Recently, several articles at once have attracted our attention and made us comment on the matter. Terminology is a very accurate thing, it is worth observing it, otherwise we will really go far.
Spetsnaz … "Oh, how much is in this word …" Indeed, there are many deserved and deeds that you can really be proud of. And, apparently, envy is also present. Nothing else can explain some of the attempts to call everything that comes to hand "special forces".
It is clear that for a real special forces soldier, it is a shame to pull an owl onto the globe. And some readers were right when they said that if things continue like this, then "special forces" will appear in the hands of cooks, combatants, financiers and other workers of the front line. Although the cooks may have gone too far. They also have a hard time sometimes. But nonetheless.
In general, we will leave on the conscience of those who composed a fairy tale about the appearance of "special forces" in the EW troops in the form of a unit to combat UAVs. There is absolutely nothing that is specialized, everything is the same as that of colleagues, but with the use of drones.
These, of course, are specialists of a special profile, but they have nothing to do with special forces. But no less deserved fighters of the invisible (in the literal sense of the word) front.
But there are nuances here.
Modern electronic warfare troops are the successors of the work begun in the 30s of the last century. Then the radio intelligence units were withdrawn from the communications units and transferred to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Headquarters. A radio intelligence department was organized there. The department commanded separate special purpose divisions (ORD OSNAZ), which became the main organizational unit during the Great Patriotic War.
Today, the functions of OSNAZ units are quite capable of performing ordinary military electronic warfare systems. Radio interception, analysis of the source of radio emission, binding to the map, suppression, or, as an option, precise guidance of artillery or aircraft.
The highlight is that not all complexes are capable of such a range of work, as, for example, "Murmansk". Some need to get close to the enemy at a much shorter distance.
The strategy and tactics of modern warfare unambiguously implies counteraction to the enemy's communications and electronic warfare systems. And, if everything with communication can be solved in a rather prosaic way, with the help of the good old direction finding and artillery attack, then in order to "knock out" the electronic warfare systems, the work is more difficult.
It is problematic to detect the complex when it works "on reception". Like any receiver. When the transmitter starts to work it is easier, but problems of a completely different nature arise. For example, with the transmission of information in conditions of suppression of the frequency range of army communications. And if the stations that are part of the "Malachite" or "Diabazol" systems operate in a complex manner, then the aviation range is also covered.
And here well-trained groups can be very useful, capable of moving as quickly as possible to the approximate area of operation of electronic warfare systems in order to neutralize them.
Both in our army and in the armies of potential there are groups capable of bearing in the area and working on stations covering any serious object or terrorizing the front edge of the troops. This is the order of the day.
And in this aspect, electronic warfare systems become one of the primary targets for the enemy's DRG. I think many will agree with me that not every object today can be disabled with the help of explosives brought by saboteurs.
Here, of course, there are a lot of nuances, but I'm talking about the fact that, based on all of the above, the question arises, which is better: to properly guard electronic warfare systems or pay more attention to calculation skills in terms of repelling all kinds of threats?
The answer was partially received last year, when we talked about the development of related specialties by rocket scientists. Moreover, rather uncharacteristic, such as laying mines and firing a grenade launcher.
In a similar way (which greatly pleased us), they operate in the electronic warfare brigade of the Western Military District, where from time to time we get access to equipment and talk about it.
Last year, they started additional training of fighters there. Counteracting enemy terrorist groups and DRGs.
In general, one should not think that the Rebites are entirely people of intellectual labor, bespectacled at computers. Yes, the computerization of modern technology commands respect, but we also did not observe weaklings in the calculations.
So that there is meat - muscles will grow.
The situation in which the muscles began to grow was the most trivial. The manufacturer has delayed the shipment of new machines. And so that the personnel do not get tired of waiting, the deputy brigade commander for work with personnel, in the past - a colonel of the Airborne Forces, showed personal initiative and decided to share his very extensive experience in the fight against various "non-people".
And he shared. So much so that this company is no longer called "counter-terrorists".
They told a case, once the press service of the Western Military District mistakenly sent a telegram to the wrong brigade. The bottom line was that film crews would come and film how the soldiers were repelling the "enemy" attack on the march, eliminating groups of "terrorists", looking for ambushes and stuff like that. What was the specifics of the correct brigade.
In the electronic warfare brigade, such a program caused an unhealthy discussion. When the colonel got acquainted with its contents, he noticed that everything would be fine, there is still a whole week, we will show everything. Then, of course, everything was sorted out.
But the actions at the exercises and maneuvers in 2016-17 caused an extremely high assessment from the inspectors. And the idea not only caught on, but was further developed. Now everyone is being taught.
We watched the process go on. Of course, educational. Of course, the fighters are far from the hardened wolves of real special forces, but who knows how everything can turn out in real actions?
Of course, in real combat conditions, electronic warfare systems should be guarded and covered. But everyone understands that real databases are often a mess at times. And anything can happen.
The almost private initiative of Colonel Gudymenko makes one seriously think about the role of the deputy commander for work with personnel. Many of us, probably, can "kindly" remember the political leaders of the Soviet army, who, at best, simply did not interfere.
Today, the deputy for the radar station really has a new hypostasis. Learn. Not only patriotism, the ability to love the Motherland and everything else, but also those skills that may be useful to a fighter in the future.
Army intelligence, airborne forces, and special forces of the GRU are few in number compared to the rest. Nevertheless, officers ending their service could do a lot of useful things by analogy with the aforementioned electronic warfare brigade in "non-combat" units. Electronic warfare, communications, railroad workers and so on. And passing on their experience, bring the personnel of the units to a new level. Contractors, of course.
Overall, the initiative is useful. Of course, "special forces" in electronic warfare will not work, but appropriate training can give not only confidence in their own capabilities, but also increase the chances of survival of the crew from any emergency situation.
