Non-nuclear submarines of project 877 "Varshavyanka" and its development - 636 are an unconditional brand of modern domestic shipbuilding. The project, created in the 70s of the last century, is still in demand. For a number of reasons (about them below), its planned replacement with a new project 677 (Amur) has not yet taken place, and it makes great sense to pay tribute to the worthy project and its creators, but also to assess the strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities of modern domestic nuclear submarines.
The submarine of project 877 was planned by the USSR Navy for mass serial construction (more than 80 units) and export supplies. In this regard, along with high requirements for the combat qualities of the new submarine, there were also requirements for simplifying the construction and operation of submarines. This largely shaped the look of the 877 project, both with its merits and demerits.
In the early to mid-70s, in the USSR Navy, the first place in the priority of NNS missions was the fight against enemy submarines, primarily to ensure the deployment of nuclear submarines and cover the areas of SSBN patrolling. For this reason, in the 877 project, strict requirements were imposed on ensuring a very low level of physical fields (and in some cases using already mastered equipment and means of the previous generation, which made it difficult to fulfill these requirements).
This task was brilliantly solved by the developer - Central Design Bureau "Rubin" and the Chief Designer of the 877 project Yu. N. Kormilitsyn. Another solution largely determined the appearance of the entire project - the use of the MGK-400 "Rubicon" SJSC with a large-sized bow antenna for noise direction finding. We can say that the submarine was designed "around" the SAC and its main antenna. For the analog complex "Rubicon" had a high detection potential, was performed at a very good technical level for the early 70s, and provided in the 80s a significant lead in detecting submarines "opponents" of our Project 877 submarine. However, there was also a "flip side of the coin". It should be noted that along with the Rubicon SJSC in the late 60s, other SJSCs were also being developed, incl. which had developed onboard detection antennas. However, the Rubicon was chosen for serial production, which was developed as a unified SAC for non-nuclear submarines and nuclear submarines of a number of projects (670M, 667BDR, 675M, etc.).
From the standpoint of today, such unification was a mistake. The main reason for the rejection of the use of advanced onboard antennas for most domestic nuclear submarines was the high level of interference, a problem that was largely resolved only on the 3rd generation of nuclear submarines.
Therefore, the main direction of the development of antennas for the submarine submarines was the implementation of the largest nose antenna for noise direction finding (which had the lowest level of interference), in connection with this, onboard and towed antennas (which played a very important role on western submarines) were practically not used in our country.
Project 877 non-nuclear submarine (NNS) "Varshavyanka"
Source:
Project 877 non-nuclear submarine (NNS) "Varshavyanka"
Source:
Project 877 non-nuclear submarine (NNS) "Varshavyanka"
Source:
The large dimensions of the antenna of the SJSC "Rubicon" largely determined the size and displacement of the project 877 submarine. At the same time, the displacement of the new submarine turned out to be close to the submarine of project 641, which had a significantly larger ammunition load and the number of torpedo tubes (TA). Their reduction was supposed to compensate for the rapid-loading device for the TA and the torpedo telecontrol complex, and the installation of the small-sized BIUS MVU-110 "Uzel" was to increase the success of torpedo attacks. The ammunition load included TEST-71M remote-controlled electric anti-submarine torpedoes, 53-65K oxygen anti-ship torpedoes, with the provision of receiving all previous types of torpedoes (except for peroxide) - 53-56V, SET-53M, SET-65, SAET-60M, mines and multi-purpose self-propelled hydroacoustic counteraction devices (GPD) MG-74, caliber 53cm. A promising USET-80 torpedo with mechanical data input and body control was planned.
For setting the means of GPA - GPD devices MG-34 and GIP-1, two VIPS devices were used.
877 project had a "standard set" of communications, radar, radio and electronic intelligence. However, the "economy" seems to be unjustified - the refusal to install a satellite navigation system. Operating in various regions of the World Ocean, in a number of cases our NNSs had significant errors in determining the location, and not so much because of navigators' mistakes, but for objective reasons of the impossibility of accurately determining the location with the available means in real conditions. The problem existed and significantly influenced the effectiveness of the actions of the naval forces in both remote and some "near" areas of the sea.
In addition, one of the serious shortcomings of the communications and control facilities of the NNS of the USSR Navy was the lack of standard means of transmitting information from depth in the HF range. The MRB buoys used with VIPS had only the VHF range and a limited communication range.
When assessing the combat capabilities of the project 877 submarine, at the time of creation, it should be noted:
Very low noise level and great potential of the analogue SAC "Rubicon" ensured anticipation in the detection of submarines of the "potential enemy" in most tactical situations.
A big disadvantage of the Rubicon SJC was the lack of on-board antennas (and the ability to develop a distance to targets in a passive mode without performing special maneuvering) and the absence of a flexible extended antenna (GPBA). The latter is probably due to the large dimensions of the sampling device (ADD) of such antennas, which made it difficult to use them on non-submarine submarines. The Navy did not have the courage to go for the solution implemented on many western non-nuclear submarines - the permanent fastening of the GPBA with a "clip" before going to sea (ie without the UPV). At the same time, the presence of a GBPA is extremely important specifically for non-submarine submarines (diesel-electric submarines), especially for ensuring the safety of non-submarines when charging batteries, when, due to high levels of interference, the efficiency of conventional HAS sharply decreases.
The excellent GAS mine detection (GAS MI) MG-519 "Arfa-M" not only provided a high-quality solution to this problem, but also was a significant help in ensuring the navigational safety of navigation, increasing the capabilities of the Project 877 submarine in battle with enemy submarines or surface ships (NK) (due to the confident classification of the GPA means, the possibility of telecontrol according to the data of the high-precision and noise-immune GAS MI). When performing torpedo firing "Arfa" successfully "saw" even torpedoes.
Having a lead in detecting enemy submarines (and, accordingly, the use of weapons), the 877 project had simple and reliable torpedoes TEST-71M in ammunition, the capabilities of which, however, were significantly limited by the outdated telecontrol system (which provided the TU of only one torpedo in a salvo, and its control only in a horizontal plane).
The "anti-ship capabilities" of the non-submarine were determined by the number of TA in which there were 53-65K autonomous torpedoes, the capabilities of the quick-loading device to reload the TA and the performance characteristics of the 53-65K torpedo itself. At the same time, it should be emphasized that the high reliability and absolute resistance to the GPA means of the homing system (HSS) along the wake of the 53-65K torpedo simultaneously limited its effective salvo distances (less than 9 km with a total cruising range of 19 km). For a significant increase in salvo distances, a telecontrol system was needed, but the initiative of the torpedo developer to introduce a telecontrol system on it (in the mid-80s) did not arouse the interest of the Navy. As a result, in terms of "anti-ship potential" 877, the project was noticeably inferior to the previous nuclear submarines of project 641 (which had a larger number of TA, and the same torpedoes).
The means of protection (counteraction) of the non-nuclear submarines of project 877 were initially insufficient, and this became one of the most serious shortcomings of project 877. The developer (CDB "Rubin") could not influence this situation in the design process - the requirements and nomenclature of these means were determined by the Navy, and the leading organization for the complexes of underwater weapons and countermeasures was the SKBM "Malakhit". This also includes the absence in the ammunition of the USSR Navy submarines of means of suppressing radio lines "radio-sonar buoy - aircraft", despite the extreme danger for the submarine of the Navy from enemy anti-submarine aircraft. The effectiveness of MG-34M and GIP-1 (put into service in 1968) was already low in the 80s. The MG-74 self-propelled device had a number of shortcomings, and most importantly, it required the abandonment of part of the ammunition (which had already decreased from the 641 project). However, measures to resolve this situation were not taken by the Navy, despite a number of excellent developments - both in industry and in the fleets (one of the examples of the latter is the onboard GPE complex developed and manufactured on an initiative basis and installed on board the submarine S- 37 of the Black Sea Fleet (Commander 2nd Rank Captain Proskurin) In the course of numerous exercises, the S-37 received the nickname "invisible" and was not hit by a single torpedo (all were diverted by the GPD onboard complex).
The significant displacement of the Project 877 submarine significantly limited the possibility of its use in shallow water areas, therefore, the USSR Navy used them mainly in oceanic areas and areas with great depths.
The constructive simplicity and availability of the project 877 submarine ensured quick and high-quality mastering by the crews, and the full disclosure of their capabilities in the process of use.
In 1985, export deliveries of Project 877 submarines began for the Indian Navy (and a number of other countries). It is of interest to compare "direct competitors" - our project 877EKM submarine, and the German project 209/1500 submarine in the Indian Navy. "Varshavyanka" demonstrated high secrecy and significant lead in detecting the "German". In the book "Jump of a whale" (about the creation of the BIUS "Knot"), an eyewitness testimony is given - a representative of the service brigade S. V. Colon: th project, I guess that just to assess their capabilities. It was in the waters of the Arabian Sea. Our lieutenant, a Hindu serving the "Knot", who was at the commander's console, after this battle, in joyful excitement, with a gleam in his eyes, told me: "They did not even notice us, and were sunk."
Non-nuclear submarine of project 877EKM
Source:
When comparing the weapon systems of our NNS and the German one, it is necessary to note the large effective firing distances of the "German", which is a consequence of the significantly more advanced remote control system of western torpedoes, which, however, with the available detection and target designation means, could not be realized in the real conditions of the Arabian Sea. At the same time, the high reliability and simplicity of the weapon and the submarine of Project 877EKM itself ensured their rapid development by the crews and their use at the "maximum capabilities".
Development of project 877
During the construction of the NNS series of project 877, the developer carried out a serious modernization of the project, which in "summary form" resulted in a deep modernization of the 877 project - project 636. The main directions of modernization were:
further increase in the secrecy of non-submarine submarines (by reducing the levels of underwater noise (USS), “coefficient
violation of stealth”(the ratio of the battery charging time to the time spent at sea), and in the future - the introduction of increased capacity lithium-polymer batteries);
improvement of radio electronic means (RES);
improvement of weapons and countermeasures.
The core of the modernization of the RES was the deep modernization of the Rubicon State Joint Stock Company, carried out at a very high quality and modern technical level. At the same time SJSC MGK-400EM represents "basic solutions" that ensure the implementation of a wide range of SJSC submarines (from the "minimum", "dimension of SAS MG-10M" - MGK-400EM-01 to "maximum" - SJSC "Irbis" MGK-400EM- 03 nuclear submarine "Chakra", and modifications MGK-400EM for non-nuclear submarine with GPBA).
However, it is necessary to note the shortcomings "inherited" from the construct of the old SJSC "Rubicon":
limited sector of the sonar subsystem;
lack of on-board antennas (passive ranging mode);
unreasonable limitation of the scale of the excellent modernized GAS MI "Arfa" (in fact, it "sees" much further;
low accuracy of the OGS subsystem in the range of operation of the CLS torpedoes (definition of only the sector - the quadrant).
At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize once again the worthy technical level of SJSC MGK-400EM (including the GPBA subsystem), highly appreciated by foreign customers, when working on low-noise targets in difficult conditions. The aforementioned shortcomings can and should be eliminated in a short time during the modernization of the SAC, with the provision of a sharp increase in the combat capabilities of the SAC and submarines.
In addition to the GAK, during the modernization of the 636 project, a modern radar complex (RLK), new means of radio and electronic reconnaissance, communication and control (BIUS "Lama"), and a periscope complex were installed. For the modernized Indian submarines of project 877EKM, RES of Indian and Western production (including SJSC and GPBA) were introduced.
The key element in the modernization of the Project 636 weapons complex was the introduction of the CLAB missile weapon system with the 3M14E KR and 3M54E1 anti-ship missiles. The people who created CLAB have accomplished practically a feat - in the most difficult conditions of the 90s, they managed to “break through” the project through a lot of bureaucratic barriers and implement it. Taking into account the problems with torpedo weapons, this practically saved our submarine building in the 90s and early 2000s.
PKR 3M54E1
Source:
After the collapse of the USSR, there was a crisis situation with the release of torpedoes for export non-nuclear submarines of project 877EKM. The torpedo 53-65KE was produced by the Machine-Building Plant. Kirov, Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan. The TEST-71ME torpedo had an imported (Ukrainian) battery, and most importantly, it was purely anti-submarine. The attempt of the Dvigatel plant to create on its basis a universal torpedo (with the installation of an SSN on the wake) was unsuccessful due to the clearly insufficient performance characteristics. Therefore, for the implementation of the Chinese contract, an export modification of the USET-80 torpedo with mechanical data input was created - the UETT remote-controlled torpedo. Later UETT became TE2 (localized version for the Dvigatel plant). At the same time, the development of a remote-controlled torpedo UGST with a unitary fuel power plant, which had high performance characteristics and a perfect SSN, was carried out.
Universal deep-sea homing torpedo (UGST) "Physicist"
Source:
However, the state of torpedo weapons is one of the main problems of domestic non-nuclear submarines, primarily due to the shortcomings of the domestic TU system.
As noted above, the shortcomings of countermeasures (MG-74, MG-34M, GIP-1) were one of the most serious shortcomings of the 877 project. To replace the MG-34M drifting device, ZAO Aquamarine developed an excellent, for that time drifting anti-torpedo protection device Vist-E.
Drifting anti-torpedo protection device "Vist-E"
Source:
In the mid-2000s, a serious modernization of the MG-74 self-propelled device was carried out - in fact, the development of a new MG-74M device, made at a modern level. Self-propelled device MG-74M was developed in versions with mechanical and electronic data entry.
Self-propelled device MG-74M
Source:
However, by this time, some foreign customers began to focus on other countermeasures, in particular, the C-303S complex from WASS.
Complex C-303S by WASS
Source:
When evaluating these GPA means, both the S-303S complex and the Vist-E, it is necessary to note their limited effectiveness against the latest torpedoes.
The transition to ultra-wideband torpedo launchers sharply reduced the effectiveness of the existing countermeasures (including systems of the S-303 type), raising the question of the fundamental possibility of effectively countering such CLOs by means of GPA.
The answer was active countermeasures (anti-torpedoes) and the development of a new generation of anti-torpedo protection AGPD (PTZ), the main features of which were:
ensuring massive use in a minimum time;
a sharp increase in the energy potential of broadband interference;
high sensitivity and adaptability to noise-signaling environment.
The implementation of the new requirements for the SGPD by means of the S-303S complex cannot be fulfilled due to the small mass-dimensional characteristics of these means. Obviously, it is necessary to switch to an increased caliber (approximately 200-220mm) to increase the energy of the devices and implement adaptability to the noise-signaling environment.
At the moment, the development of such SGPDs has not been completed in any country; today, in submarine warfare, "means of attack" (SSN torpedoes) are clearly ahead of "means of defense" (SGPD PTZ). In these conditions, anti-torpedoes will play a very important role.
Non-nuclear submarine of project 677 (project "Amur").
As already noted above, the main factor that influenced the appearance of the Project 877 submarine was the size of the main antenna of the Rubicon SJSC. At the same time, the USSR Navy included a large number of medium-displacement non-nuclear submarines of projects 613, and its development was an extremely successful project 633. The problems of domestic hydroacoustics of the USSR in the 70s ruled out the creation of an effective medium-displacement non-nuclear submarine to replace projects 613 and 633, precisely because of the absence of a compact HAC with high search potential. The scientific and technical groundwork necessary for this was obtained only in the late 80s, and the creation of the medium-displacement submarine of Project 677 ("Amur") fell on the most difficult years for our defense industry and shipbuilding.
The non-nuclear submarine of project 677 was first presented at IMDS-2005, but its fine-tuning dragged on for many years.
Description of all the twists and turns of 677 is not the topic of this article (especially since there will be a lot of things to write about soon), however, according to the author, the key problem in the implementation of this project in the 1990s - 2000s was haste and unreasonable hopes for “implementation new design technologies without their verification and full testing in bench conditions. As a result, all the existing problems were “stuffed into a solid hull”, and they had to be solved literally through the “narrow neck of the conning tower”. Probably, if the customer had not rushed so much with the deadlines (for example, he would have reasonably shifted them by 3-4 years in the early 2000s) Project 677 submarines in the Navy would have already gone into combat service and exported.
Non-nuclear submarine of the fourth generation of the Amur 1650 class
Source:
The lesson was cruel, but conclusions were drawn from it. Today, when the serial construction of the Project 677 submarine has been resumed, the question arises in society - will the “units” of this project under construction repeat the fate of the head submarine? We can confidently say that this will not happen. Not only conclusions were drawn from past mistakes, but measures were developed, implemented and actually work to ensure the successful implementation of the project. An example of this is the successful implementation of the Rubin Central Design Bureau of the most complex project to create the Bulava strategic maritime system.
With a high probability, it is possible to predict the successful implementation of the project to create a promising anaerobic power plant for non-nuclear submarines.
The main features of the project 677 submarine ("Amur"):
modern state-owned joint stock company with high search potential and new RES;
low-noise diesel-electric main power plant with a valve motor (with provision for the installation of an anaerobic plant);
extremely low noise level and new anti-hydrolocation coating;
single-body design;
reduced in comparison with NAPL
project 636 displacement, facilitating action in areas with shallow depths.
The model range of export modification 677 - "Amur" provides for a number of modifications, incl. extremely index and promising project "Amur-950" with the installation of a vertical launch (UVP) for 10 KR (anti-ship missiles), - providing a powerful simultaneous missile strike.
Submarine project "Amur-950"
Source:
Today it is difficult to predict how many Amurs will be built, and whether the success of the 877-636 project will be repeated with more than fifty submarines. However, there is no doubt that Project 677 (Amur) will be successfully implemented.
Prospects of domestic non-nuclear submarines
The main issue here is the feasibility of building "classic submarines" (diesel-electric), taking into account the widespread use of submarines with anaerobic installations in the world and the development of anti-submarine defense (ASW) means. In considering this problem, three questions are most important.
First. The use of an anaerobic installation really provides a sharp increase in the secrecy of the submarine, primarily according to the criterion of the "coefficient of violation of secrecy"), however, it provides only small strokes of the submarine and sharply increases the cost and complexity of the submarine's operation, significantly reduces its autonomy.
It is important - several options for such a power plant for domestic nuclear submarines are already "on the way".
Second. The advent of modern lithium-polymer batteries dramatically increases the underwater autonomy of diesel-electric submarines, being at the same time a much more economical solution than anaerobic power plant.
Third. The general state of the problem of "submarine versus aircraft" confrontation. The sharp increase in the capabilities of anti-submarine aircraft to detect low-noise targets in recent decades has raised the issue of the survival of submarines in the face of its opposition. Moreover, the presence of an anaerobic installation in a submarine does not ensure its safety, for example, when an anti-ship missile is fired from a submarine. The disguise of an NNS with an anti-submarine (KR) salvo while in the area of anti-submarine aviation with modern search means puts any NNS on the brink of destruction. In fact, a situation has arisen when the combat stability of a nuclear submarine in such conditions cannot be ensured solely due to its secrecy; an integrated approach is required, incl. active countermeasures for aviation (air defense missile systems), low-frequency GPA means that suppress the operation of the RGAB in the "underwater hemisphere" and means for jamming the "buoy-plane" communication lines in the "surface" one.
It should be emphasized that today no foreign submarine has such means (with the required level of efficiency). The effectiveness of the submarine air defense system of the IDAS type (Germany) and A3SM (France) is deliberately insufficient, and it cannot provide effective protection of the submarine. Without going into details, it should be noted that in Russia there is the necessary groundwork and scientific and technical potential for the creation of such non-nuclear submarines, with a high (necessary) level of efficiency.
It is important to note that the presence of an effective air defense missile system for non-submarine submarines is probably a more effective and simple solution for non-submarine submarines than an anaerobic installation (provided that lithium-polymer batteries are used), but it also provides the possibility of effective "inclusion" of non-submarines in the "operational-tactical network" of the interspecific group in a theater of operations, increasing both its efficiency and the effectiveness and combat stability of the NNS itself (due to a sharp improvement in situational awareness and the possibility of operational communication with the command). This certainly poses additional (but real!) Requirements for onboard communications and combat control on board the non-submarine submarine.
636 "plus" and "Amur plus"
Despite the fact that today projects 636 and "Amur" look decent against the background of their competitors, it is obvious that they need to be developed and modernized in the direction of:
implementation of a complex of weapons as a high-precision complex of torpedo weapons (VKTO) similar to the western submarines;
the inclusion of such a highly effective anti-submarine missile (ASM) in the ammunition load;
implementation of an effective complex of self-defense and countermeasures, including anti-torpedoes, modern GPA (anti-torpedo protection and suppression of GAS and RGAB) with outboard multi-barreled launchers of 210mm caliber, electronic warfare means of "buoy-aircraft" radio lines;
creation of an effective air defense missile system for nuclear submarines;
introduction of lithium-polymer batteries and anaerobic power plants;
improving the secrecy of non-submarine submarines, especially against sonar means (rejection of the "direct" "glare" fencing of retractable devices, the use of modern anti-sonar coatings on the 636 project);
development of communication and control facilities ensuring the effective implementation of the VKTO concept and the "inclusion" of the submarine into the network-centric communication and control system at the theater of operations.
Of interest is the question of the expediency of the development of Project 636 after the deployment of the serial construction of the submarine of Project 677 ("Amur").
I believe that the (in) customer should first of all decide this issue. Despite the newer development period for the Amur and the lower displacement, the 636 project still has significant development prospects:
a large number of non-nuclear submarines of project 877EKM and 636 in the navies of foreign states (and the Russian Navy) sets the task of their modernization (up to the creation of a promising version of the 636 project, using new complexes and systems (including with the non-nuclear submarines of the Amur project));
the double-hull design provides for the reception of an increased fuel supply (in the Central City Hospital) and a significant increase in the cruising range, while the non-submarine submarines of large displacement with a large radius and patrol period represent a very significant segment of the non-submarine market;
the introduction of multi-barreled outboard launchers dramatically increases the combat capabilities of the nuclear submarine, and the 636 project has for this significant volumes of a light hull and superstructure.
From the point of view of improving the combat qualities of non-nuclear submarines, it is obviously necessary:
Carrying out a comprehensive modernization of torpedo weapons NNS, GAK and BIUS to ensure maximum efficiency of the use of torpedoes at long distances (the introduction of fiber-optic hose telecontrol, smooth change of the travel mode (and a number of other solutions), the introduction of on-board antennas into the GAK with the implementation of passive determination of the distance by targets and ensuring coordinated processing of information from various antennas of the SAC submarine and transmitted from the side of the torpedoes). This modernization should be carried out not only in relation to new models, but also to old ones, primarily the TEST-71ME torpedoes, in a significant number of which are in the ammunition of the NNS of the 877EKM project.
Introduction to the ammunition load of submarines of PLR as a means of ensuring the defeat of enemy submarines in the shortest possible time. This also requires expanding the capabilities of the sonar subsystem of the SAC.
Equipping non-submarines with new countermeasures (air defense missile systems, GPD, electronic warfare "buoy-plane", anti-torpedoes.
It is necessary to dwell on the issue of the use of anti-torpedoes. Russia has a significant priority in the creation of active anti-torpedo protection, and today the anti-torpedo of the Packet-E / NK complex provides the highest probability of hitting an attacking torpedo among its competitors. The introduction of the anti-torpedo (AT) complex "Package-E / NK" on the NNS of projects 636 and "Amur" dramatically increases the effectiveness of their anti-torpedo protection and export potential.
[center] Antitorpeda (AT) complex "Package-E / NK"
Source:
[/center]
It should be understood that the installation of anti-torpedoes requires the use of special high-precision target designation means. The use of the standard GAS CU of the Package-E / NK complex is impractical due to the limited field of view.to ensure the effective use of the AT and the NNS board, a special SAC TSU with a maximally "spherical" viewing area is needed, similar to the SAS with a spherical antenna developed by Okeanpribor OJSC within the framework of the "Echo Search" theme.
GAS with spherical antenna theme "Echo search".
Source:
Equipping Project 636 and Amur submarines with anti-torpedoes dramatically increases their export attractiveness, and comprehensive modernization - a multiple increase in combat potential and ensuring compliance with the promising requirements for non-submarines while ensuring superiority over foreign submarines.
