Submarines of the "Pike" type. It is unlikely that there is at least one person interested in the domestic navy who would not have heard of these ships. "Pike" were the most numerous type of submarines of the pre-war Soviet Navy, and a total of 86 units were built. Since a significant number of them were in the Pacific Ocean at the beginning of the war, and a number of submarines entered service after the war, only 44 boats of this type could take part in the battles of the Great Patriotic War. According to the latest data, in the period 1941-1945. submariners who fought on "Pike" chalked up 27 transports and tankers with a total displacement of 79 855 gross register tons (this does not include the steamers "Vilpas" and "Reinbek" destroyed by boats of the "Sh" type during the Soviet-Finnish war), as well as 20 transports and schooners of neutral states, with a total displacement of about 6500 brt.
But of 44 submarines of the "Sh" type that entered the battle with the enemy, we lost 31.
It is sad to state this, but in recent years, among many fans of the history of the navy, a certain "look down" on the actions of Soviet submariners during the Second World War has taken root. They say that the tonnage was sent to the bottom of nothing, which is especially noticeable against the background of the dizzying successes of the German "U-bots" in the battle for the Atlantic, and the losses were monstrous. Let's try to figure out why this happened, using the example of the Baltic "pikes".
The history of the creation of boats of this type dates back to 1928, when, under the leadership of B. M. Malinin, the specialists of NK and the Baltic Shipyard began the preliminary design of a submarine "for carrying out positional service in closed theaters." In those years, the once mighty Russian fleet was reduced to almost nominal values, even our ability to defend Sevastopol or the Gulf of Finland in the Baltic was in big question. The country needed new ships, but there were practically no funds, which is why priority was forced to be given to the light forces.
During the First World War, submarines demonstrated their combat power. No squadron, no matter how powerful, could feel safe in the area where submarines operated, and at the same time, the latter remained a relatively inexpensive means of naval warfare. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Red Army Navy paid close attention to the submarine fleet. And you need to understand that the Pike, in general, were not created by fighting ships on enemy lines of communication, but by means of defending their own shores - it was assumed that boats of this type would be able to prove themselves as an underwater component of mine and artillery positions. And this entailed, for example, the fact that the long cruising range for ships of this type was not considered a key characteristic.
A peculiar concept of application was complemented by the desire to create the simplest and cheapest submarine. This was understandable - the capabilities of Soviet industry and the financing of the USSR naval forces in the late 1920s left much to be desired. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Russian school of submarine shipbuilding of the tsarist times, alas, turned out to be very far from the world level. The most numerous submarines of the Bars type (single-hull, cut-off) turned out to be very unsuccessful ships. Against the background of the achievements of the British E-class submarines that fought in the Baltic, the successes of Russian submariners during the First World War looked extremely modest. This is largely the fault of the low combat and operational qualities of domestic boats.
However, during the Civil War, the Royal Navy lost one of its newest submarines, the L-55, in our waters. Boats of this type were built as a development of the previous, extremely successful type E (which proved itself so well in the fight against the Kaiserlichmarine), and a significant part of them entered service after the First World War. Subsequently, the L-55 was raised and even introduced into the Red Army Navy - of course, it would be foolish not to take advantage of the opportunity to implement advanced foreign experience on the latest boat of the USSR.
As a result, the "Pike", like the L-55, became a one-and-a-half-hull boat with boolean ballast tanks, but, of course, the domestic boats were not "tracing copies" from an English submarine. However, a long break in the design and creation of warships (and submarines in particular), together with the desire to reduce the cost of the ship as much as possible, could not have a positive effect on the combat qualities of the first Soviet medium submarines.
The first four Pikes (Series III) turned out to be overloaded, their speed was lower than the design speed due to incorrectly selected propellers and an unsuccessful hull shape, at a depth of 40-50 m, the horizontal rudders jammed, the time for draining the tanks was completely unacceptable 20 minutes. It took 10 minutes to switch from economic to full underwater course. Submarines of this type were distinguished by the tightness of the internal location (even by the standards of a submarine), the mechanisms turned out to be excessively noisy. Maintenance of the mechanisms was extremely difficult - so, in order to inspect some of them, it was necessary to spend several hours disassembling other mechanisms that impeded inspection. The diesels turned out to be capricious and did not give out full power. But even if they were issued, it was still impossible to develop full speed due to the fact that at power close to maximum, dangerous vibrations of the shafts arose - this drawback, alas, could not be eradicated on the later series of "Pike". The discrepancy between the power of the electric motors and the storage battery led to the fact that at full speed the latter heated up to 50 degrees. The lack of fresh water for refilling the batteries limited the autonomy of the "Shchuk" to 8 days against the 20 set according to the project, and there were no desalination plants.
The V and V-bis series (12 and 13 submarines built, respectively) were "correcting mistakes", but it was clear that the fleet needed a different, more advanced type of medium submarine. It must be said that back in 1932 (and it is possible that even before the tests of the head Pike of the III series), the development of the Pike B project was started, which was supposed to have significantly higher performance characteristics than was assumed in the design of the type " SCH".
So, the full speed of the "Pike B" was supposed to be 17 or even 18 knots (surface) and 10-11 knots (underwater) against 14 and 8.5 knots of the "Pike", respectively. Instead of two 45-mm semiautomatic 21-K "Pike B" was to receive two 76, 2-mm guns (later stopped at 100-mm and 45-mm), while the number of spare torpedoes increased from 4 to 6, and also increased range. Autonomy should have been increased to 30 days. At the same time, a great continuity was maintained between the Pike B and the old Pike, since the new boat was to receive the main mechanisms and part of the Pike systems unchanged. So, for example, the engines remained the same, but to achieve more power, the new boat was made three-shaft.
The operational-tactical assignment for the new boat was approved by the Chief of Naval Forces on January 6, 1932, and a little more than a year later (January 25, 1933), her project, which reached the stage of working drawings, was approved by the Revolutionary Military Council. But nevertheless, in the end, it was decided to go the other way - to continue to improve the industrialized "Pike" and at the same time to get a project for a new medium boat abroad (in the end, this is how the submarine of the "C" type appeared)
Many shortcomings of the "Shch" type boats were eliminated in the V-bis-2 series (14 boats), which can be considered the first full-fledged combat ships of the series. At the same time, the identified problems (where possible) were eliminated on boats of the early series, which improved their combat qualities. Following the V-bis-2, 32 submarines of the X-series and 11 - the X-bis-series were built, but they did not have any fundamental differences from the ships of the V-bis-2 project. Unless the boats of the X series were distinguished by a special, easily recognizable and, as it was then called, "limousine" form of superstructure - it was assumed that it would reduce the resistance of the ship when moving under water.
But these calculations did not come true, and the superstructure was not very easy to use, so in the X-bis series, the shipbuilders returned to more traditional forms.
On the whole, we can state the following: submarines of the "Sh" type can in no way be called a great success of domestic shipbuilding. They did not fully correspond to the design performance characteristics, and even “paper” characteristics were not considered sufficient already in 1932. By the beginning of World War II, boats of the "Sh" type were obviously outdated. But at the same time, in no case should one underestimate the role that submarines of this type played in the formation of the domestic submarine fleet. On the day of laying the first three "Pike" series III, who was present at this event, R. A. Muklevich said:
“We have the opportunity with this submarine to start a new era in our shipbuilding. This will provide an opportunity to acquire the necessary skills and prepare the necessary personnel for the deployment of production."
And this, without a doubt, was absolutely true, and besides, a large series of the first domestic medium-sized submarines became a real "forge of personnel" - a school for many, many submariners.
Thus, for the Great Patriotic War, we had, albeit far from the best in the world and already outdated, but still combat-ready and quite formidable ships, which, in theory, could bleed the enemy a lot. Nevertheless, this did not happen - the tonnage of enemy ships sunk by "pikes" is relatively small, and the ratio of successes and losses drives me into depression - in fact, we paid for one enemy ship destroyed by "pikes" with one submarine of this type. Why did it happen?
Since today we are writing specifically about the Baltic submariners, we will consider the reasons for the relative failure of the "pikes" in relation to this theater, although some of the reasons below, of course, also apply to the submarine forces of our other fleets. So, the first of them is the explosive growth of the Red Army Navy in the mid-late 30s, when a stream of dozens of warships literally fell on the previously small naval forces, in many ways fundamentally different from the technology of the First World War, which, for the most part, our fleet was armed. There was no stock of highly qualified naval officers in the country, of course, it was impossible to quickly train them, so it was necessary to raise those who had not yet had time to get used to their previous position. In other words, the Red Army Navy experienced the same growing pains as the Red Army itself, only the fleet suffered from it even more, because a warship is not even a tank, but a much more complex and specific technique, the effective operation of which requires the coordinated efforts of many highly qualified officers and sailors.
The second reason is that the Baltic Fleet found itself in a situation that could not be predicted and that no one had counted on before the war. Its main task was considered to be the defense of the Gulf of Finland, following the model and likeness of how the Russian Imperial Navy did it in the First World War. But who could have guessed that already at the very beginning of the war, both banks of the Finnish coast would be captured by enemy troops? Of course, the Germans and Finns immediately blocked the exit from the Gulf of Finland with mines, aircraft and light forces. According to some reports, enemy minefields already in 1942 numbered over 20 thousand mines and mine defenders, this is a colossal amount. As a result, instead of defending the strongest mine and artillery position in accordance with pre-war plans and exercises (and even the Hochseeflotte, which at that time was the second fleet of the world, did not dare to enter the Gulf of Finland throughout the First World War), the Baltic Fleet had to break through it to enter the operational space.
The third reason is, alas, the reduction in intensive combat training shortly after the start of the Great Patriotic War. But if in the same Port Arthur we can "thank" the governor Alekseev and Rear Admiral Vitgeft for the lack of regular exercises at sea, then it would be inappropriate to blame the Baltic Fleet command for the lack of proper training during the Great Patriotic War - I wonder where it was to take the necessary resources for it in besieged Leningrad? But, for example, the first Baltic "Pikes" of the last and most perfect series X-bis entered service starting from June 7, 1941 ….
And, finally, the fourth reason: in the current situation, neither the Navy, nor the Army, nor the Air Force had the means sufficient to support the operation of submarines. The Germans and Finns built an echeloned anti-submarine defense of the Baltic, and the fleet locked in Kronstadt with a minimum of resources had no way of breaking it.
When evaluating the actions of this or that kind or type of troops, we, alas, often forget that no tanks, artillery, aircraft or warships operate in a vacuum. War is always a complex interaction of dissimilar forces, and therefore, for example, it makes no sense to compare the successes of Soviet and German submariners "head-on". Without a doubt, the German sailors received better training than the Soviet ones, and the submarines with which Germany fought had much better performance characteristics than the Pike (in fact, they were designed much later). But you need to understand that if the brave guys from the Kriegsmarines found themselves in the conditions in which the Soviet Baltic submariners had to fight, they would only dream of enchanting millions of tons of tonnage sunk in the Atlantic, and not for long. Because the conditions of submarine warfare in the Baltic did not have any kind of long life.
The first, and perhaps the most important thing, which, alas, the Baltic Fleet did not have was aviation of sufficient strength, capable of establishing at least temporary air supremacy in water areas. This, of course, is not about aircraft carriers, but without a sufficient number of aircraft capable of "working" over the waters of the Gulf of Finland, the withdrawal of minesweepers and ships of cover for breaking through minefields became excessively risky. The aviation we had could not crush the light forces of the Finns and Germans, which operated freely in Finnish. At the same time, the fleet did not have the opportunity to conduct regular aerial reconnaissance of the Baltic Sea, and, accordingly, had the most vague idea of both the German transport routes and the minefields covering them. In essence, our submariners were forced to go blindly at the full power of the German anti-submarine defense. And what did it lead to?
The boat Shch-304 was ordered to patrol the throat of the Gulf of Finland, and then to move to a position in the Memel-Vindava area. On the night of November 5, 1941, the commander of Shch-304 reported that it had arrived at the position, and the boat did not get in touch anymore. Much later it became clear that the position of Shch-304 was assigned to the northern sector of the German Apolda minefield. And this, alas, is not an isolated case.
In general, it was the mines that became the most terrible enemy of our Baltic submariners. Both the Germans and the Finns mined everything they could and didn’t - in two layers. The Gulf of Finland and exits from it, possible routes of our submarines along the island of Gotland, but not only there - the approaches to our transport routes were also covered by minefields. And here is the result - out of 22 submarines of the "Sh" type, which the Baltic Fleet possessed (including those that entered service after the start of the war), 16 were killed during the hostilities, of which 13 or even 14 "took" mines. The four victims of the Pike mines simply did not have time to reach combat positions, that is, they never attacked the enemy.
German submariners, raiding in the ocean, had a good idea of the routes of transatlantic convoys. They were almost not threatened by mines (except, perhaps, some sections of the route, if any, passed near the British coast), and the former airliners, which became the Focke-Wulf 200 long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft, discovered convoys and directed "wolf packs" at them.
German boats pursued the convoys on the surface, taking advantage of the fact that the speed of the transports was relatively low, and when it got dark, they approached and attacked. All this was risky, and, of course, the German submariners suffered losses, but at the same time inflicted terrible blows on the enemy's shipping. Then radars and escort aircraft carriers put an end to surface attacks (now the "wolf pack" moving behind the caravan could be detected long before it could approach the convoy), and the combined efforts of base and carrier aircraft put an end to the raids of German heavy aircraft in the Atlantic. Then the Germans were forced to switch to "blind" operations - using submarines alone against the entire ASW system of transatlantic convoys. Effects? Enchanting successes are a thing of the past, and the Germans began to pay with one submarine for each sunk transport. Of course, we can say that the protection of the Allied convoys has become many times more powerful than the protection of the Baltic shipping, which was deployed by the Germans and Finns in the Baltic, but it should be borne in mind that German submariners fought not on the Pike, but on much more perfect ships. In addition, the Atlantic Ocean lacked many shallows, shallow waters, and mines.
Yes, the Pike were not the best submarines in the world, and their crews lacked training. But with all this, boats of this type entered service since 1933, so the fleet has accumulated considerable experience in their operation. It is difficult to say for sure, but it is possible that with all the above problems and shortcomings of all our submarines at the beginning of the war, it was the Pike that were the most combat-ready. And the people who served on them were ready to fight the enemy to the end.
Usually, on the eve of May 9, we remember the heroes whose actions inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, thwarted his plans in one way or another, or ensured the successful actions of our troops, or saved someone. But in this article, we will venture to deviate from the template. We will recall the first combat campaign of the Sh-408 submarine. Which, alas, was the last for our "pike".
At one o'clock in the morning on May 19, 1943, Shch-408, accompanied by five patrol boats and seven boat minesweepers, entered the immersion area (Vostochny Goglandsky reach, 180 km west of Leningrad). Further, the boat had to act independently - it had to force the enemy areas of the PLO and go to a position in Norrkoping Bay - this is an area of the Swedish coast, south of Stockholm.
What happened next? Alas, we can only guess with varying degrees of certainty. Usually in publications it is indicated that the boat was attacked by an aircraft that damaged it, and then light forces of the Germans "aimed" along the oil trail on the Sch-408. But most likely (and taking into account the German and Finnish data) the events developed as follows: two days later, on May 21, at 13:24, Shch-408 was attacked by a German seaplane, which found it on an oil trail and dropped two depth charges on Shch-408. Where did the Sch-408 get the oil trail? It is possible that the boat received some kind of malfunction, or some kind of breakdown occurred, although it cannot be ruled out that a German plane attacked something that had absolutely nothing to do with the Sch-408. On the other hand, after 2 hours and a quarter (15:35), our boat was attacked by a Finnish aircraft, which also dropped depth charges on it, and the oil trail is again indicated as a unmasking sign. This suggests the presence of some kind of breakdown on the Sch-408.
Perhaps this was the case. Shch-408 was fatally unlucky from the very beginning of combat service. Four days after the end of the tests, on September 26, 1941, the submarine collided with the network minelayer "Onega", while receiving damage that required factory repair. The ship was repaired, but on June 22, 1942, when Shch-408 was in the ladle of the Admiralty plant, two German shells hit it, again causing heavy damage to the ship. One compartment was flooded, and the Sch-408 rested against the ground astern, having a roll of 21 degrees. It was repaired again, and by October 1943 the ship was ready to go to sea, but then again a heavy shell exploded next to the Shch-408 and fragments pierced the solid hull … The boat again got up for repair.
What was the quality of this renovation? Let us recall that this took place in besieged Leningrad. Of course, the worst thing in 1943 was the blockade winter of 1941-1942. was already behind. Mortality declined sharply: if in March 1942 100,000 people died in the city, then in May - already 50,000 people, and in July, when Shch-408 was repaired again - “only” 25,000 people.
Just for a second, imagine what is behind these "optimistic" numbers …
But back to Sch-408. Exhausted, exhausted, dying of hunger workers could well make some mistake, and the post-repair tests, if any, were clearly carried out in haste and hardly in full. So it is likely that during a long underwater passage something went out of order and an oil leak appeared, which became the reason for the discovery of Shch-408.
However, these are only guesses. Be that as it may, but less than an hour after the attack of the Finnish aircraft, at 4:20 pm, three German high-speed German barges - BDB-188; 189 and 191. They dropped another 16 depth charges onto Shch-408. Our "Pike" was not damaged, but … The fact is that after a two-day trip the batteries were discharged, they had to be recharged. Naturally, it was not possible to do this in the presence of enemy ships and aircraft, but with empty batteries, the boat could not break away from the forces pursuing her.
Thus, the ship's crew found itself in a stalemate. Sch-408 tried to escape from pursuit, but - unsuccessfully, the Germans continued to search for the boat and at 21.30 dropped 5 more depth charges on it. It became clear that the Germans would not leave the area where the Shch-408 was located.
Then the commander of Shch-408, Pavel Semenovich Kuzmin, decided to surface and give an artillery battle. It was bold, but at the same time reasonable - being on the surface, the boat was able to use the radio station and call for help. At the same time, at night there was a greater chance of breaking away from the forces pursuing the boat. Therefore, at about two o'clock in the morning, approximately (possibly later, but no later than 02.40-02.50) Shch-408 surfaced and entered into battle with the German BDB, as well as, most likely, the Swedish patrol boat VMV-17.
The forces were far from equal. Each BDB was armed with a very powerful 75-mm gun, as well as one or three 20-mm Oerlikon submachine guns, the Swedish patrol boat - one Oerlikon. At the same time, the Shch-408 had only two 45 mm 21-K semi-automatic machines. However, the word "semiautomatic device" should not be misleading, the whole semiautomatic device of the 21-K was that the bolt opened automatically after the shot.
Further descriptions of the battle vary greatly. According to the generally accepted version, "Pike" in an artillery battle destroyed two enemy patrol boats and died with the entire crew, without lowering the flag. However, after the war, the Finnish and German documents did not find confirmation of the death of at least one ship, and, frankly, it is doubtful that the Sch-408 was able to achieve such a success. Unfortunately, the combat qualities of the 45-mm shells of the 21-K semi-automatic rifles were frankly low. Thus, the high-explosive OF-85 contained only 74 grams of explosive. Accordingly, in order to destroy even a small ship, it was required to provide a huge number of hits. For example, during the Soviet-Finnish war, 152 shells had to be used up for the sinking of the Estonian ship "Kassari" (379 brt) Shch-323 - the exact number of hits is unknown, but, probably, the overwhelming majority was hit, since the ship was shot almost in range conditions … By the way, the high-explosive shell of the German 7, 5 cm Pak. 40, which was armed with the BDB, contained 680 grams of explosive.
According to other sources, the Shch-408 gunners did not sink, but damaged 2 enemy ships, but there may have been confusion here. The fact is that after the battle, the German BDB, without understanding, fired on the Finnish patrol boat VMV-6, which was going to support them, and the boat was damaged by a fragment of one shell. 408.
Most likely, this was the case - Shch-408 surfaced and entered into battle with enemy ships. It is known that at 02.55 and 02.58 radiograms were received at the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet:
"Attacked by ASW forces, I have damage. The enemy does not allow charging. Please send aviation. My place is Vaindlo."
Vayndlo is a very small island, barely visible on the map, located about 26 miles from Gogland, and the distance from Leningrad (in a straight line) is about 215 kilometers.
In the ensuing artillery battle, the Germans (in their opinion) achieved four hits of 75-mm shells and a large number of 20-mm shells. The boat responded with several hits on the BDB-188, one of which hit the German ship in the wheelhouse. In any case, it is reliably known that the battle of the German ships with the Sch-408 was not a one-sided game - the submariners still managed to inflict damage on the enemy.
And then …
Fortunately, there are caring people among us who are ready to spend time and effort solving the riddles of the not so distant past. There is a project "Bow to the Ships of the Great Victory", in which a group of divers searches for dead ships and dives to them. And so, on April 22, 2016, an underwater search expedition, in which, in addition to our compatriots, a group of Finnish divers SubZone took part, discovered the remains of a submarine Sch-408, and then made descents to it. This expedition made it possible to shed light on the circumstances of the last battle and the death of our "Pike". One of the project participants, Ivan Borovikov, told about what the divers saw:
“When inspecting the Shch-408, numerous traces of shell hits were found, which suggests that the submarine was indeed conducting an intense artillery battle. There are still boxes of shells near the guns, and it is clear that they are clearly not the first, the battle was fierce and a lot of shots were fired. A PPSh submachine gun was also found, which, most likely, was the personal weapon of the submarine commander Pavel Kuzmin. According to the charter, during a surface battle, he was supposed to go to the bridge with his personal weapon. Judging by the fact that the machine gun remained outside the "Shch-408", the commander of the "pike" most likely died during shelling.
The Finns who participated in the battle said that they saw artillery hits on the boat, saw how the Shch-408 artillery crews died and were replaced by other people. The picture that we saw at the bottom corresponds to the description of the battle given by the Finnish side.
At the same time, we did not see any serious damage to the hull of the boat. Apparently, the strikes on the "Shch-408" with the help of depth charges did not cause serious damage to it. All hatches were closed, and the crew, apparently, fought to the last for the survivability of the boat."
When asked whether the boat sank as a result of enemy artillery fire, or the survivors dived, Ivan Borovikov replied:
“Most likely," Shch-408 "went for a dive. Apparently, due to the damage, the Pike lost its buoyancy and could not surface. The crew remained on board and died a few days after the artillery battle."
We will never know what actually happened on May 23, 1943. But most likely, this is what happened: after a fierce battle, the crew of Sch-408 suffered severe losses. Most likely, the commander of the boat, Pavel Semyonovich Kuzmin, died in battle - the PPSh, which he was obliged to take with him, going to the bridge, and today lies on it, and next to the place where the commander should be there is a hole from a 75-mm projectile. Alas, it was impossible to break away from the enemy, and there was still no help.
Those who survived faced a difficult choice. It was possible to fight to the last, as long as the ship is still buoyant. Yes, in this case, many would have died, but death from an enemy shell or shrapnel in battle is a quick death, and besides, part of the crew would probably have survived. In this case, Sch-408 was guaranteed to die, those who escaped from it were captured, but at the same time those who survived the battle would have survived. They would have absolutely nothing to reproach themselves with, because they fought to the last extreme. Their heroic deed would have been admired by descendants.
But there was also a second option - to dive. In this case, there was a certain chance that the command of the Baltic Fleet, having received a radiogram-appeal for help, would take appropriate measures and drive away the enemy ships. And if we can wait for help, if the boat turns out to be (despite numerous hits) capable of surfacing, then Shch-408 can be saved. At the same time, during the battle, it was in no way possible to assess the damage to the Sch-408, it was impossible to understand whether the submarine would be able to surface after submersion or not. Only one thing was clear - if help did not come, or even came, but it was not possible to surface, then each of those who survived the artillery battle would face a nightmarish, painful death from suffocation.
The third option - to lower the flag and surrender to the enemy, for these people simply did not exist.
We will never know which of the submarine officers was in command at the moment when a terrible decision had to be made, but it was made. Shch-408 went under water. Forever and ever.
The Germans and Finns were afraid of missing out on their spoils. BDB, patrol boats, an approaching Finnish minelayer continued to patrol the Shchuka dive area, periodically dropping depth charges. Meanwhile, her crew strained their last strength in attempts to repair the damaged boat. Already in the late afternoon of May 23, enemy hydroacoustics recorded sounds, which they regarded as an attempt to purge the tanks, and, probably, it was in fact. It is known that the boat sank with a trim to the stern, but at the same time the participants of the 2016 expedition found that the stern of the Pike (sunk into the ground along the waterline) was raised. This indicates an attempt to blow through the aft ballast tanks - alas, the damage to the Shch-408 was too great for the boat to surface.
From about 17.00 on May 24, noises from Shch-408 were no longer heard. It was all over. "Pike" eternal rest at a depth of 72 meters, becoming a mass grave for the 41st member of its crew. But the Finnish and German ships remained in place and even dropped several more depth charges. Only the next day, May 25, having finally made sure that the Soviet submarine would not surface, they left the area of its death.
And what about the command of the Baltic Fleet? Upon receipt of the Shch-408 radiogram, eight I-16 and I-153 aircraft flew to Vayndlo from Lavensari, but they were intercepted by the enemy and, having lost two aircraft, returned back without completing the combat mission. The next attempt was made only 8 hours later - this time La-5 took off to the aid of the dying Pike, but they, having lost two cars, failed to break through to the site of the tragedy.
Shch-408 died in the very first military campaign. The boat never launched a torpedo attack, was unable to destroy a single enemy ship. But does this mean that we, admiring the achievements of the German submariners, should bashfully forget about how her crew fought and died? How did the crews of our other submarines die?
P. S. From the conclusions of the expedition "Bow 2016":
"The fact that all three hatches through which it was possible to leave the sunken submarine have no visible damage, but are closed, suggests that the submariners made a conscious decision not to surrender to the enemy."
