The previous material caused the expected confusion. But conclusions at that level were, if not difficult, then clearly premature, although some commentators, as is customary in our country, made them easily and naturally. Although quite a few letters and minutes still separate us from the true disclosure of the topic and acceptable conclusions.
I am very grateful to everyone who wrote another article in the comments, especially to Alexey. Very balanced and logical.
But really, it makes sense to put everything on the shelves, trying to get answers to questions, since everything is unambiguous in our history. I understand that some would like to "fried and hot" facts right now, but alas. Everything should go on as usual, so I continue.
In the first article, we (albeit not all) were convinced that with the aircraft of new types in the spacecraft air force, everything was not as rosy as we would like and as many historians write. Indeed, why it was necessary to quadruple the number of new aircraft before the start of the war is not entirely clear. But the road will be mastered by the walking one. Especially in a country where history distortions are common.
But now we will talk about what gave the Luftwaffe a real advantage in June 1941. So far - no human factor. A separate material should be given to this component, and we will do it in the near future.
So, as of 1941-22-06 on the line of contact there were not 1540 new types of aircraft, but 377. A little less so. But also a figure, whatever one may say.
But only airplanes at airfields are half the battle. The second half was needed, namely trained and trained pilots, engineers, technicians, engine specialists (for some machines). Instrumentists, radio engineers and gunsmiths, thank God, were not required, but there were enough problems with the above.
Probably, it is not worth explaining in detail to our audience that the introduction of new technology into business is always associated with certain efforts. Our Air Force was no exception, and even on the eve of the war, various modifications were continuously carried out on the equipment that was already in the troops, to eliminate the identified design, production and operational shortcomings and defects.
You must admit that it is one thing to operate and test an aircraft in the ideal conditions of a factory airfield, and quite another to unpaved runways and taxiways at most of the airfields of that time.
Plus the training of the technical staff is also a very significant aspect, but the human factor, I repeat, let's put it aside for now.
In general, as if the aircraft had to go through a full cycle of tests, including in the troops, under the control of test pilots who are no longer sophisticated bison, but namely those who would then have to use the machines in combat mode.
Opinions, reviews, acts, everything had to be collected in one heap, and …
And as a result, complete instructions for the use of aircraft in a combat situation should have appeared.
By the way, these instructions are a very important moment in the further training of pilots and to facilitate their combat work.
And here you are - on June 20, 1941, an order was issued by the Air Force Research Institute, in which it was required to complete operational tests and tests for combat use both in day and in night conditions of all combat aircraft of the new type by August 1, 1941.
Based on the test results, the Air Force Research Institute planned to develop the very instructions that were to be sent to the troops.
1. According to the technique of piloting these aircraft both day and night, at all heights up to the operating ceiling of the aircraft.
2. For combat use in day and night conditions: bombing from level flight and dive, air combat at all heights up to the practical ceiling of the aircraft.
3. On the operation of the aircraft, engine, weapons and special equipment.
Clever? Clever. Especially with night flights, which by and large only a few learned from us, and night aviation was never created at all.
It is clear that the tests were not completed, since the war began. This is a very sad fact, since in reality these documents would be very useful to our pilots, who, in fact, went into battle on unfinished aircraft of a new type, without the necessary knowledge and skills for their combat use and their operation in the air.
And here's a difficult situation for you: what is worse, inferior in all respects, except for maneuver, the I-16, or the same MiG-3, from which it was generally not clear what to expect in a real battle?
It is worth again referring to Pokryshkin's memoirs, how did he start the war on the MiG-3? But that was Pokryshkin, but Golodnikov, whom I respect no less, has a story about how one commander could not open fire on an enemy plane, because he did not know the nuances of handling weapon control.
The fact that the new aircraft got into the troops did not solve the problem of confrontation at first. We note this, because the pilots did not have time to master these machines.
Plus, the Luftwaffe had another total advantage: the radio.
There are two components at once: radio communication and radar. And here it is very difficult to argue with those who say that we were very sad with this.
Fighters of the new types, although they had regular places for radio stations of the RSI-3 "Eagle" type, were not equipped with them. Radio transmitters were installed only on the vehicles of commanders, about one for 15 aircraft. The receivers were installed more often, but the use of Soviet radio stations was very much hampered by the lack of normal protection against interference, so that the receivers caught all the work of the engine and the electrical system of the aircraft.
But even the presence of both receivers and transmitters on our aircraft would not greatly facilitate the combat work of the pilots. It was very important to have an appropriate infrastructure on the ground that would deal with the search for enemy aircraft, the organization of air battles, coordination with ground forces and air defense, target designation and guidance.
In principle, there was only a VNOS (air surveillance, warning, communications) service, but it worked according to the principles of the First World War. There are enough memoirs for today about how the VNOS posts worked. The canvases that were laid out on the ground, indicating the direction in which the enemy planes flew, miraculously seen through binoculars, are, of course, not a masterpiece.
Plus no efficiency. Even if the VNOS post noticed German planes, even if it reported by telephone to the airfield, it was simply unrealistic to aim the planes that were already in the air. Therefore, it was necessary to raise (if any) free squadrons and aim them somewhere in the direction of the enemy. Because the VNOS posts at the beginning of the war had no connection with the aircraft.
"We flew, but did not find the enemy" (we look at Pokryshkin, he often has this, and not only him).
The lack of radio communications, normal guidance services and correcting aviation actions, the possibility of real control of aircraft in the air, lack of coordination with ground forces - this was such an advantage for the Luftwaffe that it was impossible to neutralize even thousands of new aircraft.
Indeed, what is the use of hundreds and thousands of aircraft if they could not be controlled?
It turned out to be a very ugly situation in which our pilots had to constantly catch up with the enemy, look for him, completely not receiving support from the ground in the form of information, while the Germans, having an advantage in this area, chose more advantageous positions for attack and inflicted damage.
It is difficult to blame anyone for this state of affairs. Yes, if our radio-electronic industry was not in its infancy at the beginning of the war, then in any case it was losing to the German one with a clear advantage. The factories were so weak that they simply could not meet the needs of the army and air force for radio stations. We are not even talking about the radar.
But the enemy was all right. Before the war, a commission led by Alexander Yakovlev purchased a number of samples of aviation equipment from Germany, including Bf.109E, Bf.110, Ju.88, Do.215.
It turned out that the German aircraft cannot be imagined without a radio station, a radio compass, without equipment for blind landing and a number of systems designed to make life in battle for the pilot as easy as possible.
In Germany, the radio beacon and radio direction-finding services were very well developed. Aerodrome radio stations, radio beacons, radio direction finders, light beacons, airfields equipped for night flights and flights during the day in adverse weather conditions with blind landing equipment - all were designed to serve one purpose: safe and easy flights of German pilots.
When the war began, it is clear that all this equipment was used to work at the front.
For example, during the raids on Moscow, the Germans used the radio beacons of Orsha and Warsaw. Soviet bombers flying to Berlin relied solely on the skill of the navigators and the accuracy of the numbers. With this there was a relative order, but there were cases when the planes went off course and flew somewhere in the wrong direction.
In general, I believe that the absence of a radar detection service, a radio service for aircraft control and communications in the SC Air Force, in general, created much more problems than the absence of the latest types of aircraft. Agree, it was possible to have not 10 thousand aircraft in the western direction, but 15. The effect would be only one - the more organized, "sighted" in terms of information, the German aces would knock even more, taking advantage of their advantage in the organization.
There was one more important point. Now the old-timers of the air quarters will say: well, here it is again … Yes, again. Again about the motors.
How many times have I already mentioned the eternal problem of avimotors, but motors really were the weakest link in our aircraft industry. Alas, this is true. The only justification can be considered the lack of engine building as such at the time of the start of the countdown, that is, in 1917.
This is not to say that the Germans began their journey with roses and schnapps, they were no better after the defeat in the First World War. More precisely, comparable to us. But the Germans had their great engineering school, they had potential.
And so they also started with licensed engines.
Nevertheless, when Yakovlev brought the Bf 109E fighter to the VSS Research Institute in 1940 and the institute's testers turned the Messer inside out, they had to admit that the DB 601 engine was simply excellent both in terms of performance and reliability. It was even suggested to copy it and start mass production.
The idea, let's say, was as good as the motor itself. However, our engineers, unfortunately, did not cope with the automation, which was packed with DB 601.
Proposal for the introduction into production of equipment for direct fuel injection into the engine cylinders, an automatic supercharger, an automatic afterburner to be installed on our engines. Alas, they could not. All this appeared with us, but much later than with the Germans.
However, looking ahead, I will note that when we got the first normal machine guns, the Germans were exploiting the so-called "Kommandogerat" with might and main, the central automatic control machine, which not only made it easier for the pilot to control, but did it just delightfully: one movement of the throttle lever at the same time controlled air dampers, fuel equipment, radiator shutters, ignition timing, propeller attack angle …
If the German pilot needed to fly faster and higher, he simply moved the control stick. The Soviet octopus had to move, twist, press, controlling the modes. Therefore, usually the screw was in one position, the radiator flaps were upstream, and so on.
It is not surprising that it was thanks to the automation that the DB 601 was not only more powerful than the same VK-105, but it also consumed less fuel than our motors. For one horsepower of power, when operating at a comparable mode, the DB 601 consumed less fuel than our M-105 and AM-35A, respectively, by 25, 5 and 28, 5 percent.
In general, of course, it was convenient for the Germans to fly and fight with such a set of automation. Moreover, the automation was planned during the development of the aircraft, this is how to say so, it was a standard package.
Judge for yourself by the same Ju.88:
- when opening the air brakes on Ju.88, the aircraft automatically entered the dive, while the device that limits the overloads when exiting the dive is also automatically turned on;
- when dropping bombs from a dive, the aircraft automatically exits the dive;
- when the flaps are extended for landing, the angle of the stabilizer is automatically changed and both aileron, acting as flaps, are deflected down;
- on takeoff exactly 1 minute later the engine afterburner is automatically activated;
- on climb after reaching a certain height, the 2nd speed of the blower is automatically switched on;
- the temperature regime of the motor is automatically regulated;
- the quality of the mixture and the suction pressure are automatically regulated depending on the air density (flight altitude);
- the aircraft are equipped with a directional automaton, blind landing equipment, and a radio compass.
In principle, the last four points were also valid for fighters.
What it turns out: The Bf.109E was not much better in flight performance than the same MiG-3, Yak-1 and LaGG-3. However, all this automation gave the Germans a huge advantage, incommensurate with the superiority in flight performance.
While our pilot was fighting with handles, toggle switches, levers and buttons (and you can also remember 45 turns of the landing gear knob on the I-16), the German was doing his own thing - looking for a target, the direction to which he was told by radio operators of radar and observers from the ground, chose an advantageous position and prepared for battle.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War, especially the first and part of the second periods, showed that we were failing mainly due to the technical lag of our fighter aviation, which had a significant impact on actions in the operations of the ground forces.
In the early days, the Luftwaffe won strategic air supremacy along the entire front and held it until the Battle of Kursk and the battle in the skies over the Kuban.
And now it will be possible to draw a preliminary conclusion.
By the beginning of the war, we had 377 new types of fighters in the five western border districts, which were undergoing revision and testing.
In addition, 3156 fighters of obsolete types: "maneuverable" fighters I-15, I-153 and "high-speed" fighters I-16.
The fact that the main burden fell on them in the first period of the air war is understandable. The fact that even on these aircraft our pilots inflicted damage on the enemy suggests that at least the training of the flight crew of the spacecraft air force was not inferior to the training in the Luftwaffe.
However, the maximum speed of the Bf.109F was higher than the speed of the I-153 fighter with the M-63 engine by 162 km / h, and compared to the speed of the I-16 fighter with the M-63 engine by 123 km / h.
Plus technical innovations, plus the presence of radio communications.
Incidentally, of the 1233 Luftwaffe fighters on the Eastern Front, the newest Bf 109Fs were 593 units. That is, there were initially more of them than our new aircraft. If we add to this 423 pieces of Bf.109E, which was on an equal footing with our new types, then the picture is generally sad. 1016 new "messers" against our 377 new ones.
With all of the above, it's understandable why the Luftwaffe easily and naturally secured air superiority for three years, right?
But there is a third nuance, which we will talk about in the next part, and then we will make a final conclusion.
