian. The ambassador in London, and then the Polish president in exile, already in the 80s, Edward Raczynski, wrote about the same: E. Raczyński, “W sojuszniczym Londynie. Dziennik ambasadora Edwarda Raczyńskiego: 1939-1945; Londyn, 1960.
Today he is even quoted by the Ukrainian press. In the system of coordinates that developed in those years, the threat of Poland's disintegration was quite real. The aging Polish leader Piłsudski could not leave calm with Hitler's famous interview with the London Sunday Express on February 12, 1933, where the new German chancellor did not even try to hide his plans: “… The Polish“corridor”(the territory of Poland between East Prussia and the main part of Germany in 1919 -1939 - Author's note) is hated by all Germans, it must be returned to Germany. There is nothing more disgusting for the Germans than the current Polish-German border, the question of which must soon be resolved. In order to confront Germany, Pilsudski, as a true pragmatist, was ready to accept help not only from old allies, but also from old enemies such as Soviet Russia.
But practically all the encouraging strategic tendencies in relations between Warsaw and Moscow were soon interrupted by Pilsudski's "heirs", who with enviable ease were guided either by London or Paris or by Berlin. But not to Moscow. But at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s, the Soviet side was inclined towards a long-term dialogue with Poland. Judging by the real deeds, even before the National Socialists came to power in Germany, the peaceful nature of relations with the USSR was also included in the plans of the Polish leadership. In principle, having a very long joint border passing near large industrial centers and transport hubs, the two countries should have been interested in long-term cooperation in one way or another. However, the heirs of Pilsudski tried to look at the matter in a completely different way.
But back to the early 30s. On August 30, 1931 I. V. Stalin sent a letter to L. M. Kaganovich: “… why do you not report anything about the Polish draft pact (on non-aggression), handed over by Patek (the then Polish ambassador to Moscow) to Litvinov? This is a very important matter, almost decisive (for the next 2-3 years) - the question of peace with Warsaw. And I am afraid that Litvinov, succumbing to the pressure of the so-called public opinion, will reduce him to an "empty shell". Pay serious attention to this matter. It would be funny if we succumbed in this matter to the general bourgeois fad of "anti-Polonism", forgetting at least for a minute about the fundamental interests of the revolution and socialist construction "(Stalin and Kaganovich. Correspondence. 1931-1936. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001. Pp. 71-73; RGASPI, fund 81. Op. 3. Case 99. sheet 12-14. Autograph).
Soon, on September 7, in a new letter to Kaganovich, Stalin accused L. M. Karakhan (then Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR) and M. M. Litvinov, that they "… made a gross mistake in relation to the pact with the Poles, the liquidation of which will take more or less time." And already on September 20, the Politburo, duplicating this opinion of Stalin, made a final decision: to seek the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Poland. This document was signed in 1932.
Similar peaceful tendencies were manifested on the Polish side as well. So, on behalf of Pilsudski, the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, Jozef Beck, on March 27, 1932, invited the USSR Ambassador to Poland V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko for a conversation. Beck expressed concern about the growing xenophobia in Germany; asked about the construction of the Dneproges, Stalingrad Tractor, "Magnitka". The interlocutors also spoke about the Russian and Polish participants in the 1905-1907 revolution.
The visit of the representative of Piłsudski on special assignments, Bohuslav Medziński, to Moscow in 1932 was of a similar nature. Particularly impressive is the transcript of his conversation with Stalin, who eventually made a unique gesture: he not only invited Medzinsky to the May Day parade: the Polish guest was given a place on the festive platform near Lenin's mausoleum. A little later, already in 1934, Stalin noted that “caught between two fires (Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union) Yu. Pilsudski wanted to get out of this situation through the Polish-Soviet rapprochement. And it remains in the interests of the USSR as well”.
The Polish dictator, contrary to the expectations of his subordinates, did not even try to prevent Polish entrepreneurs from coming closer to the Soviets. At the end of the first Soviet five-year plan, a number of mutually beneficial Polish-Soviet agreements on the development of trade were concluded. They promptly agreed not only on the rafting of timber along the Neman, but also on the transfer to Warsaw of most of the Polish archives that were in the USSR. Also, documents of scientific exchange were signed, about the tours of Polish artists in the USSR and Soviet in Poland. Plus, in August 1934, the USSR naval delegation for the first time paid a friendly visit to the port of Gdynia (the only Polish port on the Baltic).
And at the end of January 1935 Yu. Pilsudski, despite the fact that he was seriously ill, invited Hermann Goering, the then Nazi No. 2, to hunt. however, he received a clear answer from him: "Poland is interested in peaceful relations with the USSR, with which it has a common border of a thousand kilometers." Goering was taken aback, but in conversations with Pilsudski he never returned to this topic.
In this sense, the statement of the USSR plenipotentiary mission in Poland on Polish-Soviet relations dated November 5, 1933 is very indicative:
“Further improvement of relations has created an environment favorable for the conclusion of treaties and agreements: an agreement on the border status, a floating convention, an agreement on the procedure for investigating and resolving border conflicts. A number of steps were taken along the line of cultural mutual rapprochement; there were three of our exhibitions in Poland; Soviet delegations of historians, ethnographers and doctors received a friendly welcome in Poland.
For the near future, Poland's policy will be in "balancing" between East and West. But continuing the line of rapprochement with us, Poland will continue to strive not to tie its hands."
After the death of J. Piłsudski (in May 1935), Polish-Soviet relations, in contrast to Polish-German relations, began to deteriorate again. Among other things, and because of the Polish participation in the partition of Czechoslovakia under the Munich Agreement. The appetites of the new Polish leaders immediately increased sharply, and they were already developing plans for a military invasion of Lithuania, which had not come to terms with the loss of Vilnius back in 1920. The USSR then stood up for the small Baltic republic, which subsequently greatly facilitated the process of its accession to the Union.
Almost simultaneously with this, the now carefully hushed-up rejection of Memel from Lithuania - present-day Klaipeda - was carried out in cold blood by Germany in March 1939. It is significant that in Poland it did not provoke a negative reaction, although, incidentally, the Western press, following the example of politicians, expressed its irritation for a very, very short time. But, perhaps more importantly, the top Polish leadership clearly underestimated the future consequences of Germany's unilateral denunciation of the German-Polish non-aggression pact (1934) on April 28, 1939. Unfortunately, in Warsaw, as it is obvious, and in Moscow, by the end of the 30s they made a serious mistake when they openly “surrendered” to the possibilities of developing peaceful relations with Germany. And they chose not to pay due attention to the aggressive, chauvinistic plans and concrete actions of the Nazis. It is characteristic that Soviet-Polish relations themselves fell into this "trap" skillfully created by Berlin.
But the German "Drang nach Osten" made practically no distinctions between Poland and Russia. It is no coincidence, under the cover of diplomatic flair, Germany immediately after the death of Pilsudski sharply intensified work with the Western Ukrainian nationalist underground in Poland. And subsequently, in September 39, it not only carried out a series of terrorist attacks, but also struck in the rear of the Polish troops. Including during the evacuation of the defeated Polish troops and civilians to Romania."Defensiva" could not oppose anything to this, since her cooperation with the NKVD against the OUN had ceased since 1937.
Let us take the liberty of concluding that the ruling circles of both Poland and the USSR, after the death of Yu. Pilsudski, apparently lacked understanding of the situation and the desire to rise above momentary mutual sympathies and antipathies. In any case, the constant concessions that were made to Germany on various issues by the USSR and Poland, in fact, on the verge of world war, could not but strengthen the influence of Berlin in Eastern Europe. We quite reasonably never cease to criticize Britain and France for such "peacekeeping", although, trying to ward off the Nazi threat from ourselves, alas, we are not far from them in our foreign policy.
According to many experts, both the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and even September 1, 1939 could have been prevented if Warsaw and Moscow set their sights on, albeit forced, but closer military-political cooperation with each other in anticipation of the already real German threat. Moreover, according to a number of assessments, the "pragmatic" defense pact of the USSR and Poland (in addition to their non-aggression pact) would well have made it possible to blockade German troops in East Prussia and strengthen the defenses of Gdansk (Danzig) - a "free city" before German aggression against Poland.
Naturally, the September 1939 Polish disaster was most strongly influenced by the policy of Great Britain and France in the course of military-political negotiations with the USSR, just as strange as the subsequent “strange war”. The British and French ruling circles deliberately delayed these negotiations, limiting themselves only to confirming the notorious guarantees to Poland. But London and Paris did not specify how these guarantees would be concretely implemented. Today it is well known that the delegations of our future allies did not even have the authority to sign a military agreement with the USSR, but the "strange war" only confirmed that London and Paris had deliberately "surrendered" Poland.
