Troubles. 1919 year. In the new strategic offensive of the red Southern Front, the main blow from both sides was inflicted on the Volunteer Army, which advanced towards Orel. The strike group of May-Mayevsky moved forward strongly, the flanks were open. The red command planned to crush the strike forces of May-Mayevsky, separate the Volunteer and Don armies, and beat them separately.
General situation at the front
The total number of white troops in the Moscow direction was about 100 thousand bayonets and sabers, about 300 guns, over 800 machine guns, 22 armored trains and 12 tanks. The troops of the Kiev region, under the command of General Dragomirov, were located in front of Kiev and along the Desna near Chernigov. The volunteer army of General May-Mayevsky (over 22 thousand people) occupied positions from Chernigov to Orel and to the Don (near Zadonsk). During the Moscow campaign, the main forces of May-Mayevsky achieved maximum success and reached the line Khutor-Mikhailovsky, Sevsk, Dmitrovsk, st. Eropkino, Livny, Borki, r. Ikorets. From 13 to 20 October 1919, the whites occupied Oryol. General Sidorin's Don army (50,000 men) was located from Zadonsk to the mouth of the Ilovli; General Wrangel's Caucasian army (about 15 thousand people) - in the Tsaritsyn area, with part of the forces against Astrakhan, on both banks of the Volga; A detachment of General Dratsenko from the troops of the North Caucasus - against Astrakhan from the south and south-west.
The armed forces of the South of Russia were drained of blood and weakened by a strategic offensive in the Moscow direction. Unlike the Reds, the White command was unable to provide massive support to the people. The social base was weak and already depleted by previous mobilizations. Many anti-Bolshevik forces and groups of the population, after eliminating the direct threat, were busy with internal squabbles and conflicts, opposed the White movement. The existing reserves, newly formed units and even part of the forces from the main front were diverted to the internal fronts and directions. In particular, to pacify the uprising of Makhno and other chieftains, who set fire to large areas in Novorossiya and Little Russia. Part of the forces of the Kiev region fought against the Petliurists and rebels. The troops of the North Caucasus were busy fighting the highlanders, the forces of the North Caucasian Emirate, etc.
In early October 1919, the Soviet armies of the Southern and Southeastern Fronts were put in order and replenished. The southern front under the command of Yegorov consisted of about 115 thousand bayonets and sabers, 500 guns, over 1, 9 thousand machine guns. On the right flank was the 12th Red Army - on both sides of the Dnieper from Mozyr, skirting Zhitomir, and along the Desna to Chernigov to Sosnitsa. Further, the positions of the 14th Army were located - from Sosnitsa to Krom (in the Orel region). The 13th Army took up defenses from the Krom to the river. Don (near Zadonsk, near Voronezh). The 8th Army was located between Zadonsk and Bobrov. The 1st Cavalry Corps of Budyonny was also located in the Voronezh direction (in November it was deployed into the 1st Cavalry Army). Further from Voronezh to Astrakhan, the troops of the South-Eastern Front were located under the command of Shorin. A total of about 50 thousand people. The 9th Army was stationed from Bobrov to the mouth of the Bear; The 10th operated in the Tsaritsyn direction; The 11th was located in the Astrakhan region, with operational directions up the Volga against Tsaritsyn, to the south and east along the Caspian against the North Caucasus and Guryev (Ural White Cossacks).
Southern Front offensive plan
The forces of the Reds on the Southern and Southeastern Fronts were constantly growing. In connection with the improvement of the situation on other fronts, in October - November 1919, several more divisions were transferred here. The Soviet command formed two strong strike groups in the Oryol and Voronezh directions. Moreover, on the Oryol-Kursk direction, the Reds managed to achieve 2.5-fold superiority in bayonets, and on the Voronezh-Kastornensky direction - 10-fold.
After the failure of the August offensive (), the Soviet command changed the direction of the main attacks. In the Oryol direction, the troops of the 13th and 14th armies were supposed to advance: a total of 10 divisions, 2 separate brigades, 4 cavalry brigades and 2 separate groups (62 thousand bayonets and sabers, over 170 guns and over 1110 machine guns). The main role in the offensive was to be played by the Strike Group under the command of the commander of the Latvian Division A. A. Martusevich, it was first part of the 13th Red Army, then the 14th Army. The group consisted of: the Latvian rifle division (10 regiments and 40 guns), a separate cavalry brigade of the Red Cossacks (soon deployed into a division), a separate rifle brigade. The group consisted of about 20 thousand soldiers, over 50 guns and over 100 machine guns. The plan of the red command was to use the forces of the Martusevich group to strike at the flank and rear of the units of the 1st Army Corps of Kutepov (the main strike force of the Volunteer Army) advancing on Moscow, forcing the whites to stop the offensive, and then surround and destroy the enemy. strike from the Krom area in the direction of the Kursk-Oryol railway. The 55th Infantry Division of the 13th Army was tasked with crushing the enemy advancing on Oryol.
The second strike group was formed by the red command to the east of Voronezh. The shock group consisted of the 42nd Spider Rifle Division, the 13th Army Cavalry Brigade, Budyonny's Corps, the 12th Reva Rifle Division of the 8th Army. The group was supposed to strike on the right flank of the Moscow grouping of Denikin's army, defeat the enemy in the Voronezh direction (the 4th Don and 3rd Kuban corps of Mamontov and Shkuro operated here), liberate Voronezh and strike in the rear of the enemy's Oryol group in the direction of Kastornaya. Also, the defeat of the White Guards near Voronezh created the conditions for the 8th Red Army to enter the Don.
Thus, in the new strategic offensive of the Southern Front, the main blow from both sides was inflicted on the Volunteer Army, which advanced towards Orel. The strike group of May-Mayevsky moved forward strongly, the flanks were open. The white command did not have the strength to simultaneously attack and firmly consolidate the occupied territories. Therefore, the Reds planned to defeat the strike forces of May-Mayevsky, separate the Volunteer and Don armies, and beat them separately.
White command plans
The White command had information about the concentration of enemy troops for the counteroffensive. However, there were no reserves to parry these blows. It was only possible to regroup the available forces. The offensive of the Oryol group from the beginning did not cause fears. Strong Drozdovskaya and Kornilovskaya divisions operated here. Kutepov received an order from General May-Mayevsky to attack Oryol without stopping and not to pay attention to the flanks. As the commander of the 1st Army Corps himself noted: “I will take the Eagle, but my front will advance like a sugar loaf. When the enemy strike group goes on the offensive and attacks my flanks, I will not be able to maneuver. And nevertheless I was ordered to take the Eagle!"
The threat to the left flank of the Don army in the Voronezh direction was considered more serious. Therefore, Denikin, without stopping the offensive on the Bryansk - Oryol - Yelets line, ordered the Don army to confine itself to defense in the center and on the right flank, and focus on its left flank, against Liska and Voronezh. The corps of General Shkuro, located in the Voronezh region, was transferred to the Don army.
Thus, the implementation of the plans of the red and white command led to stubborn oncoming battles, which resulted in a general engagement. The battle began, which decided the outcome of the entire campaign.
In the future, the command of the ARSUR tried to form a strong strike group in the Voronezh direction in order to defeat the shock group of the 8th Red Army and Budenny's corps, which made it possible to again intercept the strategic initiative and resume the offensive. It was possible to collect a strong shock fist only by weakening the Don and Caucasian armies. Here again, a negative role was played by the lack of unity of the white command and anti-Bolshevik forces. Denikin demanded to strengthen the left flank of the Don army by weakening the center and right wing. These demands crashed against the passive resistance of the Don command, which sought to cover the Don region as much as possible. As Denikin recalled, the command of the Don Army "was under strong pressure from the psychology of the Don Cossack masses, who gravitated towards their native huts." As a result, the Don command allocated to the strike group only the 4th corps of General Mamontov, which was dilapidated and weakened after a raid on the red rear, in which 3,500 sabers remained. At the end of November, after the insistent demands of Denikin's Headquarters, the 4th corps received reinforcements, the strike group included a Plastun brigade and a weak cavalry division. The commander of the Don Army, General Sidorin, did not want to weaken the defense of the Don region.
A similar situation was with the command of the Caucasian army. In October 1919, Wrangel inflicted strong blows on the southern and northern enemy groups in the Tsaritsyn area. After that, the commander informed the Headquarters that this success was achieved "at the cost of the complete exsanguination of the army and the last exertion of the moral forces of those commanders who have not yet been out of action." On October 29, Denikin's headquarters proposed to the command of the Caucasian army to allocate forces for a strike group in the center, or to start their own offensive operation in the northern direction in order to divert the forces of the Red Army and reduce the front of the Don army, allowing it to focus on its left wing. General Wrangel replied that the development of the operation of the Caucasian army to the north is impossible "in the absence of railways and lack of water communications." And the transfer of troops to the west will not change the general situation due to the small number of cavalry units and will lead to the loss of Tsaritsyn. Denikin withdrew from the Caucasian army only the 2nd Kuban corps.
Voronezh-Kastorno operation
On October 13, 1919, the offensive of the Voronezh group of the Reds began. The cavalry corps of Budyonny, reinforced by the infantry division of the 8th army, struck at the 4th Don corps of Mamontov in the area of the village of Moskovskoye. Until October 19, stubborn battles went on, settlements changed hands several times. On October 19, the Kuban and Don people of Shkuro and Mamantov struck at the junction of the 4th and 6th cavalry divisions in the direction of the village of Khrenovoe. Part of the Budenny's corps went over to the defensive and at the same time inflicted strong counterattacks on the enemy from the north and south. The White Cossacks were driven back to the south and east, towards Voronezh.
On October 23, the Budenovites, with the support of the rifle divisions of the 8th Army, began an assault on Voronezh. On October 24, the Reds liberated the city from Shkuro's troops, who withdrew to the right bank of the Don. Having crossed the Don, Budyonny fought to Nizhnedevitsk, threatening Kastornaya and the rear of the 1st Army Corps of the Volunteer Army. At the same time, units of the 8th Army developed an offensive to the south, occupied the Liski station, and threw back the 3rd Don Corps beyond the Don.
On October 31, Budyonny's corps was reinforced by the reserve 11th Cavalry Division. On November 2, the Donets of Mamontov launched a counterattack in the Klevna-Shumeyka area, but after suffering heavy losses they retreated. On November 3, the 42nd Infantry Division of the 13th Army occupied Livny and began to advance towards Kastorny. On November 5, Budyonny's corps, troops of the 8th and 13th armies reached the Kastornaya station. Here the Reds met strong resistance from the cavalry of Shkuro and the Markov regiment. From 5 to 15 November, the battles for Kastornaya were fought. The 42nd Infantry and 11th Cavalry Divisions advanced from the north, the 12th Infantry and 6th Cavalry Divisions from the south, and the 4th Cavalry Division from the east. As a result, the Reds took Kastornaya. By the end of November 16, White was defeated. On November 19, Budyonny's corps was deployed to the 1st Cavalry Army.
At the same time, there were stubborn oncoming battles with varying success on the front of the Don Army. The Cossacks defeated the left flank of the 8th Red Army at Bobrov and Talovaya and units of the 9th Soviet Army on the banks of the Khopra. Donets again occupied Liski, Talovaya, Novokhopyorsk and Bobrov. There was a threat that White would again occupy Voronezh. However, in the end, the Don army withdrew its right flank beyond the Don and the center beyond the Khoper, keeping behind these rivers and on the Liski-Uryupino line.
Thus, the Voronezh group advanced 250 km, liberated Voronezh, inflicted a heavy defeat on the main forces of the white cavalry, the left flank of the Don army and created a threat to the flank and rear of the Volunteer Army, contributing to the victory of the Red Army in the Orel-Kromskoye battle.
