The Caucasus is an unusually complex region. He was, is and will be. An extraordinary number of peoples and sub-ethnic groups, which within themselves were divided into clans, societies and rural communities, are permeated with many relationships and at the same time are unusually isolated. Chechen, Dagestan and Ingush tukhums and teips (large families, clan associations, etc.), Avar tlibils, Dargin djines and Lezghins' khikhils - all competed with each other using cold weapons, and later also firearms. Apart from large state formations in the form of many principalities, khanates and others. Competition consisted of regular raids and raids with the capture of livestock, property, and the people themselves. Sometimes such actions were not supported by the entire community, or they threatened a major military conflict, in which neither the robbed nor the robbers were interested.
Classic adat, i.e. the complex of traditionally established local legal and social institutions, which could be radically different for different peoples and individual communities, did not work in the conflict between two clans, societies and entire khanates or principalities. That is why at that moment another "legal" practice appeared on the scene - baranta / baramte, which in Dagestan was called "ishkil" ("ishkilia").
Ishkil (baranta) as it is
In the most general sense, ishkil is the seizure of the property of the relatives or fellow villagers of the debtor in order to force him to pay the delayed debt or to induce the defendant to satisfy the plaintiff with the performance of another kind of obligations. So, in the lands of Dagestan, it was the primordial right of the plaintiff to attack the defendant's fellow villagers and seize their property or themselves, in order to force the defendant to pay the overdue debt. At the same time, there was some difference between Ishkil and Baranta. When ishkil began to be abused, in fact this practice turned into a legalized form of racketeering or a kind of declaration of war.
However, in conditions of constant civil strife, it was almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. For example, if one society wanted to gain independence from a powerful neighbor to whom it paid tribute, then it took ishkil from him in the form of cattle or hostages, thus putting political pressure on the enemy and giving a hint to the allies. A strong neighbor could either return Ishkil by force and conduct a military expedition, or, assessing the risks and the situation with a hostile environment, abandon this idea with certain political losses. There could also be a reverse situation, when, instead of the tribute, they took Ishkil in order to force the conquered to come to terms with their fate.
Usually, ishkil was taken to compensate for losses on overdue debt obligations and because of cases of thieves' raids that caused harm to the plaintiff. There were, of course, and private, so to speak, everyday cases of the application of this practice. So, it was used in property disputes between spouses from different villages belonging to different tukhums, but this was rare, because it was strictly forbidden to marry a stranger in many clans. Ishkil could also be taken for the destruction of the pastures of one aul with cattle from the aul of another. The war for grazing areas is generally a separate page in the Caucasus conflicts, which is relevant even now, by the way.
Ishkil itself was taken with cattle or weapons, but they did not disdain to take hostages-amanats, who were sold into slavery in case of non-payment of the debt. At the same time, the practice of Ishkil could be prohibited within the free society itself, but approved by it on the external circuit. Thus, the Andalal Free Society (a society in the mountainous part of Dagestan, inhabited by Avars), in which the collection of ishkil on its territory was prohibited under the threat of a fine in the amount of a bull, the same fine punished a person who tried to interfere with such "justice" already outside the territory of Andalal.
Ishkil collection procedure
The procedure for collecting ishkil was as follows. The injured party summoned the “defendant” to the court of their own or neutral community. If the defendant did not appear in court, then he was sent a letter with a direct warning about the right to use the rant. The letter was usually taken by the kunak of the injured party, who traditionally had full rights to defend the interests of the victim. Kunak also had the right to seize Ishkil directly - with property or hostages.
Here is one of the many examples of such a letter from the plaintiff to the defendant from a certain Ramazan Barshamaysky to Atsi Kharakhinsky:
“Peace be upon you, mercy and blessings of Allah. May Allah protect you from satanic malice. Amen.
With the receipt of this letter, there was a debt lent to you according to your agreement and known to my kunak Utsisai, the bearer of this letter. Otherwise I will take Ishkil through him, as it is allowed to take. The rest you will hear from the mouth of the bearer of this letter."
If the defendant showed a fair amount of belligerence and obstinacy, then Ishkil was forcibly confiscated. So, the kunak, and more often the plaintiff himself with a group of fighters, stopped on a mountain road that led from the defendant's village. Considering that the villages were single communities, consisting of two or four clans, there was no need to have great selectivity - ishkil was imposed on everyone en masse on absolutely legal grounds. Almost the very first wagon train was attacked and took property or hostages. However, it was necessary to attack openly and in broad daylight, because it was not a robbery prohibited by adat, but a "legitimate" form of "justice".
Naturally, such a legal norm was firmly tied to practical hostilities and sometimes not only did not resolve conflicts, but only exacerbated them. Here is an example of another letter from which it becomes clear that a clash is brewing between two large societies:
“The noble lord ruler Eldar-khan-bek wishes the members of the village court, foremen, hajji and qadi of the town of Argvani (the Avar community in the north of Nagorno-Dagestan) peace, mercy and blessings from Allah Almighty.
May Allah Almighty protect them from all troubles!
Let it be known to you that we captured an inviolable letter submitter from your fellow villagers to Ishkil so that he could intercede for the property of one of our fellow countrymen Salman, who was captured by you in Ishkil, and then released him at the request of his kunak, who was instructed to compensate for the damage caused to us. Salman demands to return the gun and saber, which you took to Ishkil. If you do not return this property, then we will take Ishkil for the second and third time, until this litigation is resolved and completed. It is within your capabilities. Be healthy!"
Ishkil - just a pretext for robbery and war?
Of course, the highlanders tried to improve the ishkil mechanism. So, there were numerous agreements between villages (societies and larger formations, up to the khanates), which regulated the rules and conditions for the mechanism of using ishkil on their territory when there was a reason for its application in practice. Such agreements were concluded both orally, in the presence of respected witnesses, and in writing.
However, Ishkil had one birth injury. Ishkil could appear as a real legal instrument for settling disputes only on one condition. The plaintiff and the defendant, whoever they were, a whole free society or an individual, had to be in an equal position. As soon as the scales deviated somewhat, ishkil turned into an excuse for usurpation of power, robbery, hostage-taking and a whole punitive operation.
At the same time, in the end, the defendant in the practice of Ishkil was this or that mountain society, i.e. these were practically interstate claims. And only a warrior could be a full-fledged member of society. This introduced special military nuances to this "legal" norm.
The nomadic peoples, who just called Ishkil baranta, used this legal practice most often not to resolve disputes, but to legitimize another predatory raid. They even had a specific term "barymtachi" ("baryntachi"), meaning the hijackers of herds, hiding behind the norm of ishkil.
They even destroyed a hint of the peacekeeping function of Ishkil and the social aspects of mountain society, or rather, their change. Over time, the importance of the nobility began to increase. The highland aristocracy levied mere mortals in ever-increasing taxes, turning them into practically powerless mob. Having many levers of pressure, including violence, the nobility began to use ishkil as a clever tool to legitimize debt slavery.
The decline of a discredited practice
The first fighters against Ishkil were Muslims who began the religious expansion of the Caucasus. For them, ishkil was a primitive barbaric practice. Sharia was to come to replace him, as well as to replace adat. But for the nobility, Ishkil was already a very profitable norm, so they could not get rid of this practice on the fly. Only on the territory of the Imamat, Ishkil retreated a little and was smoothed out by Islam.
The Russian Empire also faced the problem of Ishkil. At first, however, not wanting to destroy the foundations, the Russian authorities turned a blind eye to Ishkil, and sometimes they themselves applied this practice, as the most familiar to local residents. But the more the Russian military command got acquainted with the use of ishkil, the sooner they understood the destructive and internecine potential of this norm.
Already in the first half of the 19th century, the practice of ishkil was considered illegal arbitrariness, since in conditions of disunity and inequality it led only to robberies and robberies. As a result, this legal norm began to disappear. On the one hand, the nobility, who accepted the citizenship of Russia, necessarily vowed not to use ishkil, and on the other hand, its opponents were supporters of the imamate, which, although it was destroyed, managed to work to eliminate this norm. A lot of the disappearance of the baranta was also caused by the erasure of the boundaries between the numerous khanates, utsmiys, Maysums and principalities of the Caucasus, the isolation of which dictated the need for this legal norm.
Strange as it may seem, until the establishment of Soviet power in the Caucasus, the echoes of ishkil and sheep continued to terrorize the local population. All sorts of groups, guided by their own independent ideas, tried to cover up the banal robbery with a legitimate basis. But the old vestiges in general are capable of emerging from the darkness of centuries during the period of weakening of the central state power.
